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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  	  
	  
In	   2001	   the	   South	   African	   clothing	   sector	   was	   reintegrated	   into	   the	   global	   economy	   and	  
became	   exposed	   to	   the	   icy	   winds	   of	   globalisation.	   The	   fundamental	   changes	   from	  
developments	   that	   had	   been	   playing	   out	   in	   global	   clothing	   markets	   and	   from	   which,	   as	   an	  
import-­‐substitution	   economy	  with	   high	   levels	   of	   protection,	   it	   had	   previously	   been	   shielded,	  
were	  brought	  heavily	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  industry.	  	  By	  all	  accounts,	  it	  did	  not	  
adjust	  well	  to	  the	  new	  globalised	  environment.	  The	  once	  thriving	  industry	  withered	  under	  the	  
combined	   impact	   of	   domestic	   and	   international	   factors.	   The	   negative	   impact	   of	   this	  
transformation	  was	  manifest	  in	  a	  declining	  relative	  contribution	  to	  total	  manufacturing	  output,	  
falling	  productivity	  levels,	  lack	  of	  capital	  investment,	  a	  large	  and	  significant	  contraction	  in	  sector	  
employment	  and	  stagnant	  export	  performance,	  all	  of	  which	  occurred	  in	  the	  context	  of	  rapidly	  
expanding	  domestic	  demand	  for	  clothing,	  which	  was	  increasingly	  fed	  by	  imports	  (Kaplan	  2003;	  
Barnes	  2004).	  	  
	  
The	  import	  surge	  into	  South	  Africa	  in	  2003	  was	  driven	  by	  completely	  different	  dynamics	  to	  the	  
rest	   of	   the	   world	   where	   this	   was	   generally	   a	   consequence	   of	   trade	   liberalisation	   (Edwards,	  
Kantor	  and	  Ross	  2006).	   In	  South	  Africa,	   the	  switch	  was	  tied	  to	  a	  brief,	  calamitous	  drop	   in	  the	  
Rand	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	  millennium,	   which	   lowered	   the	   international	   price	   of	   South	   African	  
clothing.	   AGOA	   buyers	   from	   the	   US	   flocked	   to	   South	   Africa	   to	   buy	   clothing	   and	   signed	   up	  
numerous	   export	   orders	   with	   local	   manufacturers.	   However,	   faced	   with	   supply	   capacity	  
constraints,	   local	   firms	   could	   not	   simultaneously	   supply	   both	   markets	   and	   chose	   to	   pursue	  
exports,	   which	   at	   the	   prevailing	   exchange	   rate	   offered	   greater	   profits.	   Left	   stranded,	   South	  
African	  retailers	  went	  offshore	  in	  search	  of	  stock;	  and	  this	  at	  a	  very	  unpropitious	  time	  for	  them	  
when	   the	   Rand	   was	   very	   strong.	   This	   period	   coincided	   with	   China’s	   rise	   in	   global	   clothing	  
markets	   following	   WTO	   accession	   in	   2001	   and	   MFA	   quota	   dissolution	   in	   2005.	   What	   local	  
retailers	  discovered	  abroad	  was	  a	  global	  market	  awash	  with	  Chinese	  clothing,	  which	  had	  driven	  
clothing	   prices	   down	  worldwide.	   The	   subsequent	   strengthening	   of	   the	   Rand,	   coupled	  with	   a	  
radical	  drop	  in	  import	  tariffs	   in	  2002	  created	  both	  easy	  access	  to	  domestic	  markets	  and	  more	  













had	  principally	  been	  driven	  by	  AGOA	  exports	  to	  the	  US,	  collapsed	  as	  the	  price	  of	  South	  African	  
products	  increased	  in	  international	  markets.	  	  
Section	  1:	  Introducing	  the	  problem	  
	  
Table	   1	   and	   Table	   2	   clearly	   demonstrate	   the	   two	   dimensions	   to	   the	   problem;	   first	   China’s	  
overwhelming	   dominance	   in	   South	   Africa’s	   clothing	   imports,	   which	   ballooned	   from	   a	   mere	  
R663	   million	   (m)	   to	   R5	   billion	   (bn)	   by	   value	   and	   from	   65	   million	   to	   485	   million	   by	   volume	  
(growth	   of	   over	   600%)	   between	   2000	   and	   2006.	   As	   a	   result,	   China’s	   share	   of	   South	   African	  
clothing	  imports	  moved	  from	  50.42%	  to	  77.13%	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Sources	  of	  South	  African	  imports	  of	  HS61	  and	  HS62	  as	  share	  of	  total	  clothing	  imports:	  1996-­‐
2006	  
HS61	   1998	   1999	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	  
China	   33.64	   38.82	   50.42	   53.73	   58.27	   68.81	   74.47	   75.59	   77.13	  
India	   3.41	   4.33	   4.02	   3.30	   2.91	   4.12	   3.81	   4.56	   3.79	  
Mauritius	   0.11	   0.83	   1.31	   0.41	   1.89	   1.91	   1.42	   2.03	   3.27	  
Hong	  Kong	   6.77	   5.95	   6.93	   7.87	   7.46	   5.47	   5.10	   3.89	   2.77	  
Indonesia	   3.56	   3.38	   3.58	   2.41	   2.34	   1.61	   0.76	   0.57	   0.61	  
Myanmar	   0.05	   0.05	   0.00	   0.00	   0.07	   0.03	   0.03	   0.24	   0.46	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
HS62	   1998	   1999	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	  
China	   15.35	   22.16	   48.75	   48.55	   51.96	   64.92	   74.25	   73.10	   79.51	  
Hong	  Kong	   5.83	   7.24	   7.44	   7.90	   5.86	   4.50	   4.21	   3.77	   2.71	  
India	   21.25	   16.53	   14.50	   10.48	   8.38	   7.91	   6.42	   8.61	   4.20	  
Malawi	   26.34	   24.34	   7.56	   11.34	   14.92	   6.56	   3.61	   3.20	   1.97	  
Indonesia	   2.67	   3.75	   1.45	   1.12	   1.74	   0.96	   0.67	   0.96	   0.77	  
Mauritius	   0.20	   0.17	   0.15	   0.20	   0.45	   0.29	   0.26	   0.52	   1.21	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
HS61&62	   1998	   1999	   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	  
China	   22.73	   28.48	   49.39	   50.68	   54.43	   66.37	   74.34	   74.22	   78.49	  
India	   14.05	   11.91	   10.50	   7.52	   6.24	   6.50	   5.35	   6.92	   4.02	  
Hong	  Kong	   6.21	   6.75	   7.24	   7.89	   6.49	   4.86	   4.58	   3.82	   2.74	  
Mauritius	   0.16	   0.42	   0.59	   0.29	   1.02	   0.89	   0.74	   1.15	   2.10	  
Indonesia	   3.03	   3.61	   2.26	   1.66	   1.98	   1.20	   0.89	   0.74	   1.15	  
Bangladesh	   0.04	   0.04	   0.10	   0.18	   0.36	   0.44	   0.38	   0.50	   0.74	  
Source:	  Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008	  
	  
Second,	   the	  collapse	   in	  South	  Africa’s	   clothing	  exports	   to	   the	  US	   (relative	   to	  growing	  exports	  
from	  its	  SSA	  competitors	  to	  this	  market).	  Whilst	  at	  first	  glance	  these	  graphs	  are	  seemingly	  out	  
of	  date,	  they	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  time	  span	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Events	  during	  this	  time	  period	  had	  a	  













South	  Africa’s	  clothing	  market	  by	  Chinese	   imports	  and	  the	  simultaneous	  failure	  of	   its	  clothing	  
exports	  post	  2003	  underscore	  the	  lack	  of	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  industry	  
in	  a	  global	  context	  from	  this	  point.	  	  
	  
Table	  2:	  SA	  exports	  vs	  major	  SSA	  competitors:	  1990-­‐2006	  
	  
Source:	  Quantec	  Statistical	  Database	   Own	  calculations	  
	  
The	  very	  heart	  of	  the	  issue,	  however,	  lay	  not	  with	  rising	  imports	  per	  se,	  but	  with	  the	  drastic	  fall	  
in	  import	  values	  that	  accompanied	  the	  surge	  in	  import	  volumes	  from	  China;	  these	  fell	  by	  26%	  
on	  average	  and	  by	  an	  even	  greater	  30%	   in	  kilogram	  categories	   (Figure	  1).	  The	  suppression	   in	  
clothing	  prices	  from	  imports	  placed	  local	  manufacturers	  under	  distinct	  and	  undue	  competitive	  
price	   pressure	   that	   demanded	   swift	   and	   preventative	   action	   from	   government	   to	   avert	   an	  
otherwise	  inevitable	  collapse	  of	  the	  industry.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Demonstration	  of	  fall	  in	  import	  prices	  from	  China:	  2000-­‐2006	  
	  













The	  response	  of	  the	  South	  African	  government	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  (DTI)	  
was	  to	  employ	  a	  drastic	  set	  of	  measures	  to	  tackle	  the	  problem	  and	  reverse	  the	  trends	  that	  had	  
taken	   place.	   This	   it	   did	   by	   negotiating	   the	   China	   Restraint	   Agreement,	   which	   I	   shall	   call	   the	  
China	  quotas	  from	  now	  on.	  The	  essence	  of	  this	  Agreement	  was	  to	  set	  quantitative	  restraints	  on	  
imports	   of	   certain	   textile	   and	   apparel	   products	   originating	   in	   China.	   The	   Memorandum	   of	  
Understanding	  signed	  between	  South	  Africa	  and	  China	   in	  September	  2006	  established	  annual	  
quotas	   through	   2008	   on	   -­‐	   mostly	   cotton	   and	   cotton-­‐rich	   -­‐	   made-­‐up	   garments	   and	   fabrics	  
spanning	   31,	   mainly	   HS61	   and	   HS62,	   tariff	   lines.	   The	   aims	   of	   the	   China	   quota	   policy	   were	  
threefold;	  i)	  to	  stop	  the	  flow	  of	  imported	  garments	  from	  China;	  ii)	  to	  stave	  off	  the	  bleeding	  of	  
employment	  and	  to	  increase	  employment	  in	  the	  industry	  and	  iii)	  to	  give	  the	  local	  industry	  a	  two	  
year	   stay	   from	   import	   competition	   for	   it	   to	   raise	   its	   capabilities	   and	   productivity	   to	   become	  
more	  competitive	  (DTI	  2006).	  In	  effect,	  the	  China	  quotas	  were	  a	  short-­‐term	  radical	  intervention	  
to	  bring	  about	  these	  three	  outcomes	  by	  affording	  further	  protection	  to	  an	  industry	  that	  already	  
nestled	  behind	  the	  highest	  tariff	  walls	  in	  the	  economy	  (Edwards	  et	  al	  2006).1	  	  
	  
The	  adoption	  of	  this	  measure	  was	  highly	  controversial,	  eliciting	  a	  vocal	  and	  public	  outcry	  from	  
industry	   retailers	   and	   clothing	   manufacturers	   who	   had	   widely	   anticipated	   the	   imminent	  
implementation	   of	   the	   Customised	   Sector	   Programme	   (CSP)	   that	   formulated	   a	   cooperative	  
solution	  to	  the	  problem.	  The	  textile	  sector	  was	  muted	  in	  its	  response.	  The	  lack	  of	  consultation	  
with	   industry	  players	  was	   the	   focal	  point	  of	  contention,	  although	  there	  were	  also	  differences	  
over	   the	   design	   and	   scope	   of	   the	   quotas,	   as	   well	   as	   their	   implementation	   and	   allocation	  
mechanism.	  Although	   the	  DTI	   claimed	   the	  quotas	  were	   instituted	  on	  behalf	  of	   requests	   from	  
Clotrade	  and	  SACTW 	  starting	  in	  2004,	  Clotrade	  objected	  strenuously	  to	  the	  proposal	  when	  the	  
decision	   was	   sprung	   on	   the	   industry	   in	   mid	   2006.	  With	   no	  movement	   from	   the	   DTI	   on	   the	  
original	  request,	  by	  then	  Clotrade	  had	  abandoned	  this	  as	  a	  measure	  that	  could	  be	  of	  any	  use.	  
The	  clothing	  manufacturers	  had	  instead	  began	  successfully	  to	  build	  a	  business	  alliance	  with	  the	  
domestic	  retailers	  and	  create	  value	  chain	  alignment	  in	  the	  sector	  as	  the	  most	  constructive	  way	  
of	   laying	   the	   foundation	   for	   a	   sustainable	   clothing	   sector	   in	   South	   Africa	   (Business	   Alliance	  
2005;	   Bisseker	   2006a).	   The	   China	   quotas,	   in	   both	   its	   mode	   of	   implementation	   and	   modus	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Edwards, Kantor and Ross 2006 observe that although the average import weighted tariff on wearing 
apparel has almost halved since 1993, falling to 40% for clothing and 22% for fabric, it is still 5 times higher 













operandi,	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  direct	  attack	  on	  the	  retailers	  and	  hence	  ran	  absolutely	  counter	  to	  
these	  objectives.	  Government,	   it	  seemed,	  had	  fallen	  captive	  to	  the	  vociferous	   lobbying	  of	  the	  
South	   African	   Workers	   Trade	   Union	   (SACTWU)	   against	   mounting	   job	   losses	   in	   the	   industry,	  
which	  crowded	  out	  all	  other	  concerns,	  not	  least	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  local	  manufacturers	  and	  
the	  very	  survival	  of	  the	  industry	  itself.	  In	  effect	  the	  China	  quota	  policy	  became	  an	  initiative	  of	  
SACTWU	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  DTI.	  	  	  
	  
The	   purpose	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	   understand	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   China	   quota	   process	   and	   to	  
assess	  whether	  or	  not	   the	   intervention	  was	  successful	   in	   terms	  of	   its	  objectives	  and	  why	   if	   it	  
wasn’t	  successful,	  it	  was	  a	  failure.	  	  
	  
I	  shall	  approach	  this	  in	  the	  following	  ways.	  Firstly,	  I	  shall	  situate	  the	  China	  quotas	  in	  the	  context	  
of	   globalisation,	   which	   has	   dramatically	   changed	   the	   position	   of	   industries	   like	   clothing	   and	  
textiles,	  with	   the	   implication	   that	  perhaps	   some	   interventions	  are	  not	  appropriate	  as	  before.	  
Secondly,	  I	  shall	  situate	  the	  China	  quotas	  in	  the	  context	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  sectoral	  policy	  for	  the	  
clothing	   and	   textile	   industry.	   This	   is	   important	   because	   the	   China	   quotas	   are	   essentially	   an	  
industrial	  policy.	  However	   this	   comes	  with	  an	   important	   restrictive	   caveat.	   I	   shall	   look	  at	   the	  
China	   quotas	   as	   an	   industrial	   policy	   measure	   with	   a	   restricted	   focus.	   I	   therefore	   eschew	  
discussion	   of	   the	   entirety	   of	   South	   Africa’s	   industrial	   policy	   and	   simply	   focus	   on	   the	   China	  
quotas	   as	   a	   particular	  measure	   in	   a	   particular	   sector.	   Thirdly,	   I	   shall	   assess	   and	  discuss	  what	  
took	  place	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  three	  major	  dimensions	  of	  this,	  namely	  imports,	  employment	  and	  
output.	  And	  in	  conclusion,	  I	  shall	  be	  able	  to	  highlight	  where	  the	  major	  failure	  lies,	  which	  is	  an	  
institutional	  and	  a	  political	  one	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  role	  of	  major	  stakeholders.	  	  	  
	  
This	  thesis	  addresses	  four	  broad	  research	  questions:	  	  
1) Did	  import	  diversion	  occur?	  	  
2) Did	  the	  China	  quotas	   lead	  to	  greater	   levels	  of	  output	  and	  innovation	  in	   local	  firms;	  
did	   they	   encourage	   upgrading	   and	   culminate	   in	   greater	   levels	   of	   domestic	  
competitiveness?	  	  
3) Did	  the	  China	  quotas	  lead	  to	  more	  or	  less	  employment?	  	  














I	   shall	   do	   this	   using	   a	   variety	   of	   different	  methodological	   techniques.	   I	   have	   i)	   conducted	   an	  
intensive	  analysis	  of	  the	  macro	  trade	  and	  historical	  data;	   ii)	   interviewed	  and	  consulted	  with	  a	  
number	   of	   key	   stakeholders;	   iii)	   interviewed	   20	   clothing	   and	   textiles	   firms	   in	   2007;	   iv)	  
undertaken	  a	  survey	  on	  32	  clothing	  manufacturers	  in	  co-­‐operation	  with	  Clotrade	  in	  2008.	  The	  
conceptual	   framework	  used	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   the	  Global	  Value	  Chain	   (GVC)	  approach,	  which	   is	  
combined	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  regulations	  and	  policies	  at	  different	  levels	  and	  a	  political	  economy	  
perspective.	  	  
	  
The	  structure	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  as	  follows:	  Chapter	  1	  explains	  the	  problem	  and	  sets	  up	  guidelines	  
for	  the	  discussion.	  It	  introduces	  the	  main	  research	  questions	  that	  I	  shall	  try	  to	  answer	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  main	  hypotheses	  which	  unperpin	  this	  thesis.	  Chapter	  2	  situates	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  China	  
quotas	   in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  globalisation	  and	   industrial	  policy.	   It	  begins	  with	  a	   literature	  
review	   of	   the	   development	   of	   buyer	   driven	   value	   chains,	   the	  MFA	   and	   the	   liberalisation	   of	  
global	  clothing	  trade	  under	  the	  ATC.	  Chapter	  3	  hones	  the	  analysis	  to	  China	  and	  the	  developed	  
country	  response	  to	  China	  which	  establishes	  the	   incidence	  of	  China-­‐specific	  safeguards	   in	  the	  
US	   and	   EU.	   It	   evaluates	   the	   success	   of	   this	   intervention	   in	   these	   regions	   and	   infers	   some	  
outcomes	   for	   the	   China	   quotas.	   Chapter	   4	   focuses	   on	   South	   Africa’s	   clothing	   sector	   which	  
orienates	   the	   analysis	   in	   the	   particular	   economic	   and	   political	   context	   of	   the	   South	   African	  
clothing	   sector.	   Chapters	   5	   to	   7	   present	   the	   empirical	   and	   qualitative	   evidence	   from	   my	  
research	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   China	   quotas	   on	   trade	   (the	   retailers);	   competitiveness	   (the	  
manufacturers	  and	  employees)	  and	  price	  (consumers	  and	  manufacturers).	  Chapter	  8	  evaluates	  
the	  China	  quotas	  as	  an	  industrial	  policy	  tool.	  Chapter	  9	  concludes	  with	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  main	  














Section	  2:	  Research	  questions,	  methodology	  and	  hypotheses	  
	  
There	   are	   four	   primary	   research	   questions	   that	   I	   shall	   address	   in	   the	   anecdotal	   body	   of	   this	  
thesis.	  
	  
Research	  question	  1:	  What	  happened	  to	  sourcing	  patterns?	  
The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  research	  focuses	  on	  trade	  and	  buying,	  looking	  at	  the	  retailers’	  response	  to	  
the	  China	  quotas	  through	  their	  sourcing	  patterns	  and	  behaviour.	  A	  pervasive	  view	  was	  that	  the	  
China	   quotas	   ignored	   the	   dynamic	   and	   complex	   nature	   of	   the	   clothing	   industry	   including	   its	  
structural	   rigidities	   and	   sensitivity	   to	   policy	   regulation	   and	   that	   the	   scope	   and	   design	   of	   the	  
quotas	   were	   based	   neither	   on	   an	   assessment	   of	   prices,	   quality	   and	   availability	   of	   material	  
inputs,	  nor	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  local	  industry	  capacity	  to	  produce	  the	  necessary	  product	  lines	  
(Hazelhurst	  2006a;	  2006b).	  Industry	  experts	  argued	  that	  quotas	  would	  lead	  to	  supply	  shortages	  
and	   supply	   chain	   bottlenecks	   mainly	   due	   to	   fabric	   restrictions	   and	   quota	   on	   fabric	   not	  
domestically	  produced	  but	  also	  because	  of	  domestic	  supply	  capacity	  constraints	  (Edwards	  et	  al	  
2006;	   Bisseker	   2006a;	   2006b).	   The	   experience	   of	   the	   United	   States	   suggests	   that	   import	  
restrictions	   on	   Chinese	   goods	   do	   not	   unequivocally	   translate	   into	   higher	   demand	   for	   locally	  
produced	  substitutes	  (le	  Roux	  2007).	  A	  more	  likely	  occurrence	  was	  that	  retailers	  would	  simply	  
secure	  alternative	  and	  possibly	   lower	  cost,	   foreign	  suppliers	  or	  adopt	  a	  number	  of	  alternative	  
strategies	   to	   mitigate	   the	   impact	   of	   restrictions	   such	   as	   pre-­‐buying	   stock	   or	   trans-­‐shipping	  
(Brink	  2006;	  Bisseker	  2006a;	  2006b).	  
	  
The	  research	  was	  guided	  by	  the	  following	  questions:	  
1. Did	  supply	  shortages	  for	  garments	  materialise?	  
2. What	  was	  	  the	  predominant	  response	  of	  retailers	  in	  the	  short-­‐run?	  And	  in	  the	  long-­‐run?	  	  
3. Did	   quotas	   lead	   to	   import	   diversion	   by	   importers	   seeking	   alternative	   suppliers	   to	   the	  
China,	  i.e.	  what	  was	  the	  macro	  trade	  effect	  of	  the	  quotas?	  
4. Was	   there	   evidence	   of	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   under-­‐declaration	   of	   imports	   or	   trans-­‐
shipments?	  














6. How	   did	   this	   response	   vary	   between	   different	   retailers	   covering	   the	   different	  market	  
segments?	  	  
7. How	  did	  retailers	  respond	  to	  become	  more	  competitive	  i.e.	  did	  they	  import	  more	  high	  
value	  added	  complex	  items	  and	  source	  more	  basics	  locally?	  What	  happened	  to	  the	  unit	  
price	  of	  imports?	  	  
	  
And	  used	  the	  following	  methodologies:	  
1. Analysis	  of	  current	  and	  historical	  macroeconomic	  trade	  data	  from	  a	  number	  of	  primary	  
data	  bases.	  	  
2. Analysis	  of	  unit	  price	  trade	  data.	  	  
3. Solicitation	  of	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  data	  from	  retailers	  (where	  possible).	  
	  
Research	   question	   2:	   What	   happened	   to	   domestic	   production	   and	   the	  
competitiveness	  of	  local	  firms?	  
The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  research	  focuses	  on	  the	  response	  of	  clothing	  manufacturers	  to	  the	  China	  
quotas.	  The	  supposition	  that	  the	  China	  quotas	  would	  reduce	  the	  importation	  of	  cheap	  Chinese	  
goods	   is	   predicated	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   they	   would	   be	   substituted	   for	   locally	   produced	  
goods	  and	  that	  the	  South	  African	  industry	  is	   internationally	  competitive	  once	  Chinese	  imports	  
are	  disregarded.	  In	  the	  short	  run	  at	  least,	  it	  was	  expected	  that	  the	  local	  industry	  would	  not	  be	  
able	   to	   fill	   the	   additional	   demand	   created	   by	   the	   intervention	   due	   to	   inherent	   physical	   and	  
infrastructural	   constraints.	   Hence,	   long	   lead	   times,	   poor	   delivery	   reliability	   and	   deteriorating	  
quality	   performance	   would	   persist	   (Bisseker	   2006a).	   A	   well-­‐recognised	   outcome	   of	   import	  
restrictions	   is	  a	  shift	  by	   importers	   towards	  high-­‐end	  garments	  as	   they	  seek	  to	  maximize	   their	  
import	  basket	  (Edwards	  and	  Morris	  2006).	  Should	  this	  occur,	  local	  firms	  would	  be	  left	  to	  fill	  low-­‐
end	  basics,	  which	  would	  downgrade	  the	  domestic	  value	  chain.	  
	  
The	  research	  was	  guided	  by	  the	  following	  questions:	  
1. Quotas	  on	  fabric	  impact	  on	  manufacturers	  -­‐	  and	  competitiveness	  -­‐	  through	  both	  fabric	  
shortages	  and	  fabric	  prices.	  Did	  fabric	  shortages	  materialise?	  Did	  fabric	  prices	  increase?	  	  













3. What	   happened	   to	   the	   composition	   of	   output?	   Were	   manufacturers	   producing	   the	  
same	  or	  different	  items?	  	  
4. What	  happened	  to	  innovation	  in	  local	  firms?	  	  
5. Manufacturers	   import	   as	   well.	   Did	   the	   application	   of	   quotas	   restrict	   the	   ability	   to	  
package	  final	  items	  as	  a	  combination	  of	  locally	  produced	  and	  imported	  product?	  	  
6. Were	  manufacturers	  able	   to	  cross-­‐subsidise	   their	   final	  products,	  or	  did	   they	  simply	  go	  
out	  of	  business	  ?	  	  
7. How	   did	   the	   China	   quotas	   affect	   the	   relationship	   between	   these	   manufacturers	   and	  
retailers?	  
8. Quota	   trading	   leads	   to	  higher	   import	  prices,	  which	   in	   theory	   should	  alleviate	   some	  of	  
the	   price	   suppression	   on	   local	   manufacturers	   since	   retailers	   benchmark	   local	   prices	  
against	   import	   prices.	   What	   happened	   to	   middleman	   mark-­‐ups;	   were	   manufacturers	  
able	  to	  achieve	  higher	  prices	  for	  their	  output?	  
	  
And	  used	  the	  following	  methodologies:	  
1. Solicitation	   of	   qualitative	   and	   quantitative	   evidence	   from	   local	  manufacturers	   (where	  
possible).	  
2. Analysis	  of	  the	  micro-­‐economic	  PPI	  data.	  
	  
Research	  question	  3:	  What	  happened	  to	  employment?	  
A	   key	   stated	   objective	   of	   the	   intervention	   was	   employment	   creation.	   However,	   industry	  
forecast	   that	   quotas	   would	   fail	   to	   create	   jobs	   and	   sustainably	   raise	   employment	   in	   the	  
industry	  (Bisseker	  2006a;	  2006b)	  and	  that	  in	  fact,	  further	  job	  losses	  would	  likely	  be	  the	  most	  
immediate	   consequence	  of	   the	   intervention	   (Minutes	  of	  meeting	  on	  quotas	  between	  DTI	  
and	  industry	  2006).	  The	  level	  and	  composition	  of	  demand	  for	  skills	  also	  provides	  important	  
insights	  into	  employment	  strength	  and	  competitiveness	  albeit	  this	  is	  difficult	  to	  establish	  at	  
the	  firm	  level	  (Morris	  and	  Reed	  2008a).	  
	  
The	  research	  was	  guided	  by	  the	  following	  questions:	  
1. What	  happened	  to	  employment	  –	  did	  it	  decrease	  or	  increase,	  or	  neither?	  
2. What	  happened	  to	  the	  demand	  for	  skills?	  Did	  skills	  requirements	  increase	  or	  decrease?	  













And	  used	  the	  following	  methodologies:	  	  
1. Analysis	   of	   quantitative	   monthly	   employment	   and	   industry	   data	   from	   the	   National	  
Bargaining	  Council.	  
2. Solicitation	  of	  qualitative	  evidence	  from	  manufacturing	  firms	  (where	  possible).	  
	  
Research	  question	  4:	  	  What	  happened	  to	  clothing	  prices	  and	  consumer	  welfare?	  	  
The	  impact	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  on	  consumers	  is	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  for	  three	  main	  reasons.	  
Firstly,	  consumers	  were	  major	  stakeholders	  in	  this	  process	  since	  they	  would	  ultimately	  bear	  the	  
costs	   or	   reap	   the	   benefits	   from	   the	   intervention	   at	   the	   till.	   Secondly,	   one	   of	   the	   primary	  
motivations	  behind	  the	  China	  quotas	  was	  consumer	  enrichment;	   the	   intervention	  would	  curb	  
profiteering	  by	  retailers	  and	  redress	  the	  inequalities	  by	  channeling	  some	  of	  these	  surpluses	  to	  
consumers	  (DTI	  2006);	  and	  thirdly,	  the	  retailers	  cited	  the	  loss	  of	  consumer	  welfare	  as	  the	  most	  
compelling	  argument	  against	  the	  China	  quotas	  and	  emphasised	  the	  important	  welfare	  function	  
that	   they	   perform	   by	   delivering	   affordable	   quality	   imported	   clothing	   to	   consumers	   (Retailer	  
Joint	   Press	  Release	  2006).	   Retailers	  predicted	   that	   garment	  prices	  would	   rise	  by	   around	  20%	  
directly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  quota	  trading	  (Bisseker	  2006a;	  )	  
	  
The	  research	  was	  guided	  by	  the	  following	  questions:	  
1. Was	  there	  evidence	  of	  quota	  trading?	  	  
2. What	  happened	  to	  the	  shelf	  price	  of	  imported	  garments?	  	  
3. What	  happened	  to	  the	  shelf	  price	  of	  garments	  generally?	  
4. What	   happened	   to	   the	   quality	   and	   variety	   of	   garments	   sold	   which	   recognised	   the	  
possibility	  of	  variations	  in	  quality	  between	  imports	  and	  local	  imitations?	  
	  
And	  used	  the	  following	  methodologies:	  
1. Analysis	  of	  macroeconomic	  import	  price	  data.	  	  
2. Analysis	  of	  clothing	  retail	  price	  data	  from	  large	  clothing	  retailers.	  















Time	  frame	  for	  the	  analysis	  	  
	  
I	  decided	  to	  do	  the	  trade	  analysis	  using	  2001	  as	  the	  earliest	  time	  point,	  since	  this	  corresponds	  
with	   the	   start	   of	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   South	   African	   clothing	   sector	   in	   response	   to	   a	  
confluence	  of	  events	  at	  this	  time,	  which	  culminated	  in	  the	  imposition	  of	  the	  China	  quotas.	  The	  
time	  period	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  retail	  data	  was	  largely	  governed	  by	  the	  availability	  of	  price	  and	  
cost	  data	  from	  large	  retail	  companies.	  
	  
The	   cut	   off	   date	   for	   analysis	   of	   quantitative	   data	   on	   retail	   prices	   and	   industry	   output	   and	  
employment	  data	  is	  31	  December	  2008.	  This	  was	  underpinned	  by	  the	  logic	  that,	  since	  retailers	  
formulate	  their	  sourcing	  strategies	  at	  least	  six	  months	  in	  advance,	  changes	  in	  buying	  patterns	  in	  
anticipation	  of	  quota	  removal	  would	  already	  be	  fully	  incorporated	  into	  responses	  to	  the	  event	  
and	  largely	  captured	  in	  2008	  macroeconomic	  trade	  data.	  Similarly,	  the	  manufacturer	  response	  
to	  quota	  removal	   is	  assumed	  to	   lead	  the	  actual	  event,	  such	  that	  changes	  to	  employment	  and	  
output	   patterns	   would	   be	   reflected	   prior	   to	   2009.	   An	   analytical	   period	   of	   eight	   years	   was	  
deemed	  sufficient	   to	   identify	   trends	  both	  pre	  and	  post	  quotas,	   although	   this	   comes	  with	   the	  
caveat	   that	   even	  when	   sourcing	  decisions	   are	  made	  months	   in	   advance,	   the	   sustainability	   of	  
trends	   in	   output,	   employment	   and	  prices	   related	   to	   quota	  withdrawal	  may	  not	   be	  decisively	  
captured	  by	  the	  2008	  data.	  	  
	  
The	  cut	  off	  date	  for	  the	  trade	  analysis	  is	  31	  December	  2010.	  I	  decided	  to	  extend	  the	  analysis	  of	  
trade	   to	   include	   the	   two	   years	   after	   quota	   removal	   to	   assess	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   change	   in	  
sourcing	   patterns,	   if	   any,	   endured	   beyond	   the	   intervention,	   or	   alternatively	   to	   see	   to	   what	  
extent	  pre-­‐quota	  patterns	  re-­‐asserted	  themselves.	  This	  analysis	  comes	  with	  the	  caveat	  that	  the	  
global	   economic	   crisis	   impacted	   South	  Africa	  with	   a	   lag,	   taking	   hold	   in	   2008,	  which	  makes	   it	  
difficult	  to	  interpret	  certain	  data	  and	  developments	  only	  in	  the	  context	  of	  safeguard	  removal	  as	  
















Data	   for	   analysis,	   both	   qualitative	   and	   quantitative,	   was	   sourced	   from	   a	   diverse	   range	   of	  
macroeconomic	   trade	  databases	   and	  dialogue	  with	   industry	   consultants,	   representatives	   and	  
experts.	  	  
Macroeconomic	  and	  trade	  data	  
The	   primary	   sources	   of	   import	   trade	   and	   macroeconomic	   data	   are	   OTEXA	   (obtained	   both	  
directly	   from	   their	   database	   at	   http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/msrpoint.htm	   and	   via	   Emerging	  
Textiles,	  Stats	  SA,	  Comtrade	  and	  SARS	  (obtained	  indirectly	  from	  Quantec	  and	  Clotrade).	  	  
	  
I	  used	  SARS	  import	  data	  obtained	  from	  the	  Clotrade	  Statistical	  database	  2001-­‐2010	  for	  all	  the	  
primary	  analysis	  of	  trade.	  Data	  from	  Quantec	  International	  Database	  2001-­‐2007	  was	  used	  as	  an	  
alternative	   source	   where	   necessary.	   Any	   variation	   in	   results	   to	   those	   reflected	   in	   imported	  
graphs	   and	   tables	   from	   other	   sources	   is	   accounted	   for	   by	   variations	   in	   the	   data	   sets;	   for	  
example	  analysts	  at	  Tralac	  use	  data	  from	  World	  Trade	  Atlas,	  which	  was	  found	  to	  differ,	  albeit	  
not	   materially,	   from	   Clotrade	   and	   Quantec	   data.	   Aggregate	   import	   values	   are	   divided	   by	  
aggregate	   import	   quantities	   to	   obtain	   import	   price	   data.	   This	   data	   is	   listed	   either	   as	   a	   dollar	  
price	  per	  unit	  or	  per	  kilogram	  and	  a	  total	  has	  been	  constructed	  by	  SARS	  using	  weights	  to	  give	  an	  
average	  unit	  price	  for	  all	  imported	  garments.	  Unit	  price	  data	  was	  used	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  price	  in	  
Chapter	  7.	  Calculations	  for	  aggregate	  import	  values	  include	  all	  categories	  in	  HS	  Chapters	  61	  and	  
62.	   Calculations	   for	   restricted	   categories	   include	   only	   data	   for	   the	   quota	   categories,	   which	  
appear	  in	  the	  Schedule	  of	  the	  Memorandum	  of	  Understanding	  between	  China	  and	  South	  Africa.	  
	  
Macroeconomic	   data	   was	   sourced	   from	   the	   DTI	   economic	   database	   at	   the	   following	   URL	  
address:	   http://www.thedti.gov.za/econdb/cssrap/SsaP014113.html	   unless	   otherwise	  
indicated.	  The	  Consumer	  Price	  Index	  was	  constructed	  from	  two	  datasets:	  for	  2002-­‐2006,	  data	  
for	  Metropolitan	  and	  Other	  Urban	  Areas,	  which	  appear	  in	  the	  following	  Schedules:	  	  VPN30501	  
(Wearing	   Apparel)	   and	   VPN40002	   (All	   Items	   Excluding	   Housing).	   In	   2008,	   the	   CPI	   was	   re-­‐
weighted	  and	  re-­‐based	  on	  2000;	  this	  new	  dataset	  was	  used	  for	  analysis	  between	  2006	  and	  2008	  
and	   is	   available	   http://www.thedti.gov.za/econdb/cssrap/SsaP014113.html.	   I	   merged	   these	  
two	   datasets	   and	   rebased	   them	   on	   2000.	   The	   Producer	   Price	   Index	   data	   used	   was	   for	   All	  













P1000002	   (All	   Domestic	   Output);	   P1204102	   (Yarn	   and	   Thread);	   P1205202	   (Wearing	   Apparel)	  
and	  P1200002	  (Manufacturing).	  These	  indices	  are	  all	  based	  to	  2000;	  where	  the	  base	  year	  was	  
altered,	   this	   is	   clearly	   indicated.	   The	   exchange	   rate	   index	   was	   calculated	   using	   an	   average	  
exchange	  rate	  over	  twelve	  months.	  	  
	  
Manufacturing	  data	  
It	   is	  difficult	   (if	  not	   impossible)	   to	  build	  a	  solid	  statistical	  counterfactual	  case	   for	  quotas	   for	  a	  
number	  of	   reasons,	   including	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   the	   China	  quotas	   can	  be	   “blamed”	   for	   the	  
collapse	   of	   an	   industry,	   which	   was	   for	   all	   intents	   and	   purposes,	   already	   “on	   the	   skids”.	   In	  
compensation	   I	   gathered	   as	  much	   case	   history	   information	   on	   what	   happened	   prior	   to	   and	  
during	   the	   quota	   period	   within	   manufacturing	   firms;	   this	   I	   used	   primarily	   to	   orientate	   the	  
intervention	   in	   its	   historical	   and	   political	   economic	   context,	   not	   to	   make	   suppositions	   or	  
conjecture	  about	  what	  “might	  have	  been”	  in	  its	  absence.	  	  
	  
Whilst	  consultation	  was	  an	  ongoing	  process,	  the	  main	  data	  collection	  points	  on	  manufacturing	  
were	   during	   fieldwork	   conducted	   in	   July	   2007	   and	   a	   survey	   of	   firms	   in	   November	   2008.	   I	  
personally	   interviewed	  20	  manufacturing	  firms	  –	  16	  clothing	  and	  4	  textiles	  –	  belonging	  to	  the	  
Cape	   and	   KwaZulu	   Natal	   Clothing	   Clusters	   in	   July	   2007.	   Although	   the	   main	   purpose	   of	   this	  
research	  was	  to	  collect	  data	  on	  skills	  and	  employment	  in	  the	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  industries,	  it	  
yielded	   important	   information	   about	   the	  preliminary	   impact	   of	   the	  quotas	  on	  manufacturing	  
firms.	  The	  objective	  was	  to	  collate	  information	  from	  as	  large	  and	  diverse	  a	  sample	  as	  possible	  -­‐	  
irrespective	  of	  size,	  turnover,	  employee	  numbers	  or	  market	  orientation	  of	  the	  firm.	  Firms	  were	  
classified	  as	   small,	  medium	  and	   large	  enterprises	  according	   to	   the	  DTI	  classification	  based	  on	  
employee	   number:	   Micro:	   1-­‐9	   employees;	   Small:	   10-­‐99	   employees;	   Medium:	   100-­‐199	  
employees	   and	   Large:	   200	   plus	   employees.	   The	   breakdown	   of	   participating	   firms	   appears	   in	  
Table	  3.	  The	  questionnaire	  for	  this	  survey	  appears	  in	  Appendix	  A	  
	  
In	  September	  2008,	  I	  conducted	  a	  survey	  in	  cooperation	  with	  Clotrade	  of	  thirty-­‐two	  firms	  from	  
its	  membership	  base.	  A	   list	  of	   firms	  that	  participated	   in	  this	  survey	  appears	   in	  Appendix	  B.	   In	  
total	   forty-­‐one	   firms	   were	   surveyed	   and/or	   interviewed	   during	   these	   sampling	   exercises	   of	  













interviewed	   in	   2007	   were	   re-­‐surveyed	   (via	   the	   questionnaire	   in	   Appendix	   B)	   in	   addition	   to	  
twenty	   one	   new	   clothing	   firms	   who	   were	   Clotrade	   members.	   My	   findings	   from	   the	   2007	  
interviews	   were	   corroborated	   by	   evidence	   from	   the	   2008	   survey.	   This	   confirmed	   that	   the	  
anecdotal	  evidence	  that	  I	  collated	  on	  employment	  and	  output	  was	  representative	  of	  trends	  for	  
the	  broader	  industry.	  	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Classification	  and	  identfication	  of	  firms	  interviewed	  in	  July	  2007	  	  
Small:	  9-­99	  employees	   Medium:100-­199	  employees	   Large:	  +200	  employees	  
Natashas	  CMT	  (80)	   Phase	  Fashions	  (107)	   Rex	  Truform	  (364)	  
Bernadotte	  Clothing	  (62)	   Radeen	  (145)	   ITL	  (T)	  (487)	  
Fashion	  World	  (±60)	   Rotex	  (T)	  (167)	   Prestige	  Clothing	  (459)	  
	  
	  
Cape	  Underwear	  (552)	  
	   	  
Celrose	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  (867)	  
	   	  
Bibette	  (933)	  
	   	  
House	  of	  Monatic	  (1149)	  
	   	  
Bonwit	  (1400)	  
	   	  
Monviso	  Knitwear	  (1444)	  
	   	  
Prestige	  Apparel	  (1747)	  
	   	  
Puma	  (T)	  (273)	  
	   	  
SA	  Clothing	  (2333)	  
	   	   Pepclo	  (2304)	  
	   	  
Frame	  Textiles	  (T)(±2000)	  
	  
	  
Although	   the	   primary	   data	   used	   for	   analysis	   of	   employment	   and	   output	   in	   Chapter	   5	   was	  
collated	  at	  the	  two	  main	  data	  collection	  points	  (the	  2007	  interviews	  and	  2008	  survey),	  collation	  
of	   qualitative	   data	   from	   firm	   employees	   and	   representatives	   was	   an	   ongoing	   process.	   I	  
conducted	   interviews	  with	  numerous	  other	   firms	  over	   the	  course	  of	  my	  research,	   including	  a	  













manufacturer	  and	  a	  large	  Australian	  affiliated	  branded	  manufacturer.	  Although	  the	  qualitative	  
data	  from	  these	  interviews	  and	  discussions	  was	  not	  included	  in	  my	  formal	  analyses,	  it	  enabled	  a	  
rich	   and	   far	   broader	   perspective	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   China	   quotas	   on	  manufacturing	   firms	  
than	  the	  sampling	  data	  alone	  could	  provide.	  	  
	  
I	   attempted	   to	   assimilate	   data	   for	   small	   firms	   through	   a	   survey	   in	   2009	   based	   on	   the	  
questionnaire	  in	  Appendix	  C.	  However,	  access	  to	  these	  primarily	  owner-­‐operated	  firms	  proved	  
difficult	   and	   the	   low	   response	   rate	   made	   it	   impossible	   to	   make	   generalisations	   about	   the	  
impact	  of	  the	  quotas	  on	  this	  cohort	  based	  on	  the	  small	  dataset.	   I	  did	  however	  collate	  (mainly	  
qualitative)	  information	  from	  a	  handful	  of	  small	  firms	  through	  personal	  interviews,	  which	  I	  used	  
in	  the	  anecdotal	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  on	  manufacturing.	  Although	  some	  of	  these	  small	  firms	  that	  
volunteered	  qualitative	  data	  are	  listed	  in	  Appendix	  C,	  not	  all	  consented	  to	  disclosure	  due	  to	  the	  
sensitive	   nature	   of	   the	   information	   and	   in	   particular	   that	   pertaining	   to	   the	   use	   of	   informal	  
labor.	  	  
	  
Whilst	   the	  significant	  contribution	  of	   the	   informal	   sector	   to	   the	  overall	   clothing	  GDP	  on	  both	  
the	  retail	  and	  manufacturing	  sides	  is	  acknowledged,	  hard	  sales	  and	  production	  data	  is	  difficult	  
to	  obtain	   and	  notoriously	  unreliable	   given	   the	   nature	  of	   this	   industry	   and	  discussions	  on	   the	  
informal	  sector	  are	  based	  on	  conjecture	  and	  “hear-­‐say”	  rather	  than	  hard	  data.	  
Retail	  price	  and	  interview	  data	  
Macro	  trade	  data	  is	  limited	  in	  a	  number	  of	  areas,	  such	  as	  its	  inability	  to	  comment	  on	  changes	  to	  
garment	   complexity	   or	   quality	   since	   HS	   import	   categories	   may	   constitute	   a	   large	   range	   of	  
changing	  products	  year	  on	  year. Consequently, this	  form	  of	  data	  cannot	  always	  be	  relied	  upon	  
to	  give	  an	  accurate	  indication	  of	  market	  trends.	  Quotas	  were	  expected	  to	  impact	  on	  consumer	  
welfare	   via	   two	   channels,	   the	   first	   being	   price	   and	   the	   second	   quality.	   The	   first	   is	   easily	  
established	   through	   an	   interrogation	   of	   unit	   price	   data.	   However,	   interviews	   with	   key	  
informants	  and	  retail	  chains	  were	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  qualitative	  effects	  and	  to	  
understand	  the	  implication	  of	  unit	  sales	  price	  variations	  in	  the	  domestic	  market	  on	  welfare	  via	  
changes	   in	   garment	   quality.	   Key	   informants	   constitute	   individuals	   directly	   involved	   in	   the	  













Business	  Alliance	  (BA)	  and	  Cape	  Clothing	  Cluster;	  Justin	  Barnes,	  CEO	  of	  Benchmarking	  Analysts	  
(BMA);	  and	  Jack	  Kipling,	  former	  director	  of	  Clotrade.	  	  
	  
Qualitative	  data	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  retail	  was	  obtained	  via	  e-­‐mails	  and	  interviews	  with	  individuals	  
involved	  with	  buying	  and	  logistics	  for	  five	  major	  South	  African	  retail	  firms	  -­‐	  each	  representing	  
different	  market	  segments	  -­‐	  between	  2006	  and	  2008.	  One	  of	  these	  retailers	  was	  re-­‐interviewed	  
in	  2011.	  Four	  of	  these	  retailers	  volunteered	  quantitative	  data2.	  These	  retailers	  are	  listed	  from	  A	  
to	  E	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  confidentiality	  of	  participants.	  Given	  the	  significant	  degree	  of	  retailer	  
concentration	   and	   market	   power	   in	   the	   South	   African	   market,	   similar	   to	   that	   in	   developed	  
countries,	   some	   prominent	   trends	   can	   be	   identified	   by	   analysing	   the	   dominant	   players.	  
However,	   the	  analysis	   comes	  with	   the	   caveat	   that	  only	   formal	   sector	   trends	  are	   captured	  by	  
this	  analysis	  and	  may	  be	  an	  unreliable	  indicator	  for	  clothing	  trends	  generally	  given	  the	  prolific	  
growth	  of	  informal	  retail	  outlets,	  which	  feed	  an	  increasing	  share	  of	  consumer	  demand	  (Sandrey	  
2006).	  	  
	  
Average	   retail	   sales	   price	   (RSP),	   average	   unit	   cost	   (AC)	   and	   unit	   volume	   data	   was	   selected	  
against	  the	  following	  criteria.	  First,	  garments	  had	  to	  be	  comparable	  across	  time	  periods	  i.e.	  had	  
not	   changed	   significantly	   in	   quality,	   style	   or	   complexity	   or	   undergone	   any	   fabric	   up/down	  
grades.	  Second,	  data	  needed	  to	  be	  continuous	  to	  enable	  statistical	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  or	  season-­‐on-­‐
season	  price	  and	  cost	   comparisons	   to	  establish	   trends	   in	   retail	  price,	   retail	   cost	  and	  mark-­‐up	  
during	  the	  quota	  period.	  
	  
Retailer	  A,	  a	  retail	  chain	  supplying	  the	  top	  end	  of	  the	  market,	  volunteered	  retail	  price	  and	  sales	  
data	   for	   15	   categories	   of	   babies’	   and	   children’s	   wear,	   all	   of	   which	   are	   particularly	   import-­‐
sensitive	  and	   subject	   to	   restrictions.	   I	   used	   this	  data	  mainly	   to	  analyse	   the	   change	   in	   retailer	  
margins	  during	  the	  quota	  period.	  Retailer	  B,	  a	  retail	  chain	  supplying	  the	  mid	  to-­‐upper	  market	  
segment,	  supplied	  average	  retail	  selling	  price,	  average	  unit	  cost	  and	  unit	  volume	  data	  for	  a	  total	  
of	  596	  categories;	  ladies	  (276),	  men’s	  (291)	  and	  children’s	  (147)	  wear.	  I	  excluded	  “Active	  wear”	  
due	   to	   the	   dominance	   of	   branded	   items	   in	   these	   categories,	   which	   by	   nature	   are	   driven	   by	  
different	   dynamics,	   although	   a	   cursory	   analysis	   showed	   that	   these	   categories	   exhibited	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













remarkably	   little	   change	   in	   both	   cost,	   mark-­‐up	   and	   selling	   price	   during	   the	   quota	   period.	   	   I	  
included	  categories	  according	  to	  the	  above	  criteria	  and	  where	  unit	  sales	  exceeded	  10,000	  units	  
in	  any	  one	  season.	  	  
	  
I	   obtained	   similar	  data	   from	  Retailer	  C,	   a	  discount	   chain	   servicing	   the	   low-­‐end	  of	   the	  market	  
covering	  471	  categories	  in	  ladies’	  (168),	  men’s	  (79)	  and	  children’s	  (224)	  wear.	  Since	  it	  was	  not	  
possible	   to	   solicit	  data	  at	  a	   level	  of	  disaggregation	  which	  allowed	   for	  differentiation	  of	  quota	  
items	   from	   non-­‐quota	   items,	   this	   analysis	   could	   not	   be	   done.	   Nor	   did	   the	   data	   differentiate	  
between	  imports	  and	  local	  garments	  for	  the	  initial	  quota	  period.	  However	  I	  did	  get	  data	  for	  a	  
restricted	  number	  of	   categories	  of	   children’s	  wear	   from	  both	   retailers,	  which	  enabled	  a	   sub-­‐
sector	  analysis	  of	  price	  between	   imported	  and	   locally	  produced	  garments	  on	  a	   small	   sample.	  
Retailer	   D	   provided	   significant	   and	   invaluable	   insights	   into	   the	   numerous	   challenges	   and	  
concerns	   around	   the	   China	   quotas.	   For	   Retailer	   E,	  with	   a	  mid-­‐to	   lower	  market	   orientation,	   I	  
used	  a	  small	  data	  set	  of	  unit	  price	  and	  sales	  volume	  data	  for	  40	  product	  categories	  of	  children’s	  














Chapter	  2:	  Globalisation,	  buyer	  driven	  value	  chains	  and	  
competitiveness	  
	  
A	  literature	  review	  of	  globalisation	  and	  regulation	  in	  global	  clothing	  markets	  
	  
In	   the	   introduction,	   I	   emphasised	   the	   importance	  of	  orientating	   the	  discussion	  of	   the	  China	  
quotas	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  this	  era	  of	  globalisation	  and	  within	  this	  context,	  the	  question	  
of	  industrial	  policy	  for	  the	  clothing	  and	  textile	  sector.	  In	  this	  Chapter,	  I	  review	  the	  vast	  body	  of	  
literature	  that	  has	  happened	  around	  this	  era	  of	  globalisation	  to	  establish	  what	  changes	  have	  
occurred	  in	  the	  worldwide	  clothing	  sector	  in	  this	  regard.	  
Globalisation	  and	  trade	  
	  
Over	   the	   past	   decade	   and	   a	   half,	   clothing	   trade	   has	   expanded	   and	   become	   increasingly	  
globalised,	  dispersed	  across	  a	  growing	  proliferation	  of	  countries	  (Nordas	  2004;	  Ikesen	  2006).	  In	  
2008	   global	   clothing	   exports	   were	   valued	   at	   US$364.91	   billion	   (bn),	   increasing	   at	   an	   annual	  
compound	   rate	   of	   10.5%	  between	  2000	   and	   2008,	   by	   11.07%	  and	   12.23%	   in	   2006	   and	   2007	  
respectively	   (Comtrade	   2009)	   and	   by	   5.14%	   in	   2008	   (Morris	   and	   Barnes	   2008).	   Despite	   a	  
contraction	  in	  growth	  in	  2009	  (and	  notably	  the	  first	  in	  over	  a	  decade),	  clothing	  was	  one	  of	  the	  
world’s	  most	  traded	  manufactured	  products	  with	  a	  share	  of	  3.8%	  (equivalent	  to	  US$315.62bn)	  
which	   constituted	   2.6%	   of	   global	   merchandise	   trade	   in	   this	   year.	   More	   importantly,	   these	  
exports	   were	   increasingly	   generated	   by	   a	   growing	   diversity	   of	   countries	   located	   in	   the	  
developing	  world	  and	  with	  declining	  export	  activity	  from	  developed	  countries.	  	  
	  
The	  data	  in	  Figure	  2	  ranks	  the	  top	  25	  exporters	  and	  importers	  of	  clothing	  by	  value	  in	  2009,	  also	  
expressed	  as	  a	  percentage	  share	  for	  each	  country	  and	  as	  a	  cumulative	  share	  of	  global	  exports.	  
This	   data	   captures	   some	   of	   the	   important	   trends	   in	   clothing	   trade	   between	   1990	   and	   2009,	  
which	  are	  masked	  at	  the	  aggregate	  level.	  	  
	  
First,	   export	   activity	   has	   largely	   shifted	   away	   from	   the	   hub	   of	   developed	   countries	   and	  
gravitated	   toward	   developing	   countries	   (LDCs).	   The	   share	   of	   LDCs	   in	   global	   clothing	   trade	  













(Staritz	  2011).	  Second,	   in	  2006	  China	   replaced	   the	  European	  Union	   (EU)	  as	   the	  world’s	  major	  
clothing	  exporter	  in	  terms	  of	  value	  and	  share.	  China	  grew	  its	  clothing	  exports	  tenfold	  between	  
1990	  and	  2008	  (Morris	  and	  Barnes	  2008)	  and	  by	  200%	  between	  2000	  and	  2009.	  In	  2009,	  China	  
commandeered	  a	  34%	  share	  (equivalent	  to	  US$107.26bn)	  of	  global	  clothing	  exports	  compared	  
with	  a	  mere	  9%	  in	  19903;	  and	   if	  Hong	  Kong	   is	   included,	  this	  share	  rises	  to	  41.2%.	  The	  second	  
largest	   exporter	   was	   the	   EU,	   who	   contributed	   an	   almost	   constant	   one	   third	   to	   total	   world	  
clothing	  exports	  between	  2000	  and	  2009,	  growing	  at	  an	  annual	  growth	  rate	  of	  around	  8%	  for	  
the	   2000	   to	   2009	   period.	   This	   was	   higher	   than	   the	   world	   average	   of	   6.5%,	   but	   significantly	  
lower	  than	  the	  22%	  for	  China	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  However,	  China’s	  growth	  rate	  halved	  (11%)	  
between	  2005	  and	  2009	  due	  to	  safeguards.	  
	  
Third,	  since	  2006	  clothing	  trade	  has	  become	  increasingly	  concentrated	  in	  Asia;	  the	  Asian	  12	  i.e.	  
Bangladesh,	   Cambodia,	   China,	   India,	   Indonesia,	   Laos,	   Nepal,	   Pakistan,	   Philippines,	   Sri	   Lanka,	  
Thailand,	  and	  Vietnam,	  increased	  their	  market	  share	  from	  42.4%	  in	  2004	  to	  47.7%	  in	  2005,	  with	  
the	   largest	   growth	   rates	   recorded	   for	   India	   (30%)	   and	   China	   (26%),	   followed	   by	   Cambodia	  
(11%),	  Vietnam	  (7%),	  and	  Indonesia	  (7%)	  as	  well	  as	  Turkey	  (4%),	  Sri	  Lanka	  (4%),	  and	  Bangladesh	  
(1%)	  (Staritz	  2011).	  In	  the	  last	  decade,	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  exports	  from	  Asia	  have	  been	  rising	  
faster	  than	  those	  from	  the	  EU,	  the	  United	  States	  (US)	  and	  the	  world	  average	  thus	  reinforcing	  
the	  leading	  role	  of	  the	  Asian	  region	  in	  world	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  trade	  (Memedovich	  2009).	  In	  
2009	  the	  top	  10	  Asian	  exporters	   in	  this	  year	  –	  China,	  Hong	  Kong,	   India,	  Bangladesh,	  Vietnam,	  
Thailand,	   Pakistan,	   Malaysia,	   Sri	   Lanka	   and	   Cambodia	   -­‐	   contributed	   58%	   (US$182.98bn)	   to	  
global	   exports	   of	   US$315.62bn	   compared	   with	   45.3%	   (US$89.81bn)	   in	   2000,	   implying	   an	  
average	  annual	  growth	  rate	  of	  16%	  between	  2000	  and	  2008.	  Italy	  and	  Germany	  were	  the	  only	  
developed	  countries	  that	  still	  featured	  meaningfully	  in	  global	  export	  markets	  in	  2009,	  although	  
in	  value	  terms	  they	  were	  decidedly	  dwarfed	  by	  China.	  
	  
Fourth,	   the	   antithesis	   applies	   to	   clothing	   imports	   where	   the	   share	   of	   developed	   countries	  
greatly	  outweighed	  that	  of	  developing	  countries.	  In	  2009,	  the	  European	  Union	  was	  the	  leading	  
world	  importer	  of	  clothing,	  accounting	  for	  48.5%	  of	  global	  imports	  in	  this	  year.	  Imports	  into	  the	  
EU	   almost	   doubled	   between	   2000	   and	   2009,	   growing	   at	   an	   annual	   compound	   rate	   of	   10%	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













during	  the	  period.	  Intra-­‐European	  trade	  historically	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  EU	  clothing	  imports	  
but	   declined	   from	   43.4%	   in	   1995	   to	   36.6%	   in	   2009	   (WTO	   2009;	   Memedovich	   2009).	   In	  
comparison,	  Asia’s,	  and	  more	  particularly	  China’s	  share	  grew	  from	  7%	  to	  25.2%	  over	  the	  same	  
period.	  Imports	  from	  China	  into	  Europe	  (EU27)	  grew	  at	  a	  compound	  rate	  of	  21%	  p.a.	  between	  
2000	  and	  2007	  to	  US$322.85bn,	  a	  share	  of	  19.8%	  of	  total	  imports.	  	  The	  Asian	  12	  also	  increased	  
their	   share	  of	  EU	   imports	  dramatically	   from	  26.6%	   to	  40.3%	  between	  2004	  and	  2009	   (Staritz	  
2011).	  	  
	  
On	  an	   individual	   country	  basis,	   the	  US	   is	  by	   far	   the	  greatest	   individual	   consumer	  of	   clothing.	  
Between	  1990	  and	  2007,	  US	  clothing	  imports	  grew	  by	  214%	  from	  US$26.98bn	  to	  US$84.85bn	  
(WTO	   2008).	   In	   2007	   this	   constituted	   23.7%	   of	   world	   clothing	   imports.	  More	   importantly,	   a	  
third	  (33.6%)	  of	  these	  imports	  (US$28.53bn)	  came	  from	  China,	  which	  grew	  at	  a	  compound	  rate	  
of	   18%	   between	   2000	   and	   2007	   (WTO	   2007) 4 .	   The	   estimated	   overall	   clothing	   import	  
penetration	  ratio	  for	  the	  US	  was	  94%	  in	  2006	  (Clothesource	  2008,	  cited	  in	  Gereffi	  and	  Frederick	  
2010);	  Asia	  was	  the	  main	  contributor	  to	  these	  imports	  (68.9%),	  with	  China	  alone	  accounting	  for	  
29.4%	   in	   this	   year.	  However,	   although	   the	  US’s	   share	  of	   global	   imports	  held	   steady	  between	  
2007	  and	  2009,	   hovering	  between	  21-­‐22%	  during	   this	   period,	   this	  was	   almost	   10%	  below	   its	  
2005	  share	  of	  almost	  30%	  (which	  spiked	  following	  MFA	  quota	  removal	  and	  then	  dipped	  again	  in	  
response	   to	   safeguards).	   In	   2009	   Germany	   was	   the	   second	   largest	   individual	   importer	   of	  
clothing	  on	   a	   global	   basis	  with	   a	   share	  of	   9.3%,	   followed	  by	   Japan	  with	   a	   7.7%	   share.	  Again,	  
most	   of	   these	   imports	   hailed	   from	   China	   (Morris	   and	   Barnes	   2008).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Comtrade data deviates from WTO data, showing total clothing imports into the US of $78.92bn in 2007 










Figure	  2:	  Top	  importers	  and	  exporters	  of	  clothing	  by	  value:	  2000;	  2005-­‐2009	  
	  
Data	  source:	  ITC	  Own	  calculations	  
	  
Analysis	   of	   macro	   trade	   data	   shows	   that	   a	   distinguishing	   feature	   of	   the	   recent	   wave	   of	  
globalisation	   in	   the	   clothing	   sector	   is	   deep	   asymmetrical	   growth	   of	   clothing	   production	   both	  
between	   developed	   and	   developing	   countries,	   and	   between	   developing	   countries,	   and	  more	  
recently,	  a	  global	  consolidation	  of	  production	  in	  China	  and	  a	  handful	  of	  other	  Southeast	  Asian	  
countries	   coupled	   with	   increasing	   marginalisation	   of	   other	   developing	   countries.	   Studies	  
evidence	  similar	  trends	  in	  the	  microeconomic	  data	  i.e.	  falling	  clothing	  output	  and	  employment	  
levels	  in	  developed	  countries	  compared	  with	  output	  and	  employment	  expansion	  for	  developing	  
countries.5	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













The	  restructuring	  and	  reorganisation	  of	  the	  clothing	  value	  chain	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  had	  two	  
main	  drivers:	  i)	  the	  development	  of	  global	  buyer-­‐driven	  value	  chains	  and	  production	  networks	  
in	  the	  clothing	  sector	  and	   ii)	  changes	   in	  the	  strategies	  and	  sourcing	  techniques	  of	  these	   large	  
global	  buyers	  in	  response	  to	  the	  phase-­‐out	  of	  the	  Multifiber	  Arrangement	  (MFA)	  quota	  system	  
at	  the	  end	  2005.	  	  
	  
The	  development	  of	  the	  buyer	  driven	  clothing	  value	  chain	  	  
	  
Similar	  to	  many	  other	  traded	  manufactured	  products,	  clothing	  production	  refers	  to	  a	  series	  of	  
component	   activities	   which	   are	   sold	   as	   inputs	   for	   other	   components	   and	   end	   up	   as	   final	  
products,	   all	   linked	   and	   coordinated	   globally	   (Dicken	   1998;	   Morris	   2007).	   Each	   distinct	   task	  
spanning	   the	   conception	   of	   a	   garment	   through	   the	   different	   stages	   of	   production	   and	   final	  
disposal	  can	  be	  easily	  outsourced	  and	  allocated	  to	  capable	  foreign	  suppliers	  (Gereffi,	  Humphrey	  
and	   Sturgeon	   2005;	   Memedovich	   2009).	   Complex	   tasks	   that	   are	   capital	   and	   knowledge	  
intensive	  such	  as	  design,	  distribution,	  market	  intelligence,	  branding	  and	  advertising,	  for	  which	  
significant	  barriers	   to	  entry	   for	  new	  firms	  exist,	  and	  profitability	   is	  greatest,	   remain	   largely	   in	  
rich	   developed	   economies	   (Gereffi	   1999;	   Kaplinsky	   and	   Morris	   2006).	   In	   comparison,	  
production	   related	   tasks,	   which	   are	   neither	   skill	   nor	   capital	   intensive	   and	   have	   low	   entry	  
barriers,	  are	  outsourced	  to	  developing	  economies	  (Gibbon	  2003a;	  Morris	  2007;	  Bair	  2008).	   In	  
this	   manner,	   the	   clothing	   value	   chain	   has	   become	   functionally	   and	   spatially	   segmented	  
according	   to	  comparative	  advantage.	  The	  clothing	  sector	   is	  particularly	  suited	   to	   these	  global	  
production	  arrangements	  as	  most	  (intermediate)	  products	  can	  be	  exported	  at	  each	  stage	  of	  the	  
chain	  (Morris	  and	  Barnes	  2008). What	  is	  more,	  since	  a	  large	  part	  of	  garment	  assembly	  -­‐	  cutting,	  
sewing	  and	  finishing	  activities	  -­‐	  cannot	  be	  easily	  standardized	  and	  automated,	  labour	  remains	  a	  
major	  part	  of	  production	  costs	  (Jones	  2005;	  ILO	  2005).	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  search	  for	  low	  wage	  
is	   a	   major	   driver	   of	   the	   clothing	   value	   chain	   and	   has	   driven	   production	   toward	   the	   lowest	  
wage/cost	   regions	   around	   the	   world	   (Nordas	   2004;	   Morris	   and	   Barnes	   2008;	   Memedovich	  
2009).	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   given	   its	   low	   capital	   -­‐	   low	   skill	   requirement,	   investment	   in	   clothing	  
production	   is	  notoriously	   fickle	  and	  mobile	   (Nauman	  2006)	  with	   the	   implication	   that	  clothing	  
sector	   development	   in	   many	   developing	   countries	   is	   superficial	   with	   low	   levels	   of	   domestic	  














A	   key	   characteristic	   of	   global	   value	   chains	   is	   the	  dominance	  of	   one	   key	  party	  who	   is	   able	   to	  
exert	  a	  defining	  influence	  over	  the	  activities	  within	  a	  given	  value	  chain.	  In	  a	  value	  chain,	  such	  as	  
for	   clothing,	   where	   design	   and	   marketing	   play	   an	   important	   role,	   but	   where	   production	   is	  
relatively	   labour	   intensive,	   “the	   buyers”	   i.e.	   large	   retailers,	   marketers	   and	   branded	  
manufacturers	  perform	  this	   lead	  role	  (Roberts	  and	  Thoburn	  2002).	  These	  chains	  are	  demand-­‐
driven	   and	   aptly	   called	   “buyer	   driven”	   chains	   due	   to	   the	   hold	   that	   buyers	   have	   over	  
manufacturers,	  specifying	  critical	  characteristics	  in	  terms	  of	  style,	  fit	  and	  fabric,	  as	  well	  as	  many	  
aspects	  of	  production	  itself,	  including	  which	  firms	  make	  what	  products,	  how,	  where,	  when,	  and	  
at	  what	  cost	   (Gereffi	  1999;	  Kaplinsky	  2005;	  Gereffi	  et	  al	  2005).	  Whilst	  not	  directly	   involved	   in	  
production,	   these	   buyers	   control	   and	   organise	   production	   on	   a	  worldwide	   basis.	   A	   group	   of	  
leading	   transnational	   corporations	   (TNCs),	   from	   developed	   and	   developing	   countries,	   has	  
played	   a	   major	   role	   in	   organizing	   and	   coordinating	   these	   global	   production	   systems	  
(Appelbaum	   and	   Gereffi	   1994;	   Gereffi	   and	  Memedovic	   2003).	   Coordination	   and	   cooperation	  
have	  become	  central	  to	  their	  corporate	  strategies.	  	  	  
The	  emergence	  of	  global	  buyers	  and	  the	  transfer	  of	  power	  from	  manufacturers	  to	  
retailers	  
	  
The	  main	  leverage	  of	  buyers	  over	  other	  actors	  in	  the	  chain	  is	  exercised	  through	  their	  ability	  to	  
shape	  mass	   consumption	   via	   the	   development	   of	   strong	   global	   brands	   and	   their	   reliance	   on	  
global	  production	  networks	  to	  feed	  this	  demand	  (Gereffi	  1999;	  Gereffi	  et	  al	  2005).	  Consumers	  
have	  responded	  in	  kind	  by	  demanding	  disposable	  high	  quality	  fast-­‐fashion	  clothing	  (ILO	  2005).	  
They	  have	  become	  more	  demanding	   in	  terms	  of	  price,	  spending	  a	  smaller	  proportion	  of	   their	  
income	  on	  clothing	  but	  shopping	  more	  frequently	  and	  buying	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  clothing	  items	  
(Nordas	  2004).	  They	  have	  also	  increasingly	  fallen	  to	  the	  allure	  of	  brand	  labels.	  	  
Developments	   in	  the	  retail	  space	  have	  been	  key	  drivers	  of	  global	  clothing	  production	  activity.	  
Over	  the	  past	  decade	  value	  chains	  have	  been	  reinforced	  by	  a	  growth	  in	  retailer	  power	  in	  both	  
developed	   and	   increasingly,	   developing	   economies	   (Gereffi	   and	  Memedovic	   2003;	   Kaplinsky	  
2005).	   In	  2007,	   the	   top	   five	   retailers	   in	   the	  US	  accounted	   for	  56%	  of	   sales	  among	  the	   top	  20	  
retailers	  (Morris	  and	  Barnes	  2008).	  Walmart	   is	  the	  single	   largest	  retailer,	  representing	  32%	  of	  
total	  US	  demand	  in	  the	  retail	  sector	  in	  2007	  (National	  Retail	  Foundation	  2008).	  The	  UK	  clothing	  
retail	   sector	   is	   similarly	   concentrated.	   Concentration	   through	   mergers	   and	   acquisitions	  













other	  agents	  within	  the	  value	  chain	  allowing	  them	  to	  manage	  and	  coordinate	  global	  contracting	  
networks	  and	  to	  cater	  for	  the	  latest	  fashion	  trends,	  change	  stock,	  lower	  unit	  prices	  and	  provide	  
product	  variety	  with	  ease	  (Salinger,	  Bhorat	  and	  Flaherty	  1999;	  Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008).	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	  technological	  advancements	  in	  information	  and	  transportation	  –	  bar	  coding,	  point	  
of	   sale	   scanning	   and	   containerisation	   -­‐	   combined	  with	   standardisation	   of	   business	   protocols	  
and	  international	  product	  codes,	  allows	  the	  cost	  and	  flexibility	  advantages	  of	  global	  sourcing	  to	  
be	   realised	   at	   the	   production	   level	   by	   linking	   the	   clothing	   value	   chain	   both	   vertically	   and	  
horizontally	  (Morris	  and	  Barnes	  2008).6	  As	  a	  result,	  retailers	  are	  increasingly	  able	  to	  transfer	  the	  
pressures	   to	   minimise	   costs	   and	   improve	   quality	   and	   variety	   to	   manufacturers,	   mainly	   in	  
developing	   countries	   (ILO	   2005).	   These	   manufacturers	   either	   have	   to	   absorb	   the	   costs	   and	  
lower	  their	  margins,	  or	  improve	  productivity.	  	  	  
As	   intangible	  aspects	  of	   the	  value	  chain	   (such	  as	  marketing,	  brand	  development,	  and	  design)	  
have	   become	   more	   important	   for	   the	   profitability	   and	   power	   of	   lead	   firms,	   so	   “tangibles”	  
(production	   and	   manufacturing)	   have	   increasingly	   become	   “commodities”	   (Gereffi	   and	  
Frederick	   2010)	   and	   the	   roles	   and	   relationship	   between	   retailers	   and	   manufacturers	   have	  
become	  increasingly	  blurred	  with	  time.	  There	  has	  been	  a	  realignment	  of	  interests	  in	  the	  chain	  
as	  organisational	  barriers	   to	  entry	  –	  associated	  with	   the	  creation	  and	  buttressing	  of	  brands	   -­‐	  
have	  grown	  (Gereffi	  and	  Memedovic	  2003).	  	  Bargaining	  power	  has	  gradually	  gravitated	  towards	  
the	   branding,	   design	   and	  merchandising	   ends	   of	   the	   value	   chain	   (i.e.	   towards	   the	   retailers)	  
whilst	  the	  supply	  end	  (the	  manufacturers)	  has	  been	  marginalised.	  Consequently,	  the	  sector	   is	  
driven	  mainly	  by	  the	  largest	  brand	  name	  owners	  and	  retailers	  in	  the	  industry,	  who	  are	  able	  to	  
exercise	  decisive	   influence	  over	   their	  value	  chain	  without	  having	  to	  take	  direct	  control	  of	   the	  
production	  process	  itself.	  	  
This	   fundamental	   restructuring	   in	   the	   retailing	   and	   merchandising	   ends	   of	   the	   industry	   in	  
developed	  economies	  has	  culminated	   in	  a	  shift	   in	  power	  from	  manufacturers	  to	  retailers	  and	  
branded	  marketers	  which	  has	  enabled	   them	   to	   subsume	   the	   traditional	  manufacturer	   as	   the	  
leader	   in	   the	  clothing	  chain	   (Gereffi	  and	  Memedovich	  2003;	  Gereffi	  et	  al	  2005).	  The	  ultimate	  
outcome	   of	   the	   transfer	   of	   power	   from	  manufacturers	   to	   retailers	   has	   been	   a	   shift	   from	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This refers to vertical relations between links (e.g. supply chain management) and horizontal relations 














supplier-­‐driven	   value	   chain	   to	   a	   buyer-­‐driven	   value	   chain;	   and	   a	   simultaneous	   expansion	   of	  
production	   (Kaplinsky	   2005;	   Morris	   2006a;	   Morris	   and	   Barnes	   2008).	   Competition	   has	  
intensified	  as	  retailers,	  manufacturers	  and	  branded	  marketers	  all	  compete	  in	  a	  global	  market.	  
On	  one	  hand,	  retailers	  have	  “taken	  on”	  their	  old	  customers	  (the	  manufacturers)	  by	  themselves	  
moving	   into	   the	  manufacturing	  and	  design	   space.	  They	  have	  also	   started	   to	   import	   from	   low	  
cost	   offshore	   locations	   (Morris	   and	   Barnes	   2008);	   they	   have	   become	   more	   specialised	   by	  
product	  (i.e.	  the	  rise	  of	  specialised	  stores	  selling	  only	  one	  item,	  such	  as	  clothes)	  and	  price	  (the	  
growth	  of	  high-­‐volume,	  low	  cost	  discount	  chains)(Gereffi	  and	  Memedovich	  2003)	  and	  they	  have	  
developed	   their	   own	   proprietary	   brand	   labels,	   which	   are	   highly	   fashion-­‐oriented	   and	   price	  
sensitive.	   These	   are	   designed	   in-­‐house	   and	   marketed	   alongside	   products	   from	   branded	  
marketers	   and	   manufacturers. Production	   is	   outsourced	   offshore,	   often	   by	   direct	   foreign	  
sourcing	   (Gereffi	   and	  Memedovic	   2003;	  Gereffi	   and	   Frederick	   2010).	   Cutting	  out	   the	  middle-­‐
man	  provides	  both	  better	  prices	  to	  customers	  and	  higher	  margins	  to	  retailers.	  Today,	  retailers	  
are	   expanding	   the	   range	   of	   private-­‐label	   products	   offered	   and	   developing	   higher-­‐margin	  
private-­‐label	  goods	  (Euromonitor	  2009).	  	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   retailers'	   involvement	   in	   manufacturing	   activities	   has	   been	   echoed	   by	  
manufacturers'	  move	   into	   retail	   activities	  aimed	  at	   strengthening	   their	  own	  brand	   strategies.	  
This	   trend	   has	   intensified	   over	   time	   and	   brand	   owners	   have	   themselves	   become	   speciality	  
retailers.	   Thus	   the	   industry	   can	   be	   described	   as	   ‘hypercompetitive’;	   where	   local	   producers	  
compete	   both	   with	   international	   competition	   as	   well	   as	   domestic	   manufacturers.	  
Simultaneously	   an	   oligopsony	   amongst	   retailers	   occurs	   as	   they	   compete	   fiercely	   amongst	  
themselves	  for	  low	  cost	  suppliers	  (Morris	  2006a;	  2006b).	   
Global	   buyers	   in	   the	   clothing	   sector	   have	   been	   described	   as	   ‘the	   organisational	  motors’	   and	  
‘the	  key	  drivers	  of	  globalisation	  in	  the	  apparel	  industry’	  as	  they	  shape	  the	  geography	  of	  clothing	  
manufacturing	   by	   their	   sourcing	   strategies	   (Appelbaum	   and	   Gereffi	   1994;	   Gereffi	   2005;	  
Palpacuer,	  Gibbon	  and	  Thomsen	  2005).	  Over	   the	  past	   five	  years,	   there	  has	  been	  a	  significant	  
rationalisation	  and	  consolidation	  of	  the	  supply	  base.	  Large	  buyers	  have	  begun	  managing	  their	  
supply	   chain	   more	   effectively	   and	   have	   started	   to	   establish	   more	   effective	   direct	   supply	  
relationships	  around	  a	  handful	  of	   reliable	  and	  capable	  suppliers	   (Gibbon	  2002a;	  2008;	  Morris	  













Arrangement	  (MFA)	  quotas	  in	  2005,	  whilst	  their	  intensification	  in	  recent	  years	  has	  been	  largely	  
attributed	  to	  the	  economic	  downturn	  (Gereffi	  and	  Frederich	  2010).	  	  
The	  Multifiber	  Arrangement	  (MFA)	  
	  
The	   MFA	   was	   a	   quota-­‐based	   preferential	   trade	   agreement	   that	   limited	   exports	   of	   certain	  
countries	   to	   the	  US	   and	  major	   trade	  destinations	   across	   Europe	   (Kaplinsky	   and	  Morris	   2006;	  
Brambilla,	   Khandelwal	   and	   Schott	   2007).	   Beginning	   as	   a	   series	   of	   voluntary	   export	   restraints	  
imposed	   initially	   by	   the	   US	   on	   Japanese	   textile	   exports,	   it	   gradually	   morphed	   into	   a	   more	  
systematic	  mechanism	  “to	  deal	  with	  market	  disruption	  in	  importing	  developed	  countries	  while	  
allowing	  exporting	  developing	  countries	  to	  expand	  their	  share	  of	  world	  trade	  in	  these	  products”	  
(USITC	   2004).	   This	   was	   presumably	   to	   give	   developed	   countries	   time	   to	   restructure	   their	  
clothing	  industries	  before	  opening	  up	  to	  competition	  from	  developing,	  and	  arguably	  lower	  cost,	  
countries.	   In	   reality,	   the	  MFA	  was	  designed	   to	  protect	   the	  high	  value-­‐added	  segments	  of	   the	  
value	   chain	   in	  developed	  economies	   in	  order	   to	  prevent	   large	   structural	   adjustment	   costs	   as	  
Asian	  clothing	  and	  textile	  production	  started	  to	  grow	  (Kaplinsky	  and	  Morris	  2006;	  Memedovich	  
2009).	  	  It	  afforded	  a	  high	  level	  of	  protection	  to	  clothing	  industries	  in	  developed	  countries	  whilst	  
muting	   the	  participation	  of	  developing	   countries	   such	  as	   China	   (Brambilla	   et	   al	   2007).	  Quota	  
was	  allocated	  to	  preferred	  trading	  partners	  and	  complex	  tariff	  schedules	  were	  simultaneously	  
implemented	   through	   bilateral	   negotiations	   to	   protect	   the	   capital	   intensive	   sections	   of	   the	  
value	   chain	   while	   allowing	   developed	   nations	   to	   outsource	   unskilled,	   labour	   intensive	  
production	  to	  developing	  nations	  (USITC	  2005:	  p.91;	  Kaplinsky	  2005).	  	  
Since	  quotas	  were	  imposed	  discriminately	  rather	  than	  globally,	  differentials	  between	  countries	  
in	   terms	   of	   product	   coverage	   and	   the	   degree	   of	   restrictiveness	   created	   a	   set	   of	   incentives	  
whereby	  production	  concentrated	  in	  locations	  where	  quotas	  were	  least	  binding	  and	  particularly	  
where	   production	   was	   geared	   to	   US	   and	   EU	   markets	   (Naumann	   2006).	   When	   key	  
manufacturers	   such	   as	   India	   and	   China	   reached	   their	   quota	   limits,	   they	   would	   negotiate	  
bilateral	   agreements	   with	   countries	   holding	   excess	   quota	   allowances	   with	   established	  
developed	  country	  access	  (Flanagan	  2003a;	  Barnes	  and	  Esselaar	  2005;	  Morris	  2006a).	  In	  similar	  
fashion, importers	   in	   developed	   countries	   engaged	   in	   “quota	   hopping”,	   shifting	   low-­‐skill	  













exporting	   the	   finished	   item	   to	   its	   final	   market 7 	  (UNCTAD	   2005).	   Hence	   quotas	   created	  
accidental	  beneficiaries	  by	  encouraging	  the	  spread	  of	  clothing	  production	  to	  countries	  where	  it	  
had	   not	   previously,	   nor	   would	   likely	   have,	   occurred	   without	   the	   shield	   of	   quota	   protection	  
(Kaplinsky	   2005;	   Flanagan	   2006a).	  Where	   quotas	  were	   particularly	   restrictive,	   and	   especially	  
against	  China,	  third	  parties	  began	  to	  locate	  outside	  of	  China	  and	  establish	  strategic	  production	  
and	   obligational	   sourcing	   partnerships 8 	  with	   countries	   with	   established	   international	  
manufacturing	  economies	  with	  supply	  capabilities,	   such	  as	  Mauritius,	  who	  were	  able	   to	  offer	  
investors	   quota	   and	   tariff-­‐based	   preference	  margins	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   access	   to	   international	  markets	  
that	  quota	  constrained	  countries	  did	  not	  have	  (Morris	  and	  Barnes	  2008).	  In	  this	  manner,	  they	  
controlled	   ‘triangular	   production	   networks’	   i.e.	   production	   in	   developing	   countries	   was	  
organised	  by	  firms	  in	  middle	  income	  countries	  with	  garments	  sold	  to	  final	  buyers	  in	  developed	  
markets	   (Gereffi	   1999;	  Morris	   2006a).	  Many	  African	   countries	   in	   particular,	   notably	   Lesotho,	  
Madagascar,	   Kenya	   and	   South	   Africa	   saw	   a	   revival	   of	   their	   clothing	   sectors	   owing	   to	  
investments	  of	  this	  nature	  (Nauman	  2006).	  	  
Outcomes	  of	  the	  MFA	  	  
	  
MFA	   quotas	   led	   to	   diverse	   and	   largely	   unintended	   outcomes,	   driving	   a	   much	   broader	  
worldwide	  diffusion	  and	  expansion	  of	   the	  sector	   than	  would	  otherwise	  have	   taken	  place	  and	  
they	   materially	   contributed	   to	   the	   international	   fragmentation	   of	   the	   clothing	   supply	   chain	  
(Naumann	   2006;	   Morris	   2007).	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   removal	   of	   these	   trade	   restrictions	  
catalysed	  significant	  modifications	  to	  the	  trade	  patterns	  that	  manifest	   in	  their	  presence.	  On	  1	  
January	  1995,	   the	  MFA	  was	   replaced	  by	   the	  Agreement	  on	  Textiles	  and	  Clothing	  Trade	   (ATC)	  
which	  was	  entered	  as	  a	  compromise	  Agreement	  between	  developed	  (importing)	  countries	  who	  
were	   pressing	   for	   a	   broadening	   of	   the	  MFA	   and	   developing	   (exporting)	   countries	   who	  were	  
opposed	  to	  it.	  The	  ATC	  was	  a	  time-­‐limited	  and	  thus	  self-­‐destructing	  agreement,	  which	  set	  out	  a	  
definitive	  plan	  for	  the	  structured	  removal9	  of	  all	  MFA-­‐type	  quantitative	  restrictions	  on	  clothing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The product range was also modified to move into sectors with unused quotas – for example T-shirts were 
lengthened and exported as tunics under a different tariff line. 
8  An obligational relationship is a mutually beneficial agreement where both intermediaries and 
manufacturers commit to a long-term commercial relationship. This encourages investment in new 
infrastructure and the implementation of world class manufacturing techniques due to the assurance that 
manufacturers have of future orders. 
9 The integration process occurred over four phases and involved 2 mechanisms: i) product integration and 
quota removal and ii) acceleration of growth rates of those still in effect in the transition period. The 













by	   1	   January	   2005.	   In	   addition	   to	   gradually	   removing	   quotas,	   the	   growth	   rates	   of	   remaining	  
quotas	   were	   gradually	   increased;	   this	   was	   designed	   with	   a	   view	   to	   improving	   developing	  
country	  access	  to	  developed	  country	  markets	  (Morris	  2006a;	  Brambilla	  et	  al	  2007).	  	  
Despite	   its	   promise	   of	   a	   steady	   liberalisation	   of	   trade,	   the	   practical	   implementation	   of	   the	  
Agreement	   lagged	   its	   theoretical	  prescription	  since	  developed	  countries	  backloaded	  the	  most	  
trade	  sensitive	  products	  to	  ensure	  a	  much	  slower	  delivery	  of	  effective	  trade	  liberalisation	  than	  
anticipated	  and	  not	   least,	   intended	   (Nauman	  2006).	   This	  was	   largely	   testimony	   to	   its	   flexible	  
and	  non-­‐prescriptive	  design.	  In	  2004	  the	  US	  maintained	  import	  quotas	  on	  textiles	  and	  apparel	  
on	  43	   countries	   supplying	   69%	  of	  US	   imports,	  with	   China	  by	   far	   the	   largest	   supplier.	   The	   EU	  
demonstrated	  similar	  evasiveness;	  more	  than	  70%	  of	   its	  clothing	   imports	  were	  still	  subject	  to	  
quotas	  at	  this	  time	  (Kaplinsky	  and	  Morris	  2006).	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  largest	  integration	  would	  take	  
place	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period	  portended	  significant	  market	  disruption	  in	  the	  immediate	  wake	  
of	  quota	  removal	  (Brambilla	  et	  al	  2007;	  Ikenson	  2003).	  	  
As	  the	  final	  date	  for	  quota	  removal	  drew	  close,	  there	  was	  lively	  debate	  over	  the	  likely	  impact	  of	  
liberalisation	   on	   global	   clothing	  markets	   and	   its	   implications	   for	   developing	   country	   growth.	  
Universally,	   China	  was	   expected	   to	   be	   the	  major	   beneficiary	   of	   liberalisation,	   although	  other	  
countries	   such	   as	   Vietnam,	   Bangladesh,	   Indonesia	   and	   India	   who	   have	   a	   similarly	   derived	  
comparative	  advantage	  from	  access	  to	  low	  cost	  fabric	  and	  labour	  and	  whose	  imports	  were	  also	  
constrained	  by	  quotas,	  were	  also	  expected	  to	  benefit10.	  Some	  predicted	  a	  ‘big	  bang”	  effect	  with	  
buyers	   sourcing	   solely	   from	   China,	   so	   flooding	   global	  markets	   with	   cheap	   Chinese	   garments	  
(Morris	   and	   Barnes	   2008).	   Some	   envisaged	   a	   more	   orderly	   and	   gradual	   change	   with	   large	  
retailers	   consolidating	   and	   rationalising	   their	   purchases	   around	   a	   handful	   of	   politically	   and	  
financially	   stable	   suppliers	   (UNCTAD	   2004;	   Morris	   and	   Barnes	   2008).	   Others	   were	   more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
goods from all major textiles and clothing segments and; ii) comprise a set portion of the country’s total 
clothing and textile imports by volume at each stage. Phase I, commencing 1 January 1995, countries had 
to integrate products that accounted for at least 16% of their 1990 textile and apparel import volumes; 
Phases II, and III commencing 1 January 1998 and 2002 respectively saw an additional 17% and 18% 
integrated respectively; or a total of 51% during the three stages. Finally, on 1 January 2005, Phase IV 
culminated with the integration of the remaining 49% of export volumes and all quotas were eliminated on 
trade in the goods subject to normal GATT rules. In addition to gradually removing quotas, the growth rates 
of remaining quotas were to be increased by 16% for major suppliers during Phase in 1995; 25% in Phase 
II; and 27% in Phase III9. 
10 Conversely, countries which had effectively been protected by the quota system from more competitive 













cautious	  in	  their	  predictions,	  and	  adopted	  a	  “wait	  and	  see”	  approach	  to	  decide	  how	  suppliers	  
would	  react	  (Flanagan	  2006a)	  	  
The	  implications	  of	  MFA	  quota	  removal	  for	  competitiveness	  
	  
In	   the	   previous	   section	   I	   gave	   a	   broad	   overview	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   developments	   and	  
transformations	   in	   the	  global	   clothing	   industry	  over	   the	  past	  decade	  which	  exemplifies	   three	  
phenomena;	   the	   development	   of	   buyer-­‐driven	   global	   value	   chains,	   the	   emergence	   of	   large	  
global	   buyers	   and	   the	   intensification	   of	   competition	   in	   the	   industry	   following	   MFA	   quota	  
removal	  (Gereffi	  and	  Frederick	  2010).	  I	  shall	  now	  tie	  these	  together	  with	  competitiveness	  and	  
industrial	  policy.	  	  
	  
Prior	   to	   2005,	   the	   sourcing	   strategies	   of	   buyers	   in	   developed	   countries	  were	   conditioned	   by	  
access	   to	   developed	   country	   markets	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   MFA	   (Kaplinsky	   and	   Morris	   2006;	  
Naumann	  2006;	  Morris	  2007).	  MFA	  quotas	  determined	  when	  the	  outward	  shift	  of	  production	  
occurred,	  while	  preferential	  access	  to	  overseas	  markets	  through	  trade	  agreements	  determined	  
where	  firms	  went	  (Gereffi	  2002b;	  2008).	  With	  the	  removal	  of	  MFA	  quotas,	  the	  competitiveness	  
issue	  has	  increased	  in	  complexity.	  	  
Two	  key	  developments	  have	   shaped	  competitiveness	   in	   the	  post	  MFA	  era.	   Firstly,	   the	   rise	  of	  
private	   label	  brands	   that	   are	  directly	   sourced	  by	   retailers	   from	   their	   suppliers;	   and	   secondly,	  
the	  emergence	  of	  large	  organised	  buyers	  and	  more	  recently,	  of	  intermediaries	  and	  third	  party	  
agents.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  direct	  sourcing	  requires	  faster	  reaction	  times	  from	  manufacturers	  and	  
better	  understanding	  of	  a	  retailer’s	  particular	  needs	   i.e.	  culture,	  market	  orienation	  etc.	   In	  the	  
second	  instance,	  organised	  buying	  and	  third-­‐party	  sourcing	  increases	  the	  scale	  and	  flexibility	  of	  
buying	   operations	   and	   enhances	   the	   negotiating	   power	   of	   retailers	   and	   their	   ability	   to	   drive	  
prices	  down	  (Staritz	  2011).	  Post	  MFA,	  these	  structural	  and	  organisational	  factors	  present	  more	  
systematic	  and	  inherent	  barriers	  to	  entry	  than	  regulatory	  and	  institutional	  factors.	  The	  sourcing	  
strategies	  and	  behavior	  of	   the	   large	  buyers	   that	  drive	   the	  value	   chains	   in	   the	   clothing	   sector	  
strongly	   inform	   the	   nature	   and	   structure	   of	   operations	   and	   the	   development	   of	   the	   global	  
clothing	   sector	   (Gereffi	   and	   Frederick	   2010).	   Their	   considerable	   buying	   power	   and	   access	   to	  
transparent,	  real	  time,	  truly	  global	  information	  flows	  has	  manifest	  in	  considerable	  change	  in	  the	  













operations.	   On	   the	   demand-­‐side,	   clothing	   products	   have	   become	   more	   specialised	   and	  
differentiated,	   spanning	   a	   vast	   variety	   of	   styles	   but	   of	   smaller	   quantities;	   and	   private	   label	  
brands	  have	  flourished	  and	  replaced	  many	  traditional	  branded	  products	  (Staritz	  2011).	  On	  the	  
supply	   side,	   many	   countries	   have	   upgraded	   their	   production	   capabilities	   to	   meet	   the	   new	  
competitive	  challenges	  of	  fast	  fashion	  and	  quick	  response	  manufacturing	  which	  has	  eroded	  the	  
possibilities	  for	  emerging	  countries	  to	  capitalise	  on	  their	  geographical	  and	  locational	  advantage.	  
Sustained	  competitiveness	  redefined	  
	  
So	  what	   is	   sustained	   competitiveness	   in	   this	   new	  paradigm?	   In	   this	   new	   era	   of	   globalisation	  
characterised	  by	  fast	  fashion	  and	  fast	  response	  production,	  whilst	  price,	  quality	  and	  proximity	  
to	   market	   are	   still	   the	   main	   determinants	   of	   competitiveness,	   other	   factors	   have	   grown	   in	  
importance;	   including	   labour	   productivity,	   quality	   and	   cost	   of	   fabric,	   lead	   times	   and	   services	  
offered	  to	  apparel	  importers	  or	  brands.	  Import	  tariff	  rates	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  freight	  also	  play	  an	  
important	  role	  (Morris	  and	  Reed	  2008a;	  Emerging	  Textiles	  2008a)	  and	  in	  developed	  economies,	  	  
customers	   have	   grown	   increasingly	   aware	   of	   non-­‐production	   factors	   like	   country	   of	   origin	  
labeling,	   ethical	   sourcing	   and	   social	   compliance	   (Morris	   2006a).	   Sourcing	   decisions	   are	  
increasingly	   based	   on	   which	   factories	   can	   best	   meet	   these	   critical	   success	   factors	   (Gibbon	  
2002a;	  2008)	  
Researchers	   note	   that	   buyers	   actively	   discriminate	   between	   suppliers	   who	   can	   provide	   real	  
value	  to	  customers,	  not	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  price,	  but	  also	  product	  quality	  and	  service,	  including	  
speed	  to	  market,	  supply	  chain	  efficiency,	  reliability	  (Flanagan	  2006a)	  and	  liability	  for	  risk	  (Scott	  
and	   Lee	   1991;	   Birnbaum	   2002b;	   Flanagan	   2003a).	   What	   is	   more,	   retailers	   are	   generally	  
consolidating	  and	   rationalising	   their	   supply	  chain	  around	  a	  handful	  of	   large	  capable	   suppliers	  
who	  are	  strategically	  located	  near	  major	  markets	  and	  able	  to	  supply	  a	  comprehensive	  range	  of	  
clothing	   spanning	   several	   market	   segments;	   in	   effect,	   they	   want	   to	   “one	   stop	   shop”	  
(Euromonitor	  2009;	  Barrie	  &	  Ayling	  2009	  in	  Staritz	  2011).	  Recently,	  a	  major	  driver	  of	  this	  trend	  
has	   been	   the	   recession	  which	  has	   encouraged	   firms	   to	   ‘cut	   the	   fat’	   and	   confine	   their	   supply	  













Although	  preferential	  trade	  agreements	  still	  provide	  tariff	  advantages,	  and	  according	  to	  Morris	  
and	   Kaplinsky	   2006,	   still	   extend	   considerable	   benefits	   to	   developing	   countries11,	   empirical	  
evidence	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   quota	   removal	   shows	   that	   developing	   countries	   who	   are	   able	   to	  
offer	   full	   package	   capabilities	   have	   benefitted	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   those	   who	   can’t.	   In	   other	  
words,	  firms	  are	  only	  able	  to	  exploit	  their	  locational	  comparative	  advantage	  –	  speed	  to	  market	  
and	  fast	  replenishment	  –	   if	   they	  are	  able	  to	  offer	  a	  high	  quality	  and	  comparable	  product	  at	  a	  
competitive	  price	  to	  their	  foreign	  competitors.	  This	  suggests	  that	  sustained	  competitiveness	  in	  
the	  new	  era	  of	   globalisation	   is	  not	   simply	  a	  wage	  game	  but	   lies	   in	   the	  ability	   to	   compete	  on	  
price,	  flexibility,	  responsiveness	  and	  reliability	  (Morris	  and	  Barnes	  2008).	  Whilst	  low	  price	  is	  still	  
a	   necessary	   condition,	   it	   is	   no	   longer	   a	   sufficient	   condition	   for	   sustained	   competitiveness.	   In	  
order	   to	   maintain	   their	   position	   in	   the	   value	   chain,	   firms	   need	   to	   constantly	   innovate	   and	  
upgrade	   their	   capabilities	   to	  meet	   the	   demands	   of	   global	   buyers,	   undertaking	   the	   necessary	  
technological	   and	   innovational	   changes	   required	   for	   the	   transition	   to	   World	   Class	  
Manufacturing	   (Nordas	   2004;	   Morris	   2006).	   As	   Kaplinsky	   2005	   posits:	   In	   this	   new	   era	   of	  
globalisation,	  you	  need	  to	  run	  faster	  just	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  same	  place.	  The	  prescriptive	  role	  for	  
government	  and	  industrial	  policy	  is	  to	  champion	  the	  process	  of	  upgrading.	  So	  what	  is	  upgrading	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  clothing	  sector?	  	  
	  
Functional	  and	  industrial	  upgrading	  in	  the	  clothing	  sector	  
	  
Clothing	   production	   is	   organis d	   under	   four	   prototypes,	   which	   are	   associated	  with	   different	  
activities	  and	  embody	  varying	  potential	  for	  social	  learning	  for	  suppliers	  (Gereffi,	  Humphrey	  and	  
Sturgeon	   2005).	   These	   typologies	   describe	   the	   network	   of	   relationships	   linking	   suppliers	   in	  
global	   value	   chains	   to	   lead	   firms.	   The	   relationships	   between	   lead	   firms	   and	   suppliers	   differ	  
across	  sectors	  due	  to	  the	  particular	  characteristics	  of	  the	  production	  process	  and	  organisation	  
of	  the	  sector,	  such	  as	  the	  sophistication	  and	  availability	  of	  technology	  involved,	  the	  absence	  or	  
existence	  of	  technical	  and	  process	  standards	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  rapid	  turnover	  time	  and	  
speed	   to	   market	   is	   essential	   to	   competitiveness	   (Bair	   2005).	   The	   most	   basic	   form	   of	   CMT	  
production,	   which	   is	   essentially	   garment	   cutting	   and	   assembly	   of	   supplied	   components	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Some pundits contended that these would be less significant than quota benefits were with the average 
US duty on clothing items of 17 percent providing only a thin margin of preference over producers not 













according	  to	  customer’s	  specifications,	  is	  associated	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  knowledge	  and	  learning	  
and	   little	   social	   integration.	   There	   is	   little	   value	   added	   and	   the	   factory	   is	   simply	   paid	   a	  
processing	  fee	  for	  the	  garment	  and	  uses	  fabric	  sourced	  by	  and	  owned	  by	  the	  buyer.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  model,	  Own	  Equipment	  Manufacture	   (OEM)	  or	   full	  package	  production	   is	  a	  more	  
domestically	   integrated,	   higher	   value	   added	   form	   of	   production	   done	   to	   the	   customer’s	  
specifications	  on	  design	  and	  raw	  material	  inputs	  but	  where	  the	  supplier	  is	  capable	  of	  sourcing	  
and	   financing	   garment	   components	   and	   providing	   all	   production	   services,	   packaging	   and	  
delivery	  of	  final	  product	  to	  the	  retailers	  “free	  on	  board”	  (FOB)	  i.e.	  all	  costs	  are	  included	  in	  the	  
contractor’s	   price	   except	   shipping.	   Full	   package	   production	   fundamentally	   changes	   the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  buyer	  and	  supplier	  giving	  more	  autonomy	  to	  the	  supplier	  and	  creating	  
more	  possibilities	  for	  innovation	  and	  learning	  about	  sourcing	  (although	  not	  design)(Gereffi	  and	  
Memedovich	  2003).	  The	  final	  and	  most	  “evolved”	  model,	  Original	  Brand	  manufacturing	  (OBM),	  
focuses	  on	  branding	  rather	  than	  on	  design	  or	  manufacturing,	  which	  allows	  transition	   into	  the	  
sale	  of	  own	  brand	  products.	  Functional	  upgrading	  in	  the	  paradigm	  of	  buyer	  driven	  global	  value	  
chains	  occurs	  when	  firms	  move	  away	  from	  CMT	  to	  OEM	  (production	  contractor)	  to	  ODM	  (Full	  
package	  production)	  and	  finally	  to	  OBM	  production.	  	  
	  
Industrial	   upgrading	   occurs	  when	   countries	   change	   their	   roles	   in	   these	   export	   hierarchies	   as	  
they	  develop	  and	  upgrade	  their	  manufacturing	  capabilities	  and	  progress	  from	  low	  to	  high	  value	  
added	   segments	   of	   the	   chain	   in	   a	   sequential	   fashion	   over	   time,	   transitioning	   away	   from	   the	  
production	   of	   mass	   produced	   standardised	   items	   for	   mass	   discount	   retailers	   toward	   the	  
manufacture	   of	   higher	   value	   added	   and	   more	   complex	   garments	   to	   meet	   the	   more	  
sophisticated	   demands	   of	   retailers	   servicing	   upmarket,	   fashion-­‐oriented	   market	   segments	  
(Gereffi	  and	  Frederick	  2010)12.	  According	   to	  Gereffi	   (2002),	   the	  most	   successful	   countries	  are	  
those	  who	  are	  experts	  in	  OEM	  supply,	  or	  those	  who	  are	  developing	  full-­‐package	  capabilities.	  At	  
the	   same	   time,	   a	   successful	   transition	   from	   CMT	   to	   OEM	   production	   hinges	   crucially	   on	   a	  
country’s	  ability	   to	  establish	   links	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	   lead	  firms	   in	  buyer-­‐driven	  chains	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  














are	   the	  primary	   sources	  of	  material	   inputs,	   technology	   transfer	  and	  knowledge13	  (Gereffi	   and	  
Memedovich	  2003).	  	  
	  
The	  evolving	  role	  of	  industrial	  policy	  for	  the	  clothing	  sector	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  shift	  to	  global	  sourcing	  and	  with	  it	  the	  allocation	  of	  clothing	  production	  to	  low	  wage,	  
low	   cost	   countries,	   has	   been	   beneficial	   from	   a	   product-­‐pricing	   perspective,	   it	   has	   had	   a	  
deleterious	   impact	   on	   clothing	   production	   and	   employment	   in	   developed	   countries	   and	   has	  
triggered	   consternation	   in	   advanced	   economies	   about	   job	   loss	   and	   the	   degradation	   of	  
capabilities	   that	   could	   spell	   the	   disappearance	   of	   entire	   national	   industries	   (Gereffi	   2005).	   It	  
also	   sparked	  a	  debate	  about	   the	  benefits	  and	  costs	  of	  globalisation	   for	  developing	  countries.	  
Some	   claim	   that	   it	   has	   been	   unproblematically	   beneficial,	   while	   others	   argue	   that	   global	  
outsourcing	  has	  led	  to	  “immiserizing”	  growth	  and	  a	  “race	  to	  the	  bottom”	  for	  some	  developing	  
countries	   as	   they	   compete	   with	   one	   another	   to	   offer	   transnational	   companies	   the	   lowest	  
operating	   costs	   (Kaplinsky	   2000;	   2005;	  Morris	   2007).	   The	   significant	   expansion	   of	   the	   global	  
workforce	   from	   China’s	   emergence	   in	   global	   value	   chains	   has	   led	   some	   to	   argue	   that	   the	  
impacts	  of	  globalisation	  may	  reach	  even	  further	  and	  bid	  down	  the	  living	  standards,	  not	  only	  for	  
unskilled	  work	  and	  primary	  products,	  but	  increasingly	  for	  skilled	  work	  and	  industrial	  products	  as	  
well	  (Gereffi	  2005).	  
	  
Unlike	  the	  past,	  where	  growth	  of	  the	  Newly	  Industrialised	  Countries	  (NICS)	  came	  largely	  at	  the	  
expense	  of	  clothing	  sectors	  in	  the	  developed	  world,	  this	  time	  round	  clothing	  sector	  expansion	  
in	  the	  developing	  world	  is	  taking	  place	  differentially	  –	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  China	  and	  Asia	  and	  at	  
the	  expense	  of	  other	  less	  globally	  competitive	  developing	  country	  producers	  (Kaplinsky	  2006).	  
In	  short,	   the	  challenges	  confronting	  developing	  economy	  clothing	   industries	  are	  compounded	  
by	  globalisation	  and	  the	  changing	  dynamics	  of	  global	  value	  chains.	  Whilst	  clothing	  has	  been	  the	  
source	  of	  rapid	  export-­‐led	  industrialisation	  in	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  and	  especially	  in	  East	  Asia	  
(Gereffi	   and	   Memedovic	   2003),	   and	   is	   generally	   regarded	   as	   the	   potential	   first	   step	   for	  
developing	  countries	  embarking	  on	  an	   industrialisation	  path due	  their	  comparative	   low	  wage	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The move to global sourcing historically began in East Asia, mainly China, Hong Kong and Korea, but as 
wages in these areas rose, low wage assembly components of production were increasingly outsourced to 
other parts of Asia, as well as African and America (Gereffi 2003; Kaplinsky 2005). In this way, multilayered 













advantage14 	  and	   the	   low	   capital,	   technological	   and	   skill	   requirements	   for	   developing	   the	  
industry, value	  chain	  theory	  argues	  that	  the	  greatest	  value	   is	  added	  in	  the	  design,	  marketing,	  
branding	   and	   distribution	   of	   a	   product.	   Returns	   are	   greatest	   in	   these	   high	   value	   added	  
segments	  which	  have	  the	  highest	  barriers	  to	  entry.	  Although	  participation	  in	  the	  global	  market	  
guarantees	   gains	   for	   poor	   countries,	   they	   also	   risk	   becoming	   bogged	   down	   in	   the	   lower	  
segments	  of	  the	  chain,	  and	  in	  competition	  with	  each	  other,	  are	  compelled	  to	  maintain	  their	  low	  
wages	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  chain	  (Kaplinsky	  2005;	  Kaplinsky	  and	  Morris	  2006;	  Morris	  2007).	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	   firms	   from	  high	  wage	  developing	  economies	  are	   finding	   it	   increasingly	  difficult	   to	  
retain	  a	  competitive	  edge	  in	  a	  progressively	  global	  market	  place.	  These	  firms	  have	  constantly	  to	  
confront	  the	  competitive	  challenge	  from	  firms	  in	  low-­‐wage,	  industrializing	  economies	  that	  are	  
able	  to	  produce	  more	  cheaply	  (Morris	  and	  Barnes	  2008).	  
	  
The	   failure	   of	   ‘neo-­‐liberalist’	   policies 15 	  which	   prescribed	   one,	   fast	   dose	   of	   “stabilization,	  
liberalization	   and	   privatization”	   (Rodrik	   2006)	   to	   deliver	   universal	   success	   to	   (developing)	  
countries	  who	  implemented	  various	  components	  of	  its	  reform	  proposals,	  saw	  the	  remnants	  of	  
support	  for	  Washington	  Consensus-­‐style	  policies	  crumble,	  thus	  ushering	  in	  renewed	  thinking	  on	  
industrial	   policy.	   However,	   the	   various	   “do	   more”	   or	   “do	   less”	   prescriptions	   of	   modern	  
practitioners	   of	   industrial	   policy	   hinge	   largely	   on	   their	   respective	   views	   about	   whether	  
industrialisation	   and	   economic	   growth	   should	   be	   pursued	   by	   exploiting	   or	   by	   defying	   a	  
country’s	   comparative	   advantage.	   On	   one	   hand,	   proponents	   of	   the	   comparative	   advantage	  
following	  (CAF)	  approach	  to	  growth,	  most	  notably	  Justin	  Lin16,	  remain	  loyal	  to	  the	  Neo-­‐classical	  
paradigm	  of	   a	   “facilitating	   state”	  which	   nudges	   growth	   along	   an	   optimal	   path	   bounded	  by	   a	  
country’s	  capital,	  labour	  and	  natural	  resource	  endowments.	  Lin	  contends:	  “The	  facilitating	  state	  
provides	  the	  necessary	  co-­‐ordination	  to	  remove	  the	  barriers	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  these	  firms	  
and	   their	   related	   industries,	   and	   gives	   them	   a	   helping	   nudge	   to	   overcome	   externalities,	   but	  
then	   is	   able	   to	   let	   them	   grow	   and	   advance	   organically	   because	   of	   their	   comparative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Roberts and Thoburn 2003 note that the fact that the wage component makes up almost 80% of the cost 
of producing a garment  
15These policies, which prescribed a strongly market-oriented approach i.e. increased reliance on free 
market forces, were formulated by John Williamson in 1989 and codified in terms of the Washington 
Consensus. For further reading ref to Rodrik 2006 and Stiglitz in 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Consensus) 













advantage.”	   (Lin	   and	  Chang	   2009).	   	   Economic	   growth	   achieved	   in	   this	  manner,	   Lin	   argues,	   is	  
more	  gradual	  but	  also	  more	   sustainable	   compared	  with	   the	   rapid	  growth	  of	   the	   latter	  which	  
allows	   countries	   to	   “leap	  onto	   the	   industrialisation	   ladder”	  but	  with	  uncertain	  outcomes.	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  Ja-­‐Hoon	  Chang	  supports	  a	  growth	  path	  that	  by	  its	  very	  nature	  implies	  a	  highly	  
interventionist	   role	   for	   the	   state	   to	   support	   fledgling	   industries	   that	   have	   no	   proclivity	   for	  
organic	   growth.	   Chang	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   precisely	   by	   removing	   the	   restraints	   encumbent	   on	  
developing	  economies	  that	  rapid	  industrial	  growth	  can	  be	  achieved	  in	  leap	  frog	  fashion.	  This	  he	  
dubbed	   “kicking	   away	   the	   ladder”.	   In	   effect,	   by	   importing	   off	   the	   shelf	   technology	   and	  
expertise,	   developing	  economies	   can	  be	   freed	   from	  endemic	   restraints	  on	  growth	  associated	  
with	  their	  low	  capital	  and	  skill	  endowments.	  	  
However,	  whilst	   Lin	   and	   Chang	  map	  out	   the	   outer	   boundaries	   of	   the	   industrial	   policy	   space,	  
there	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  approach	  industrial	  policy.	  In	  his	  seminal	  work,	  Industrial	  Policy	  for	  the	  
21st	  Century,	  Rodrik	  emphasised	  the	   importance	  of	   institutional	  reform17	  as	  a	  central	  plank	  of	  
his	   theoretical	   policy	   architecture.	   This	   new	   archetype	   for	   industrial	   policy	   engenders	   an	  
increasing	   recognition	   for	   the	   need	   to	   embed	   private	   initiatives	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   public	  
action	  (Rodrik	  2004;	  2007a;	  2007b)	  to	  address	  the	  binding	  constraints	  to	  economic	  growth	  that	  
vary	   from	   country	   to	   country	   (Rodrik	   2006).	   A	   prerequisite	   for	   a	   successful	   outcome	   to	   the	  
process	   is	   the	   “right”	   institutional	   setting.	   Indeed,	   Rodrik	   argues	   that	   achieving	   the	   right	  
institutional	   setting	   overshadows	   all	   other	   elements	   of	   policy	   design	   such	   that	   the	   policy	  
process	   is	   fundamentally	   more	   important	   than	   the	   policy	   choice:	   “A	   first-­‐best	   policy	   in	   the	  
wrong	   institutional	   setting	   will	   do	   considerably	   less	   good	   than	   a	   second-­‐best	   policy	   in	   an	  
inappropriate	  institutional	  setting.	  Put	  differently,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  industrial	  policy,	  specifying	  
the	  process	  is	  more	  important	  than	  specifying	  the	  outcome.”	  (Rodrik	  2004:	  pp	  18-­‐19).	  	  
Rodrik	   (2007a)	   summed	  up	  his	   approach	  as	  one	  which	   strives	   to	   get	   the	  policy	  process	   right	  
rather	   than	   achieve	   policy	   outcomes:	   “to	   design	   a	   setting	   in	  which	   private	   and	   public	   actors	  
come	   together	   to	   solve	   problems	   in	   the	   productive	   sphere,	   each	   side	   learning	   about	   the	  
opportunities	  and	  constraints	   faced	  by	   the	  other“	   (Rodrik	  2007a).	   In	   this	  paradigm,	   industrial	  
policy	   is	   a	   process	   designed	   to	   elicit	   areas	   where	   policy	   action	   is	   most	   likely	   to	   make	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Rodrik argues that the failure of economic reform under Washington Consensus-style policies lies not with 
the policies themselves, but can be chalked up to the absence of institutional reform that was necessary to 













difference	   and	   to	   generate	   policy	   initiatives	   in	   response.	   Hence	   the	   idea	   of	   an	   autonomous	  
“non	   learning”	  government	   that	  can	   internalise	  externalities	  with	  1st	  best	  Pigouvian	  subsidies	  
(Bair	   2008)	   has	   widely	   been	   replaced	   by	   the	   paradigm	   of	   a	   “learning	   government”	   where	  
industrial	  policy	  presents	  an	  opportunity	  for	  the	  government	  to	  interact	  with	  firms	  and	  industry	  
and	   learn	   about	   the	   constraints	   that	   exist	   and	   the	   opportunities	   that	   are	   available	   with	   the	  
objective	  of	  “uncovering	  where	  the	  most	  significant	  obstacles	  to	  restructuring	  lie	  and	  what	  type	  
of	  interventions	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  remove	  them”	  (Rodrik	  2007a).	  	  
Rodrik	  2007	  and	  Rodrik	  and	  Hausmann	  2006	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  generic	  market	  
failures	   and	   externalities	   –	   indeed	   a	   wider	   range	   with	   a	   more	   constraining	   impact	   on	  
development	  than	  has	  hitherto	  been	  recognised.	  The	  location	  and	  magnitude	  of	  these	  failures	  
is	  highly	  uncertain.	  Hence	  the	  argument	  for	  an	  active	  role	  for	  government	  is	  precisely	  because	  
of	  the	  wide	  ranging	  extent	  of	  market	  failure.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  industrial	  policy	  is	  bedeviled	  by	  
two	   key	   issues	   (Rodrik	   2004;	   2007a;	   Hausmann	   and	   Rodrik	   2006).	   One	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	  
government	  is	  not	  omniscient,	  which	  implies	  that	  the	  policy	  setting	  must	  be	  one	  in	  which	  public	  
officials	   are	   able	   to	   elicit	   information	   from	   the	  private	   sector	   on	   an	  ongoing	  basis	   about	   the	  
constraints	  and	  opportunities	  that	  exist.	   	  The	  private	  sector	   is	  typically	  better	   informed	  about	  
the	  existence	  and	  nature	  of	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  information	  externalities	  than	  the	  public	  sector.	  
For	   this	   reason,	   activities	   designed	   to	   address	   these	   externalities	   cannot	   be	   made	   at	   arms-­‐
length	  by	  bureaucrats	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  stakeholders	  and	  business,	  who	  are	  inherently	  in	  tune	  
to	   business	   realities	   on	   the	   ground.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Rodrik	   and	   Hausmann	   2007	   note,	  
industrial	  policy	  is	  fallible	  to	  corruption	  and	  exploitation	  by	  unscrupulous	  stakeholders	  and	  self-­‐
interested	   bureaucrats.	   The	   critical	   institutional	   challenge	   is	   thus	   to	   find	   an	   intermediate	  
position	  between	  stakeholders	  and	  government	  which	  guarantees	  a	  policy	  setting	  that	  does	  not	  
alienate	  the	  policy	  process	  from	  its	  core	  objectives	  and	  goals	  whilst	  simultaneously	  avoiding	  an	  
agenda	  that	  inherently	  biases	  a	  single	  social	  or	  national	  objective.	  In	  effect,	  it	  is	  a	  situation	  that	  
fosters	  co-­‐operation	  between	  stakeholders	  and	  government	  without	  bureaucrats	  landing	  up	  in	  
business’	  pockets.	  	  
There	   are	   three	   cornerstones	   to	   sound	   industrial	   policy	   architecture:	   political	   leadership,	  
private	   embeddedness	   and	   coordination;	   and	   transparency	   and	   accountability	   (Rodrik	   2006;	  













The	  three	  cornerstones	  of	  industrial	  policy	  architecture	  
	  
	  1)	  Political	   leadership	  of	   the	   industrial	  policy	  by	  a	  cabinet-­‐level	  politician,	  a	  vice-­‐president	  or	  
the	   president	   himself	   who	   has	   internalised	   the	   agenda	   of	   economic	   restructuring	   and	   has	  
accepted	   responsibility	   for	   it.	   Cabinet-­‐level	   (or	   above)	   political	   sanction	   raises	   the	   political	  
profile	  of	   industrial	  policy	  and	  ensures	   that	  economic	   transformation	   is	  driven	  at	   the	  highest	  
level	  of	  government.	  It	  protects	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  industrial	  policy	  by	  providing	  oversight,	  co-­‐
ordination	  and	  monitoring	   for	   the	  bureaucrats	  and	  agencies	  entrusted	  with	   its	  execution	  and	  
implementation,	  both	  guarding	  against	   self-­‐interested	  behavior	  by	   the	  agency	  and	  protecting	  
the	   agency	   from	   capture	   by	   private	   interests.	   Finally,	   it	   identifies	   a	   clear	   political	   figure	   as	  
accountable	  for	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  policy.	  
	  
2)	   Establishment	   of	   a	   knowledge	   and	   feedback	  mechanism	   in	   the	   form	   a	   co-­‐ordination	   and	  
deliberation	  council	  that	  comprises	  representatives	  from	  all	  stakeholder	  groups	  through	  which	  
information	   exchange	   and	   social	   learning	   discussed	   abov 	   can	   occur.	   This	   requires	   that	   the	  
implementing	  agencies	  maintain	   communication	  channels	  with	   stakeholders	   to	  allow	  officials	  
to	  have	  a	  good	  information	  base	  on	  business	  realities,	  which	  is	  fundamental	  for	  sound	  decision-­‐
making;	   and	   that	   the	   agent	   or	   agencies	   that	   are	   tasked	   with	   championing	   the	   policy	   have	  
demonstrated	  competence,	  the	  location	  of	  which	  may	  pre-­‐determine	  the	  tool	  used.	  	  
	  
3)	  There	  must	  be	  mechanisms	  of	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  which	  ensure	  that	  the	  actions	  
of	  co-­‐ordination	  councils	  and	  agents	  are	  done	  in	  a	  transparent	  and	  accountable	  manner;	  that	  
all	   stakeholders	   are	   included	   in	   deliberations;	   and	   that	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	   council	   reflect	   a	  
collaborative	  solution	  between	  all	  stakeholders	  and	  government.	  	  
	  
The	  key	   issue	   that	   institutional	  design	  has	   to	  grapple	  with	   is	  how	  to	  ensure	   that	  government	  
can	  access	  and	  learn	  from	  the	  information	  possessed	  by	  the	  private	  sector.	  Simultaneously,	  the	  
private	   sector	   needs	   to	   be	   well	   informed	   about	   government	   policies	   and	   limitations	   since	  
government	  has	  an	  important	  impact	  on	  their	  behaviour.	  This	  is	  why	  institutional	  design	  which	  
facilitates	   learning	   and	   information	   flow	   is	   so	   important	   for	   effective	   industrial	   policy	   and	  
strategy.	   Organisations	   and	   processes	  which	   bring	   government	   and	   business	   into	   a	   dialogue	  













and,	  reciprocally	  so	  that	  business	  can	  have	  knowledge	  of	  governmental	  policies	  and	  capacities	  
(Morris	  2011).	  The	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  industrial	  policy	  is	  international	  competitiveness:	  i)	  to	  launch	  
local	   firms	  onto	  a	  world	  class	  manufacturing	   (WCM)	  platform	   from	  which	   they	  can	  enter	   the	  
upper	  segments	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  where	  returns	  are	  greatest;	  and	  ii)	  to	  increase	  the	  systemic	  
efficiency	   of	   the	   clothing	   sector	   by	   fostering	   co-­‐operational	   and	   obligational	   relationships	  
between	  value	  chain	  constituents	  to	  enable	  industrial	  upgrading.	  	  
Recent	   times	   have	   seen	   a	   coincidental	   shift	   in	   approach	   to	   industrial	   policy	   for	   the	   clothing	  
sector	   which	   is	   increasingly	   evaluated	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   global	   value	   chains	   and	   the	  
manner	  in	  which	  firms,	  regions	  and	  countries	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  global	  economy.	  This	  determines	  
the	   possibilities	   for	   firms	   to	   become	   integrated	   into	   the	   global	   clothing	   value	   chain	   by	  
upgrading	   their	  production	  capabilities	   to	  move	   from	  CMT	  (low	  value	  added)	   to	  OEM	  (higher	  
value	  added)	  production	  (Kaplinsky	  and	  Morris	  2000;	  Gereffi	  2003).	  The	  global	  clothing	  market	  
has	  undergone	  tremendous	  change	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  globalisation	  and	  
MFA	   trade	   liberalisation.	   Three	   aspects	   of	   this	   transformation	   are	   exemplified.	   Firstly,	   the	  
dynamic	   nature	   of	   buyer-­‐driven	   value	   chains	   which	   underscores	   the	   need	   for	   firms	   in	  
developing	  economies	  to	  transition	  away	  from	  low-­‐wage	  derived	  competitiveness	  by	  constantly	  
upgrading	   their	   design	   and	   marketing	   skills	   and	   demonstrating	   World	   Class	   Manufacturing	  
capabilities	   (Barnes	   and	  Esselaar	  2005)	   to	   avoid	  entrapment	   in	   low	  value-­‐added	   segments	  of	  
the	   chain	  where	   few	  opportunities	  exist	   for	  domestic	   integration	  and	   learning.	   Secondly,	   the	  
power	  of	  global	  buyers	  who	  drive	   the	  value	  chain	   for	   clothing	  and	  whose	  sourcing	   strategies	  
and	  practices	  strongly	  inform	  the	  spread	  and	  pattern	  of	  clothing	  production	  and	  global	  clothing	  
trade	  and	  the	  development	  of	  their	  domestic	  clothing	  sectors.	  Thirdly,	  the	  dominance	  of	  China	  
in	   these	   global	   clothing	   networks.	   Increasingly,	   focus	   has	   diverted	   away	   from	   demand-­‐side	  
macro	  policies	  to	  encompass	  a	  set	  of	  closely	  related	  proactive	  micro	  level	  initiatives	  that	  aim	  to	  
‘strengthen	  the	  value	  chain’	  by	  fostering	  cooperation	  between	  multiple	  participants	  along	  the	  
value	  chain	  (Morris	  and	  Levy	  2011).	  	  
	  
I	  shall	  revisit	  the	  industrial	  policy	  discussion	  more	  systematically	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  China	  quotas	  
in	   Chapter	   8	  where	   I	   shall	   show	   that	  whilst	   acknowledging	   the	   various	   debates,	   the	   Rodrik-­‐
Hausmann	   approach	   resonates	   particularly	   well	   with	   the	   industrial	   policy	   discussion	   in	   this	  













debate	  over	   the	  good	  and	  bad	  of	  policy	   instruments,	  such	  as	  quotas,	   focusing	   instead	  on	  the	  
importance	   of	   institutional	   reform.	   The	   argument	   that	   I	   shall	   make	   in	   Chapter	   8	   is	   that	   the	  
fundamental	   flaw	   with	   the	   China	   quotas	   lay	   with	   the	   policy	   process	   rather	   than	   the	  
intervention	  itself.	  	  














Chapter	  3:	  Globalisation,	  China	  and	  safeguards	  
	  
I	  have	  thus	  far	  has	  dealt	  with	  globalisation,	  value	  chains,	  protectionism	  and	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  
the	   global	   clothing	  market	   due	   to	  MFA	   quota	   removal	   in	   a	   general	   sense.	   In	   this	   Chapter,	   I	  
sharpen	  the	  discussion	  to	  China	  to	  focus	  more	  specially	  on	  the	  China-­‐specific	  Textile	  Safeguards	  
(mainly	  the	  in	  US)	  with	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  precedent	  use	  of	  quotas	  to	  “fix”	  the	  problem	  of	  
import	   competition	  may	  not	   bear	   up	   so	  well	   in	   the	  new	  era	  of	   globalisation,	   demand-­‐driven	  
clothing	   chains	   and	  hegemonic	  China.	   Part	   1	   gives	   an	  overview	  of	  China’s	  historic	   rise	   in	   the	  
global	  clothing	  market	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  dimension	  of	  China’s	  growth	  in	  clothing	  exports	  to	  
the	  world	   in	   the	  past	   two	  decades,	  and	  especially	  since	  2005	  when	  the	  most	  binding	  of	  MFA	  
quotas	  were	   lifted.	   Some	   explanations	   for	   the	   extraordinary	   success	   of	   the	   Chinese	   clothing	  
sector	  are	  also	  reviewed.	  In	  Part	  2	  the	  discussion	  turns	  to	  the	  particular	  impact	  of	  China	  on	  the	  
US	  and	  EU	  clothing	  markets	  and	  their	  policy	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  –	   i.e.	  the	  China-­‐specific	  
safeguard	  action.	   I	   shall	  use	  conclusions	   from	  this	  analysis	   to	   infer	  possible	  outcomes	   for	   the	  
South	  African	  China	  quotas,	  which	  are	  introduced	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  
Part	  1:	  An	  historical	  perspective	  on	  China	  
	  
China’s	  competitiveness	  explained	  
	  
Whilst	   the	   lifting	   of	   restrictions	   in	   2005	   undoubtedly	   provided	   expedient	   passage	   to	   global	  
clothing	   markets 18 ,	   the	   clothing	   industry	   was	   identified	   by	   China	   as	   an	   important	  
industrialisation	   path	   as	   early	   as	   1970	   and	   was	   the	   main	   target	   of	   early	   economic	   reform.	  
Between	  1978	  and	  1995,	  the	  unit	  growth	  in	  clothing	  factory	  output	  increased	  by	  1,339%	  (17%	  
per	   annum	   compounded)	   and	   the	   contribution	   of	   clothing	   to	   China’s	   textiles	   and	   clothing	  
exports	  more	  than	  doubled	  in	  this	  period	  (Table	  4).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This said, Flanagan 2005a points out that the forecasted Chinese monopoly of global clothing markets 
following quota removal did not transpire. Whilst buyers did intend to increase their buying from China by 
46.3% after quota abolition, this implied that China’s sales to the US and EU – with no change in the market 
size – would lift its share to 19.3% (by volume) in 2005 from 13.7% in 2003. In fact, 63.6% of buyers 















Table	  4:	  China’s	  apparel	  industry	  exports	  as	  a	  %	  of	  total	  textiles	  and	  apparel	  exports:	  1978-­‐1997	  
Year Share% Year Share% 
1978 29.1 1988 43.0 
1979 31.7 1989 46.7 
1980 37.5 1990 49.5 
1981 41.0 1991 53.8 
1982 43.8 1992 66.1 
1983 41.5 1993 57.9 
1984 41.8 1994 66.7 
1985 38.7 1995 63.3 
1986 40.9 1996 67.4 
1987 39.3 1997 69.7 
Source:	  China	  Textile	  Industry:	  Harvard	  Centre	  of	  Textile	  and	  Apparel	  research	  1999)	  
	  
By	  1995,	  China	  had	   the	   largest	   clothing	   industry	   in	   the	  world	  with	  more	   than	  3.9	  million	   (m)	  
workers	  employed	  in	  an	  estimated	  47,000	  establishments	  producing	  6,685	  billion	  (bn)	  units	  of	  
garments.	   In	  US$	  terms,	  exports	  grew	  from	  $9.7bn	  in	  1990	  to	  $115bn	  in	  2007,	  an	  increase	  of	  
1,092%	  (World	  Trade	  Organisation	  2008)	  and	  at	  an	  annualized	  compound	  rate	  of	  18%	  between	  
2000	  and	  2007	  (Figure	  3).	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  Demonstration	  of	  China	  in	  world	  exports	  in	  2000	  and	  2007	  
	  














Figure	  4	  below	  illustrates	  China’s	  dominance	  in	  almost	  every	  major	  clothing	  category	  in	  2007	  in	  
which	   year	   it	   accounted	   for	   almost	   half	   of	   global	   clothing	   exports 19 	  (equivalent	   to	  
US$108.64mn)	  (ITC	  2008).	  More	  importantly,	  it	  shows	  the	  significant	  rates	  of	  growth	  that	  China	  
has	  achieved	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years	  in	  categories	  where	  its	  share	  is	  still	  relatively	  small	  (6105	  
and	  6106).	  Most	  of	  China’s	  clothing	  exports	  are	  destined	  for	  the	  US,	  EU	  and	  Japan.	   In	  2007,	  a	  
third	  (33.6%;	  US$28,53bn)	  of	  all	  US	  and	  almost	  a	  fifth	  (19.8%)	  of	  all	  EU	  clothing	  imports	  came	  
from	  China.	   In	   2008,	   China	   exported	  US$113.37bn	   of	   clothing	   to	   the	  world	   and	  was	   the	   top	  
supplier	  to	  Japan,	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU	  (JUSEU)	   in	  this	  year	  with	  a	  68%	  share	  of	  major	  garment	  
export	  categories20	  to	  the	  region	  (Flanagan	  2010;	  Birnbaum	  2010).	  Between	  1990	  and	  2007,	  US	  
clothing	   imports	  grew	  by	  214%	   from	  US$26.98bn	   to	  US$84.83bn	   (WTO	  2008);	  a	   third	   (33.6%	  
equivalent	  to	  US$28.53bn)	  of	  these	  came	  from	  China,	  from	  which	  imports	  grew	  at	  a	  compound	  
rate	  of	  18%	  between	  2000	  and	  2007.	  Imports	  into	  Europe	  from	  China	  (EU27)	  grew	  at	  a	  similar	  
compound	  rate	  of	  21%	  p.a.	  between	  2000	  and	  2007	  to	  US$32.29bn,	  a	  share	  of	  19.8%	  of	  total	  
EU	  imports.	  
Figure	  4:	  Demonstration	  of	  China’s	  performance	  in	  global	  clothing	  imports	  in	  major	  clothing	  
categories:	  2007 
	  
Data	  source:	  ITC	  Own	  calculations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This includes Hong Kong’s share of 8.34% (See previous section on Global Trade) 
20 Categories included are babies’ wear, men’s jackets, tracksuits, women’s jackets, socks, tights, men’s 
swimwear, women’s swimwear, corsetry, knitted briefs, woven briefs, panties, slips and petticoats, women’s 













Figure	  5	  below	  demonstrates	  the	  accelerated	  growth	  in	  China’s	  clothing	  exports	  to	  the	  world	  by	  
value	  between	  2001	  and	  2007	  from	  US$32bn	  to	  US$108bn,	  an	  increase	  of	  235%	  for	  the	  period.	  	  
	  




The	  reasons	  behind	  China’s	  extraordinary	  competitiveness	  have	  been	  resourcefully	  investigated	  
but	   (especially	   current)	   information	   is	   limited.	   Ultimately	   China’s	   numerous	   and	   varied	  
strengths	   are	   tied	   to	   its	   considerable	   size	   and	   rapid	   growth,	   its	   government’s	   long-­‐term	  
strategic	   vision	  and	  ability	   to	  orchestrate	   long-­‐term	  plans;	   and	   its	  diligent	   investment	   in	  new	  
technologies.	  It	  used	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (FDI)	  to	  rapidly	  modernize	  its	  economy,	  which	  it	  
secured	   through	   the	   lure	   of	   its	   large	   internal	   market	   and	   potential	   to	   serve	   as	   an	   export	  
platform;	  and	  it	  used	  its	  integration	  in	  the	  global	  trade	  system	  to	  facilitate	  the	  rapid	  upgrading	  
of	  its	  technology.	  It	  got	  modern	  technology	  embodied	  in	  capital	  goods	  and	  components	  and	  its	  
export	  firms	  were	  forced	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  best	  (OECD	  2002).	  China	  came	  to	  the	  realisation	  
that	   employment	   and	   job	   creation	  was	   a	   priority	   and	   structured	   a	   development	   plan	   aimed	  
solely	   at	   achieving	   this	   purpose.	   The	   plan	   had	   four	   legs:	   i)	   It	   identified	   labour	   intensive	   and	  
mutually	  beneficial	  industries	  (clothing,	  footwear,	  luggage	  and	  toys)	  with	  complementary	  skills	  
(stitching)	  and	  markets;	  ii)	  If	  the	  industry	  was	  export	  oriented,	  they	  were	  developed	  by	  a	  port;	  













specialised	  education	  systems	  and	  heavy	  investment	  in	  higher	  education21	  ;	  iv)	  A	  critical	  mass	  of	  
clothing	  firms	  was	  achieved22	  off	  the	  back	  of	  which	  a	  viable	  textiles	  industry	  was	  developed	  and	  
thereafter,	   in	   similar	   fashion,	   a	   clothing	   machine	   equipment	   manufacturing	   industry.	   Most	  
importantly,	   as	   China	   achieved	   a	   critical	  mass,	   scale	   economies	   and	   productivity	   gains	   were	  
accompanied	  by	  a	  simultaneous	  fall	  in	  prices.	  	  
	  
China’s	   initial	  comparative	  advantage	  derived	  principally	  from	  low	  wage	  costs.	  Figure	  6	  below	  
demonstrates	  China’s	  comparative	  wage	  advantage	  in	  1995.	  	  
	  
Figure	  6:	  Country	  comparison:	  Production	  costs	  (China	  and	  selected	  countries)	  	  
(SAH	  =	  Standard	  allowed	  hour);	  Exchange	  rates	  as	  of	  October	  1995	  
	  
Source:	  China	  Textile	  Industry:	  Harvard	  Centre	  of	  Textile	  and	  Apparel	  Research	  1999	  
	  
However,	  the	  lynchpin	  of	  China’s	  success	  lies	  ultimately	  with	  its	  industrial	  policies	  which	  grew	  
the	  Chinese	  apparel	  industry	  from	  being	  largely	  volume-­‐driven	  to	  meet	  domestic	  demand	  in	  the	  
1960’s	   to	   export-­‐driven	   in	   the	   early	   1990’s	   to	   consumer-­‐oriented	   in	   the	   late	   1990’s.	   Low	  
barriers	   to	   entry	   in	   the	   apparel	   industry	   led	   to	   early	   entry	   by	   private	   investors	   in	   1992	   as	  
reforms	  were	  expanded	  to	  allow	  entry	  into	  China	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  Clothing	  firms	  fall	  into	  one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For example, women’s wear in Hangzhou, men’s wear in Wenzhou, socks in Ningbo, neckties in 
Chengzhou and knitted products in Zhangcha (Guangdong Province) (Zhang et al 2004) 
22  Clothing and textiles is a numbers game where volumes count. Consequently, the initial part of 
development focused solely on achieving a critical mass of clothing firms with up to 50% of all textile inputs 
imported in 2004. Currently China has 16 million employees in clothing and only 4 million in fabric. In South 













of	  four	  broad	  categories:	  privately	  owned,	  collective	  (owned	  by	  a	  rural	  or	  urban	  township)	  (RT),	  
state	   owned	   (SOE),	   foreign	  owned	  or	   jointly	   owned	   (JVE)	   by	   a	   foreigner	   and	   either	   an	  RT	  or	  
SOE.	  RTs	   (pure	  or	   jointly	  as	  a	   JVE)	  are	  the	   largest	  clothing	  producers	  on	  almost	  every	   level	   in	  
terms	   of	   number	   of	   enterprises,	   volume	   of	   product	   produced	   and	   exports.	   These	   comprised	  
91.21%	  of	   national	   clothing	   output	   in	   1993	   (China	   textile	   Industry:	  Harvard	   Centre	   of	   Textile	  
and	  Apparel	  Research	  1999).	  In	  the	  early	  1990’s	  the	  number	  of	  JVEs	  grew	  rapidly	  with	  12,194	  
firms	  exporting	  US$7.68	  billion	  clothing	  products	  in	  1995.	  In	  1996,	  RT	  output	  was	  estimated	  to	  
be	  80%	  of	  total	  clothing	  output	  with	  SOEs	  the	  second	  largest	  number	  of	  apparel	  establishments	  
(Qi-­‐liang	   et	   al.	   1999).	   According	   to	   Chi	   Daily,	   Chinese	   purchases	   of	   textile	  machinery	   totaled	  
nearly	   US$12bn	   between	   June	   2000	   and	   June	   2003	   with	   statistics	   reflecting	   a	   US$22bn	  
investment	   in	   its	   textiles	   and	   clothing	   industries	   since	   2001	   (Table	   5).	   Today	   China	   has	   a	  
comparative	   advantage	   in	   fabric	   that	   is	   unequalled	   globally	  with	   a	   15	  million	   strong	   clothing	  
and	   2	  million	   strong	   textiles	   industry.	   Before	   2005,	   50%	   of	   Chinese	   apparel	   was	  made	   from	  
imported	  fabric,	  now	  it	  is	  closer	  to	  90%.	  
	  
Table	  5:	  Textile	  machinery	  purchases	  in	  China	  	  
Major	  textile	  machinery	  imports	  
Item	   2000(in	  units)	   %	  change	  from	  2001	  
Automatic	  spooling	   1,186	   23.54%	  
Rapier	  looms	   5,873	   67.61%	  
Water	  jet	  looms	   9,589	   71.82%	  
Air-­‐jet	  looms	   14,963	   108.31%	  
Washing,	  bleaching,	  dying	  machines	   4,582	   51.82%	  
Source:	  China	  National	  Textile	  Industry	  Council;	  	  
(ibid.http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/fr2004/Reapplication_Brassieres.pdf)	  
	  
A	  combination	  of	  low	  interest,	  non-­‐repayable	  loans	  and	  cash	  export	  incentives,	  coupled	  with	  an	  
undervalued	  currency	  and	  most	  particularly,	   its	  exemption	   from	  social	   and	   institutional	   costs	  













compliant	  countries	  cannot	  match	  23.	  The	  cornerstone	  of	  their	  policy	   is	  to	  target	  markets	  that	  
they	  want	   i.e.	  the	  US,	  fix	  their	  currency	  against	  that	  particular	  market’s	  currency	  to	  achieve	  a	  
measure	  of	  undervaluation	  (which	  relative	  to	  the	  Dollar	   is	  about	  40%),	  provide	  non-­‐repayable	  
loans	  at	  1½%	  interest	  per	  annum	  and	  an	  export	   incentive	  of	  18%	  per	  annum	  payable	   in	  cash,	  
which	  is	  not	  WTA	  compliant.	  Furthermore,	  given	  that	  most	  of	  the	  enterprises	  are	  state-­‐owned,	  
there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  generate	  a	  profit.	  These	  factors	  combine	  to	  yield	  a	  benefit	  (of	  at	  least	  48%)	  
that	   far	  outweighs	  any	  of	   the	  usual	   factors	   that	  enhance	  a	  country’s	  comparative	  advantage,	  
such	  as	  proximity	  to	  markets,	  a	  stable	  business	  environment,	  market	  access	  and	  skilled	  labour.	  
Given	  that	  the	  fabric	  cost	  of	  any	  garment	  is	  between	  40%	  and	  60%,	  being	  able	  to	  discount	  the	  
price	  by	   48%	   implies	   that	   it	   can	  be	   sold	   at	   less	   than	   cost24.	   This	   precludes	   any	   country	   from	  
competing	  effectively	  with	  China	  off	  any	  other	  platform.	  
	  
The	   argument	   that	   China	   does	   not	   play	   off	   a	   level	   field	   is	   not	   new	   but	   focus	   has	   recently	  
diverted	  away	  from	  its	  undervalued	  currency	  and	  low	  labour	  costs	  and	  towards	  other	  factors.	  
This	  shift	  occurred	  for	  two	  principle	  reasons:	  First,	  wages	  in	  China	  are	  no	  longer	  low	  relative	  to	  
many	   Asian	   and	   SSA	   competitor	   countries;	   and	   second,	   labour	   is	   not	   the	   unique	   factor	   in	  
sourcing	  (Gibbon	  2008;	  Emerging	  Textiles	  2008a;	  Morris	  and	  Reed	  2008a).	  Labour	  productivity	  
(which	   is	   now	   particularly	   high	   in	   China),	   quality	   and	   cost	   of	   fabric,	   lead	   times	   and	   services	  
offered	  to	  apparel	  importers	  or	  brands	  also	  play	  an	  important	  role	  (Ref	  Chapter	  2).	  Today	  China	  
is	  recognised	  for	  its	  dexterity,	  versatility	  and	  flexibility;	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  make	  most	  textile	  and	  
apparel	  products	  at	  any	  quality	  level	  at	  a	  competitive	  price	  (USITC	  Trade	  Report	  2005	  p.55).	   
China	  and	  MFA	  quota	  removal:	  Global	  impacts	  and	  consequences	  	  	  
	  
After	   a	   decade	   of	   patiently	   positioning	   itself	   to	   “clothe	   the	   world”,	   China’s	   opportunity	   to	  
unleash	  its	  extraordinary	  competitiveness	  on	  global	  clothing	  markets	  came	  in	  2001	  when	  it	  was	  
granted	  access	  to	  the	  WTO.	  The	  real	  fillip	  to	  growth	  however,	  was	  the	  removal	  of	  MFA	  quotas.	  
In	   2006,	   when	   the	   final	   and	  most	   binding	  MFA	   quotas	   were	   lifted,	   Chinese	  made	   garments	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 JTVs were given preferential tax treatments, paying lower and fewer taxes than other forms of ownership 
as well as being the recipients of preferential tax policies such as tax hikes for the initial two years of 
operation and the need to only pay half for three years (Note: This was cancelled for JVEs registered after 
Jan 1st 1996) (Qi-Liang et al, 1999) 
24 According to Kipling 2008, this is the equivalent of having the exchange rate at R13.00 to the dollar plus 













flooded	  into	  developed	  country	  markets	  bringing	  to	  fruition	  the	  prophecy	  of	  Chinese	  hegemony	  
in	  a	  liberalised	  global	  clothing	  market	  (Salinger	  et	  al	  1999;	  Morris	  2007;	  Morris	  and	  Reed	  2008a;	  
Emerging	  Textiles	  2008b).	  Without	  the	  added	  cost	  of	  quotas,	  China	  could	  finally	  compete	  solely	  
on	  price	  and	  became	  “the	   supplier	  of	   choice”	   (USITC).	   Fueled	  by	  global	  buyers’	  penchant	   for	  
offshore	   outsourcing	   and	   adroit	   use	   of	   its	   extensive	   global	   networks	   that	   it	   had	   established	  
under	   the	  MFA	   system,	   China	   blanketed	   the	   globe	  with	   its	   clothing	   products.	  Whilst	   largely	  
anticipated	   by	   major	   analysts	   and	   industry	   experts25,	   the	   unprecedented	   scope,	   speed	   and	  
scale	   of	   China’s	   growth	   sparked	   renewed	   debate	   about	   its	   impact	   on	   and	   the	   (disastrous)	  
implications	   of	   its	   growth	   for	   other	   developing	   supplier	   countries;	   and	   particularly	   for	   the	  
“accidental	  beneficiaries”	  of	  quotas	  and	  countries	  who	  had	  developed	   their	   clothing	  markets	  
through	   quota-­‐derived	   rather	   than	   genuine	   comparative	   advantage	   (USITC	   2006;	   Flanagan	  
2005a)26.	  	  
	  
The	  greatest	   victim	  of	  China’s	   liberalisation	  was	   the	  developed	  world	  and	  particularly	   the	  US	  
and	  EU.	  In	  tandem	  with	  quota	  phase	  out,	  imports	  of	  clothing	  into	  the	  US	  recorded	  substantial	  
growth	   from	  1995	   to	  2003,	   rising	   from	  US$36bn	   in	  1995	   to	  US$63bn	   in	  2003,	  an	   increase	  of	  
74%.	  Imports	  into	  the	  EU	  similarly	  rose	  from	  US$65bn	  to	  US$91bn,	  an	  increase	  of	  40%	  for	  the	  
same	  period.	   In	   2003,	   the	   global	   imports	   of	   clothing	   amounted	   to	  US$226bn,	   an	   increase	   of	  
12%	   year	   on	   year	   of	   which	   the	   EU	   had	   the	   greatest	   share,	   accounting	   for	   43%	   of	   the	   total,	  
followed	  by	  the	  US	  with	  a	  share	  of	  30%	  (Ref	  Chapter	  2	  section	  on	  global	  trade).	  	  
This	  is	  depicted	  graphically	  in	  Figure	  7	  which	  shows	  the	  locational	  demographics	  of	  suppliers	  of	  
clothing	  to	  the	  US.	  It	  demonstrates	  the	  increasing	  dominance	  of	  China	  in	  US	  clothing	  markets	  as	  
MFA	   quota	   removal	   progressed	   into	   the	   latter	   and	  more	  meaningful	   stages	   of	   liberalisation;	  
between	  2000	  and	  2004	  China	   jumped	  two	  bands	  (from	  10.5%	  to	  16%)	  The	  picture	  was	  even	  
more	  dire	  for	  the	  EU	  shown	  in	  Figure	  8;	  in	  2004	  China	  accounted	  for	  over	  20%	  of	  all	  EU	  imports,	  
up	  from	  14.5%	  in	  2000.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Some argue that China’s preemptive response to trade liberalisation is a manifestation of the relatively 
more binding quotas placed on China than limits on other countries viz’ the MFA; the slower growth rate of 
quotas on China; and finally, the relatively greater restrictions that were placed on China’s ability to shift 
quota allocations across different categories of goods or across years (Brambilla et al 2007). 
26 This point cannot be expanded due to topic constraints but for further reading see Morris and Barnes 













Figure	  7:	  US	  sources	  of	  apparel	  imports	  :	  2000-­‐2004 
	  
Source:	  Naumann	  2006	  
	  
Figure	  8:	  EU	  sources	  of	  apparel	  imports:	  2000-­‐2004	  
	  
Source:	  Naumann	  2006	  
	  
This	  fact	  is	  further	  confirmed	  by	  imports	  recorded	  by	  quantity	  in	  Figure	  9,	  which	  plots	  monthly	  
clothing	  import	  quantities	  from	  January	  2000	  to	  July	  2005	  into	  the	  US	  and	  in	  Figure	  10,	  which	  













kilograms.	   Both	   diagrams	   clearly	   illustrate	   the	   surge	   in	   the	   volume	   of	   imports	   from	   China	  
following	   the	   lifting	  of	   restrictions27	  and	  portray	  China’s	   substantial	   share	  of	   clothing	   imports	  
into	  both	  regions	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  
	  
Figure	  9:	  US	  imports	  of	  apparel	  form	  China	  and	  the	  Rest	  of	  the	  World:	  Jan	  2000-­‐July	  2005	  (monthly	  
data) 
	  
	  	  	  	  Source:	  Naumann	  2006	  
	  
Figure	  10:	  EU	  imports	  of	  apparel	  from	  China	  and	  Rest	  of	  World	  2000-­‐2004	  (annual	  data) 
	  
      Source:	  Naumann	  2006	  
Once	   restrictions	  were	   lifted,	   imports	   from	  China	   into	   the	  US	   rocketed	  with	   apparel	   imports	  
increasing	  by	  279%	  in	  the	  first	  year	  following	  quota	  removal.	  Production	  of	  garments	  expanded	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The EU and US employ different classification systems with regard to the monitoring of textile and 













by	  50%,	  growing	   from	  6.9bn	  pieces	   in	  2000	  to	  10.3bn	  pieces	   in	  2003	   (www.ceicdata.com).	   In	  
some	  categories,	  imports	  into	  the	  US	  spiked	  alarmingly	  upon	  MFA	  quota	  removal.	  Table	  6	  gives	  
percentage	  changes	  in	  value	  and	  volume	  for	  imports	  in	  certain	  clothing	  categories	  into	  the	  US	  
from	  China	  between	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2001	  and	  the	  comparable	  2003	  period.	   It	  also	  shows	  
the	  percentage	  price	  change	  for	  each	  category	   in	  a	  similar	  comparison.	  Table	  7	  shows	  similar	  
data	  for	  a	  broader	  set	  of	  clothing	  categories	   in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2005	  on	  the	  comparable	  2004	  
period.	  
	  
Table	  6:	  Imports	  in	  selected	  clothing	  categories	  following	  MFA	  quota	  removal	  
  Change q1’01-q1’03 
Category Units m) Volume Value Price 
Brassieres Doz 466% 383% -15% 
Dressing gowns  Doz 927% 431% -48% 
Socks Pairs 3262% 164% -48% 
Source:	  OTEXA	   Own	  calculations	  
	  
Table	  7:	  Percentage	  change	  in	  imports	  in	  selected	  clothing	  categories	  from	  China	  into	  the	  US	  
	  














Trade	   figures	   released	   by	   the	   Chinese	   government	   at	   the	   end	   of	   January	   2005	   showed	   that	  
Chinese	   imports	   of	   textiles	   and	   clothing	   into	   the	   US	   had	   jumped	   about	   75%,	   rising	   from	  
US$702m	   in	   January	   2004	   to	   more	   than	   US$1.2bn.	   In	   terms	   of	   product	   volume,	   imports	   of	  
major	  clothing	  products	  from	  China	  leapt	  546%.	  In	  January	  2004,	  for	  example,	  China	  exported	  
941,000	   cotton	   knit	   shirts	   under	   quota,	  whereas	   in	   January	   2005	   it	   shipped	   18.2m,	   a	   rise	   of	  
1,836%.	   Similarly,	   imports	   of	   cotton	   knit	   trousers	   were	   up	   1,332%	   year	   on	   year.	   Given	   that	  
China	  ships	  a	  large	  part	  of	  its	  goods	  through	  Hong	  Kong,	  which	  would	  not	  be	  reflected	  in	  these	  
figures,	  the	  real	  impact	  might	  well	  have	  been	  understated	  (Barboza	  and	  Becker	  2005)	  
	  
Data	  in	  Table	  8	  below	  tells	  a	  similar	  story	  for	  the	  EU.	  The	  data	  evidences	  the	  consistent	  rise	  in	  
volumes	  into	  the	  EU	  and	  US	  across	  garment	  categories	  during	  quota	  phase-­‐out	  as	  import	  limits	  
were	  removed.	  The	  Dollar	  value	  of	   imports	  rose	  by	  69.9%	  between	  2004	  and	  2005	  whilst	  the	  
square	  metre	  equivalent	  rose	  by	  98%.	  
	  










Year	  on	  year	  	  
growth	  	  (All	  other	  
suppliers)	  
Average	  per	  unit	  
price	  change	  
(China)	  
4	   T-­‐shirts	   199%	   24%	   -­‐37%	  
5	   Pullovers	   530%	   14%	   -­‐42%	  
6	   Trousers	   413%	   18%	   -­‐14%	  
7	   Blouses	   256%	   4%	   -­‐30%	  
26	   Dresses	   219%	   1%	   2%	  
31	   Brassieres	   110%	   6%	   -­‐37%	  
Source:	  European	  Union	  /	  Commission	  Regulation	  (EC)	  No	  1084/2005	  (based	  on	  SIGL)28	  
	  
More	  relevantly,	  the	  expansion	  in	  import	  volumes	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  significant	  fall	  in	  unit	  
prices	   for	   imports	   from	  China.	   Imports	   from	   China	   into	   the	  US	   and	   the	   EU	   grew	   unabatedly	  
partly	  due	  to	  the	  relaxation	  of	  limits	  on	  import	  volumes	  but	  mainly	  because	  prices	  from	  China	  
had	  fallen	  dramatically	  in	  early	  2005	  to	  around	  70%	  of	  the	  World	  average	  (Flanagan	  2005b).	  For	  
example,	  the	  price	  of	  bras	  from	  China	  fell	  to	  US$33.43/doz	  in	  2003	  compared	  with	  the	  global	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 SIGL: EC DG Trade's integrated system for the management of licenses for imports of textiles, clothing, 













average	  of	  US$43.17;	  and	  the	  price	  of	  cotton	  trousers	   from	  China	  fell	   from	  US$154.53/doz	   in	  
2004	  to	  US$66.64/doz	  in	  2005	  which	  was	  a	  third	  less	  than	  the	  global	  average	  of	  US$82.07/doz	  
(Ref:	   http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/fr2005/347_348request.pdf).	   In	   US	   categories	   seeking	  
protection,	  China	  dropped	  its	  prices	  by	  an	  average	  of	  53%	  with	  the	  largest	  drop	  of	  89%	  (wool	  
hosiery)	  and	  the	  smallest	  of	  4%.	  However,	  the	  category	  in	  which	  this	  small	  drop	  occurred	  was	  
one	   in	  which	  China	  already	  had	  an	  80%	  market	  share	   (silk	  gloves).	   In	   the	  category	  where	  the	  
largest	  price	  drop	  was	  experienced,	  China	  increased	  its	  US	  market	  share	  from	  4%	  to	  48%	  in	  four	  
years.	  This	  price	  deflation	   lies	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	  China	  story	  and	  has	  spawned	  much	  debate	  
due	   the	  profound	  effect	   that	  cheap	  Chinese	   imports	  have	  on	   importing	  countries	   (Mc	  Carthy	  
2007;	  Edge	  2006;	  Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008).	  Neither	  has	   the	  picture	  changed	  much	   in	   recent	  
times.	  Figure	  11	  below	  shows	   the	  steady	   rise	   in	   import	  penetration29	  by	  China	   in	  EU	  clothing	  
markets	  between	  2004	  and	  2007.	  Imports	  from	  China	  into	  the	  EU	  totaled	  US$32bn	  in	  2007,	  an	  
increase	  of	  more	  than	  208%	  since	  1999.	  In	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  2008	  alone,	  imports	  from	  China	  
totaled	  US$8.23bn,	  up	  9.57%	  on	  imports	  in	  the	  comparable	  quarter	  in	  2007.	  
	  
Figure	  11:	  Imports	  into	  the	  EU:	  Top	  10	  suppliers	  
TOP 10 EU-27 SUPPLIERS IN CLOTHING 
 
Euros (millions) 





  World 45.052 49.305 55.491 58.079 100.0 28.9 
1 China 11.534 16.961 18.883 21.878 37.7 89.7 
2 Turkey 7.747 8.098 8.238 8.937 15.4 15.4 
3 Bangladesh 3.721 3.538 4.615 4.385 7.6 17.8 
4 India 2.480 3.239 3.811 3.841 6.6 54.9 
5 Tunisia 2.603 2.463 2.468 2.567 4.4 -1.4 
6 Morocco 2.428 2.264 2.368 2.530 4.4 4.2 
7 Hong Kong 1.965 1.705 2.511 1.683 2.9 -14.3 
8 Indonesia 1.338 1.200 1.414 1.202 2.1 -10.2 
9 Vietnam 635 690 1.024 1.122 1.9 76.8 
10 Sri Lanka 814 797 969 1.041 1.8 27.9 
	  
Source:	  Eurostat	  database	  2008	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













Import	   figures	   for	   the	  United	   States	  once	  again	   tell	   a	   similar	   story.	  Between	  2003	  and	  2007,	  
imports	  from	  China	  into	  the	  US	  grew	  by	  154.76%	  from	  US$4,60bn	  to	  US$22.75bn.	  An	  analysis	  
of	  data	  at	  the	  category	  level	  is	  even	  more	  informative.	  	  
	  
Figure	  12	  shows	  clothing	  imports	  into	  the	  US	  by	  value	  in	  2007	  in	  major	  clothing	  categories	  and	  
cumulative	   growth	   rates	   in	   these	   categories	   between	   2004	   and	   2007.	   Figure	   13	   then	  
demonstrates	  China’s	  share	  in	  total	  clothing	  imports	  into	  the	  US	  in	  the	  major	  categories	  as	  well	  
as	   the	  US’s	   share	   in	  China’s	  exports	   in	   these	  categories.	  The	   former	  broadly	  confirms	  deeper	  
penetration	  by	  China	  into	  US	  clothing	  markets.	  The	  latter	  however	  suggests	  that	  the	  US	  is	  losing	  
importance	   as	   an	   import	   destination	   for	   China’s	   clothing	   exports.	   Given	   the	   fact	   that	   China	  
grew	  its	  net	  clothing	  exports	  in	  these	  categories	  by	  between	  67%	  and	  154%,	  this	  might	  point	  to	  
China	   refocusing	  on	   alternative	  markets,	   principally	   in	   response	   to	   safeguards.	  Despite	   some	  
indication	  that	  this	  trend	  in	  prices	  may	  have	  begun	  to	  reverse	  due	  to	  rising	  costs	  in	  China	  and	  
weakness	  of	  major	  currencies,	  China’s	  unit	  prices	  remain	  generally	  lower	  on	  average	  than	  unit	  
prices	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
	  
Figure	  12:	  Demonstration	  of	  China	  in	  selected	  US	  clothing	  imports	  
	  





















Figure	  13:	  Change	  in	  China’s	  share	  in	  US	  imports	  in	  selected	  clothing	  categories:	  2003;	  2007	  
	  
Source:	  OTEXA	  	  Own	  calculations	  
	  
The	  impact	  of	  China	  on	  employment	  and	  production	  in	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  
	  
The	   dramatic	   flood	   of	   Chinese	   imports	   following	   ATC	   expiry	   was	   accompanied	   by	   a	   steep	  
decline	   in	  employment	  and	  domestic	  production	   in	  the	  US	  and	  EU.	  The	  US	  and	  the	  EU,	  along	  
with	   Japan	  are	  the	   largest	  consumers	  of	  clothing	  but	   the	  portion	  of	  domestic	  demand	  that	   is	  
satisfied	  by	  imports	  has	  increased,	  whilst	  the	  portion	  fed	  by	  domestic	  production	  has	  declined.	  	  
Between	  1990	  and	  2006,	  US	  clothing	  imports	  rose	  by	  $59bn,	  an	  average	  annual	  growth	  rate	  of	  
14.2%	   (Morris	   and	  Barnes	   2008).	  Overall,	   US	   exports	   fell	   by	   45%	  while	   imports	   increased	   by	  
41%	   between	   1999	   and	   2006	   (OTEXA	   2008).	   At	   the	   end	   of	   2006,	   domestic	   production	  
accounted	   for	   only	   9%	   of	   the	   United	   States	   clothing	   market,	   with	   imports	   making	   up	   the	  
remainder	  (des	  Marteau	  2005).	  The	  EU,	  similar	  to	  the	  US,	  demonstrates	  a	  continued	  reliance	  on	  
imports	   to	   feed	   domestic	   demand.	   In	   2007	   the	   EU(27)	   exported	   US$103.37bn	   of	   clothing30	  
(29.9%	   of	   the	  world	  market).	   However,	   they	   imported	  US$162.81bn	   of	   clothing	   in	   the	   same	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 76% (US$78.63bn) of this comprised intra-EU trade; this share has remained relatively constant since 













year31.	   This	   compares	  with	   exports	   of	  US$56.24bn	  and	   imports	   of	  US$8.18bn	   in	   2000,	  which	  
translates	  into	  an	  annual	  percentage	  growth	  of	  9%	  and	  10%	  respectively.	  	  
	  
Given	   the	   labour-­‐intensive	   nature	   of	   the	   clothing	   industry,	   its	   contribution	   to	   overall	  
employment	   is	   significant,	   as	  were	   the	   associated	   losses	   from	   its	   decline	   (Morris	   and	  Barnes	  
2008).	   The	   job	   losses	   that	   accompanied	   the	   contraction	   in	   their	   own	   domestic	   clothing	  
production	  following	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  ATC	  presented	  a	  major	  political	  and	  economic	  
challenge	  to	  authorities	  in	  developed	  countries	  and	  were	  a	  primary	  motivation	  behind	  the	  US	  
clothing	  industry’s	  petition	  to	  government	  for	  safeguards.	  Between	  1995	  and	  2004,	  the	  US	  lost	  
595	  000	  clothing	  jobs32	  –	  more	  than	  five	  times	  the	  losses	  of	  the	  UK,	  which	  amounted	  to	  109	  000	  
over	  the	  same	  period33.	  In	  the	  first	  month	  after	  quotas	  were	  lifted,	  12	  200	  jobs	  were	  lost	  in	  the	  
US	   textiles	   and	   apparel	   industries	   (Barboza	   and	   Becker	   2005).	   Employment	   data	   for	   the	   EU	  
shows	  that	  whilst	   it	  was	  not	  as	  hard	  hit	  as	  the	  US	  and	  has	  managed	  retain	  a	  sizeable	  clothing	  
industry	  consisting	  of	  175	  830	  firms	  employing	  2	  474	  932	  people	  with	  a	  turnover	  of	  $211.3bn	  in	  
200734	  (European	  Commission	  2009)35,	  neither	  has	  it	  escaped	  unscathed.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 52% (US$84.20bn) was intra-EU trade. 
32 United States clothing employment totaled 1.4 million in 1970 (Heron 2002: p. 755), but by 1995 it had 
already dropped to 814,000, falling by a further 73% to only 219,000 in 2004. During 2001 alone, 344,000 
jobs in the US clothing industry were lost (Flanagan 2003b), in 2003 another 50,00032 (Heron 2002) and 
between February 2004 and February 2007 another 67,500 (Employment Statistics Survey, 2007). 
33 In the UK, employment decreased by 29%, from 154 000 in 1995 to 45000 in 2004 (Morris and Barnes 
2008). 
34 This figure is for EU-27 countries. 














Part	  2:	  Lessons	  from	  Safeguards	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  EU36	  
	  
The	  incidence	  of	  safeguards	  in	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  
	  
The	  developed	  country	  response	  to	  the	  negative	  impacts	  from	  China’s	  liberalisation	  was	  to	  seek	  
renewed	  restrictions	  on	  imports	  from	  China	  through	  WTO	  safeguard	  provisions,	  which	  allowed	  
member	  states	  to	  take	  trade-­‐restricting	  action	  against	  any	  surge	  in	  textile	  and	  clothing	  imports	  
from	  China	   that	   threatened	  market	  disruptions	  and	   the	  orderly	  development	  of	   trade	   (USITC	  
2005)37.	  	  WTO	  safeguard	  provisions	  allow	  imports	  to	  be	  restricted	  to	  a	  maximum	  of	  7.5%	  above	  
the	  previous	  year’s	  quantity	  (USITC	  2006).	  The	  months	  following	  final	  expiry	  of	  the	  ATC	  saw	  a	  
number	   of	   these	  measures	   implemented	   by	   countries	   affected	   by	   the	   surge	   in	   imports,	   and	  
particularly	   where	   China’s	   rapid	   increase	   in	   market	   share	   in	   response	   to	   the	   relaxation	   of	  
quotas	  came	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  domestic	  manufacturers	  and	  developed	  countries’	  other	  trading	  
partners.	  	  
	  
Whilst	  some	  relatively	  small	   importers,	  namely	  Peru,	  Turkey	  and	  Brazil	   invoked	  the	  safeguard	  
provisions	  against	  China	   in	  terms	  of	   its	  WTO	  Accession	  Agreement38	  (Flanagan	  2006a),	  the	  US	  
was	   the	   first	   major	   importer	   that	   made	   use	   of	   the	   ‘China	   safeguards’39	  	   (Ref	   Footnote	   36)	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 The imposition of safeguards resulted from the post MFA impact of Chinese imports in 2005. The surge 
in imports from China to South Africa started in 2002 and had totally different causes (Morris and Einhorn 
2008).  
37 Chinese textiles and clothing were subject to a special textiles safeguard provision until 31 December 
2008 in terms of China’s Accession treaty, which was far less prescriptive than the standard WTO 
procedure. Whereas WTO compliance requires proof of actual damage (to the domestic market), the China 
Accession Agreement allowed action to be taken against perceived damage and threat of disruption due to 
imports from China (WTO 2001). Consequently, most of the safeguard action against China concentrated in 
the China safeguard actions under China’s accession treaty rather than the more lengthy WTO compliant 
route (Flanagan 2005b). 
38 This allowed them to set limits of 7.5 % annual growth on imports from China of some clothing categories 
for a period of one year 
39 Flanagan 2006b points out that this is most likely because WTO compliance requires proof of below-cost 
selling, which would be hard to demonstrate since clothing prices from China were roughly the same on 














Figure	  14:	  Schedule	  of	  safeguards	  imposed	  by	  US	  on	  China	  	  during	  ATC	  expiry	  	  
	  
Source:	  OTEXA	  database	  
	  
In	   January	   2006	   the	   US	   government	   set	   renewed	   limits	   on	   a	   range	   of	   textile	   and	   apparel	  
products	  deemed	  “quota-­‐free”	  since	  China’s	  accession	  into	  the	  WTO	  covering	  34	  categories	  of	  
textiles	  and	  apparel	  into	  the	  US	  for	  2006,	  2007	  and	  2008,	  including	  the	  19	  categories	  subject	  to	  
import	   limits	   under	   the	   “textile-­‐specific	   safeguard”	   clause	   in	   China’s	   WTO	   accession	   treaty	  
(Figure	  14	  above).	  These	  limits,	  listed	  in	  Table	  9,	  remained	  effective	  until	  the	  end	  of	  2008.	  
	  
The	   decision	   to	   proceed	   with	   safeguards	   culminated	   two	   years	   of	   investigation	   and	  
consultation	   by	   the	  USITC	   into	   allegations	   that	   items	   in	   the	   restricted	   categories	  were	   being	  
imported	  from	  China	  into	  the	  US	  in	  such	  increased	  quantities,	  or	  under	  such	  conditions,	  so	  as	  to	  
cause,	  or	  threaten	  to	  cause,	  market	  disruption	  to	  the	  domestic	  producers	  operating	  in	  the	  US	  of	  
like	   or	   directly	   competitive	   products	   (http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/safeguards).	   This	  
move	   was	   unprecedented	   and	   ran	   very	   much	   against	   the	   spirit	   of	   liberalised	   trade,	   which	  
motivated	   the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   MFA	   in	   2003.	   The	   EU	   took	   similar	   action	   against	   China,	  
although,	   in	   an	  effort	   to	  maintain	   good	   relations	  with	  China,	   and	  unlike	   the	  US,	   it	   chose	   the	  
WTO	  compliant	   route	   to	  act.	   In	  2005	   it	   requested	   formal	   consultations	  at	   the	  WTO	  and	  held	  
bilateral	  negotiations	  with	  China	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Article	  242	  of	  the	  WTO	  rules	  in	  terms	  
of	  which	  imports	  from	  China	  would	  be	  limited	  to	  7.5%	  above	  imports	  in	  the	  preceding	  twelve-­‐













covered	   6	   clothing	   categories	   consisting	   of	   T-­‐shirts,	   pullovers,	   dresses	   and	   bras	   that	   were	  
threatened	   by	   prodigious	   imports	   from	   China	   which	   set	   specific	   quantitative	   limits	   for	   2005	  
based	  on	  the	  growth	  rates	  between	  January	  and	  April	  2005.	  Six	  of	  the	  covered	  categories	  had	  
been	  subject	   to	   investigations	   launched	  by	   the	  EU	  on	  24	  April,	  after	  data	  showed	  substantial	  
rises	  in	  exports	  from	  China.	  	  	  	  
Table	  9:	  Quota	  limits	  set	  by	  US	  on	  clothing	  imports	  from	  China 
MFA Category Unit 2004 quota 2005 exports 2006 quota 2007 quota 2008 quota 
332/432/632 Hoiserya DPR 42,433,990 58,230,777 na na na 
332/432/632-B Baby socksa DPR - - 61,146,461 71,724,800 80,866,195 
332/432/632-T Baby socksa DPR - - 64,386,841 75,443,136 85,058,437 
338/339 Cotton knit shirts DOZ 2,523,532 20,624,490 20,822,222 23,893,373 26,938,606 
340/640 Mens woven shirts DOZ 2,345,946 6,173,242 6,743,644 7,738,332 8,724,590 
345/645/646 Sweaters DOZ 1,030,348 7,850,557 8,179,211 9,477,660 10,581,854 
347/348 Cotton trousers DOZ 2,421,922 18,379,651 19,666,049 22,566,791 25,442,951 
349/649 Brassieres DOZ 17,729,479 20,717,107 22,785,906 26,146,827 29,479,266 
352/652 Underwear DOZ 5,276,745 18,175,964 18,948,937 21,957,081 24,302,011 
359-S/659-S Swimwear KG 750,959 5,951,219 4,590,626 5,267,743 5,990,767 
443 Mens wool suits NO 140,015 1,613,356 1,346,082 1,544,629 1,756,637 
447 Mens wool trousers DOZ 76,352 203,332 215,004 246,718 280,581 
638/639 MMF knt shirts DOZ 2,712,680 3,762,225 8,060,063 9,248,922 10,427,707 
647/648 MMF trousers DOZ 2,974,238 6,490,061 7,960,355 9,134,507 10,298,709 
847 Silk & veg fibre trousers DOZ - 15,714,461 17,647,255 20,250,255 23,029,668 
Notes:	   The	   table	   reports	   the	   safeguards	   imposed	   on	   clothing	   categories	   for	   imports	   from	   China	   in	   2005.	   	   Quotas	  were	   imposed	   on	   group	  
332/432/632	   in	  2004	  and	   in	  2006	  on	  two	  new	  group	  categories	  332/432/632-­‐B	  and	  332/432/632-­‐T.	  The	  figures	  reported	  for	  332/432/632-­‐B	  
and	  332/432/632-­‐T	   are	   those	   in	   the	  official	  OTEXA	  database	   for	   2006-­‐2008	  but	  due	   to	   a	   lack	  of	   aggregation	   for	   the	  2004-­‐2006	  period,	   the	  
values	  for	  this	  period	  are	  recorded	  as	  n/a.	   	  2005	  exports	  of	  332,432	  and	  632	  are	  aggregate	  data	  for	  these	  categories	  according	  to	  the	  trade	  
data.	  	  
Source:	  OTEXA	  database	  	  (Own	  calculations)	  
The	  relief	  afforded	  by	  safeguards	  was	  intended	  as	  temporary	  and	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  providing	  
time	  for	  the	  industry	  to	  adjust	  to	  import	  competition.	  By	  inference,	  the	  China	  safeguards	  were	  













manufacturing	   output	   and	   ii)	   improve	   employment	   levels	   in	   the	   sector,	   which	   had	   fallen	  
consistently	   since	   January	   2001.	   They	   were	   also	   supposed	   to	   introduce	   predictability	   and	  
certainty	   back	   into	   domestic	   clothing	   markets	   in	   the	   US	   and	   EU	   by	   regulating	   the	   pace	   of	  
foreign	  import	  penetration,	  mitigating	  employment	  losses	  and	  boosting	  local	  supply	  in	  the	  host	  
country.	  	  
	  
In	   this	   section	   I	   shall	  analyse	  whether	   they	  were	  successful	   in	  achieving	   these	  objectives.	  My	  
analysis	  draws	  on	  opinions	  from	  industry	  experts,	  reports	  from	  the	  USITC	  and	  firsthand	  analysis	  
of	  trade	  data	  from	  OTEXA	  to	  investigate	  changes	  in	  trade	  flows	  between	  the	  US	  and	  its	  major	  
trading	  partners,	  and	  in	  particular	  China,	  and	  the	  market	  shares	  of	  these	  countries	  viz-­‐a-­‐viz	  US	  
apparel	   imports.	   Similar	  analysis	   is	  done	   for	   the	  EU	  albeit	  on	  a	  more	  circumscribed	  database	  
from	   the	   EU	   Trade	   department.	   My	   main	   objective	   is	   to	   establish	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  
safeguards	   in	  the	  US	  and	  data-­‐permitting,	  the	  EU,	  to	  address	  unemployment	  and	  insulate	  the	  
domestic	  market	  from	  Chinese	  competition.	  	  
Macro	  trade	  effects:	  Import	  diversion	  and	  transshipment	  
	  
In	   their	   immediate	  wake,	   safeguards	  did	   successfully	   reduce	   imports	   from	  China	   into	   the	  US,	  
which	  fell	  by	  14.64%	  and	  10.67%	   in	  volume	  and	  value	  terms	  for	   the	  first	  six	  months	  of	  2006.	  
Almost	  all	  of	  the	  decreases	  occurred	  in	  restricted	  categories.	  China’s	  share	  in	  total	  imports	  fell	  
accordingly	   as	   shown	   in	   Figure	   15	   below.	   What	   is	   more,	   aggregate	   US	   imports	   fell	   in	   both	  
volume	   and	   value	   terms	   by	   2.36%	   and	   0.46%	   respectively	   in	   the	   first	   six	   months	   after	  
imposition	  of	  the	  new	  restrictions.	  
Figure	  15:	  Chinas	  share	  of	  US	  apparel	  imports:	  1997-­‐2006	  
	  













The	   impact	  of	   safeguards	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	  of	   their	   imposition	  primarily	   stemmed	  
from	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  the	  process	  of	   their	   implementation.	   	  The	  Memorandum	  of	  
Understanding	   (MOU)	   was	   only	   signed	   in	   mid-­‐November	   2005.	   So	   for	   most	   of	   2005,	   the	  
safeguards	  were	  applied	  on	  a	  piecemeal	  basis	  because	   the	   visa	   system	  was	  not	   yet	   in	  place.	  
Hence	  firms	  had	  no	  guarantee	  that	  they	  would	  actually	  receive	  ordered	  product.	  Firms	  operate	  
with	  extended	   lead	  times	  of	  about	  six	  months	   from	  date	  of	  placing	  their	  orders.	  So,	  although	  
the	  firms	  placing	  orders	  would	  have	  guaranteed	  access	  to	  quota,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  guaranteed	  
access	  to	  actual	  product,	  many	  of	  them	  had	  already	  switched	  to	  alternative	  country	  suppliers.	  
Table	  10	  shows	  that	  there	  was	  virtually	  no	  growth	  in	  US	  imports	  (2005-­‐06)	  for	  safeguard	  items.	  
Furthermore	  the	  quotas	  were	  not	  fully	  utilized	  in	  2006.	  However,	  once	  a	  stable	  system	  was	  in	  
place	   in	  2007	  (January	  to	  November),	  US	   imports	   in	  the	  quota	  categories	   from	  China	  actually	  
increased	  by	  12%.	  This	  was	  because	  the	  MOU	  created	  stability	  that	  made	  it	  "safe"	  to	  increase	  
sourcing	  again	  from	  China.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  10:	  US	  General	  Imports	  from	  China	  in	  Square	  Meters,	  millions	  2004	  -­‐2007	  





Total all products  11,662.2 16,763.0 18,613.5 17,111.7 19,879.2 
Subtotal safeguard categories 4,913.9 7,322.4 7,367.8 6,755.6 7,574.7 
Subtotal non-safeguard categories 6,748.4 9,440.6  11,245.7 10,356.1 12,304.5 
    39.9% 19.1% -7.9% 18.8% 
Source:	  USITC	  personal	  communication	  
	  
However,	  once	  started,	  import	  diversion	  also	  became	  stabilised.	  The	  initial	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  
2006	   US	   safeguards	   were	   Bangladesh,	   Vietnam,	   Indonesia	   and	   Cambodia	   (Figure	   16	   below).	  
Vietnam	  gradually	  strengthened	  its	  foothold	  in	  the	  US	  apparel	  import	  market	  once	  safeguards	  
were	   initiated	  with	   shipments	   from	   this	   region	   surging	  33.44%	   in	  US$	  and	  35.24%	   in	   volume	  
terms	  compared	  with	  same	  period	  in	  200640	  (Emerging	  Textiles	  2007a;	  OTEXA	  2008).	  At	  the	  end	  
of	  2007,	  Vietnam	   lay	   in	   third	  place	   (behind	  Mexico)	  with	  a	  5.90%	  market	  share	  equivalent	   to	  
US$4.36bn;	  this	  was	  despite	  quotas	  on	  Vietnamese	  garments.	  Shipments	  from	  Bangladesh	  also	  
surged;	   in	   2007	   its	   import	   share	   was	   4.20%	   (US$3.10bn)	   (Emerging	   Textiles	   2007a;	   2007b).	  
Bangladesh	   was	   the	   clear	   winner	   in	   the	   immediate	   quota	   period	   (Emerging	   Textiles	   2007a).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  














Total	   imports	   from	  China	  fell	  15%	   in	  December	  2007,	  which	  confirmed	  a	  sourcing	  shift	   in	  the	  
near	  term.	  
	  
Figure	  16:	  US	  apparel	  imports:	  January	  to	  June	  2006	  –	  value	  and	  volume	  change 
 











1st half 2006 
Value 
change 
World 32,208.56 10.32% -2.36% 6.09% -0.46% 
China 6,612.80 97.93% -14.64% 69.61% -10.67% 
Mexico 2,640.17 -10.17% -13.76% -9.07% -13.89% 
Bangladesh 1,333.79 19.45% 19.62% 19.93% 26.54% 
Honduras 1,157.66 4.03% -12.03% -1.91% -12.64% 
Indonesia 1,694.59 17.07% 19.92% 19.67% 27.37% 
India 1,810.50 29.68% 13.71% 34.24% 17.75% 
Vietnam 1,541.36 3.13% 27.40% 6.33% 30.40% 
Cambodia 950,02 11.87% 31.22% 19.86% 29.93% 
El Salvador 620,93 1.57% -26.20% -5.88% -24.06% 
Pakistan 622,75 11.28% 21.01% 10.65% 12.89% 
Philippines 955,75 1.00% 27.88% 2.51% 17.61% 
Dominican Rep 757,81 -6.04% -20.35% -10.18% -18.98% 
Thailand 888,58 0.69% 11.31% 0.47% 5.73% 
Hong Kong 1,386.10 -19.27% 24.66% -8.79% 24.22% 
Vol in square metre equivalents; Value in US$; Unit value is US$ per SME; sorted on 
Vol Jan-June 2006 
Source:	  OTEXA	   	  (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
However,	   not	   all	   of	   these	   initial	   gains	   were	   sustained	   by	   all	   countries	   over	   the	   longer	   term	  
(Emerging	   Textiles	   2008d).	   Analysis	   for	   the	   full	   safeguard	   period	   (2006-­‐2008)	   shows	   that	  
imports	  into	  the	  US	  overall	  fell	  by	  0.09%	  in	  value	  from	  US$71.63bn	  to	  US$71.57bn	  and	  grew	  by	  
just	  0.69%	  in	  volume	  terms;	  and	  imports	  in	  the	  13	  quota	  categories	  sampled	  fell	  by	  0.76%	  and	  
0.43%	  by	  value	  and	  volume.	  	  
	  
Aggregate	  clothing	  imports	  from	  China	  grew	  by	  23.79%	  in	  value	  and	  by	  19.71%	  in	  volume	  terms	  













the	  growth	  between	  periods	  was	  very	  uneven.	  Following	  robust	  value	  and	  volume	  increases	  of	  
22.29%	  and	  10.58%	   in	  2006	  and	  22.83%	  and	  23.48%	   (volume)	   in	  2007,	   import	   (total)	   growth	  
from	  China	  moderated	  sharply	  in	  2008	  to	  0.78%	  in	  value	  terms	  and	  actually	  turned	  negative	  in	  
volume	   terms,	   shrinking	   by	   3.05%.	   Import	   growth	   from	   China	   in	   quota	   categories	   showed	   a	  
similar	  trend,	  slowing	  from	  31.74%	  in	  2007	  to	  just	  4.07%	  in	  2008	  by	  value	  and	  from	  25.51%	  to	  
0.94%	   by	   volume.	   Restrictions	   did	   dramatically	   reduce	   imports	   in	   some	   individual	   categories	  
(Table	  11).	  	  
	  
Table	  11:	  Import	  volumes	  from	  China	  in	  selected	  quota	  categories	  	  
Category Import volume (sme) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2006-2008 2009 
ALL  QUOTA 97.93 10.58 23.48 -3.05 19.17 10.72 
332/432/632-T Baby socksa 10.05 -20.75 -51.92 9.19 22.63 22.63 
338/339 Cotton knit shirts  674.08 68.81 41.20 5.94 49.59 78.23 
340/640 M&B woven shirts 149.73 -27.33 68.50 5.89 78.42 19.70 
345/645/646 Sweaters 631.51 -34.48 73.23 -16.13 45.28 46.27 
347/348 Cotton trousers 1606.03 -20.99 0.94 16.84 17.94 244.33 
349/649 Brassieres 16.76 -8.99 20.37 6.76 28.50 6.63 
352/652 Underwear 230.94 -24.12 66.63 -0.59 65.64 52.29 
359-S/659-S Swimwear 569.99 -22.61 6.47 3.60 10.30 59.67 
443 M&bB wool suits 957.76 -18.02 -1.36 14.43 12.87 7.09 
447 M&B  wool trousers 205.53 -27.20 19.31 -17.01 -0.99 72.67 
638/639 MMF knit shirts  443.03 236.67 43.09 1.20 44.82 11.21 
647/648 MMF trousers 164.35 -15.53 45.68 -5.39 37.83 27.84 
847 Silk trousers -10.77 -5.89 -13.97 -5.02 -18.29 -44.16 
















Furthermore,	   although	   imports	   in	   non	   quota	   categories	   increased	   throughout	   the	   safeguard	  
period,	  despite	  safeguards,	  US	  importers	  still	  increased	  the	  proportion	  of	  quota	  imports	  to	  non	  
quota	  imports	  (by	  value)	  from	  China,	  which	  expanded	  in	  2007	  by	  over	  2%	  to	  almost	  38%	  (Table	  
12).	  
	  
Table	  12:	  Decomposition	  of	  imports	  from	  China	  into	  quota	  and	  non-­‐quota	  categories	  
	  
	  
In	   sum,	   imports	   from	   China	   contracted	   significantly	   in	   the	   latter	   quota	   period	   but	   import	  
diversion	  also	  became	  stabilized	  with	  only	  a	  few	  countries	  extending	  their	  gains	  through	  2007	  
and	   2008,	   specifically,	   Vietnam,	   Indonesia	   and	  Bangladesh	   (OTEXA	  2008).	   Furthermore,	   once	  
restrictions	   were	   lifted	   at	   the	   end	   of	   2008,	   albeit	   with	   a	   lag	   in	   200941,	   imports	   from	   China	  
rebounded	  by	  35.34%	  and	  22.99%	  in	  volume	  and	  value	  terms	  respectively	  between	  2008	  and	  
2010.	  	  
	  
In	  2010,	  China	  commandeered	  nearly	  40%	  of	  all	  clothing	  imports	   into	  the	  US	  by	  value	  (Figure	  









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  

















Figure	  18:	  Demonstration	  of	  China	  in	  US	  quota	  imports:	  2006-­‐2010	  
	  
Note:	  Slight	  statistical	  variations	  obtain	  from	  non-­‐aggregation	  at	  the	  part	  category	  level.	  


















Table	   13	   demonstrates	   China’s	   performance	   in	   selected	   US	   quota	   imports	   (shown	   as	   a	  
percentage	  change	  on	  the	  comparable	  period)	  for	  the	  period	  of	  quota	  operations	  and	  the	  post	  
quota	  period	  and	   these	   two	  periods	   combined.	   It	   shows	   that	   import	   growth	  across	  all	   quota	  
categories	  climbed	  sharply	  after	  quota	  removal	  both	  by	  volume	  (69.19%)	  and	  value	  (41.41%),	  
an	  increase	  of	  110%	  and	  93%	  on	  the	  pre-­‐quota	  levels.	  	  
	  


























All quota  24.33 37.10 69.19 41.41 110.35 93.88 
332/432/632part Socks -47.50 -37.24 52.5 33.37 -19.93 -16.29 
338/339 Cotton knit shirts 49.59 73.76 132.82 80.60 248.26 213.80 
340/640 M/B woven shirts 78.42 118.77 59.74 49.64 185.01 227.37 
347/348 Cotton trousers 17.94 16.72 445.64 295.32 543.54 361.42 
349/649 Brassieres 28.50 19.09 32.10 20.83 69.75 43.90 
352/652 Underwear 65.64 84.61 128.15 73.17 277.91 219.68 
359/659part Swimwear 10.30 60.55 122.58 24.19 145.50 99.39 
443 Wool suits 12.87 35.85 41.63 35.44 59.86 83.99 
447 Wool trousers -0.99 32.37 140.16 86.62 137.79 147.03 
638/639 MMF knit shirts 44.82 24.66 33.39 30.81 93.18 63.07 
345/645/646 Sweaters 45.28 74.68 60.92 47.74 133.79 158.07 
647/648part Trousers 37.83 24.66 77.25 30.81 144.31 63.07 
847 Silk & veg trousrs -18.29 -20.26 -52.52 -51.27 -61.20 -61.14 
Source:	  	  OTEXA	   (	  Own	  calculations)	  
	  
However,	  even	  more	  relevant	  was	  the	  change	  in	  unit	  prices	  (Table	  14),	  which	  was	  a	  major	  bone	  
of	   contention	   pre-­‐quotas.	   In	   the	   period	   following	   safeguard	   removal,	   unit	   prices	   from	   China	  
declined	   on	   average	   by	   15.6%	   and	   in	   some	   categories,	   such	   as	   bras	   and	   trousers,	   by	  
significantly	  more.	  These	  declines	  were	  notably	   significantly	   smaller	   in	  magnitude	   than	   those	  
between	  2004	  and	  2005.	  Furthermore,	  qualitative	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  prices	  are	  unlikely	  to	  


























  CHANGE IN UNIT IMPORT PRICE (%) 
All apparel  -14.3 3.4 -8.5 -5.4 
All quota  -32.2 12.7 -15.6 -4.8 
332/432/632part Socks -9.3 19.6 -12.6 4.5 
338/339 Cotton knit shirts -56.7 16.2 -22.4 -9.9 
340/640 M/B woven shirts -26.3 22.6 -6.3 14.9 
347/348 Cotton trousers -39.4 20.2 -8.2 10.4 
349/649 Brassieres -68.2 -1.0 -27.6 -28.3 
352/652 Underwear -1.0 -7.3 -8.5 -15.2 
359/659part Swimwear -51.8 11.4 -24.1 -15.4 
443 Wool suits -61.3 45.6 -44.2 -18.8 
447 Wool trousers -4.5 20.4 -4.4 15.1 
638/639 MMF knit shirts -15.2 33.7 -22.3 3.9 
345/645/646 Sweaters -46.0 -2.9 -8.2 -10.9 
647/648part Trousers -44.4 -9.6 -26.2 -33.3 
847 Silk & veg trousers -0.4 -2.4 2.7 0.2 
	  
Source:	  OTEXA	  	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
Supply	  from	  a	  handful	  of	  the	  alternative	  locations,	  which	  became	  established	  during	  the	  quota	  
period	   also	   endured	   beyond	   safeguards.	   Bangladesh 42 ,	   Vietnam 43 ,	   Indonesia	   and	   India	  
continued	  to	  show	  robust	  growth	  between	  2008	  and	  2010,	  growing	  their	  respective	  shares	  of	  
the	  market	   to	  8.23%,	  6.20%,	  5.50%	  and	  4.36%	  (Table	  15	  below).	  This	  confirms	  predictions	  by	  
some	  pundits	  that	  the	  sourcing	  of	  imports	  from	  alternative	  low	  cost	  countries	  to	  China,	  mainly	  
in	   response	   to	   limitations	  on	  Chinese	  products44,	  was	   likely	   to	  be	  a	  permanent	  phenomenon	  
rather	   than	   a	   knee-­‐jerk	   reaction	  by	  US	   importers.	   Anecdotal	   evidence	   from	   large	  US	   apparel	  
importers	   reveals	   that	   they	   actively	   seek	   alternatives	   to	   China	   to	   balance	   risks	   and	   costs45	  
(Flanagan	   2006a;	   2010;	   Emerging	   Textiles	   2008a;	   2008b).	   Interviews	   with	   large	   US	   retailers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 In categories 345/645/646 (sweaters) and 347/348 (cotton trousers) Bangladesh was the 2nd largest 
supplier behind China in 2010. 
43 In category 347/348 (cotton trousers), Vietnam was the 4th largest supplier to the US behind China, 
Bangladesh and Mexico. 
44 Although a rapidly rising Yuan and increasing production costs are also having an impact. 
45 We are grateful for input and the data in Table 8 from Robert Koopman and Kimberlie Freund of the 
USITC. In 2005 Nathan and Associates interviewed the main US retailers in respect of sourcing from AGOA 
exporters as an alternative to China (Morris and Reed 2008a). The importance of spreading risk in their 













confirmed	  the	  emergence	  of	  Bangladesh	  as	  a	  key	  supplier	   to	   the	  US	  market	  after	  positioning	  
itself	   to	  cater	   for	   large	  runs	  of	  one	  product	  with	  minimal	  styling.	  Figure	  19	  demonstrates	   the	  
increased	   importance	   of	   quota	   imports	   and	   particularly	   cotton	   products,	   to	   Bangladesh	   and	  
Vietnam	  over	  the	  past	  decade46.	  	  
	  
Figure	  19:	  Performance	  of	  Bangladesh	  and	  Vietnam	  in	  US	  quota	  imports	  
Source:	  OTEXA	  	  (	  Own	  calculations)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Flanagan 2006b observes that these countries, and in particular Bangladesh, have achieved success 
through low prices (viz low wage costs) but that this strategy is likely to face headwinds in the longer term 
given uncompetitive high freight and port costs relative to China and India, high levels of corruption and 













A	   less	   intuitive	   outcome	   in	   this	   respect	   was	   the	   loss	   of	   importance	   of	   Honduras47	  and	   El	  
Salvador	   as	   suppliers	   to	   the	   US	  market	   once	   restrictions	   were	   lifted.	   Despite	   bilateral	   trade	  
agreements	  with	  the	  US	  and	  their	  proximity	  to	  this	  market,	  imports	  from	  both	  these	  countries	  
fell	  in	  value	  and	  volume	  terms	  after	  quota	  dissolution,	  reversing	  many	  of	  the	  gains	  achieved	  off	  
the	  back	  of	  safeguards.	  Similarly,	   imports	  from	  Mexico	   lagged	  those	  from	  Asia,	   falling	  24.21%	  
and	  29.92%	  by	  value	  and	  volume	  between	  2006	  and	  2008,	  and	  by	  15%	  in	  2007	  alone	  (Morris	  
and	   Barnes	   2008).	   Although	   these	   losses	   moderated,	   imports	   from	  Mexico	   fell	   by	   a	   further	  
11.79%	  (value)	  and	  8%	  (volume)	  between	  2008	  and	  2010,	  which	  implies	  a	  loss	  of	  nearly	  2.5%	  of	  
US	  market	  share	  since	  2006	  (from	  7.4%	  to	  4.96%).	  The	  analysis	  also	  throws	  up	  evidence	  of	  the	  
(much	  anticipated)	  incidence	  of	  trans-­‐shipping	  through	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Macau.	  The	  significant	  
drop	   in	   value	   and	   volume	   imports	   from	   both	   regions	   (of	   over	   80%)	   after	   safeguard	   expiry	  
suggests	  that	  the	  magnitude	  of	  this	  activity	  was	  considerable.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  15:	  Comparative	  change	  in	  US	  imports	  of	  top	  suppliers	  to	  US:	  Quota	  vs	  post	  quota	  period	  
	  
Source:	  (OTEXA)	  Own	  calculations	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Although imports from this region fell on net, it outperformed in category 332/432/632 (socks) in the post 
quota period; imports in this category increased from US$46,4m in 2008 to US$69,83m making Honduras 
the top supplier to the US in this category in 2010. Although at the same time, an argument could be made 













In	   2007,	   six	   countries,	   namely	   China,	   Mexico48,	   Vietnam,	   Indonesia,	   India	   and	   Bangladesh	  
accounted	   for	   56.67%	   of	   all	   clothing	   imports	   into	   the	   US.	   In	   2010	   this	   share	   increased	   to	  
64.07%.	  Theories	  about	  supply	  chain	  rationalization	  thus	  appear	   to	  have	  been	  realised	  at	   the	  
macro	   trade	   level.	   In	   respect	   of	   the	   EU	   safeguards,	   analysis	   of	   import	   values	   suggests	   that	  
safeguards	  were	   ineffective	   in	   limiting	   imports	   from	  China.	  Despite	   the	   intervention,	  Chinese	  
exports	   of	   clothing	   and	   textiles	   to	   the	   region	   grew	   by	   30%	   in	   the	   2005-­‐2007	   period,	   with	   a	  
particularly	  large	  increase	  in	  woven	  fabric	  (470%)	  (Eurostat	  2008).	  In	  2008,	  imports	  into	  the	  EU	  
from	  China	  stood	  at	  US$69.77bn,	  which	  was	  a	  57%	  increase	  on	  2006	  levels	  of	  US$27.96bn	  (ITC	  
2010).	   In	   the	   third	   quarter	   of	   2008	   alone,	   imports	   from	   China	   totaled	   8.23bn,	   up	   9.57%	   on	  
imports	  in	  the	  comparable	  quarter	  in	  2007.	  Table	  16	  below	  demonstrates	  the	  significant	  growth	  
rates	  of	   Chinese	   imports	   during	   the	  period	   that	   restrictions	  were	   in	  place	   in	   the	   EU	   in	   some	  
clothing	   categories.	  Chinese	   imports	   showed	   robust	  growth	   through	  2008	  despite	   safeguards	  
whilst	  Vietnam	  outperformed	  all	   other	  emerging	   suppliers	  with	  growth	  of	   almost	  30%	   in	   the	  
first	  three	  quarters	  of	  2008	  alone	  (Emerging	  Textiles	  2009c).	  
	  
Table	  16:	  Change	  in	  clothing	  imports	  by	  value	  into	  the	  EU	  (27)	  from	  China	  in	  selected	  HS	  categories	  
	  
Source:	  ITC	   	  (Own	  calculations)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Morris	  &	  Barnes	  (2008)	  note	  that	  despite	  bilateral	  trade	  agreements	  with	  the	  US,	  imports	  from	  Mexico	  













Import	  price	  inflation	  and	  downgrading	  of	  the	  domestic	  value	  chain	  
	  
A	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  unit	  values	  in	  quota	  categories	  shows	  that	  import	  prices	  increased	  during	  
the	   safeguard	   period,	   which	   confirms	   predictions	   about	   price	   inflation	   and	   may	   evidence	  
upgrading	  of	  the	  import	  basket	  (or	  downgrading	  of	  the	  local	  manufacturing	  base),	  i.e.	  a	  shift	  in	  
imports	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  higher	  value-­‐added,	  higher	  quality	  products	  (Table	  17).	  This	  happens	  
because	   importers	   striving	   to	   maximise	   profits	   drop	   low-­‐margin	   items	   first	   when	   they	   are	  
forced	   to	   reduce	   consignments	   (Edwards	   et	   al	   2006).	   The	   corollary	   to	   this	   is	   that	   domestic	  
manufacturers	  are	  forced	  toward	  low	  cost	  basic	   items	  whilst	   importers	  fill	  the	  demand	  at	  the	  
high	  end	  of	  the	  market49.	  Unit	  values	  of	  apparel	   imports	   into	  the	  US	  for	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2006	  
rose	  by	  1.95%	  on	  aggregate	  whilst	  those	  from	  China	  rose	  by	  4.65%	  (Emerging	  Textiles	  2007b).	  
These	  price	  movements	  persisted	  for	  the	  full	  2006	  period;	  the	  aggregate	  unit	  value	  for	  imports	  
in	  quota	  categories	  from	  China	  rose	  sharply	  in	  2006	  by	  44.77%,	  compared	  with	  the	  broad-­‐based	  
price	  deflation	  of	  23%	   for	   the	  comparable	  2005	  period,	  which	   largely	  motivated	  petitions	   for	  
safeguard	  protection	   in	   the	   first	   instance.	  Unit	   values	   for	   imports	   from	  China	   in	   general	   also	  
rose	  by	  10.58%,	  compared	  with	  a	  fall	  of	  14.31%	  in	  2005.	  	  
	  
Price	  inflation	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  quota	  categories	  at	  the	  aggregate	  level;	  unit	  values	  for	  US	  quota	  
imports	   on	   net	   increased	   by	   11.52%	   in	   2006,	   largely	   reversing	   the	   deflationary	   trend	   in	   the	  
comparable	   2005	   period,	   during	  which	   prices	   for	   these	   categories	   fell	   on	   average	   by	   2.81%.	  
Overall	   US	   import	   values	   grew	   at	   a	   smaller	   rate	   of	   1.8%	   but	   this	   nevertheless	   again	   saw	   a	  
reversal	  of	   the	  deflation	   in	  2005	  prices	  of	  3.83%.	  Unit	   values	   for	   imports	   in	  quota	  categories	  
from	  China	  and	   the	  World	   increased	  by	  12.41%	  and	  0.94%	   respectively	  during	   the	   safeguard	  
period	   (2006-­‐2008),	   compared	  with	  price	  movements	  of	  3.40%	   (China)	   and	  0.77%	   (World)	   at	  
the	  aggregate	  level.	  In	  ten	  of	  the	  thirteen	  quota	  categories,	  unit	  values	  from	  China	  increased	  by	  
between	  2006	  and	  2008	  and	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  most	  sensitive	  categories	  (those	  with	  high	  fill	  
rates)	  (OTEXA).	  Where	  unit	  values	  from	  China	  fell	  during	  the	  safeguard	  period,	  for	  instance	  in	  
the	   case	   of	   brassieres,	   this	   may	   have	   been	   due	   to	   excess	   supply	   in	   China	   from	   US	   buyers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 This is a cautious observation. Given that only a small share of US clothing consumption is produced 
locally, a direct link between the Chinese safeguards and rise in unit import values might be a bit 
questionable and the effect on US manufacturers requires qualitative validation which is beyond the scope 













switching	   to	  alternative	   sources	  as	   a	   result	  of	   safeguards,	   in	   this	   case,	  Bangladesh	   (Emerging	  
Textiles	  2008b;	  Emerging	  Textiles	  2009b).	  	  
	  
Table	  17:	  Comparison	  of	  price	  for	  quota	  imports	  from	  China	  pre,	  during	  and	  post	  restrictions 








All	  quota	   	   -­‐23.00	   47.76	   12.40	   -­‐18.94	  
345/645/646	   Sweaters	   -­‐39.44	   26.68	   20.23	   -­‐8.19	  
347/348	   Cotton	  trousers	   -­‐53.35	   28.54	   8.13	   -­‐25.59	  
349/649	   Brassieres	   -­‐0.99	   44.51	   -­‐7.33	   -­‐8.53	  
352/652	   Underwear	   -­‐51.78	   19.10	   11.45	   -­‐24.10	  
647/648part	   Trousers	   -­‐44.43	   32.28	   -­‐9.55	   -­‐26.20	  
332/432/632part	   Socks	  incl.	  baby	  socks	   -­‐9.34	   38.78	   19.55	   -­‐12.55	  
338/339part	   Cotton	  knit	  shirts	   -­‐56.73	   106.12	   16.16	   -­‐22.43	  
340/640	   Woven	  shirts	   -­‐26.35	   32.61	   22.61	   -­‐6.32	  
638/639	   MMF	  knit	  shirts	   -­‐53.86	   64.86	   6.10	   -­‐8.23	  
443	   Wool	  suits	   -­‐4.55	   16.50	   20.35	   -­‐4.37	  
447	   Wool	  trousers	   -­‐15.24	   15.30	   33.69	   -­‐22.29	  
359/659part	   Swimwear	   -­‐61.29	   51.22	   45.55	   -­‐44.20	  
847	   Silk	  &	  veg	  trousers	   -­‐0.41	   11.21	   -­‐2.41	   	  2.68	  
Data	  source:	  OTEXA	  Own	  calculations)	   	  	  	  	  
(Statistical	  variations	  from	  Table	  12	  obtain	  from	  aggregations	  of	  part	  categories)	  
	  
Aggregate	   price	   increases	  were	   evident	   for	  most	   emerging	   supplier	   countries	   as	  well	   for	   the	  
safeguard	  period;	  such	  as	  Bangladesh	  (5.79%),	  Indonesia	  (6.21%)	  and	  Vietnam	  (2.39%)	  as	  well	  
as	  India	  (3.56%)	  (Emerging	  Textiles	  2008c).	  Full	  year	  increases	  of	  between	  a	  half	  and	  10%	  were	  
recorded	  for	  nine	  of	  the	  twelve	  alternative	  sourcing	  locations	  in	  2008	  (Table	  18)	  (OTEXA),	  which	  
implies	  that	  US	  manufacturers	  were	  generally	  being	  forced	  toward	  production	  of	  basic,	  low	  unit	  
value	   items.	  This	  may	  be	  evidence	  of	  product	  downgrading	  although	   this	   requires	  qualitative	  
validation.	   In	  2008,	  further	   increases	  or	  marginal	  decreases	  were	  recorded	  for	  seven	  of	  these	  
locations.	  India,	  Cambodia	  and	  Indonesia	  registered	  large	  price	  falls	  in	  2008,	  which	  may	  reflect	  
some	   rationalization	   of	   the	   supply	   base	   around	   a	   few	   alternative	   supply	   locations	   such	   as	  
Vietnam	   and	   Bangladesh	   (although	   again,	   the	   depressive	   effect	   of	   the	   global	   economic	  
downturn	   is	   likely	   also	   a	   factor	   here).	   Notably,	   Honduras	   and	   El	   Salvador,	   who	   recorded	  
progressively	   negative	   price	   movements	   between	   2005	   and	   2008	   are	   participants	   in	  













the	  final	  garment	  is	  re-­‐imported	  under	  special	  arrangement	  and	  usually	  at	  a	  preferential	  tariff	  
rate	  (Morris	  and	  Barnes	  2008).	  	  
	  
When	  restrictions	  were	  lifted,	  prices	  for	  quota	  and	  aggregate	  imports	  from	  China	  fell	  by	  18.95%	  
and	   8.49%	   respectively	   between	   2009	   and	   2010,	   as	   did	   prices	   for	   US	   imports	   in	   general	   by	  
7.76%	   (quota)	   and	   8.50%	   (overall).	   In	   some	   individual	   categories,	   the	   price	   movements	   for	  
quota	  imports	  between	  the	  pre	  and	  post	  quota	  period	  are	  very	  significant,	  ranging	  from	  4%	  to	  
44%.	  	  
	  
Table	  18:	  Demonstration	  of	  aggregate	  unit	  import	  values	  for	  the	  top	  twelve	  supply	  countries	  into	  the	  
US	  in	  2008	  (sorted	  on	  2008	  import	  value) 
AGGREGATE	  UNIT	  VALUES	  FOR	  IMPORTS	  INTO	  THE	  US	  
COUNTRY	   2003	   2005	   2007	   2008	   2010	   %	  	  	  
CHANGE	  
’05-­‐‘06	  






%	  CHANGE	  	  
’08-­‐‘10	  
World	   3.24	   3.12	   3.17	   3.15	   2.89	   1.80	   -­‐0.31	   -­‐0.46	   -­‐0.77	   -­‐8.50	  
China	   3.17	   2.57	   2.83	   2.94	   2.69	   10.58	   -­‐0.53	   3.95	   3.40	   -­‐8.93	  
Vietnam	   3.21	   3.40	   3.42	   3.42	   3.08	   0.03	   0.62	   -­‐0.09	   0.53	   -­‐10.03	  
Indonesia	   3.49	   3.49	   3.74	   3.66	   3.51	   3.74	   3.26	   -­‐2.03	   1.16	   -­‐4.33	  
Mexico	   3.49	   3.57	   3.74	   3.88	   3.72	   0.50	   4.21	   3.78	   8.15	   -­‐4.11	  
Bangladesh	   2.02-­‐	   2.11	   2.30	   2.40	   2.45	   5.75	   2.96	   4.38	   7.47	   2.12	  
India	   3.76	   3.77	   3.65	   3.48	   3.20	   0.70	   -­‐3.69	   -­‐4.68	   -­‐8.20	   -­‐7.96	  
Honduras	   2.17	   2.10	   2.05	   1.96	   1.90	   2.12	   -­‐4.40	   -­‐4.73	   -­‐8.92	   -­‐2.99	  
Cambodia	   2.35	   2.41	   2.80	   2.67	   2.35	   5.06	   10.40	   -­‐4.43	   5.51	   -­‐12.26	  
Thailand	   3.45	   3.37	   3.38	   3.40	   2.83	   -­‐3.56	   3.98	   0.62	   4.63	   -­‐17.53	  
Hong	  Kong	   4.71	   5.88	   5.68	   6.02	   4.80	   -­‐8.72	   5.76	   5.90	   12.00	   -­‐20.29	  
El	  Salvador	   2.01	   1.87	   1.83	   1.83	   2.00	   4.33	   -­‐5.94	   -­‐0.02	   -­‐5.96	   8.93	  
Pakistan	   2.29	   2.18	   2.15	   2.15	   2.14	   -­‐3.66	   2.65	   -­‐0.23	   2.42	   -­‐0.52	  
Sri	  Lanka	   3.63	   3.64	   3.85	   3.87	   3.86	   2.68	   3.03	   0.47	   3.52	   -­‐0.22	  
Philippines	   	   3.53	   3.76	   3.52	   2.91	   -­‐3.66	   10.63	   -­‐6.29	   3.68	   -­‐17.53	  
Macau	   	   4.11	   4.33	   4.53	   3.80	   2.17	   3.12	   4.82	   8.09	   -­‐16.10	  
Malaysia	   	   3.21	   2.89	   2.67	   3.52	   -­‐12.01	   2.53	   -­‐7.58	   -­‐5.24	   31.63	  














Unit	  price	  data	  for	  the	  post	  safeguard	  period	  2008-­‐2010	  also	  provides	  corroborative	  evidence	  
of	   illegal	   and	   irregular	   import	   activity.	   In	   particular,	   the	   erratic	   price	   movements	   for	   some	  
countries	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   quota	   removal,	   notably,	   Hong	   Kong,	   Macau	   and	   the	   Philippines	  
confirmed	  previous	  suspicions	  about	  round-­‐tripping	  and	  transshipment	  activity	  through	  these	  
regions.	  The	  results	  for	  Bangladesh,	  El	  Salvador	  and	  Malaysia,	  rising	  unit	  values	  accompanying	  
shrinking	   import	   volumes	   deserve	   particular	   comment.	   These	   could	   be	   interpreted	   either	   as	  
genuine	  competence	  to	  supply	  the	  high	  end	  of	  the	  US	  market	  post	  quotas	  or	  alternatively,	  as	  
evidence	  of	  under-­‐declared	  import	  values	  during	  the	  safeguard	  period.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Malaysia,	  
there	  is	  significant	  reason	  to	  believe	  the	  latter	  (Emerging	  Textiles	  2009b).	  	  
	  
In	   2010	  most	   supplier	   countries	   to	   the	  US	   saw	   a	   pullback	   in	   clothing	   prices	   relative	   to	   2009	  
(with	  China	  being	  no	  exception)	  due	   in	  principle	   to	   the	  global	  economic	  downturn.	  However,	  
despite	  general	  consensus	  of	   inflation	   in	  China	  fuelled	  by	  higher	   labour	  and	  production	  costs,	  
some	  pundits	  cautioned	  against	  misinterpreting	  China’s	  apparent	  pullback	  in	  some	  categories,	  
and	  most	  notably	  cotton	  T-­‐shirts	  and	  trousers,	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  weakness.	  They	  propose	  that	  China	  
has	   simply	   transgressed	   to	   higher	   segments	   of	   the	   global	   market	   leaving	   other	   exporting	  
countries	  to	  fight	  over	  less	  profitable	  basics	  (Flanagan	  2010;	  Birnbaum	  2011).	  	  
	  
A	  similar	  trend	  is	  evident	  in	  data	  for	  the	  EU.	  Table	  19	  shows	  import	  prices	  from	  China	  into	  the	  
EU	   in	  clothing	  categories	   in	  Q3	  2008	  compared	  with	   the	  same	  period	   the	  previous	  year.	  This	  
shows	  that	  China’s	  prices	  into	  the	  EU	  began	  declining	  less	  sharply	  during	  2008	  due	  to	  rising	  unit	  
values	   in	   some	   categories,	   particularly	   for	  wovens	   (HS62).	   For	   instance,	   the	  prices	   of	   babies’	  
garments	  under	  HS6111	  actually	   rose	   in	   the	   third	  quarter	  after	   falling	   in	   the	   first	  and	  second	  
quarters	   of	   2008	  by	   2.6%	  and	  1.1%	   (not	   shown).	   Similarly,	   prices	   in	   category	  HS6205	   (men’s	  
shirts)	   surged	   16%	   in	   the	   third	   quarter	   after	   rising	   only	   3.3%	   and	   8.3%	   in	   the	   previous	   two	  
quarters.	   And	   in	   Chapter	   6208	   (women’s	   underwear	   and	   pyjamas)	   unit	   prices	   from	   China	  
gained	  11.2%	  after	  falling	  13.8%	  and	  22.4%	  in	  the	  first	  and	  second	  quarters	  respectively	  	  	  
	  
This	  notwithstanding,	  China’s	  unit	  prices	  remained	  generally	  lower	  on	  average	  than	  unit	  prices	  
from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  (ROW	  in	  the	  table).	  However	  the	  gap	  between	   import	  prices	   from	  
China	  and	  ROW	  reduced	  for	  certain	  categories;	  for	  example,	  whereas	  import	  values	  from	  China	  













31%	  in	  the	  third	  quarter.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  whereas	  unit	  prices	  for	  T-­‐shirts	  from	  China	  were	  
the	   same	   as	   those	   from	   ROW,	   Chinese	   prices	   rebounded	   9%	   in	   the	   second	   quarter.50	  The	  
volume	  of	  imports	  also	  fell	  in	  some	  categories;	  T-­‐shirts	  for	  instance	  fell	  4%	  in	  the	  third	  quarter	  
of	  2008	  after	  rising	  nearly	  18%	  in	  the	  second	  quarter	  (not	  shown).	  
	  
Table	  19:	  Demonstration	  of	  changes	  in	  clothing	  import	  prices	  from	  China	  into	  the	  EU:	  	  Q3	  07	  vs	  Q3	  08.	  
	  
Source:	  Emerging	  Textiles	  2011	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 China’s prices on T-shirts were 24% above the ROW import price in the second quarter of 2007 when 













Prices	  of	  clothing	  from	  China	   into	  the	  EU	  began	  to	  fall	  almost	   immediately	  upon	  the	   lifting	  of	  
restrictions	   in	   2009,	   which	   offered	   China	   greater	   competitiveness	   over	   quota	   emergent	   EU	  
suppliers,	  a	  trend	  which	  persisted	  into	  2010.	  In	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2010,	  prices	  from	  China	  fell	  
in	  20	  of	  23	  clothing	  categories	  and	  especially	   in	  quota-­‐sensitive	  categories	  such	  as	  men’s	  knit	  
shirts	   (16%),	  women’s	  knit	  and	  woven	  blouses	   (18.66%	  and	  18.22%),	  brassieres	   (19.08%)	  and	  
men’s	   underwear	   (26.20%)	   (Emerging	   Textiles	   2011).	   In	   nearly	   all	   product	   categories,	   prices	  
from	  China	  were	  10%	   -­‐	  25%	  below	   its	   competitors	   in	   the	   first	  part	  of	  2010.	  However,	   rather	  
than	  competitiveness	  gains,	   these	  price	  movements	  are	  more	   likely	  a	   reversal	  of	   the	  product	  
degrading	   which	   notoriously	   accompanies	   quantitative	   restrictions.	   With	   quotas	   gone,	  
importers	   are	   no	   longer	   compelled	   to	   pursue	   high	   margin	   products	   and	   attack	   low-­‐end	  
segments	   of	   the	   market.	   Hence	   lower	   unit	   values	   since	   2008	   probably	   more	   likely	   reflect	  
shipments	  of	  lower	  quality	  products.	  
Faulty	  quota	  mechanisms	  	  
	  
CASE STUDY: RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF “BABY SOCKS FROM CHINA INO THE UNITED 
STATES 
Objections against quantitative restrictions on imports of certain baby socks and booties in terms of 
quotas on hosiery (category 332/432/632) prompted an investigation by the UITC into the probable 
effect of their removal. The report concluded that the removal of BSB1- socks with bulky 
embellishments which preclude them from being worn as footwear - from the quota would likely have a 
negligible effect on the level of imports of baby socks and booties from China on total US imports of 
baby socks and booties and on domestic producers of baby socks and booties. This is because the 
product imported under this definition constituted a product for which there was no US production.  
With respect to BSB2 -  socks with embellishments - the commission upheld the restrictions despite 
significant qualitative evidence that the quotas had simply led to higher unit prices with no increase in 
domestic orders. This is because importers had either procured additional quota early when quota 
costs were at their highest or switched to higher cost foreign suppliers including South Korea, Taiwan 
and Cambodia.  
 
Justification for safeguards: Removal of these articles from quota could result in declining import prices 
and an increase in the total volume of US imports.  
 
Import restraints therefore remained despite evidence that i) increased costs associated with 
purchasing quota or changing suppliers are passed onto consumers and ii) any domestic loss in sales 
of BSB2 would likely affect sales of other baby socks since BSB2 are mostly sold as part of an 
assortment that includes other baby socks even though they alone account for a relatively small share 
of total imports of baby socks.  













Another	  policy	  lesson	  is	  drawn	  from	  a	  case	  study	  of	  restrictions	  on	  imports	  of	  baby	  socks	  which	  
demonstrates	   the	   inherent	  problem	  with	   interventions	   that	  paint	  with	  a	  broad	  brush.	  Firstly,	  
the	  quota	  net	  may	  be	  cast	  too	  wide	  with	  the	  result	  that	  it	  catches	  products	  that	  do	  not	  require	  
restrictions	   but	   whose	   limitation	   disrupts	   the	   local	   market.	   Government	   officials	   are	   often	  
incapable	  of	  appreciating	  the	  broader	  supply	  chain	  effects	  of	  restrictions	  on	  product	  categories.	  
More	   importantly,	   it	   also	   demonstrates	   that	   quotas	   may	   not	   altruistically	   benefit	   local	  
manufacturers	  but	  will	  more	   likely	   lead	  to	  supplier	  substitution	  where	  the	  product	   is	  sourced	  
from	  alternative	  foreign	  locations	  at	  a	  higher	  cost.	  	  
	  
Domestic	  production	  and	  employment	  
	  
Figure	  20	  below	  summarises	  the	  trend	  in	  US	  domestic	  production	  and	  import	  penetration	  in	  9	  
of	  the	  12	  categories	  that	  petitioned	  for	  protection	  after	  the	  expiration	  of	  MFA	  quotas.	  It	  shows	  
that	   the	   share	   of	   US	  manufacturers	   in	   the	   domestic	  market	   dwindled	   from	   almost	   16½%	   in	  
2003	  to	  a	  pitiful	  4¼%	  in	  2009.	  
	  
Figure	  20:	  Demonstration	  of	  trends	  in	  US	  production	  in	  selected	  clothing	  categories:	  2003;2005;2007;	  
2009	  
*YTD	  June	  2009	   2003	   2005	   2007	   2009*	  
Category	   Domestic	  production	  in	  total	  domestic	  demand	  (%)	  
Average	  across	  all	  quota	  categories	   16.49	   11.63	   5.14	   4.24	  
338/339	  Cotton	  knit	  shirts	   18.8	   11.2	   4.8	   13.8	  
345/645/646	  Cotton	  and	  MMF	  sweaters	   12.2	   13.3	   6.3	   5.2	  
349/649	  Cotton	  and	  MMF	  bras	   23.6	   19.3	   6.1	   0.4	  
638/639	  MMF	  knit	  shirts	  and	  blouses	   11.5	   5.9	   3.5	   4.2	  
647/648	  MMF	  trousers	   17.6	   10.5	   6.8	   5.4	  
352/652	  Cotton	  and	  MMF	  underwear	   18.4	   11.4	   7.1	   0.9	  
347/348	  Cotton	  trousers	  	   19.0	   12.6	   3.2	   1.2	  
340/640	  Cotton	  and	  MMF	  shirts	  and	  blouses	   10.8	   8.8	   3.3	   2.8	  
















US	  production	  in	  all	  categories	  declined	  steadily	  between	  2003	  and	  2010,	  averaged	  across	  all	  12	  
quota	   categories.	   Furthermore,	   import	   penetration	   rocketed	  during	   the	   2007	   to	   2009	  period	  
despite	  the	  imposition	  of	  safeguards	  on	  9	  of	  these	  categories.	  Along	  with	  declines	  in	  domestic	  
production,	  employment	  levels	  in	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  continued	  to	  hemorrhage	  through	  the	  quota	  
period.	   In	   2007	   US	   clothing	   output	   fell	   by	   40%	   and	   clothing	   employment	   by	   8.3%	   (Textiles	  
Intelligence	   2008).	   Similar	   to	   the	   US,	   EU	   production	   declined	   during	   the	   quota	   period	   with	  
nearly	  a	  6.4%	  decrease	  in	  employment	  in	  2007	  alone	  (European	  Commission	  2008).	  
	  
	  Policy	  lessons	  from	  safeguards	  in	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  
	  
The	  findings	  presented	  for	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  come	  with	  the	  caveat	  that	  a	   full	   impact	  analysis	  of	  
these	  particular	   cases	  of	   safeguards	  are	  not	   the	  objective	  of	   this	   research.	   It	   is	   conducted	   to	  
infer	   outcomes	   for	   safeguards	   in	   South	   Africa	   and	   to	   offer	   guidelines	   for	   policy	  making	  with	  
regard	   to	   protectionism	   in	   the	   clothing	   sector.	   I	   fully	   acknowledge	   that	   in	   many	   areas	   my	  
analysis	  is	  only	  partial.	  
Safeguards	  in	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  were	  intended	  as	  a	  temporary	  measure,	  afforded	  with	  the	  express	  
purpose	  of	  providing	  the	  industry	  with	  some	  time	  to	  adjust	  to	  import	  competition.	  A	  statement	  
on	   the	  EU	  accord	  noted	   that:	   “(It)	  offers	  a	   fair	  deal	   for	  China	  while	  giving	   respite	  and	  much-­‐
needed	  breathing	  space	  to	  textiles	  industries	  in	  Europe	  and	  developing	  countries.	  (...)	  It	  proves	  
the	  virtue	  of	  free	  trade,	  but	  also	  the	  necessity	  to	  intervene	  to	  soften	  phases	  of	  transition	  and	  
economic	   changes,	   particularly	   on	   the	   social	   side.”	   The	   EU	   statement	   further	   noted	   Europe	  
"respects	  China’s	  right	  to	  benefit	  from	  trade	  liberalization"	  and	  that	  it	  will	  provide	  a	  "window	  
for	   adaptation"	   for	   producers	   in	   developing	   countries	   whose	   exports	   to	   the	   EU	   have	   been	  
displaced	  by	  increased	  Chinese	  exports	  (i.BRIDGES	  Weekly	  15	  June	  2005).	  	  
By	   inference,	  quotas	  were	   intended	  to	  generate	  greater	   levels	  of	   local	  sourcing	  to	  rejuvenate	  
local	   manufacturing	   output	   and	   raise	   employment	   levels	   in	   the	   sector,	   which	   have	   fallen	  
consistently	   since	   January	  2001	   in	  ATC	   countries.	   The	  qualitative	  evidence	  on	   the	  US	  and	  EU	  
safeguards	  is	  largely	  contraindicative	  to	  their	  prescribed	  outcomes.	  Safeguards	  led	  to	  i)	  import	  
diversion,	   ii)	   suppression	  of	  domestic	  prices	   and	   iii)	   possible	  downgrading	   in	   the	   local	   supply	  
chain.	  Two	  immediate	  concerns	  of	  industry	  over	  the	  imposition	  of	  restrictions	  on	  imports	  from	  













net	  impact	  on	  imports	  overall	  and	  ii)	  provide	  added	  impetus	  to	  transshipment	  practices	  which	  
were	   already	   believed	   to	   be	   at	   high	   level,	   particularly	   through	   Indonesia	   and	   certain	   African	  
countries	  receiving	  preferential	  treatment	  under	  AGOA.	  
	  
An	  analysis	  of	  macro-­‐trade	  and	  economic	  data	   suggests	   that,	  whilst	  quotas	  were	  effective	   in	  
reducing	   imports	   from	  China,	   they	  did	  not	  generate	  a	  commensurate	  drop	   in	  overall	   clothing	  
imports	   into	  the	  US.	  Since	  restrictions	  were	  specific	  to	  China,	   importers	  were	  not	   inhibited	   in	  
their	  ability	  to	  source	  from	  alternative	  low	  cost	  suppliers	  such	  as	  Bangladesh	  and	  Vietnam,	  who	  
were	   either	   unconstrained	   by	   quotas	   or	   whose	   quotas	   were	   less	   binding	   than	   China’s.	   US	  
buyers	   indicated	   that	   these	   new	   suppliers	  were	   likely	   to	   be	   of	   even	   greater	   benefit	   into	   the	  
future	   than	   China	   who	   does	   not	   have	   unlimited	   production	   capacity	   and	   is	   switching	   focus	  
increasingly	   to	   its	   own	   domestic	  market.	   There	   are	   already	   signs	   of	   a	   trade	   off	   between	   its	  
supply	  to	  US	  and	  EU	  markets,	  with	  the	  latter	  taking	  preference	  (Flanagan	  2005a;	  2006a;	  2010).	  
In	  sum,	  safeguards,	  at	  best,	  slowed	  the	  rate	  of	  imports	  from	  China,	  and	  this	  only	  temporarily;	  
they	  also	  encouraged	  importers	  to	  prematurely	  identify	  alternative	  foreign	  sources	  of	  clothing,	  
the	  effect	  of	  which	  endured	  beyond	  the	  restrictions.	  What	   is	  clearly	   indicated	   in	  the	  US	  price	  
data,	  however,	   is	  that	  there	  was	  significant	  trans-­‐shipment	  and	  other	  irregular	   import	  activity	  
during	  the	  safeguard	  period,	  as	  was	  widely	  anticipated	  by	  commentators	  and	  analysts.	  
	  
From	  an	  output	  perspective,	  safeguards	  did	  not	  present	  any	  observable	  stimulus	   to	  domestic	  
output	  or	  employment,	  both	  of	  which	  continued	  to	  decline	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  intervention.	  
There	  was	  little	  or	  no	  evidence	  from	  the	  employment	  or	  domestic	  production	  data	  that	  orders	  
reverted	  to	  local	  US	  manufacturers	  to	  fill	  the	  void	  in	  supply	  that	  was	  created	  by	  the	  restrictions.	  
This	  was	  largely	  forecasted	  by	  industry;	  as	  one	  pundit	  argued:	  "This	  (the	  safeguards)	  does	  not	  
solve	   the	   problem.	   It	   only	   pushes	   the	   danger	   from	   China	   farther	   off,"	  
(http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridgesweekly/6224/).	  Furthermore,	  higher	  unit	  import	  values	  suggest	  
that	  quantitative	  restrictions	  may	  have	  pushed	  domestic	  manufacturers	  toward	  low-­‐cost,	  basic	  
items	  by	  encouraging	  importers	  to	  upgrade	  their	  import	  basket.	  
	  
Finally,	   an	   important	   policy	   lesson	   that	   emerged	   from	   the	   US	   and	   EU	   is	   the	   considerable	  
uncertainty	  that	  is	  created	  when	  policies	  are	  poorly	  defined	  and	  implemented.	  In	  both	  the	  US	  













business	   before	   implementing	   the	   restrictions	   and	   were	   ignorant	   about	   the	   unintended	  
consequences	   of	   the	   intervention.	   The	   sharp	   pullback	   in	   imports	   from	   China	   and	   the	   low	  
utilisation	   rate	   of	   quotas	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   their	   imposition	   in	   the	  US	   primarily	  
stemmed	  from	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  the	  process	  of	  their	  implementation.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
babysocks	   for	   instance,	   the	   overly	   broad	   scope	   of	   the	   intervention	   led	   to	   the	   inclusion	   of	  
products	   that	  domestic	  producers	  were	  unable	   to	  produce.	  This	  happens	  when	  governments	  
are	  not	   fully	   informed	  and	  are	  thus	   inherently	   incapable	  of	  appreciating	  the	  consequences	  of	  
their	   actions.	   If	   distortions	   are	   to	   be	   minimised,	   policies	   must	   be	   formulated	   in	   close	  
collaboration	   and	   consultation	  with	   industry	   who	   have	   the	   detailed	   knowledge	   necessary	   to	  
appreciate	  the	  potential	  distortions	  that	  an	  intervention	  may	  create.	  	  
The	  significant	  supply	  bottlenecks	  and	  disruptions	  to	  supply	  in	  the	  EU	  as	  millions	  of	  units	  of	  bras	  
were	   impounded	   at	   EU	   customs	   elucidate	   this	   point.	  51	  This	   was	   caused	   by	   the	   swift	   re-­‐
introduction	  of	  quotas	  in	  June	  2005,	  which	  specified	  new	  limits	  on	  import	  quantities	  and	  whose	  
implementation	   did	   not	   allow	   importers	   sufficient	   time	   to	   adjust	   their	   import	   quantities	   to	  
comply	  with	  the	  new	  restrictions.	  Importers	  argued	  that	  the	  new	  restrictions	  had	  been	  imposed	  
retroactively	   to	   their	   announcement	   date	   (June	   10),	   rather	   than	   to	   the	   date	   of	   their	   actual	  
implementation	  (July	  12),	  by	  which	  time	  quota	  limits	  had	  already	  been	  filled.	  The	  renegotiation	  
of	   the	   safeguards	   to	   allow	   half	   of	   the	   2006	   quota	   to	   count	   toward	   2005	   limits	   resolved	   the	  
immediate	  problem	  but	  the	  industry	  issued	  warnings	  about	  future	  supply	  shortages	  and	  price	  
increases	  for	  consumers.	  	  	  
It	   is	   within	   this	   broad	   framework	   of	   policy-­‐making,	   having	   observed	   the	   impacts	   and	  
implications	  of	  similar	  interventions	  imposed	  in	  other	  countries,	  that	  I	  shall	  now	  investigate	  the	  
China	  quotas.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  














Chapter	  4:	  The	  South	  African	  clothing	  industry	  
	  
I	   shall	   start	  my	  analysis	   by	   contextualizing	   the	  China	  quotas	  within	   the	   geography	  of	   specific	  
economic	  and	  political	  developments	  in	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  sector	  in	  the	  relevant	  period	  
preceding	  its	  (it	  being	  “the	  China	  quotas”)	  imposition.	  My	  primary	  aim	  is	  to	  convey	  the	  complex	  
and	   multi-­‐dimensional	   nature	   of	   the	   China	   quotas,	   which	   should	   not,	   and	   for	   that	   matter	  
cannot,	  be	  seen	  as	  an	   isolated	  execution	  of	   industrial	  policy.	   It	  must	  be	  viewed	   in	   its	  entirety	  
and	   in	   the	   context	  of	   the	  many	  other	  political	   and	  economic	  events	   that	  both	  preceded	  and	  
played	  alongside	  it.	  To	  draw	  an	  analogy,	  the	  China	  quotas	  were	  simply	  the	  head	  of	  a	  very	  large	  
boil	  that	  had	  been	  festering	  beneath	  the	  skin	  of	  the	  clothing	  sector	  for	  almost	  a	  decade	  before	  
finally	  bursting	  in	  2006.	  	  
Globalisation	  and	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  industry	  	  
	  
South	  Africa	  has	  a	  mature	  and	  expanding	  domestic	  market,	  which	  services	  a	  diverse	  consumer	  
base	  characterised	  by	   large	   income	  and	  cultural	  differences.	  The	  South	  African	  clothing	  value	  
chain	  is	  domestically	  oriented	  and	  local	  production	  is	  geared	  almost	  exclusively	  around	  supply	  
to	  the	  domestic	  market.	  This	  differentiates	  it	  from	  its	  Sub	  Saharan	  African	  (SSA)	  counterparts,	  
who	   have	   small	   domestic	   clothing	   markets	   with	   clothing	   production	   mainly	   geared	   towards	  
exports,	  and	  here	  mainly	  to	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  markets,	  and	  where	  domestic	  demand	  is	  small	  and	  
not	  as	  diverse	  (Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008).	  	  
	  
The	  domestic	   focus	  of	   the	  South	  African	  clothing	   industry	   is	   largely	  a	   legacy	  of	   the	  Apartheid	  
and	   sanctions	   era,	   during	   which	   time	   state	   intervention	   to	   promote	   the	   industry	   occurred	  
within	  an	   import	   substituting	   industrialisation	   (ISI)	  paradigm	   that	  biased	   the	  sourcing	  of	   local	  
inputs.	   High	   levels	   of	   protection	   (import	   duties	   were	   100%	   plus)	   suppressed	   the	   need	   for	  
innovation	   and	   investment,	  whilst	   small	   economies	   of	   scale	   from	  orientation	   around	   a	   small	  
and	  culturally	  coherent	  consumer	  base	  led	  to	  low	  levels	  of	  market	  specialisation,	  coupled	  with	  
high	  levels	  of	  product	  diversification	  covering	  the	  full	  range	  of	  demand	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  firm-­‐
level	  functional	  diversification	  (Gibbon	  2002b;	  2008).	  The	  domestically	  owned	  and	  entrenched	  













(and	   arguably	   sole)	   beneficiaries	   of	   the	   various	   government	   policies	   (local	   content	  
requirements	  and	  import	  duties)	  and	  who	  extracted	  significant	  political	  economy	  leverage	  from	  
their	   position	   as	   leaders	   of	   the	   South	   African	   value	   chain.	   This	   culminated	   in	   a	   clothing	   and	  
textiles	  sector	  plagued	  with	  inefficiencies,	  inherently	  limited	  in	  capacity	  and	  infrastructure	  and	  
most	   importantly,	   by	   and	   large	   uncompetitive	   without	   the	   productivity	   to	   significantly	   drive	  
large	   export	   volumes.	   In	   combination,	   these	   factors	   intensified	   the	   sector’s	   dependence	   on	  
skilled	   labour	   and	   product	   diversification52.	   However,	   this	   was	   unimportant	   in	   an	   import	  
substitution	  economy	  that	  continued	  to	  operate	  through	  difficult	  economic	  conditions	  through	  
established	  and	  historically	  entrenched	  local	  networks,	  which	  shielded	  it	  from	  the	  changes	  that	  
clothing	  markets	  worldwide	  were	  experiencing	  (Barnes	  2004).	  
	  
However,	   this	   all	   changed	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   millennium.	   In	   2001	   the	   Rand	   plummeted	   to	  
around	  R12.00	   to	  1$US	   (from	  R6.00=1$US	   in	  1999)	  and	  AGOA	  buyers,	  primarily	   from	  the	  US,	  
flocked	  to	  South	  Africa	  to	  buy	  clothing,	  which	  at	  the	  prevailing	  exchange	  rate	  was	  attractively	  
priced.	  Local	  manufacturers	  signed	  up	  numerous	  export	  orders,	  but	  had	  insufficient	  capacity	  to	  
simultaneously	   supply	  both	  export	  and	  domestic	  markets	  and	  consequently	   reneged	  on	   their	  
orders	  to	  domestic	  retailers.5354	  This	  left	  domestic	  retailers	  scrambling	  to	  find	  stock.	  They	  were	  
compelled	  to	  seek	  alternative	  (foreign)	  suppliers;	  and	  this	  at	  a	  very	  unpropitious	  time	  for	  them	  
when	  the	  exchange	  rate	  was	  R13:USD1.	  The	  inflection	  point	  for	  the	  local	  clothing	  industry	  came	  
in	   2003	   which	   saw	   a	   complete	   reversal	   of	   this	   scenario.	   The	   strengthening	   of	   the	   Rand	   to	  
around	  US$1=R6	  and	  the	  economic	  boom,	  coinciding	  with	  the	  indirect	  impact	  of	  global	  Chinese	  
clothing	  exports	   (and	  competition	   from	   falling	  prices)	   following	  China’s	  2001	  WTO	  accession,	  
afforded	   local	   retailers	   greater	   buying	   power	   in	   international	   markets	   (Morris	   and	   Einhorn	  
2008).	   Global	   sourcing	  was	   further	   augmented	   by	   a	   coincidental	   radical	   simplification	   of	   the	  
tariff	  schedule	  that	  removed	  minimum	  specific	  duties,	  lowered	  average	  excise	  duty	  to	  40%;	  and	  
removed	   rebates	   on	   fabric,	   thus	   opening	   the	   market	   to	   competition	   from	   which	   it	   had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 This was the opinion of one interviewee in 2011 who expressed the view that the Rand needs to be at 
R12:1US$ before SA is competitive from a price point of view. 
53 Jack Kipling of Clotrade also observes that there were large-scale fabric shortages and not all exporters 
were proficient although on the plus side, 12000 new jobs were created. 
54 Manufacturers offer a contradictory version of these events, namely, that the expansion in demand 
afforded them greater bargaining power in price negotiations with retailers who rebelled against higher price 













previously	  been	  protected	  (Cassim,	  Oyango	  and	  Van	  Deventer	  2004).	  The	  combined	  result	  was	  
easier	   access	   to	   the	   domestic	   market	   for	   importers	   on	   one	   hand	   and	   diminishing	   export	  
opportunities	   for	  manufacturers	   –	  due	   to	   a	   stronger	  Rand	  and	  higher	   fabric	  prices55	  -­‐	   on	   the	  
other.	  Given	   the	   constraints	   that	   South	  African	   clothing	  manufacturers	   faced	  with	   the	  AGOA	  
rules	   of	   origin,	   and	   the	   South	   African	   government’s	   reluctance	   to	   extend	   the	   Duty	   Credit	  
Certificate	   Scheme	   (DCCS)	   that	   subsidised	   exports,	   the	   capacity	   of	   domestic	   exporters	   was	  
radically	  limited	  (Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008).	  Imports	  grew	  expediently	  whilst	  exports	  collapsed.	  
Chinese	   imports	  moved	   from	  16.5%	  of	   total	  Rand	  value	  clothing	   imports	   in	  1995	   to	  74.2%	   in	  
2005,	   an	   increase	   of	   450%	   by	   value.	   Adding	   Hong	   Kong,	   combined	   Chinese	   clothing	   imports	  
jumped	   to	   78.8%	   of	   total	   clothing	   imports	   in	   2005	   (Morris	   and	   Einhorn	   2008).	   Local	  
manufacturers	  sought	  vainly	  to	  return	  to	  their	  previous	  customers,	  the	  local	  retail	  chains,	  but	  
the	  domestic	  value	  chain	  had	  radically	  restructured;	  large	  scale	  imports	  of	  cheap	  clothing	  from	  
China	  became	  entrenched.	  This	  chain	  of	  events	  marked	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  mindset	  where	  the	  
industry	  went	  from	  blinkered	  to	  global	  and	  South	  Africa	  transformed	  from	  being	  a	  net	  earner	  of	  
foreign	  currency	  to	  a	  net	  user56.	  
	  
Greater	   integration	   into	   the	   global	   economy,	   coupled	   with	   rapid	   social	   and	   political	  
transformation	   in	   the	   post-­‐Apartheid	   years	   encouraged	   vibrant	   growth	   in	   consumer	   demand	  
for	   clothing.	   Since	   imports	   generally	   offered	   better	   value	   and	   variety	   for	   price-­‐conscious	  
customers	  hungry	  for	  new	  and	  diverse	  fashions,	   local	  suppliers	   increasingly	  favoured	  imports.	  
What	   this	   implied	   for	   local	   clothing	   manufacturers,	   who	   were	   by	   and	   large	   globally	  
uncompetitive	   without	   the	   fillip	   of	   Rand	   weakness	   and	   thus	   remained	   exclusively	   focused	  
domestically,	   is	  that	  they	  faced	  a	  diminishing	  market	  share	  as	   import	  competition	  from	  China	  
intensified.	   South	   African	   exporters	   were	   globally	   uncompetitive	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons	  
including	  the	  rapid	  appreciation	  of	  the	  Rand,	  AGOA’s	  unfavourable	  rules	  of	  origin	  specifications	  
for	   South	  Africa	   (Morris	  2006a),	   the	   inability	  of	  domestic	   fabric	  manufacturers	   to	  adequately	  
supply	   local	  exporters,	  paralysis	  of	   industrial	  policy	  to	  support	   the	   industry,	  high	  comparative	  
labour	   costs,	   skill	   shortages,	   and	   the	   inability	   to	   move	   rapidly	   enough	   onto	   a	   World	   Class	  
Manufacturing	   (WCM)	   production	   platform.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   clothing	   sector	   remained	   very	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The removal of rebates on fabric effectively increased fabric prices by 20% (Jack Kipling 2011) 













dependent	  on	   the	  domestic	  market	   and	  gradually	   sank	  under	   the	   competitive	  pressure	   from	  
rising	  Asian	  global	  dominance.	  
	  
The	  most	   important	  change	  that	  transpired	  from	  this	  confluence	  of	  events	  was	  the	  change	  of	  
guard	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  value	  chain.	  	  Similar	  to	  developed	  countries,	  the	  
South	  African	  clothing	  retail	  market	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  high	  concentration	  of	  buying	  power	  in	  
the	  hands	  of	  a	   few	   large	   retailers57	  who	  yield	   considerable	   influence	  over	   the	  value	   chain.	   In	  
1999,	   the	   top	   five	   retailers	   accounted	   for	   over	   70%	   of	   formal	   clothing	   sales	   in	   South	   Africa	  
(Salinger	  et	  al,	  1999:	  16).	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  supply-­‐end	  of	  the	  chain,	  which	  struggled	  to	  shed	  the	  
shackles	  of	  the	  past	  and	  remained	  significantly	  hamstrung	  by	  the	  numerous	  infrastructural	  and	  
physical	   constraints	   of	   a	   usufruct	   economy,	   the	   buyer-­‐end	   rapidly	   matured	   into	   a	   globally	  
defined	  face.	  Augmented	  sourcing	  capabilities	  enhanced	  the	  buying	  power	  of	  local	  retailers	  and	  
strengthened	   their	   position	   in	   the	   local	   value	   chain,	   which	   transformed	   from	   being	   supply	  
driven	  to	  buyer	  driven.	  This	  allowed	  local	  retailers	  to	  mimic	  their	  global	  contemporaries	  in	  their	  
role	  as	  drivers	  of	  the	  chain;	  to	  wield	  ad	  nauseam	  power	  over	  local	  manufacturers;	  to	  insist	  on	  
lower	  prices	  which	  were	  benchmarked	  against	  Chinese	  imports;	  to	  negotiate	  more	  favourable	  
supply	  and	  delivery	  terms;	   to	  stipulate	  exacting	  quality	  and	  design	  specifications;	  and	  to	  shift	  
the	  costs	  and	  burden	  of	  inventory	  control	  onto	  their	  suppliers.	  	  
	  
I	   shall	   now	   exemplify	   the	   impact	   of	   these	   developments	   on	   the	   local	   clothing	   industry	   by	  







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The majority of these retailers’ head offices are located in Cape Town, which used to provide clothing 
manufacturers in the Western Cape with a comparative advantage. However due to advancements in 
telecommunications, regional proximity advantages have largely been eroded. Although advantages in 
terms of easier delivery, speeding up of purchasing processes and ease of dealing with problems still 
remain, most retailers now source from firms across the country with price and the quality of service 













	  Performance	  of	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  industry	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  quotas	  
	  
Domestic	  sales	  and	  production	  
	  
The	  domestic	  market	   for	  clothing	  grew	  substantially	  between	  2001	  and	  2006,	  by	  R8,061.17m	  
from	  R14,885.25m	   to	  R22,946.43m,	  an	   increase	  of	  35.13%	   (Figure	  21	  below).	   In	   comparison,	  
domestic	   production	   grew	  by	  only	   18.14%	  or	  R2,749.50m	  over	   the	   same	  period;	   this	   implies	  
that	  growth	  in	  demand	  was	  increasingly	  satisfied	  by	  imports.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  2006	  the	  domestic	  
share	  in	  the	  clothing	  market	  was	  just	  66.07%	  compared	  with	  83.38%	  in	  2002.	  
	  
Figure	  21:	  Domestic	  demand	  for	  clothing	  versus	  domestic	  production	  of	  clothing	  
	   	  
Source:	  Stats	  SA	   	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
International	  trade:	  Clothing	  exports	  and	  imports	  
	  
The	  dynamics	  behind	  the	  brief	  flourish	  of	  exports	  in	  response	  to	  temporary	  Rand	  weakness	  in	  
2001,	   followed	  by	   their	   drastic	   decline	   in	   2003,	   has	   already	   been	  discussed	   but	   is	   illustrated	  
below	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  export	  performance	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  China	  quotas.	  Nominal	  
clothing	   exports	   jumped	  by	   160.29%	   from	  R995.15m	   in	   1999	   to	   R2,590.27m	   in	   2002,	   before	  
plummeting	  67.71%	  to	  R836.5m	  by	  2006,	  which	  was	  below	  1999	  levels.	  This	  was	  primarily	  due	  
to	  a	  collapse	  in	  AGOA	  exports	  to	  the	  US,	  which	  fell	  precipitously	  by	  84.29%	  (in	  nominal	  terms)	  
between	  2001	  and	  2006,	  from	  R1,899.63m	  to	  R298.48m	  (Figure	  21	  above).	  The	  stimulus	  for	  the	  













by	  50.62%	  between	   January	  2002	   from	  R11.61	   to	   the	  US$	   to	  R5.73	  by	  November	  2004,	   thus	  
raising	  the	  international	  price	  of	  South	  African	  tradable	  goods	  (Figure	  22).	  
	  
Although	  exports	  to	  the	  EU	  had	  traditionally	  been	  South	  Africa’s	  bread	  and	  butter	  (albeit	  on	  a	  
much	  smaller	  scale	  than	  the	  US),	  they	  also	  responded	  to	  the	  currency	  strength	  and	  fell	  by	  63%	  
in	  nominal	  terms	  (53%	  in	  real	  terms)	  to	  a	  mere	  R190.21m	  (US$83m)	  in	  2006	  from	  R653.90m	  in	  
2001	  (Figure	  23).	  	  
	  
Figure	  22:	  South	  Africa’s	  exports	  to	  US	  (via	  AGOA)	  and	  EU	  
	  	  
Data	  source:	  Comtrade	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
Figure	  23:	  	  Rand-­‐dollar	  exchange	  rate:	  1998-­‐2006	  
	  













However,	   the	   export	   value	   data	   does	   not	   tell	   the	   whole	   story	   either;	   from	   2005,	   exports	  
recorded	  by	  volume,	  both	  on	  aggregate	  and	   in	  unit	   categories	   jumped	  up,	  although	  by	  value	  
they	  continued	  to	  trend	  downward	  (Figure	  24,	  Figure	  25	  and	  Figure	  26).	  This	  implied	  that	  prices	  
for	  exports	  in	  unit	  categories	  and	  overall	  started	  to	  fall	  from	  2005.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  South	  
Africa	  was	  exporting	  greater	  volumes	  of	  product,	  the	  earnings	  from	  those	  exports	  were	  being	  
eroded	  by	   lower	  prices.	   Since	   this	   point	   coincides	   almost	   perfectly	  with	   the	   final	  MFA	  quota	  
phase-­‐out,	  the	  sudden	  price	  deflation	  in	  global	  export	  markets	  was	  likely	  the	  “China	  effect”.	  In	  
conclusion,	  whilst	   South	  Africa	  was	  not	   affected	  by	   the	  ATC	  expiry	   in	   the	   same	  manner	   that	  
many	  other	  countries	  were,	  since	  it	  did	  not	  impose	  import	  quotas	  on	  China,	  it	  was	  nevertheless	  
still	  impacted	  by	  China’s	  liberalisation	  through	  the	  general	  deflation	  in	  global	  export	  prices	  after	  
2005.	  	  
	  
Figure	  24:	  Total	  South	  African	  exports	  by	  volume	  and	  value	  	  
	  
























Figure	  25:	  South	  African	  exports	  in	  unit	  and	  kilogram	  categories	  by	  volume	  
	  
Source:	  Clotrade	  2006	  	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
Figure	  26:	  South	  African	  exports	  in	  unit	  and	  kilogram	  categories	  by	  value 
	  
Source:	  Clotrade	  2006	  	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
In	  2001,	  clothing	  comprised	  18.7%	  of	  manufactured	  output	  and	  1.6%	  of	  total	  exports	  (the	  DTI	  
2001).	   As	   of	   2006,	   clothing	   exports	   were	   no	   longer	   a	   significant	   part	   of	   the	   South	   African	  
clothing	   industry	   (Morris	   and	   Barnes	   2008).	   However	   the	   dramatic	   rise	   in	   imports	   did	  more	  
damage	   to	   the	   trade	  balance	   than	  poor	   export	   performance	   (Table	   20).	  Again,	   the	  dynamics	  













but	  the	  numbers	  elucidate	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  problem.	  Between	  2000	  and	  2006,	  the	  import	  
value	  of	  garments	  jumped	  fourfold	  from	  R1,337.10m	  to	  R6,491.83m	  with	  the	  real	  acceleration	  
to	   imports	   coming	   in	   2003;	   between	   2003	   and	   2006,	   nominal	   clothing	   imports	   jumped	   by	  
180.94%,	  compared	  with	  a	  fall	  of	  63%	  for	  exports	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  
	  
Table	  20:	  Imports	  and	  exports	  matrix	  for	  clothing	  2000-­‐2006	  
	  
Source:	  Import	  data	  –	  Clotrade	  Statistical	  database;	  Export	  data	  –	  Quantec	  statistical	  database	  
Note:	  The	  figures	  for	  2006	  and	  2007	  imports	  have	  been	  adjusted	  for	  forward	  purchasing	  by	  retailers	  in	  anticipation	  
of	  the	  China	  quotas	  
These	  clothing	  and	  fabric	  imports	  emanated	  primarily	  from	  China	  (Einhorn	  2006;	  Morris	  2007)	  
whose	   value	   share	   of	   the	   South	  African	   domestic	   clothing	  market	   expanded	   from	  57.83%	   to	  
88.30%	  over	  the	  same	  period,	  increasing	  by	  717%	  and	  612%	  by	  value	  and	  volume	  respectively	  
(Figure	  27).	  
	  
Figure	  27:	  Demonstration	  of	  China	  in	  total	  value	  and	  volume	  clothing	  imports	  into	  SA	  
	  














Whilst	   this	  problem	  was	  being	  experienced	  worldwide,	  South	  Africa	  was	  particularly	  hard	  hit.	  
Between	  1995	  and	  2005,	  the	  average	  cumulative	  growth	  rate	  of	  Chinese	  clothing	  exports	  to	  the	  
world	  was	  11.3%	  compared	  with	  21.4%	  to	  South	  Africa	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  	  
Figure	  28:	  Comparison	  of	  Chinese	  clothing	  exports	  into	  SA	  vs	  the	  World:	  1995-­‐2005	  
	  
Source:	  	  Sandrey	  2006	  
	  
In	  effect,	  China’s	  clothing	  exports	  to	  South	  Africa	  in	  2005	  were	  over	  eight	  times	  more	  than	  in	  
1995,	  whilst	  its	  global	  exports	  in	  2005	  were	  only	  three	  times	  their	  1995	  levels	  (Sandrey	  2006).	  
Figure	  28	  above	  illustrates	  the	  problem;	  the	  galloping	  line	  of	  the	  relative	  rise	  in	  clothing	  exports	  
to	  South	  Africa	  between	  2003	  and	  2006,	  and	  in	  particular	  after	  2005	  when	  MFA	  quotas	  ended	  
(Sandrey	   2006).	   Furthermore,	   as	   evidenced	   in	   the	   US	   and	   EU,	   this	   surge	   in	   imports	   was	  
accompanied	  by	  a	  sharp	  drop	  (of	  around	  30%)	  in	  unit	  fob	  import	  values	  from	  China	  (	  
Figure	  29).	  	  
Figure	  29:	  Divergence	  of	  value	  and	  volume	  imports	  from	  China	  in	  unit	  and	  kilogram	  categories:	  2000-­‐
2006	  
	  













Almost	   all	   of	   China’s	   growth	   occurred	   in	   categories	   that	   were	   earmarked	   for	   safeguards	  
(henceforth	  referred	  as	  quota	  categories)(Figure	  30).	  	  
	  
Figure	  30:	  Demonstration	  of	  China	  in	  quota	  imports	  by	  value	  and	  volume:	  2000-­‐2006	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  
	  Source:	  Clotrade	  	  Own	  calculations	  
	  
Between	  2000	  and	  2006	  China	  grew	   its	   share	   in	  quota	  categories	   from	  52.52%	   to	  81.35%	  by	  
value	   and	   from	   62.33%	   to	   87.60%	   by	   volume.	   Unit	   import	   prices	   in	   these	   categories	   fell	   by	  
around	  20%	  in	  nominal	  terms,	  and	  by	  an	  even	  larger	  30%	  in	  real	  terms	  between	  2001	  and	  2003	  
(after	  falling	  by	  35%	  in	  real	  terms	  between	  2000	  and	  2002).	  
	  
The	  net	  impact	  of	  the	  rise	  in	  imports	  and	  collapse	  in	  exports	  is	  clearly	  illustrated	  below	  (Figure	  
31)	  which	  gives	  the	  ratio	  of	  imports	  to	  exports	  in	  quota	  categories.	  South	  Africa	  moved	  from	  an	  
import:export	  ratio	  of	  0.79	  (i.e.	  for	  every	  one	  Rand	  of	  exports	  it	  imported	  just	  79c	  of	  imports)	  in	  




















Figure	  31:	  SA	  clothing	  imports	  vs	  exports	  in	  quota	  categories	  	  
	  




Data	   on	   capital	   expenditure	   is	   no	   longer	   captured	   by	   Statistics	   South	   Africa	   (having	   been	  
discontinued	   in	   2001),	   thus	   making	   a	   comprehensive	   analysis	   of	   the	   sector’s	   recent	   capital	  
upgrading	  position	  difficult.	  This	  is	  just	  one	  example	  of	  the	  general	  apathy	  toward	  the	  clothing	  
sector	  on	  behalf	  of	  authorities.	  As	   is	  apparent	  from	  Figure	  32,	  capital	  expenditure	  for	  clothing	  
has	   historically	   been	   extremely	   erratic	   when	   compared	   to	   manufacturing	   as	   a	   whole,	   with	  
clothing	  firms	  spending	  only	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  their	  sales	  on	  new	  capital	  goods.	  
	  
Figure	  32:	  Capital	  Expenditure	  1995	  -­‐2001	  
	  














A	  read	  on	  trends	  post	  2003	  are	  given	  by	  firm	  level	  benchmarking	  data	  and	  the	  CTFL	  Skills	  Audit.	  
Although	   41%	   of	   apparel	   firms	   surveyed	   for	   the	   CTFL	   audit	   in	   2004	   reported	   that	   they	   had	  
invested	   in	   capital	   over	   the	   previous	   12	   months,	   firm	   level	   data	   from	   the	   Western	   Cape58	  
showed	  that	  capital	  expenditure	   remained	  at	  a	   low	  2.7%	  through	  2004	   (declining	   fractionally	  
from	   2.8%	   in	   2003).	   Qualitative	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   capital	   expenditure	   declined	   at	   an	  
accelerated	   pace	   in	   the	   five	   years	   preceding	   the	   China	   quotas	   given	   the	   uncertainty	  
surrounding	   the	   government’s	   policy	   stance	   regarding	   the	   sector	   and	   the	   low	   levels	   of	  
profitability	  (Morris	  and	  Reed	  2008b).	  Firm-­‐level	  benchmarking	  data	  showed	  that	  41%	  of	  firms	  
in	   the	  clothing	   industry	   in	  2004	  had	  capital	  equipment	  with	  an	  average	  age	  of	  more	   than	  10	  




Figure	  33	  shows	  the	  percentage	  utilisation	  of	  production	  capacity	   for	  manufacturing,	  clothing	  
and	  textiles	  from	  1995	  to	  2006.	  Although	  volatile,	  utilisation	  of	  capacity	  in	  the	  clothing	  industry	  
compared	   favourably	   to	   both	   manufacturing	   and	   textiles.	   The	   clothing	   industry	   consistently	  
operated	  at	  a	  utilisation	   level	  above	  82%	  of	   its	  capacity	  until	  2003,	  whilst	  manufacturing	  was	  
only	  able	  to	  achieve	  this	  once	  between	  1995	  and	  2003,	  with	  this	  occurring	  in	  1995.	  	  However,	  
after	   peaking	   at	   92%	   in	   2004,	   capital	   utilisation	   in	   the	   clothing	   industry	   fell	   sharply	   to	   82%,	  
where	   it	  more	  or	   less	  remained	  from	  2005	  through	  2006.	  Figure	  34	  shows	  that	  from	  2002,	   in	  
tandem	  with	  the	  collapse	  in	  exports	  and	  the	  subsequent	  surge	  in	  imports,	   lack	  of	  demand	  for	  








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













Figure	  33:	  Capital	  Utilisation	  1995-­‐2006	  
	  
Source:	  Stats	  SA	  accessed	  on	  25	  June	  2011	  (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
Figure	  34:	  Explanations	  for	  under-­‐utiisation	  of	  production	  capacity	  
	  






















Employment	  and	  industry	  strengths	  
	  
Employment	  in	  the	  clothing	  sector	  declined	  dramatically	  from	  2004.	  Table	  21	  indicates	  that	  the	  
number	  of	  clothing	  workers	  employed	  in	  the	  formal	  sector	  and	  registered	  with	  the	  Bargaining	  
Council	  declined	  by	  24%	  (23,412)	  between	  December	  2004	  and	  2006,	  although	  the	  number	  of	  
firms	  only	  declined	  by	  12%	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  	  Bargaining	  Council	  employment	  was	  roughly	  
evenly	  split	  between	  KwaZulu-­‐Natal	  (KZN)	  and	  the	  Western	  Cape	  (WC)	  with	  30,147	  and	  28,541	  
workers,	  representing	  40.44%	  and	  38.29%	  respectively	  of	  total	  Bargaining	  Council	  employment	  
of	   74,546	   in	   December	   2006.	   These	   two	   cohorts	   also	   hemorrhaged	   the	   most	   in	   terms	   of	  
employment	  between	  2003	   and	  2006,	   each	   shedding	   around	  20%	   (6000	  employees)	   of	   their	  
workforce.	  	  
	  
However,	  this	  data	  only	  reflects	  employment	  in	  formal	  sector	  firms,	  which	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  
accurately	  calculate	  employment	  figures	  for	  reasons	  that	  shall	  become	  clear	  later.	  
	  




31.12.1998 834 80,635 
31.12.1999 784 78,711 
31.12.2000 702 69,954 
01.01.200259 651 62,712 
31.12.2002 672 65,585 
31.12.200360 1,090 95,187 
31.12.2004 1,169 97,958 
31.12.2005 1,138 83,081 
31.12.2006 1,048 74,456 
	  	  	  	   	   Source:	  National	  Bargaining	  Council	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Figures for 31/12/2001 are not available so the next best 31/1/2002 was used. 
60 From 25/07/2003 a Collective Agreement was published for the Non-Metro areas. The figures reflected 













Wage	  rates	  and	  Bargaining	  Council	  compliance	  
	  
Wages	   in	   the	   clothing	   industry	   are	   governed	   by	   national	   collective	   agreements	   negotiated	  
between	   employers	   and	   employees.	   In	   terms	   of	   this	   agreement	   a	   wage	   differential	   exists	  
between	  firms	  located	  in	  metro	  areas	  and	  firms	  located	  in	  non-­‐metro	  areas,	  with	  firms	  in	  non-­‐
metro	  areas	   subject	   to	   lower	  wage	   rates.	   The	  wage	   rates	   that	  were	  applicable	   to	  metro	  and	  
non-­‐metro	  areas	  in	  2006	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  22	  and	  Table	  23.	  	  
	  
Table	  22:	  Metro	  areas	  collective	  wage	  agreements	  2007	  
Category Industry wage 
Head Cutter R1, 134.30 




Pattern Grader R915.35 
	  
Table	  23:	  Non-­‐Metro	  areas	  collective	  wage	  agreements	  August	  2007	  
	  	   Area	  1	   Area	  2	  
Descriptions	   New	   Established	   New	   Established	  
Category	  A	   R348.50	   R387.50	   R287.00	   R316.00	  
Category	  B	   R352.00	  -­‐	  R407.00	   R443.50	   R289.50	  -­‐	  R329.00	   R354.00	  
Category	  C	   R387.50-­‐	  R525.50	   R571.50	   R315.50-­‐R414.50	   R449.50	  
Category	  D	   R387.50	  -­‐	  R490.00	   R561.00	   R315.50-­‐R387.00	   R441.50	  
Category	  E	   R411.00-­‐	  R587.50	   R653.50	   R331.50-­‐R462.00	   R512.00	  
Band	  Knife	  Cutter	   R370.00	  -­‐	  R474.00	   R529.50	   R303.00-­‐375.50	   R417.50	  
Clerical	   R381.00	  -­‐	  R459.50	   R538.50	   R311.00-­‐R365.50	   R424.00	  
Assistant	  Head	  Cutter	   	  	   R632.00	   	   R496.00	  
Head	  Cutter	   	   R778.50	   R560.00	   R608.00	  
Foreperson	   	   R690.50	   R426.15	   R560.00	  
Driver	  (1-­‐4)	   	   R	  432.00-­‐	  R640.00	   	   R346.50	  -­‐	  R502.00	  
	  
Notes:	  	  	  	  	  Wage	  rate	  applicable	  for	  the	  period	  1	  September	  2007	  to	  30	  August	  2008	  
Wage	  rates	  reflect	  a	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  increase	  of	  5%	  across	  the	  board	  
KwaZulu-­‐Natal	  =	  Grade	  1	  employees	  
Western	  Cape	  =	  Grade	  B	  employees	  
Area	  1	  consists	  of	  the	  magisterial	  districts	  of	  Camperdown,	  Umzinto,	  Paarl,	  Stellenbosch,	  Uitenhage,	  Area	  2	  consists	  
of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  non-­‐metro	  areas.	  
New	  =	  employer	  of	  24	  months	  or	  less,	  Established	  =	  employer	  of	  more	  than	  24	  months	  
	  














Table	   24	   shows	   the	  massive	   level	   of	   non-­‐compliance	  in	   the	   industry	   in	   respect	   of	  Bargaining	  
Council	  regulations	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  China	  quotas.	  KZN	  was	  by	  far	  the	  most	  non	  compliant	  with	  
86%	   of	   known	   firms	   non-­‐compliant,	   followed	   by	   the	  Western	   Cape	   with	   32%.	   Furthermore,	  
levels	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  remained	  consistently	  high	  through	  2006,	  as	  demonstrated	   in	  Table	  
25.	  	  
Nearly	  all	   instances	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  were	  due	  to	  non-­‐payment	  of	  Bargaining	  Council	  wage	  
rates	  rather	  than	  non-­‐payment	  of	  levies.	  The	  vast	  majority	  were	  small	  firms	  and	  CMTs.	  	  
	  
Table	  24:	  Non-­‐compliance	  by	  clothing	  firms	  2004-­‐2007	  (%)	  








W Cape 28% 34% 32% 
KZN 84% 92% 86% 
Northern 57% 60% 49% 
E Cape 24% 25% 16% 
TOTALS 55% 66% 57% 
Source:	  National	  Bargaining	  Council	  
	  
Table	  25:	  Non-­‐Metro	  areas	  wage	  collective	  agreements	  2005	  










W Cape Sub-total 307 13 320 102 32% 
 Metro 295 13 308 99 32% 
 Non-metro 12 0 12 3 25% 
KZN Sub-total 345 123 468 402 86% 
 Metro 206 107 313 301 96% 
 Non-metro 139 16 155 101 65% 
Northern Sub-total 310 85 395 193 49% 
 Metro 224 24 248 76 31% 
 Non metro 86 61 155 101 65% 
E Cape Sub-total 48 1 49 8 16% 
 Metro 41 1 42 5 43% 
 Non metro 7 0 0 3 16.33% 
TOTALS  1010 222 1232 705 57% 














	  Worker	  productivity	  
	  
The	  indexed	  output	  per	  employee	  data	  calculated	  using	  inflation-­‐adjusted	  sales	  figures	  divided	  
by	  the	  number	  of	  employees	  (official	  estimate)	  is	  represented	  in	  Figure	  35	  below.	  	  
	  
Figure	  35:	  Productivity	  per	  worker:	  Clothing	  versus	  manufacturing	  
	  
Source:	  Stats	  SA	  	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
Nominal	   output	   per	   employee	   for	   total	   manufacturing	   increased	   from	   R356.72	   thousand	   in	  
1998	   to	   R783.99	   thousand	   in	   2006,	   which	   represented	   an	   improvement	   of	   32.39%	   in	   real	  
terms,	  although	  2003	  output	   level 	  did	  decline	   in	  nominal	   terms	  for	   the	   first	   time	  since	  1995	  
(Barnes	  and	  Esselaar	  2005).	  Nominal	  output	  per	  employee	  for	  the	  clothing	  sector	  fell	  between	  
1998	  and	  2000	  from	  R100.67	  thousand	  to	  R94.40	  thousand,	  which	  showed	  a	  fall	  in	  real	  terms	  of	  
13.21%.	   However,	   between	   2001	   and	   2006,	   output	   per	   employee	   increased	   by	   71%	   in	   real	  
terms	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  lower	  rate	  of	  growth	  in	  output,	  which	  led	  to	  lower	  employment.	  	  
Firm-­level	  competitiveness	  
	  
Benchmarking	  studies	  conducted	  for	  the	  Western	  Cape	  and	  KZN	  clothing	  clusters	  showed	  that	  
between	  2004	  and	  2006	  significant	  progress	  (especially	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape)	  was	  made	  toward	  
upgrading	  the	  operational	  performance	  of	  clothing	  firms	  in	  the	  clusters	  in	  respect	  of	  some	  key	  
performance	   indicators	   –	   principally	   inventory	   holding,	   internal	   reject	   rates,	   lead	   times,	   and	  















Table	  26:	  Operational	  performance	  of	  clothing	  firms	  (Manufacturers	  +	  CMTs)	  
 KwaZulu-Natal  Western Cape  
 
Market Driver Key Performance Indicators 
n 2004 2006 % 
Change 
 n 2004 2006 % 
Change  
Raw Material (Days) 15 16.5 15.2 8.0 16 21.7 18.4 14.8 
Work in Progress (Days) 15 7.6 6.9 8.9 16 10.4 9.4 9.3 
Finished Goods (Days) 15 13.7 16.0 -16.7 16 13.5 13.3 1.1 
 
Cost Control 
Total Inventory (Days) 15 37.8 38.0 -0.8 16 45.5 41.2 9.5 
Customer Return Rate (%) 15 1.1 0.7 -36.6 16 0.4 0.2 -42.4 Quality 
Internal Reject Rate (%) 16 4.5 4.7 -4.8 16 2.5 2.1 15.6 
Lead time ex prod (Domestic - 
Days) 
6 44.7 23.8 46.6 8 64.3 24.4 62.1 
Flexibility 
Lead time ex prod (Global - 
Days) 
5 69.0 64.7 6.2 6 79.4 63.3 20.3 
Training spend as a % of total 
remuneration 
15 3.30 2.8 -15.8 14 2.6 3.3 26.8 
Absenteeism (%) 16 7.9 7.4 7.9 17 7.0 6.9 1.2 
Capacity to 
change 
Off line training (Days) 10 0.7 1.2 63.4 13 1.9 1.4 -26.3 
Source:	  Benchmarking	  and	  Manufacturing	  Analysts	  
	  
However,	  a	  smaller	  study	  in	  2005	  revealed	  that	  local	  firms	  still	  had	  some	  way	  to	  go	  in	  meeting	  
domestic	  retailers’	  demands	  (Figure	  36).	  
	  
Figure	  36:	  WCM	  conversion	  efficiences	  in	  Western	  Cape	  firms	  	  	  
	  













By	  all	  accounts,	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  manufacturing	  industry	  was	  “on	  the	  skids”	  for	  some	  
time	  before	  the	  China	  quotas.	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  respect	  of	  all	  the	  major	  performance	  indicators	  
analysed	   in	  the	  run	  up	  period	  to	  the	  China	  quotas	  which	  show	  poor	  and	  deteriorating	  export	  
performance,	  high	  -­‐	  and	  rising	  -­‐	   levels	  of	  import	  penetration,	  low	  levels	  of	  capital	   investment,	  
falling	   domestic	   output	   and	   employment	   levels.	   Furthermore,	   the	   South	   African	   clothing	  
industry	   lagged	  behind	   its	   international	  counterparts	   in	  respect	  of	  conversion	  efficiencies	  and	  
other	  key	  indicators	  of	  WCM.	  I	  shall	  now	  draw	  the	  political	  economy	  into	  this	  picture.	  	  
	  
The	  socio-­political	  context	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  
With	  relatively	  stable	  politics,	  no	  effective	  import	  competition,	  a	  domestically	  entrenched	  value	  
chain	   and	   an	   expanding	   domestic	   market,	   2001	   to	   2006	   should	   have	   been	   a	   period	   of	  
significant	  growth	  for	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  sector.	  The	  analysis	  above	  showed	  
that	   reality	   ran	   in	   the	   opposite	   direction.	   I	   shall	   now	   situate	   the	   clothing	   sector’s	   poor	  
performance	  within	  the	  broader	  political	  context	  of	  events	  that	  culminated	  in	  the	  imposition	  of	  
the	  China	  quotas.	  Although	  the	  serious	  problems	  only	  began	  to	  show	  themselves	  in	  2003,	  the	  
period	  between	  1997	  and	  2002	  was	  a	  period	  of	  lost	  opportunity	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  clothing	  
and	  textiles	  sector.	  The	  constant	  reshuffling	  and	  reorganization	  of	  the	  DTI61	  resulted	  in	  a	  policy	  
void	  and	   this	   at	   a	   critical	   time	   for	   the	   clothing	   sector,	  which	   labored	  under	  political	   baggage	  
from	  a	  checkered	  past	  with	  key	  officials	  who	  were	  tasked	  with	  championing	  transformation	  in	  
the	  sector.	  The	  strained	  relationship	  between	  business	  and	  government	  saw	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  
clothing	  industry	  repeatedly	  marginalized	  at	  cabinet	  level	  with	  the	  result	  that	  rhetoric	  in	  policy	  
briefs	  did	  not	  translate	  into	  concrete	  policy	  action.	  	  
The	  negative	  ramifications	  of	  political	  vacillation	  and	  recurrent	   tension	  between	   industry	  and	  
government	   on	   the	   South	   African	   clothing	   sector	  were	   profound.	   The	   policies	   that	   emerged	  
from	   the	   political	   muddle	   prematurely	   exposed	   the	   clothing	   sector	   to	   competitive	   global	  
pressures	   that	   it	   was	   ill	   equipped	   to	   deal	   with.	   On	   one	   hand,	   the	   DTI	   went	   beyond	   WTO	  
requirements	  and	  embarked	  on	  a	  series	  of	  duty	  phase-­‐downs	  and	  tariff	  book	  simplifications62,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 According to one commentator, the constant reorganisation of key officials at the DTI’s clothing and 
textiles desk, the change of ministers, change of staff and deployment of menial persons into high-level 
positions became a “standard SA joke.” 
62 The industry saw the elimination of import quotas, a movement to a more uniform tariff structure, and then 













whilst	  on	  the	  other,	  they	  were	  ineffective	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  improve	  access	  for	  South	  African	  
exports	   into	  the	  EU	  via	  the	  FTA	  and	  the	  US	  by	  negotiating	  better	  Rules	  of	  Origin	  (RoO)	  under	  
AGOA.	   South	   Africa	   faced	   a	   triple	   stage	   transformation	   rule	   compared	  with	   the	   single	   stage	  
transformation	   rule	   for	   other	   SSA	   countries,	   affording	   the	   latter	   a	   significant	   competitive	  
advantage	   (Morris	   2006a;	   2007).	   Nor	   was	   there	   any	   concerted	   effort	   to	   address	   the	   cost	  
rigidities	  from	  infrastructural	  and	  capacity	  constraints	  and	  most	  particularly,	  high	  raw	  material	  
costs	  due	  to	  shortages	  of	  local	  fabric	  –	  which	  actually	  increased	  due	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  rebates	  –	  
and	  high	  labour	  costs	  which	  were	  buoyed	  up	  by	  union	  strength.	  	  	  
	  
The	  cost	   increases	   in	   labour	  and	   fabric	  without	  productivity	  growth,	  export	  stagnation	  as	   the	  
reality	   of	   RoO	   set	   in	   and	   the	   surge	   of	   imports	   from	   China	   all	   created	   the	   conditions	   for	   the	  
problems	  that	  developed	  and	  started	  to	  show	  themselves	   in	  2003.	  Again	  at	  a	  critical	  time	  for	  
the	  local	  industry,	  when	  imports	  started	  to	  pour	  alarmingly	  into	  South	  Africa’s	  newly	  liberalized	  
clothing	  market63	  and	  at	  a	  crucial	  stage	  for	  addressing	  the	  crisis	  of	  job	  losses	  in	  the	  sector64,	  the	  
DTI	   experienced	   more	   change	   and	   yet	   another	   reorganisation65.	   The	   DTI	   sector	   directorate,	  
which	  until	  the	  1990s	  had	  been	  fairly	  substantial	  and	  dynamic	  in	  assisting	  the	  industry	  to	  adjust	  
to	   the	  new	  demands	  of	  global	   competition,	  was	   reduced	   to	  an	  empty	   shell	   (Morris	   and	  Levy	  
2011).	  	  
	  
Apart	  from	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  DTI	  directorate	  and	  the	  associated	  decline	  in	  government	  
assistance,	   there	   were	   two	   other	   important	   dynamics	   that	   severely	   constrained	   firms’	  
adjustment	   to	   the	   new	   competitiveness	   demands	   from	   increasing	   globalisation	   and	   trade	  
liberalisation.	  The	  first	  was	  a	  change	  to	  the	  institutional	  framework	  that	  governed	  the	  clothing	  
sector	  and	  the	  second,	  the	  lack	  of	  co-­‐ordination	  between	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  industries	  and	  of	  
value	  chain	  cohesion	  between	  these	  sectors.	  In	  respect	  of	  the	  first	  point,	  concerned	  about	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
percentage point decline (from 50 to 22 percent) in tariffs on yarn and fabrics respectively, and a 30 
percentage point decline (from 60 to 30 percent) in tariffs on made-up household textiles (Roberts and 
Thoburn, 2004: p127).  By 2001, tariffs on textiles were down to 28% and tariffs on clothing down to 40%, 
both from over 100% (ibid Morris and Levy 2011)  
63  This is the view a former key representative of the clothing manufacturing sector interviewed in 
September 2011 
64 A discussion had been initiated in this respect under the council of Minister Alec Erwin 
65 Minister Alec Erwin left, handing over the desk to Minister Mandisi Mphlawa. Dr Alistair Ruiters remained 













rapidly	   falling	  membership	   arising	   from	   formal	   sector	   job	   losses,	   the	   clothing	  workers	   union	  
(SACTWU)	  moved	  from	  a	  regionalised	  based	  bargaining	  council	  to	  a	  centrally	  based	  bargaining	  
council.	   This	   wage	   agreement	   operated	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	   negotiated	   wage	   was	   the	  
legislated	  maximum	  wage	  payable	  by	   firms	   and	   all	   concessions	   to	  pay	   less	   than	   this	   amount	  
had	   to	   be	   granted	   by	   the	   Bargaining	   Council.	   The	   system	   was	   further	   complicated	   by	   the	  
alliance	  between	  large	  textile	  players	  and	  the	  union	  which	  ensured	  adjustment	  of	  wages	  to	  the	  
highest	   denominator,	   that	   being	   textiles	   firms	   for	   whom	   labour	   was	   a	   relatively	   low	   cost	  
compared	   with	   clothing	   firms.	   Statutory	   compliance	   with	   minimum	   wages	   and	   metro	  
redefinition	   had	   a	   major	   impact	   on	   smaller	   clothing	   firms	   who	   were	   penalised	   for	   non-­‐
compliance	   within	   the	   legal	   framework	   of	   the	   new	   Bargaining	   Council.	   Rather	   than	   work	  
cooperatively	  with	  clothing	  firms	  to	  raise	  competitiveness	  in	  the	  industry,	  SACTWU	  tried	  to	  gain	  
control	  of	   the	   industrial	  policy	   terrain	  of	   the	  value	  chain	  and	  sector	  activity	   (Morris	  and	  Levy	  
2011).	  	  
 
The	  second	  constraint	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  clothing	  industry	  to	  harness	  the	  benefits	  of	  flexibility	  
and	   speed	   to	   market	   was	   the	   lack	   of	   coordination	   between	   firms	   within	   the	   South	   African	  
clothing	   and	   textiles	   industries.	   The	   institutionally	   rigid	   labour	  market	   system	   that	   obtained	  
from	   the	   new	   statutory	   wage	   legislation	   inherently	   disadvantaged	   clothing	   firms,	   further	  
frustrating	   their	   efforts	   to	   align	   themselves	  with	   global	   competition.	   The	   lack	   of	   coordinated	  
output	  plans	  and	  obligational	   relationships	  between	   textiles	  and	  clothing	   firms	  culminated	   in	  
fabric	  shortages	  and	  the	  once	  dominant	  textiles	  firms	  slowly	   lost	  their	  grip	  on	  the	   industry	  as	  
local	   clothing	   firms	   turned	   increasingly	   to	   imports.	   As	   firms	   closed	   down,	   retrenched	   or	  
disappeared	   under	   the	   radar	   of	   the	   Bargaining	   Council,	   SACTWU	   attempted	   to	   shore	   up	   its	  
eroding	   position	   by	   commencing	   socio-­‐economic	   industrial	   action	   against	   domestic	   retailers	  
under	  a	  Section	  77	  Application66	  through	  Nedlac	  to	  force	  retailers	  to	  commit	  to	  sourcing	  90%	  of	  
their	   goods	   locally	   (http://www.nedlac.org.za/section-­‐77/archived-­‐notices/media-­‐
statement.aspx.).	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Section 77 of the Labour Relations Act gives workers the right to take part in protest action to promote or 
defend their socio-economic interest and be protected against dismissal and other disciplinary action. It 
gives Nedlac, as a policy-making body made up of Government, Business, Labour and the Community, the 














The	  Nedlac	  application	  failed	  and	  tensions	  in	  the	  sector	  peaked.	  This	  appeared	  to	  finally	  rouse	  
government	   to	   the	   crying	   need	   for	   swift	   and	   radical	   policy	   action	   to	   avert	   the	   crisis	   that	  
threatened	   to	   engulf	   the	   sector.	   Beginning	   in	   late-­‐2003,	   a	   series	   of	   determined	   efforts	  were	  
made	  at	  public	  and	  private,	  national	  and	  provincial	  levels	  to	  address	  the	  challenges	  confronting	  
the	   clothing	   industry	   (Morris	   and	   Levy	   2011).	   To	   combat	   the	   problem	   of	   imports	   (not	   the	  
volume	   but	   the	   low	   declared	   import	   values),	   Clotrade	   was	   open	   to	   any	   measure	   that	   was	  
compliant	   with	   the	   WTO	   and	   World	   Customs	   Organisation	   -­‐	   such	   as	   import	   tariffs	   or	   a	  
combination	  of	  ad	  valorum	  and	  minimum	  specific	  duties	  –	  provided	  this	  was	  accompanied	  by	  
more	   effective	   action	   by	   ITAC.	   In	   2003	   Clotrade	   submitted	   a	   full	   proposal	   informing	  
government	   of	   the	   numerous	   challenges	   that	   the	   sector	   was	   facing	   and	   the	   need	   for	   some	  
urgent	  preventative	  action	  in	  the	  form	  of	  safeguards.	  The	  proposal	  was	  summarily	  dismissed	  by	  
government	  as	  special	  pleading67.	  	  
	  
By	  2005,	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  social	  forces	  and	  organisations	  –	  national	  and	  local	  government	  
initiatives,	  private	  sector	  organisations,	  industry	  associations,	  and	  trade	  unions	  -­‐	  had	  coalesced	  
to	  produce	  two	  distinct	  policies	  and	  strategies	  to	  change	  the	  structural	  situation	  of	  the	  clothing	  
and	   textiles	   industry.	   These	   initially	   worked	   in	   tandem	   reinforcing	   each	   other’s	   efficacy	   but	  
ultimately,	  due	  mainly	  to	  the	  illegitimate	  abuse	  of	  predatory	  power	  and	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  
counter	   this,	   ran	   in	   contradictory	   directions	   to	   produce	   conflicting,	   unproductive	   and	  
unintended	   consequences	   (Morris	   2011).	   In	   2003	   with	   the	   initial	   success	   of	   exports	   under	  
AGOA	  and	  the	  Rand	  depreciation,	  the	  DTI’s	  chief	  economist	  commissioned	  a	  US	  consultant	  to	  
survey	  US	   clothing	  buyers	   so	  as	   to	   assess	  what	   restructuring	  of	   the	  domestic	   industry	  would	  
facilitate	  a	  strengthening	  of	  purchases	  from	  South	  Africa.	  US	  buyers	  overwhelmingly	  identified	  
the	  need	   for	   introducing	   flexible	   labour	   conditions	   to	  align	  with	   competitors	   from	  East	  Asian	  
economies.	  The	  Minister	  refused	  to	  discuss	  the	  report,	  and	  reassured	  SACTWU	  that	  this	  would	  
not	  be	  entertained	  (Morris	  and	  Levy	  2011).	  	  
	  
At	  the	  private	  level,	  the	  industry	  mobilized	  its	  own	  response	  to	  the	  problem.	  In	  late	  2004,	  the	  
Cape	  Clothing	  Cluster	  (later	  renamed	  the	  Cape	  Clothing	  and	  Textile	  Cluster	  (CCTC)	  after	  textiles	  
firms	  were	  invited	  to	  join	  the	  Cluster)	  was	  launched	  with	  financial	  and	  institutional	  assistance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













from	  Provincial	  government68.	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  launch	  of	  a	  similar	  cluster	  in	  KwaZulu-­‐
Natal.	  In	  2004,	  the	  DTI	  initiated	  a	  process	  of	  producing	  Customised	  Sector	  Plans	  (Programmes)	  
(CSP)	   for	  a	  variety	  of	   targeted	  sectors.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   the	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  sector,	   the	  DTI	  
contracted	  the	  same	  consultants	  that	  had	  overseen	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  clusters	  to	  formulate	  a	  
coordinated	   strategy	   to	   raise	   competitiveness,	   exports	   and	   investment,	   as	   well	   as	   address	  
employment	  and	  equity	  in	  the	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  sectors.	  An	  immediate	  challenge	  was	  to	  get	  
the	  two	  sectors	  to	  work	  together:	  their	  interests	  were	  different,	  and	  they	  had	  a	  long	  history	  of	  
being	   unable	   to	   agree	   on	   a	   common	   set	   of	   policy	   initiatives	   to	   support	   the	   industry.	   The	  
consultant	   brought	   on	   board	   to	   facilitate	   the	   CSP	   process	   had,	   however,	   been	  working	  with	  
both	   sectors	   (as	   part	   of	   the	   cluster	   development	   process)	   and	   was	   able	   to	   move	   relatively	  
seamlessly	  between	  them	  (Morris	  and	  Levy	  2011).	  Over	  the	  following	  months,	  this	  consultant	  
engaged	   in	   an	   intensive	   process	   of	  meeting	  with	   representative	   stakeholders	   in	   the	   clothing	  
and	  textiles	  industries	  –	  identifying	  obstacles	  and	  constraints	  and	  challenges,	  as	  well	  as	  testing	  
strategies	   to	   overcome	   them.	   Despite	   repeated	   attempts	   to	   engage	   SACTWU,	   the	   union	  
declined	  participation	  in	  the	  policy	  formulation	  process.	  	  
The	  Customised	  Sector	  Programme	  (CSP)	  
	  
At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  proposed	  CSP	  was	  a	  public	  private	  partnership	  institution	  –	  the	  Textile	  and	  
Clothing	   Development	   Council	   (TCDC)	   -­‐	   bringing	   together	   all	   industry	   and	   government	  
stakeholders	   to	   advise,	   develop,	   and	   ensure	   implementation	   of	   a	   series	   of	   proposed	  
interventions	  deemed	  necessary	  to	  bolster	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  industry	  (Morris	  2011).	  The	  
CSP	   was	   offered	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   “continuing	   to	   forge	   constructive	   engagement	   with	  
stakeholders”	  who	  were	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  thus	  inherently	  tuned	  into	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  
industry.	  It	  aimed	  to	  translate	  the	  strategic	  position	  of	  the	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  industries	  into	  
discrete	  action	  via	  seven	  Strategic	  Themes	  and	  25	  associated	  Key	  Action	  Programs	  (KAPS).	  The	  
KAPS	  laid	  out	  a	  substantive	  plan	  of	  action	  detailing	  necessary	  interventions.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 The Western Cape Provincial Department of Economic Development and Tourism provided funding and 
institutional support for the CCTC; in KwaZulu-Natal, support came from both the Durban metropolitan 














Whilst	   shying	   away	   from	   strictly	   protectionist	   “solutions	   based	   on	   attempts	   to	   defend	   the	  
economy	   from	   fair	   competitive	   pressures	   through	   restriction	   on	   trading	   with	   the	   World	   or	  
subsidies	  to	  domestic	  companies”	  (CSP	  2004)	  that	  aimed	  simply	  and	  temporarily,	  to	  defend	  the	  
status	  quo,	  the	  CSP	  acknowledged	  a	  growing	  consensus	  that	  focused	  trade	  remedies,	  such	  as	  
safeguards,	   to	  address	   the	   surge	   in	   imports	  of	   certain	   textiles	  and	  clothing	  products	   into	   the	  
South	  African	  market	  were	  required	  to	  enable	  the	  clothing	  industry	  to	  restructure	  for	  long-­‐term	  
competitiveness.	   However,	   it	   warned	   about	   the	   temporary	   nature	   of	   such	   measures:	  
“Notwithstanding	  the	  solid	  arguments	  for	  trade	  remedy	  measures,	  which	  are	  supported,	  they	  
are	   at	   best	   a	   temporary	   shield	   for	   industry	   for	   a	   limited	   period	   in	   order	   to	   allow	   for	  
restructuring	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Key	  Action	  Programs	  (KAPs).”(CSP	  2004) 
	  
The	  finalization	  of	  the	  CSP	  in	  late	  2005	  looked	  to	  be	  a	  major	  achievement	  for	  government	  and	  
industrial	  policy	  having	  successfully	  navigated	  the	  antagonistic	  relationships	  between	  clothing	  
and	  textiles	  firms	  to	  produce	  more	  coordinated	  and	  cooperative	  output	  plans	  between	  the	  two	  
sectors.	  However,	   the	  CSP	  process	  had	   two	   fundamental	  weaknesses.	  Firstly	   it	  was	  sectorally	  
based	  rather	  than	  value	  chain	  driven.	  It	  implicitly	  assumed	  global	  value	  chains	  were	  driving	  the	  
industry	   and	   hence	   implied	   that	   the	   key	   to	   achieving	   international	   competitiveness	   was	  
successful	   exporting	   (Morris	   2011).	  However,	   the	  most	   salient	   point	   about	   the	   local	   industry	  
was	  that	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  (and	  was	  unlikely	  to	  be	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future)	  an	  export-­‐based	  
industry.	  Instead	  it	  was	  primarily	  oriented	  to	  the	  domestic	  market	  and	  driven	  by	  the	  domestic	  
retail	  chains.	  And	  here	  lay	  the	  second	  process	  weakness	  of	  the	  CSP.	  The	  drivers	  of	  the	  domestic	  
clothing	  and	  textiles	  value	  chain	  –	  the	  six	  major	  clothing	  retail	  chain	  stores	  who	  controlled	  70%	  
of	  domestic	   sales	   -­‐	  were	  only	  weakly	   represented	   in	   the	  CSP	  process.	  This	  was	  a	   crucial	   flaw	  
since	   the	   entire	   orientation	   of	   the	   industry	   had	   shifted	   toward	   the	   domestic	  market	   (Morris	  
2011).	  	  
	  
The	   buy-­‐in	   by	   retailers	   into	   the	   cooperation	   process	   was	   crucial	   to	   the	   successful	  
implementation	   of	   the	   CSP	   and	  was	   addressed	   immediately	   after	   the	   CSP	  was	   presented	   to	  
government	   in	   mid	   2005.	   The	   retailers’	   involvement	   was	   not	   voluntary,	   but	   was	   achieved	  













hosted	  by	  the	  CTCC	  and	  held	  between	  private	  participants	  (to	  exclusion	  of	  government).69	  The	  
subsequent	   commitment	   of	   these	   retailers	   to	   the	   development	   of	   the	   local	   industry	   was	   a	  
major	  and	  indeed	  historical	  step	  forward	  in	  terms	  of	  value	  chain	  cooperation.	  In	  October	  2005,	  
a	  Clothing	  and	  Textiles	  Business	  Alliance	  was	  established,	  encompassing	  the	  associations	  from	  
all	  three	  parts	  of	  the	  value	  chain.	  By	  2006,	  all	  the	  major	  retailers	  had	  joined	  the	  Cape	  and	  KZN	  
clothing	  clusters.	  The	  retailers	  both	  paid	  special	  membership	  fees,	  and	  created	  a	  new	  fund	  for	  
achieving	  alignment	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  and	  upgrading	  the	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  manufacturers	  
(Morris	  and	  Levy	  2011).	  	  
	  
The	   firms	   and	   associations	   comprising	   the	   value	   chain	   believed	   that	   the	   CSP	   proposals	  
presented	   to	   the	  DTI	   heralded	  a	  new	  era	   and	  would	  deliver	   the	  much-­‐needed	   lifeline	   to	   the	  
flailing	   industry.	   However,	   the	   successful	   implementation	   of	   the	   KAPS	   depended	   crucially	   on	  
the	  determination	  of	  government	  and	  its	  institutions	  to	  drive	  and	  co-­‐ordinate	  the	  process	  and	  
to	   reinforce	  efforts	  by	  business	   to	  bring	  about	   these	   transformations.	  However,	   the	   requisite	  
national	  level	  governmental	  support	  was	  not	  forthcoming.	  Instead	  (at	  the	  request	  of	  SACTWU)	  
the	   DTI	   initiated	   a	   re-­‐negotiation	   of	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   CSP	   which	   resulted	   in	   a	   tortuous	   and	  
frustrating	  process	  for	  the	  industry	  associations	  in	  the	  Business	  Alliance.	  By	  the	  middle	  of	  2006,	  
when	  the	  new	  CSP	  was	  finally	  concluded,	  most	  sector	  participants	  had	  lost	  faith	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  
bring	   about	   the	   necessary	   unity	   within	   the	   industry.	   Furthermore,	   the	   CSP	   was	   never	  
implemented.	   Instead,	   in	   September	   2006,	   the	   government	   dropped	   its	   bombshell	   on	   the	  
industry	  with	  the	  announcement	  of	   its	  “China	  quota”	  plan.	  Having	  been	  finalized	  without	  any	  
stakeholder	  participation	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  SACTWU),	  the	  quota	  proposals	  came	  as	  a	  fait	  
accomplit	  to	  the	  industry	  since	  they	  would	  go	  ahead	  in	  the	  form	  presented	  to	  industry	  whether	  
they	  drew	  support	  or	  not70.	  	  
	  
At	  the	  public	  level,	  Clotrade	  and	  the	  retailers	  unanimously	  rejected	  the	  China	  quota	  proposal,	  
lodging	  objections	  on	  three	  main	  grounds:	   i)	  Some	  manufacturers	  had,	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  any	  
meaningful	   reaction	   from	   government	   over	   the	   precedent	   three	   years,	   restructured	   their	  
business	   and	   had	   themselves	   begun	   to	   import	   garments	   and	   garment	   components	   to	   cross	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 The most important of which was hosted by the CTCC and opened by the Deputy Minister of the DTI in 
September 2005 (Morris and Levy 2011) 













subsidise	   their	   business	   and	  would	   also	   be	   hurt	   by	   quotas.	   ii)	   The	   China	   quotas	   presented	   a	  
threat	   to	   the	   retailer-­‐manufacturer	   alliance,	   since	   it	   would	   upset	   the	   retailers.	   iii)	   Finally,	   it	  
could	  derail,	  or	  at	  best	  seriously	  delay	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Customised	  Sector	  Program	  
(CSP),	  which	  had	  a	  few	  KAP’s	  that,	  if	  introduced	  swiftly,	  might	  have	  made	  a	  material	  difference	  
to	  the	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  sector.	  	  
	  
Behind	  this	  rejection	  however,	  the	  industry	  response	  to	  government’s	  resolute	  championing	  of	  
the	   quota	   initiative	   was	   divided.	   The	   textile	   association	   eschewed	   openly	   condemning	   the	  
China	  quotas.	   Some	   clothing	  manufacturers	   felt	   uncomfortable	   about	  Clotrade’s	   rejection	  on	  
the	  basis	  that	  they	  themselves	  had	  initially	  requested	  safeguards,	  whilst	  the	  majority	  wanted	  to	  
distance	  themselves	  totally	  from	  the	  proposal	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	   it	  was	   largely	  a	  product	  of	  
SACTWU	  politics.	  Retailers	  were	  also	  divided	  in	  terms	  of	  translating	  their	  rejection	  into	  practical	  
mechanisms	  between	   those	  who	  proposed	  publicly	   legal	   action	  and	  others	  who	   felt	   this	  was	  
politically	  unwise.	  Eventually	  the	  latter	  response	  won	  the	  day	  and	  each	  retailer	  retreated	  into	  
highly	  individualistic	  strategic	  responses.	  	  In	  the	  end	  	  the	  net	  effect	  was	  a	  fracturing	  of	  the	  hard	  
won,	  but	  fragile,	  internal	  unity	  of	  the	  Business	  Alliance	  and	  the	  dissipation	  of	  the	  joint	  industry	  
wide	   industrial	  policy	  so	  painstakingly	  created	  over	  the	  past	  couple	  of	  years.	  Each	  association	  
went	   its	  own	  way,	  and	  retailers	  adopted	  a	  pragmatic	  approach	  to	  the	  government	  and	  union	  
control	  of	  the	  China	  quotas,	  whilst	  actively	  seeking	  alternative	  sources	  of	  supply	  from	  other	  low	  
cost	  global	  producers.	  	  
	  
The	   question	   for	   business	   was	   why	   the	   DTI	   opted	   to	   unilaterally	   impose	   quotas	   despite	  
cognizance	  by	  government	  for	  the	  need	  of	  the	  cooperative	  solution	  formulated	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
CSP?	  As	  far	  as	  they	  were	  concerned,	  the	  DTI’s	  U-­‐turn	  was	  politically	  driven;	  SACTWU	  had	  opted	  
out	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  CSP71	  and	  government	  it	  seemed,	  lacked	  the	  political	  will72	  to	  pioneer	  
the	  process	  without	  union	  support73.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 According to one interviewee, this went beyond an attempt to railroad the CSP: “When SACTWU realised 
that the CSP would go ahead, their nose was in a knot and they attempted to develop a strategy to compete 
with the CSP.” 
72 The exact reasons for this are open to speculation. One view is that it was no coincidence that business 
was continuously stonewalled in their efforts to call government to action and that all the parties in key 
decision-making positions came with a history - their mothers worked in the clothing sector - and a chip on 
their shoulder, which made them anti-business from the start. 
73 There were also suggestions that South Africa had granted China market economy status in return for the 













As	  one	  key	  official	  concluded:	  
	  
“We	  were	  told	  to	  see	  the	  China	  quotas	  as	  a	  political	  decision	  and	  we	  decided	  to	  heed	  
advice	  to	  “get	  over	  it	  and	  make	  the	  best	  of	  it.”74	  	  	  
	  
What	  the	  China	  quotas	  were	  supposed	  to	  do…	  
	  
The	  China	  quotas	  had	  three	  explicit	  aims:	  Firstly,	  reduce	  clothing	  imports	  from	  China;	  secondly,	  
raise	  employment	  levels	  in	  the	  industry	  	  -­‐	  and	  more	  than	  this,	  create	  (55	  000)	  jobs;	  and	  thirdly,	  
provide	   the	   local	   industry	   with	   a	   two	   year	   period	   of	   relief	   from	   import	   competition	   to	  
restructure	  and	  become	  globally	  competitive	  by	  encouraging	  local	  retailers	  to	  source	  from	  local	  
manufacturers”	  (Ibrahim	  Patel.	  General	  Secretary	  of	  SACTWU	  2006).	  Restrictions	  were	  imposed	  
on	  31	  tariff	  lines	  with	  82	  product	  categories	  affected:	  11	  at	  the	  HS4,	  63	  at	  the	  HS6	  and	  8	  at	  the	  
HS8	   level.	  Not	   all	  were	   in	   the	  generally	   recognised	   clothing	   categories	  of	  Chapters	  HS61	  and	  
HS62,	  but	  also	  in	  fabrics	  (HS52,	  55	  and	  60)	  and	  one	  in	  curtains	  (HS63).	  These	  lines	  accounted	  for	  
65.81%	  of	  2007	  aggregate	  clothing	  imports.	  The	  criteria	  governing	  the	  selection	  of	  these	  exact	  
lines	  were	   far	   from	  clear.	  However	  Sandrey	  and	  Jansen	  2007	  concluded	  that	  since	  only	  six	  of	  
the	   lines	   that	   received	   quotas	   showed	   growth	   rates	   that	   exceeded	   the	   growth	   of	   clothing	  
imports	  from	  China	  overall,	  growth	  alone	  was	  not	  the	  selection	  criterion.	  
What	  industry	  said	  would	  happen…	  
	  
At	   the	   time	  of	   implementation,	   industry	  emphatically	   rejected	  the	  DTI’s	  proposal	   that	  quotas	  
would	   promote	   employment	   and	   encourage	   firms	   to	   commit	   to	   and	   engage	   in	   meaningful	  
reform.	   Instead	  a	  series	  of	  quite	  contrary	  outcomes	  were	  anticipated.	  To	  put	   the	  quotas	   into	  
context,	   Clotrade	   (2007)	   observed	   that	  without	  making	   provision	   for	   growth	   in	   demand,	   the	  
shortfall	  between	  2006	  imports	  in	  restricted	  categories	  and	  the	  2007	  quota	  implied	  that	  172.9	  
million	   garments	   and	   5.6	   million	   kilos	   of	   wearing	   apparel75	  had	   to	   be	   sourced	   from	   local	  
manufacturers	  or	  alternative	  countries	  to	  China	  at	  short	  notice.	  If	  this	  quantity	  were	  produced	  
locally,	   60,000	   additional	   jobs	   would	   be	   created,	   which	   given	   the	   2006	   level	   of	   74	   600	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 These were the words of a high level official to a Clotrade representative when he was challenged about 
the credibility of the claim that 55000 jobs would be created. 
75 In January to December 2006, 345.1 million garments (71% of total unit imports from China) and 9.4 
million kilos (48% of total kilo imports from China) were imported in restricted categories. The 2007 quotas in 













employees,	  meant	  that	  the	  industry	  would	  have	  to	  double	  its	  capacity	  and	  rejuvenate	  the	  skills	  
pool	  which	  has	  been	  haemorrhaging	  since	  2003.	  	  
	  
The	  industry	  anticipated	  a	  series	  of	  quite	  contrary	  outcomes;	  that	  the	  China	  quotas	  would:	  
	  
• Lead	   to	   import	   diversion	   and	   the	   premature	   discovery	   of	   alternative,	   and	   possibly	   lower	  
cost	  suppliers	  to	  China	  whilst	  providing	  little	  stimulus	  to	  local	  output	  (Brink	  2006)	  
• Encourage	   trans-­‐border	   shipments,	   illegal	   activities	   and	   increase	   the	   number	   of	   imports	  
declared	  under	  incorrect	  codes	  (Bisseker	  2006a;	  Sandrey	  2006)	  
• Push	   local	  manufacturers	   	  down	   the	   value	   chain	   toward	   low	   value-­‐added	   goods	   (Bisseker	  
2006b;	  2007a;	  le	  Roux	  2007).	  
• Cause	  supply	  shortages	  and	  supply	  chain	  bottlenecks	  	  
• Be	  ineffective	  as	  an	  intervention	  to	  promote	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  industry.	  	  
• Fail	   to	  create	   jobs	  and	  sustainably	   raise	  employment	   in	   the	   industry	   (Edwards	  and	  Morris	  
2007)	  	  
• Create	   welfare	   problems	   by	   raising	   the	   cost	   of	   clothing	   which	   reduces	   the	   disposable	  
income	  of	  the	  poor	  (Bisseker	  2006b;	  2007b;	  Hazelhurst	  2006a;	  Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008)	  
• Disrupt	   value	   chain	   alignment	   by	   driving	   a	   wedge	   between	   both	   textile	   and	   clothing	  














Based	  on	  the	  preliminary	  research,	  I	  postulated	  four	  main	  hypotheses	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  impact	  
of	  the	  China	  quotas	  on	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  industry.	  	  	  
	  
• Hypothesis	   1:	  Quotas	   would	   lead	   to	   import	   diversion	   and	   would	   fail	   to	   encourage	  
greater	  levels	  of	  local	  sourcing.	  
	  
• Hypothesis	  2:	  Quotas	  would	  push	  manufacturers	  down	  the	  value	  chain	  and	  would	  not	  
stimulate	  domestic	  output.	  	  
	  
• Hypothesis	  3:	  Quotas	  would	  fail	  to	  create	  jobs	  or	  sustainably	  raise	  employment.	  
	  
• Hypothesis	  4:	  Quotas	  would	  lower	  the	  disposable	  income	  and	  utility	  of	  South	  African	  
consumers	   by	   raising	   garment	   prices	   and	   restricting	   access	   to	   quality	   affordable	  
clothing.	  
	  
A	  synthetic	  framework	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  	  
	  
Sustainable	   industrial	   policy	   should	   aim	   to	   secure	   two	   agenda;	   competitiveness	   and	  welfare.	  
Morris	  2006	  posits	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  any	  particular	  industrial	  policy	  intervention	  should	  
be	  tested	  against	  how	  it	  meets	  and	  balances	  these	  needs.	  Competitiveness	  concerns	  the	   long	  
term	  sustainability	  of	  the	  sector	  and	  has	  two	  broad	  aims;	  a)	  to	  raise	  the	  production	  capabilities	  
of	   individual	   enterprises	   by	   raising	   internal	   operational	   performance	   and	   upgrading	  
technological	   and	  management	   functions;	   and	   b)	   to	   achieve	   systemic	   efficiency	   of	   the	   value	  
chain	  by	  aligning	  the	  interests	  of	  manufacturers	  with	  downstream	  (textiles	  manufacturers)	  and	  
upstream	   (retailers)	   actors.	  Morris	   2011	  observes	   that	   the	   former	   can	  be	   tackled	   at	   the	   firm	  
level,	  but	  one	  cannot	  be	  an	  island	  of	  competitiveness	  in	  a	  sea	  of	  inefficiency.	  Hence	  ultimately	  
international	   competitiveness	   has	   to	   be	   grounded	   in	   both	   building	   firm	   level	   capability	   and	  
systemic	  competitiveness.	  
	  
The	  welfare	  requirement	  of	  industrial	  policy	  is	  also	  two	  dimensional,	  and	  is	  concerned	  with;	  i)	  	  













Employment	  welfare	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	  workers	   in	   the	   sector	   and	   the	  wage-­‐plus-­‐benefit	  
structure	   facing	   individuals	   employed	   in	   the	   sector.	   Consumer	   welfare	   is	   far	   broader	   and	   is	  
concerned	   with	   raising	   the	   disposable	   income	   of	   the	   poor	   by	   decreasing	   the	   cost	   of	   wage	  
goods.	  The	  long	  term	  impact	  of	   industrial	  policy	  should	  be	  to	   increase	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  
labour	  through	  the	  consumption	  of	  cheaper	  wage	  goods	  which	  will	  feed	  through	  to	  lower	  wage	  
costs	  across	  all	  sectors;	  falling	  prices	  of	  clothing	  reduce	  wage	  pressure	  in	  other	  sectors	  (Morris	  
and	  Einhorn	  2008).	  
The	   evaluation	   of	   whether	   the	   China	   quotas	   secured	   the	   competitiveness	   agenda	   requires	  
asking	   two	   questions:	   Firstly,	   how	   did	   the	   retailers	   respond	   to	   the	   quotas	   to	   remain	  
competitive;	  did	  they	  source	  more	  locally	  or	  did	  they	  look	  for	  alternative	  foreign	  suppliers?	  And	  
secondly,	  how	  did	  the	  quotas	  impact	  on	  manufacturers;	  were	  they	  able	  to	  upgrade	  and	  become	  
more	  competitive	  to	  meet	  the	  new	  demands	  of	  globalisation	  and	  change	  their	  position	   in	  the	  
value	  chain?	  The	  evaluation	  of	  whether	  the	  quotas	  secured	  the	  welfare	  dimension	  also	  requires	  
asking	  two	  questions:	  Firstly,	  how	  were	  employees	  impacted	  by	  the	  quotas	  and	  secondly,	  how	  
were	  consumers	  impacted	  by	  the	  quotas?	  	  
These	  questions	  are	  addressed	  in	  the	  following	  sections;	  the	  first,	  which	  looks	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  
the	  quotas	  on	  trade	  and	  buying	  (the	  retailers),	  the	  second,	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  
quotas	  on	  output	  and	  employment	  (manufacturers);	  and	  the	  third,	  which	  analyses	  the	  impact	  of	  
the	  quotas	   on	   garment	  prices	   (consumers).	   The	   employment	  welfare	  dimension	   is	   subsumed	  
under	   the	   discussion	   on	   competitiveness.	   These	   analyses	   are	   the	   constituent	   parts	   to	   the	  














Chapter	  5:	  The	  effect	  of	  quotas	  on	  buying	  and	  trade:	  The	  
retailer	  response	  
	  
Changes	  in	  buying	  behavior	  and	  sourcing	  patterns	  are	  captured	  at	  the	  macro	  trade	  data	  level	  as	  
changes	  in	  trade	  flows	  between	  trading	  partners.	  Large	  retailers	  drive	  demand	  through	  global	  
clothing	  value	  chains;	  they	  decide	  where,	  when	  and	  how	  clothing	  production	  will	  occur	  and	  in	  
this	  manner,	  they	  determine	  both	  the	  magnitude	  (volume)	  and	  direction	  (flows	  and	  patterns)	  of	  
clothing	   trade	   between	   trading	   blocs.	   Similarly,	   the	   response	   of	   local	   retailers	   to	   the	   China	  
quotas	   would	   manifest	   as	   a	   change	   in	   clothing	   trade	   flows	   between	   South	   Africa	   and	   its	  
suppliers.	  	  
	  
The	  pervasive	  industry	  view	  was	  that	  local	  firms	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  overcome	  the	  physical	  and	  
technical	   infrastructural	  restraints	  to	  production	  in	  the	  short	  run	  with	  fabric	  shortages	  adding	  
to	   the	   problem	   (Bisseker	   2006b).	   Retailers	   estimated	   that	   60%	   of	   their	   customer’s	   favourite	  
fabrics	   not	   readily	   available	   in	   South	   Africa	   would	   be	   restricted	   by	   quota,	   whilst	   the	   local	  
industry	  offered	  a	  decidedly	  circumscribed	  range	  of	  fabric	  at	  prices	  as	  much	  as	  50%	  more	  than	  
China	   (Retailer	   Joint	   News	   Release	   2006).	   Even	   where	   excess	   supply	   capacity	   existed,	   local	  
supply	   would	   not	   match	   current	   price,	   quality	   or	   fashionability	   (Retailer	   joint	   news	   release	  
2006).	  In	  the	  short	  run,	  this	  would	  drive	  retailers	  offshore	  (Bisseker	  2006a;	  Bleby	  2006).	  	  In	  the	  
longer	  run,	  consolidation	  of	  supply	  around	  new	  foreign	  locations	  would	  negate	  the	  incentive	  to	  
switch	   to	   local	   sourcing,	   which	   would	   neutralise	   the	   long-­‐term	   demand	   impact	   of	   the	  
restrictions	  on	  local	  supply.	  	  
	  
Despite	  numerous	  and	  material	  differences	  between	  the	  China	  quotas	  (especially	  in	  economic	  
and	   political	   motivations	   which	   I	   shall	   explain	   later)	   and	   safeguards	   in	   the	   US	   and	   EU,	   the	  
interventions	   were	   functionally	   and	   technically	   similar	   –	   they	   both	   imposed	   quantitative	  
restrictions	  on	  imports	  from	  China	  -­‐	  and	  they	  had	  similar	  objectives,	  to	  reduce	  Chinese	  imports,	  
create	  employment	  and	  provide	   the	   local	   industry	  with	  a	  period	   to	   restructure	  and	  adjust	   to	  
import	  competition.	   I	  showed	  in	  Chapter	  3	  that	  safeguards	   in	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  broadly	  failed	  in	  













unintended	  and	  sometimes	  contradictory	  outcomes	  to	  their	  initial	  prescription.	  The	  experience	  
of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  particular,	  suggests	  that	  import	  restrictions	  on	  Chinese	  goods	  would	  not	  
unequivocally	   translate	   into	   higher	   demand	   for	   locally	   produced	   substitutes.	   A	   more	   likely	  
occurrence	  was	   that	   retailers	  would	  adopt	  a	  number	  of	  alternative	   strategies	   to	  mitigate	   the	  
impact	  of	  restrictions	  including:	  i)	  Pre-­‐buying	  stock	  in	  large	  volumes	  in	  anticipation	  of	  quotas;	  ii)	  
diverting	  shipments	   through	  countries	   that	  are	  not	   restricted;	  or	   iii)	   securing	  alternative,	  and	  
possibly	   lower	   cost,	   foreign	   suppliers.	   In	   the	   long	   run,	   the	   last	   option	   was	   expected	   with	  
countries	  where	  contracts	  already	  existed,	  such	  as	  India,	  reaping	  immediate	  benefits	  but	  with	  
suppliers	  casting	  an	  ever	  widening	  net	  toward	  other	  Asian	  countries	  over	  the	  longer	  term	  (Brink	  
2006).	  	  
	  
Since	  sourcing	  strategies	  were	  expected	  to	  change	  over	  time	  depending	  on	  the	   impact	  of	  the	  
quotas	  on	  the	   local	   industry	  and	  the	  occurrence	  of	  alternative	  buying	  opportunities	  abroad,	   I	  
divided	  the	  analysis	   into	  three	  time	  periods	  to	  enable	  these	  changes	  to	  be	   isolated:	  First,	   the	  
short	   run	   2006-­‐2007;	   Second,	   the	   medium	   run	   2006-­‐2008.	   Third,	   the	   long	   run	   2008-­‐2010,	  
which	  was	  effectively	  the	  period	  after	  quota	  removal.	  
	  
Forward	  purchasing	  by	  retailers	  and	  supply	  bottlenecks	  
	  
The	   first	   major	   oversight	   of	   the	   DTI	   was	   the	   failure	   to	   anticipate	   that	   a	   delay	   in	   the	  
implementation	   of	   quotas	   would	   result	   in	   massive	   buying	   forward	   by	   retailers	   seeking	   to	  
mitigate	   the	   impact	  of	   the	   restrictions	  and	   this	  despite	   the	  highly	  publicised	   incidence	  of	   the	  
“bra	  wars”	   in	  Britain.	   The	  delay	  between	   their	   announcement	   in	  September	  2006	  and	  actual	  
implementation	   in	   January	   2007	   led	   to	   significant	   forward	   purchasing	   as	   importers	   hurriedly	  
brought	  forward	  their	  2007	  orders	  for	  import	  in	  2006.	  Figure	  37	  (reproduced	  from	  Sandrey	  and	  
van	  Eeden	  2006)	  clearly	  shows	  the	  announcement	  of	  quotas	  in	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  2006.	  This	  is	  
characterised	  by	  a	  sharp	  increase	  in	  the	  flow	  of	  quota	  imports	  from	  China	  in	  the	  fourth	  quarter	  
of	  2006	  and	  their	  subsequent	  imposition	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2006,	  which	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  period	  of	  
sharply	   subdued	   import	   activity	   from	   China	   in	   the	   first	   two	   quarters	   of	   2007.	   Clotrade	  
estimated	  that	  between	  38.5	  million	  and	  42	  million	  garments	  from	  China	  were	  brought	  forward	  
from	  2007	  for	  delivery	  in	  November/December	  2006	  to	  land	  before	  the	  introduction	  of	  quota	  















Figure	  37:	  Comparison	  of	  quarterly	  import	  activity	  in	  quota	  lines	  2003	  –	  2007	  
	  
	  	  	  Source:	  Clotrade	  statistical	  database	  (Own	  calculations)	  (Reproduced	  from	  Sanfdrey	  and	  van	  Eeden	  2006)	  
	  
The	  spike	  in	  imports	  in	  Figure	  37	  from	  countries	  other	  than	  China	  (Rest	  of	  the	  World)	  in	  the	  last	  
two	  quarters	  of	  2007	  is	  provisional	  evidence	  that	  quota	  imports	  from	  China	  were	  displaced	  by	  
imports	  from	  other	  regions.	  	  
Import	  diversion	  	  
	  
Stockpiling	  of	  Chinese	  clothing	  was	  a	  kneejerk	  response	  to	  quotas	  and	  was	  never	  envisaged	  as	  a	  
long	   run	   supply	   plan.	   Inevitably	   retailers	   would	   have	   to	   switch	   their	   sourcing	   of	   restricted	  
garments	  to	  local	  firms	  or	  foreign	  suppliers	  other	  than	  China	  (Bisseker	  2006b).	  The	  discussion	  
proceeds	  with	  an	  overview	  of	   import	  activity	   in	  aggregate	   imports,	  and	  quota	  and	  non	  quota	  
categories.	   It	   concludes	   with	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   implications	   for	   import	   diversion	   and	   local	  
manufacturing.	  	  
Macro	  trade	  impact	  of	  the	  quotas	  in	  the	  short	  run	  
Aggregate	  clothing	  imports	  
	  
Between	   January	   and	   December	   2007,	   imports	   from	   China	   fell	   by	   R1,901.98m	   (49.31%)	   and	  













South	   Africa	   fell	   by	   a	   lesser	   8.58%	   (R591.91m)	   from	   R6,900.01m	   to	   R6,308.10m	   (Table	   27),	  
which	  implies	  that	  the	  shortfall	  of	  	  R1,310.97m	  in	  imports	  was	  diverted	  elsewhere.	  Consistent	  
the	  US	  and	  EU	  experience,	  a	  large	  chunk	  of	  China’s	  share	  was	  simply	  reallocated	  to	  alternative	  
supply	  countries	  (Sandrey	  2006).	  Where	  did	  buyers	  go	  to?	  	  
	  
Table	  27:	  Major	  percentage	  and	  monetary	  gainers	  in	  aggregate	  clothing	  imports	  
Major percentage movers Major value movers 
  
Rank Country % 
change 
Rank Country Value 
change 
 World -8.58  World -591.91 
 China -27.92  China -1,512.12 
1. Madagascar 4,823.54 1. Indonesia 111.96 
2. Malaysia 1,092.84 2. Mauritius 110.71 
3. Myanmar 444.17 3. Malaysia 103.20 
4. Sri Lanka 381.99 4. Bangladesh 90.67 
5. Macau 374.55 5. Vietnam 84.44 
6. Vietnam 341.03 6. India 81.19 
7. Indonesia 232.66 7. Myanmar 78.55 
8 Cambodia 198.99 8. Hong Kong 69.62 
9 Bangladesh 178.35 9. Thailand 37.74 
10 Zimbabwe 85.13 10. Zimbabwe 37.43 
11 Mauritius 76.59 11. Turkey 27.56 
12 Thailand 59.62 12. Sri Lanka 27.27 
13 Turkey 54.99 13. Madagascar 23.61 
14 Tunisia 53.07 14. Cambodia 23.60 
15 Hong Kong 36.86 15. Macau 12.15 
16 Romania 30.40 16. Italy 8.10 
17 India 29.26 17. Pakistan 6.27 
18 Pakistan 24.50 18. Tunisia 5.71 
19 France 16.35 19. United States 5.35 
20. United States 15.92 20. Romania 4.65 
21. Italy 10.64 21. France 4.41 
22. Republic of Korea 9.84 22. Republic of Korea 0.42 
23. Taiwan -1.29 23. Taiwan -0.26 
24. Philippines -4.86 24. Philippines -0.54 
25 Germany -5.55 25 Germany -0.75 













Table	   27	   shows	   that	   in	   the	   immediate	   wake	   of	   the	   quotas,	   this	   was	   Mauritius,	   Indonesia,	  
Malaysia	  and	  Vietnam76	  who	  were	  the	   immediate	  beneficiaries	  of	   the	  quotas;	  and	  to	  a	   lesser	  
extent,	   Sri	   Lanka	  and	  Zimbabwe	  also	  achieved	  gains	  of	   approximately	  100%	  or	  more	   in	  2007	  
compared	  with	  the	  same	  2006	  period77.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  South	  African	  buyers	  sampled	  a	  host	  
of	  new	  suppliers.	  Some	  countries	  that	  never	  featured	  heavily	  in	  the	  past	  made	  dramatic	  inroads	  
into	   the	   South	   African	   market	   e.g.	   Cambodia,	   Madagascar	   and	   Bangladesh	   (Sandrey	   2006).	  
Despite	   expectations	   that	   India	  would	   be	   a	  major	   beneficiary	   of	   quotas	   (Brink	   2006),	   it	   was	  
consistently	   outperformed	   in	   both	   percentage	   and	  monetary	   terms	  by	   these	  other	   emerging	  
supplier	   countries.	   Of	   particular	   interest	   is	   Malaysia,	   who	   as	   of	   December	   2007,	   was	   the	  
principle	  beneficiary	  of	  quotas	  having	  achieved	  more	  than	  1000%	  growth	  in	  value	  terms	  and	  an	  
even	  more	  impressive	  8000%	  in	  volume	  terms	  in	  2007.	  Volumes	  increased	  from	  238	  000	  units	  
in	   2006	   to	   19.26	   million	   units	   in	   2007,	   of	   which	   81%	   (R15.62	   million)	   were	   under	   quota	  
(Clotrade	   2007a).	   This	   was	   widely	   perceived	   to	   be	   preliminary	   evidence	   of	   transshipment	  
activity	  through	  this	  region	  (Clotrade	  2006a;	  Sandrey	  2006)	  
Quota	  and	  non	  quota	  imports	  
	  
The	   analysis	   here	   decomposes	   aggregate	   imports	   into	   quota	   and	   non	   quota	   catgories.	   The	  
objective	   is	   to	   compare	   trade	   in	   quota	   categories	   with	   that	   in	   non	   quota	   categories.	   The	  
analysis	   is	  done	  by	   clothing	  Chapters.	   This	  will	  be	  done	   in	   three	  ways.	   First,	  on	  an	  aggregate	  
basis.	  Second,	  by	  unit	  and	  kilogram	  categories.	  Third,	  by	  HS	  categories.	  These	  distinctions	  are	  
prompted	   a)	   by	   the	   diverse	   b haviour	   of	   unit	   and	   kilo	   imports	  within	   quota	   and	   non	   quota	  
cohorts	  and	  b)	  due	  to	  the	  disproportionate	  share	  of	  quota	  categories	  in	  the	  different	  clothing	  
Chapters;	  28	  in	  Chapter	  61	  (wovens)	  compared	  with	  47	  in	  Chapter	  62	  (knits).	  (Sandrey	  2006)	  
	  
The	   decline	   for	   China	   at	   the	   aggregate	   level	   (established	   above)	   was	   mainly	   driven	   by	   a	  
progressive	  decline	  in	  quota	  imports	  following	  quota	  imposition.	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  Table	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 A recent research report suggests that some of this growth may be due to the establishment of Chinese 
clothing firms in some of these Asian countries in response to (mainly) US safeguards  (Emergingtextiles, 
2008). 
77 Interviews with key informants in the industry revealed that some firms in Swaziland, struggling in the post 
MFA environment, coped by taking advantage of the China quotas and switched to exporting to South 
Africa. However, because Swaziland belongs to the South African Customs Union, the magnitude of these 













28	   below,	   which	   tracks	   imports	   from	   China	   by	   cumulative	   quarters	   during	   2007	   in	   quota	  
categories	  and	  overall.	  The	  data	  is	  expressed	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  2006	  values.	  	  
	  
Table	  28:	  Quota	  imports	  from	  China	  (Rm):	  2007	  by	  cumulative	  quarters	  
	   2006	   Q1	  2007	   Q2	  2007	   Q3	  2007	   Q4	  2007	  
World	   4,707.06	   669.13	   1,	  371.44	   2,459.16	   3,552.50	  
China	   3,813.52	   426.01	   812.60	   1,382,70	   1,905.30	  
China	  	  2006	   100%	   65.03%	   60.86%	   56,79%	   49.26%	  
%	  market	  share	   81.02%	   63.67%	   59.25%	   56.23%	   53.63%	  


























































































Data	  source:	  Clotrade	  	  (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
Table	  29	  and	  Table	  30	  contain	  base	  data	  for	  HS61	  and	  HS62	  imports	  respectively	  for	  the	  entire	  
Chapter	  for	  January	  to	  December	  2007.	  Comparable	  2006	  data	  is	  also	  shown,	  as	  are	  percentage	  















HS	  Chapter	  61	  
	  
In	  2007,	   total	  HS61	   imports	   fell	  both	   from	  China,	  by	  16.70%	  equivalent	   to	  R382.23m	  and	  the	  
World,	  although	  only	  by	  a	  marginal	  0.92%	  or	  R27.38m.	  In	  contrast,	  India	  and	  Mauritius	  showed	  
sizeable	   value	   (percentage)	   increases	   in	   HS61	   imports	   of	   R70.24m	   (62.49%)	   and	   R71.68m	  
(73.85%)	  respectively,	  as	  well	  as	  Malaysia	  (R48.96m;	  979.58%),	  Myanmar	  (R43.98m;	  325.69%);	  
Indonesia	   (R42.45m;	   235.72%);	   Bangladesh	   (R27.11m;	   95.68%)	   and	   Thailand	   (R22.69m;	  
75.99%).	   Madagascar	   (2,654.15%),	   Cambodia	   (170.17%),	   Vietnam	   (99.89%)	   and	   Sri	   Lanka	  
(174.80%)	  also	  achieved	  impressive	  percentage	  gains	  although	  all	  off	  a	  low	  value	  base.	  	  
	  
Table	  29:	  South	  African	  imports	  of	  HS61	  (knitted	  apparel)	  from	  Jan-­‐Dec	  2007	  
Country Total H61 imports H61 quota imports H61 no  quota imports 












World 2,939.69 -0.92 919.05 -27.88 2,020.64 19.37 
China 1,906.33 -16.70 481.51 -54.68 1,424.82 16.21 
India 182.63 62.49 98.71 104.20 83.93 31.02 
Myanmar 57.49 325.69 43.57 737.80 13.92 67.59 
Mauritius 168.74 73.85 42.53 462.59 126.21 41.01 
Malaysia 53.96 979.58 40.44 3,109.54 13.52 261.74 
Indonesia 60.46 235.72 37.12 319.52 23.34 154.76 
Hong Kong 76.91 -6.36 35.42 42.42 41.50 -27.54 
Thailand 52.55 75.99 25.86 98.12 26.70 58.81 
Bangladesh 55.44 95.68 17.98 129.80 37.47 82.66 
Turkey 40.15 78.50 14.09 139.54 26.06 56.88 
Vietnam 26.95 99.89 12.10 93.93 14.85 105.02 
Malawi 15.90 -76.21 7.84 -77.22 8.06 -75.14 
Italy 29.48 -1.25 6.33 -1.33 23.15 -1.22 
Sri Lanka 13.16 174.80 4.34 329.28 8.82 133.49 
Cambodia 25.79 170.17 4.15 207.50 21.64 164.01 
United States 20.45 30.46 3.62 38.12 16.84 28.92 
France 12.45 22.90 3.43 30.94 9.02 20.10 
Pakistan 13.90 -10.26 1.92 -40.36 11.98 -2.36 
Taiwan 10.65 -9.73 1.63 -49.05 9.03 4.85 
Portugal 8.26 92.95 1.24 59.85 7.02 100.28 
Madagascar 12.67 2,654.15 0.46 2,621.47 12.21 2,655.39 
Zimbabwe 2.49 32.05 0.22 -47.14 2.28 53.98 













The	   greatest	   losers	   in	   both	   value	   and	   percentage	   terms	   were	   Malawi	   (R50.95m;	   76.21%),	  
United	   Kingdom	   (R5.24m;	   42.59%)	   and	   Hong	   Kong	   (R5.22m;	   6.36%)	   along	   with	   Pakistan	  
(10.26%),	  Germany	  (17.07%)	  and	  Korea	  (12.35%)	  off	  a	  lower	  base.	  	  
	  
HS	  61	  Quota	  imports	  
	  
Imports	  in	  HS61	  quota	  categories	  from	  China	  more	  than	  halved	  between	  2006	  and	  2007,	  falling	  
by	  R580.97m	  (54.68%).	  Imports	  from	  the	  World	  also	  fell	  by	  R355.31m	  (27.88%).	  Conversely,	  a	  
host	   of	   other	   countries	   recorded	   significant	   value	   and	   percentage	   gains	   in	   these	   categories,	  
particularly	   India	   (R50.37m;	   104.20%),	   Malaysia	   (R39.18m,	   3,109.54%),	   Myanmar	   (R38.37m;	  
737.80%),	   Indonesia	   (R28.27m;	   319.52%)	   and	   Mauritius	   (R34.97m;	   462.59%)	   and	   Thailand	  
(R12.81m;	   98.12%),	   as	   well	   as	   Sri	   Lanka	   (329.28%),	   Vietnam	   (93.93%),	   Turkey	   (139.54%),	  
Cambodia	  (207.50%)	  and	  Madagascar	  (2,621.47%)	  off	  a	  lower	  base.	  The	  greatest	  loser	  in	  both	  
value	   and	   percentage	   terms	  was	  Malawi	   (R26.58m;	   77.22%)	   along	  with	   Zimbabwe	   (47.14%),	  
United	  Kingdom	  (46.65%),	  Pakistan	  (40.36%)	  and	  Germany	  (38.54%).	  	  
	  	  
Non-­‐quota	  HS61	  imports	  	  
	  
Table	   30	   below	   shows	   country	   rankings	   for	   comparable	   2006	   and	   2007	   periods	   for	   HS61	  
imports.	  
	  
Table	  30:	  South	  African	  imports	  of	  HS61.	  knitted	  apparel	  from	  January	  to	  December	  2007	  
	  













In	   HS61	   non-­‐quota	   categories,	   imports	   from	   China	   increased	   by	   16.21%,	   equivalent	   to	  
R198.74m	  as	  did	  imports	  from	  the	  World	  by	  19.37%	  or	  R327.93m.	  Positive	  value	  increases	  were	  
also	  registered	  by	  all	  other	  of	  the	  major	  import	  countries	  but	  these	  were	  generally	  lower	  than	  
increases	   in	   quota	   lines.	  Mauritius,	  Madagascar	   and	   Vietnam	  were	   the	   exceptions.	   The	   only	  
countries	   that	   experienced	   decreases	   in	   imports	   in	   both	   value	   and	   percentage	   terms	   were	  
Malawi	  (75.14%;	  R24.36m),	  Hong	  Kong	  (27.54%;	  R15.77m),	  United	  Kingdom	  (41.34%;	  R3.96m)	  
and	  Germany	  (11.73%;	  R0.38m).	  
	  
HS	  Chapter	  62	  
	  
Table	  31:	  South	  African	  imports	  of	  HS62,	  woven	  apparel	  from	  January	  to	  December	  2007	  
Country Total H62 imports H62 quota imports H62 non quota imports 












World 3,368.41 -14.35 2,675.98 -22.82 692.43 48.68 
China 1,997.12 -36.13 1,473.98 -47.26% 523.14 57.56 
Hong Kong 181.55 70.13 165.74 79.09 15.82 11.61 
India 175.98 6.63 130.15 6.55 45.86 6.68 
Malawi 99.69 28.54 96.60 27.11 5.25 22.57 
Indonesia 66.62 280.83 90.99 254.49 9.57 98.78 
Bangladesh 86.06 282.45 83.54 307.05 2.53 22.66 
Mauritius 86.53 82.18 82.53 78.24 4.00 202.23 
Zimbabwe 78.91 87.50 78.78 88.12 1.09 28.06 
Vietnam 82.25 629.31 76.22 736.13 6.35 124.84 
Malaysia 58.68 1,220.19 50.04 1,928.94 8.64 336.79 
Italy 54.81 18.30 46.21 15.03 8.60 39.62 
Thailand 48.48 45.01 38.96 57.60 9.53 9.28 
Myanmar 38.74 826.88 38.02 989.10 0.73 5.53 
Turkey 37.54 35.85 32.19 70.71 5.35 -39.04 
Sri Lanka  21.24 804.36 19.68 849.75 1.57 465.43 
Pakistan 17.97 77.75 15.41 150.69 2.56 -35.31 
France 18.93 12.41 14.74 1.33 4.20 82.27 
Romania 15.86 40.08 13.11 19.05 2.76 769.13 
United States 18.52 3.23 11.85 -3.89 6.67 18.86 
Tunisia 11.01 49.35 10.62 45.66 0.39 388.68 
Cambodia 9.67 317.89 9.12 351.81 0.56 87.44 
Madagascar 11.42 38,822.76 8.82 61,964.33 2.61 17,114.36 













The	   data	   in	   Table	   31	   above	   shows	   a	   similar	   pattern.	   Although	   the	   values	   of	   imports	   in	   both	  
clothing	   Chapters	   are	   comparable	   for	   the	   January	   to	   December	   2007	   period,	   R2,939.69m	  
(HS61)	  versus	  R3,368.41m	  (HS62),	  there	  is	  a	  big	  difference	  in	  the	  relative	  shares	  of	  quota	  and	  
non	  quota	  lines	  in	  the	  respective	  Chapters.	  Imports	  in	  HS62	  were	  heavily	  concentrated	  in	  quota	  
categories.	  During	  2006,	  quota	  imports	  comprised	  88.15%	  (R3,467.22m)	  of	  total	  HS62	  imports	  
(R3,932.94m)	  and	  89.38%	   (R2,794.99m)	  of	  all	  HS62	   imports	   from	  China	   (R3,127.01m).	  During	  
2007	  these	  reduced	  to	  a	  still	  high	  79.44%	  and	  73.80%	  for	  the	  World	  and	  China	  respectively.	  
	  
Imports	   from	  China	   in	   this	  Chapter	   fell	   by	  over	  a	   third	   (36.13%),	  which	   in	   value	   terms	  was	  a	  
significant	   fall	   of	   R1,129.89m.	   HS62	   imports	   from	   the	   World	   also	   fell,	   although	   by	   a	   much	  
smaller	  percentage	  of	  14.35%,	  equivalent	   to	  R564.53m.	  These	   values	  are	  notably	   larger	   than	  
those	   for	  Chapter	  H61.	  Conversely,	   imports	   from	   India	  and	  Hong	  Kong,	   the	   second	  and	   third	  
largest	  suppliers	  were	  up	  by	  6.63%	  (R10.95m)	  and	  70.13%	  (R74.84m)	  respectively,	  almost	  all	  in	  
quota	   lines,	   as	   were	   imports	   from	   all	   other	   major	   suppliers;	   Vietnam	   (R74.84m;	   629.31%),	  
Indonesia	   (R69.51m;	   230.83%),	   Bangladesh	   (R63.56m;	   282.45%),	   Malaysia	   (R54.24m;	  
1,220.9%),	   Mauritius	   (R39.03m;	   82.18%),	   Myanmar	   (R34.57m;	   826.88%)	   and	   Zimbabwe	  
(R36.83m;	  87.50%),	  also	  mainly	  in	  quota	  lines.	  The	  increase	  for	  Hong	  Kong	  was	  contrary	  to	  the	  
experience	  of	  HS61	  but	  not	  unexpected	  given	  that	  quota	  was	  a	  more	  important	  factor	  in	  HS62	  
(Sandrey	   2006).	   Other	  major	   percentage	   gainers	   were	   Sri	   Lanka	   (804.26%)	   and	  Madagascar,	  
whose	  gains	  of	  38,822.76%	  were	  impressive	  albeit	  off	  a	  lower	  base.	  
	  
HS62	  quota	  imports	  
	  
HS62	  quota	  imports	  from	  the	  World	  and	  China	  fell	  in	  percentage	  terms	  by	  a	  similar	  magnitude	  
to	   those	   in	   the	  HS61	  cohorts,	  by	  22.82%	  and	  47.26%	   respectively,	  but	   the	  values	  are	  higher;	  
R791.23m	   and	   R1,321.01m	   for	   the	  World	   and	   China	   respectively.	   Surprisingly,	   the	   growth	   in	  
imports	  from	  India	   in	  these	  categories	  rose	  by	  a	  mere	  6.55%.	  Hong	  Kong,	  South	  Africa’s	  third	  
largest	   import	   partner	   in	   this	   Chapter	   in	   2006,	   however,	   saw	   strong	   growth	   of	   79.09%	   or	  
R73.19m	   in	   value	   terms.	  Other	   countries	   that	   performed	   consistently	  well	   in	   both	   value	   and	  
percentage	   terms	   were	   Vietnam	   (R67.11m;	   736.13%),	   Indonesia	   (R65.32m;	   254.49%),	  
Bangladesh	   (R63.01m;	   307.05%),	   Malaysia	   (R47.57m;	   1,928.94%),	   Zimbabwe	   (R36.90m;	  













low	  base,	  Madagascar’s	  gain	  of	  61,964.33%	   is	  noteworthy.	  One	  of	   the	  greatest	   losers	   in	  both	  
percentage	  and	  value	  terms	  behind	  China	  was	  Mozambique	  (62.97%;	  R7.96m)	  
	  
HS62	  non-­‐quota	  imports	  
	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  change	  of	  all	  was	  recorded	  in	  non	  quota	  HS62	  imports.	  Imports	  for	  
the	  World	  in	  HS62	  non	  quota	  categories	  increased	  by	  nearly	  50%	  (versus	  48.68%),	  and	  China	  by	  
57.56%	   (versus	   19.21%),	   a	   considerably	   larger	   percentage	   increase	   than	   for	   HS61	   cohorts,	  
although	  once	  again	  the	  values	  are	  lower	  at	  R226.70m	  and	  R191.12m	  for	  the	  World	  and	  China	  
respectively.	   China	   showed	   an	   obvious	   shift	   toward	   imports	   in	   non-­‐quota	   categories.	   Non-­‐
quota	   imports	  for	  all	  other	  major	  suppliers	   increased	  between	  5%	  and	  25%,	  except	   Indonesia	  
and	  Mauritius	  who	  saw	  respective	  increases	  of	  94.16%	  and	  235.06%.	  
	  
Table	  32	  below	  shows	  country	  rankings	  for	  comparable	  2006	  and	  2007	  periods.	  
	  
Table	  32:	  South	  African	  imports	  of	  HS62,	  knitted	  apparel	  from	  January	  to	  December	  2007	  
Total H62 imports H62 quota imports H62 non quota imports 
2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 
1. China 1. China 1. China 1. China 1. China 1. China 
2. India 2. Hong Kong 2.  India 2. Hong Kong 2. India 2. India 
3. Hong Kong 3. India 3. Hong Kong 3. India 3. Hong Kong 3. Hong Kong 
4. Malawi 4. Malawi 4. Malawi 4. Malawi 4. Turkey 4. Thailand 
5. Mauritius 5. Indonesia 5. Mauritius 5. Indonesia 5. Thailand 5. Malaysia 
6. Italy 6. Mauritius 6. Zimbabwe 6. Bangladesh 6. Italy 6. Indonesia 
7. Zimbabwe 7. Bangladesh 7. Italy 7. Mauritius 7. United States 7. Italy 
8. Thailand 8. Vietnam 8. Indonesia 8. Zimbabwe 8. Indonesia 8. United States 
9. Indonesia 9. Zimbabwe 9. Thailand 9. Vietnam 9. Taiwan 9.Vietnam 
10.Turkey 10 Malaysia 10. Bangladesh 10. Malaysia 10. Pakistan 10. Turkey 
Data	  source:	  Quantec	  Statistical	  Database	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
The	  ratio	  of	  quota	  to	  non	  quota	  imports	  
	  
An	  alternative	  way	  to	  identify	  changes	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  total	  imports	  is	  presented	  in	  Table	  
33	  below	  which	  reproduces	  the	  data	  from	  Table	  29	  and	  Table	  31	  as	  ratios	  of	  quota	  imports	  to	  













relatively	   greater	   importance	   of	   HS62	   in	   quota	   categories.	   The	   inclusion	   of	   Madagascar,	  
Cambodia	  and	  Macau	  is	  for	  illustrative	  purposes	  of	  a	  later	  argument	  on	  transshipment.	  
	  
Table	  33:	  Ratio	  of	  HS61	  and	  HS62	  quota	  to	  non	  quota	  imports	  
Country Chapter HS61 Chapter HS62 
 2006 2007 2006 2007 
World 0.75 0.45 7.44 3.86 
China 0.87 0.34 8.42 2.82 
Hong Kong 0.43 0.85 6.53 10.48 
India 0.75 1.18 2.85 2.84 
Malawi 1.06 0.97 48.69 31.20 
Indonesia 0.97 1.59 5.78 10.55 
Mauritius 0.08 0.34 38.85 20.67 
Bangladesh 0.38 0.48 10.37 33.13 
Vietnam 0.86 0.81 4.22 12.64 
Zimbabwe 0.28 0.10 199.38 583.12 
Malaysia 0.34 2.99 1.25 5.79 
Italy 0.27 0.27 6.53 5.38 
Thailand 0.78 0.97 2.84 4.09 
Myanmar 0.63 3.13 5.06 52.25 
Turkey 0.35 0.54 2.15 6.02 
Sri Lanka 0.27 0.49 7.47 12.54 
France 0.35 0.38 6.31 3.51 
United States 0.16 0.19 2.20 1.78 
Pakistan 0.26 0.16 1.55 6.01 
Madagascar 0.04 0.04 0.94 3.38 
Cambodia 0.16 0.19 6.79 16.38 
Macau 1.27 4.76 39.95 71.83 
Data	  source:	  Quantec	   	  	  (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
Chapter	  61	  	  
Non	  quota	  imports,	  which	  always	  dominated	  imports	  in	  HS61,	  increased	  their	  share	  to	  68.74%	  
in	  2007	   from	  57.05%	  the	  previous	  year.	  Quota	   imports	   from	  the	  World	  comprised	  31.26%	  of	  
aggregate	  imports	  in	  HS61	  in	  2007,	  down	  from	  42.95%	  in	  2006.	  At	  an	  aggregate	  level,	  the	  ratio	  
of	  quota	  imports	  to	  non	  quota	  imports	  fell	  from	  0.75:1	  to	  0.45:1,	  confirming	  the	  slight	  overall	  
shift	  away	   from	   imports	   in	  quota	  and	   toward	   those	   in	  non	  quota	  categories	   identified	  above	  













non	  quota	  imports	  made	  up	  74.74%	  of	  all	  HS61	  imports	  from	  China	  compared	  with	  53.57%	  in	  
2006	  (not	  shown).	  The	  percentage	  share	  in	  aggregate	  imports	  of	  quota	  lines	  from	  China	  fell	  to	  
25.26%	   in	   2007	   from	   46.43%	   in	   2006.	   Comparatively,	   most	   other	   major	   suppliers,	   with	   the	  
exception	   of	   Zimbabwe,	   Malawi	   and	   Vietnam,	   increased	   their	   ratio	   of	   quota	   to	   non	   quota	  
imports	  in	  2007	  and	  in	  particular,	  India,	  Mauritius,	  Malaysia	  and	  Myanmar.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  62	  
As	  mentioned	  previously,	  quota	  imports	  from	  the	  World	  comprised	  79.44%	  of	  total	  imports	  in	  
this	   Chapter	   in	   2007,	   down	   from	   88.16%	   in	   2006.	   However,	   despite	   the	   minority	   share	   of	  
imports	  in	  non	  quota	  categories	  -­‐	  40.01%	  -­‐	  this	  was	  double	  the	  2006	  figure	  of	  18.31%.	  The	  fall	  
in	  the	  ratio	  from	  7.44:1	  to	  3.86:1	  confirmed	  that	  in	  2007,	  HS62	  quota	  imports	  from	  the	  World	  
fell	   relative	   to	  HS62	   non	   quota	   imports.	   At	   an	   individual	   country	   level,	   the	   shift	   toward	   non	  
quota	  imports	  was	  particularly	  evident	  for	  China	  where	  the	  ratio	  of	  quota	  to	  non	  quota	  imports	  
fell	   from	  8.42:1	   to	   2.82:1.	   That	   is,	   for	   it	   every	   unit	   non	  quota	   imports,	   there	  were	  only	   2.48	  
units	  of	  quota	   imports	   in	  2007,	  which	   is	   a	   third	  of	   the	  8.42	  units	   for	  2006.	   	  As	   a	  percentage	  
share	   in	  total	  HS62	  imports	  from	  China,	  non	  quota	   imports	   increased	  from	  10.62%	  to	  26.19%	  
(not	  shown)	  in	  2007.	  If	  this	  growth	  was	  sustained,	  imports	  in	  non	  quota	  categories	  from	  China	  
could	   potentially	   offset	   its	   loss	   of	   quota	   imports	   in	   HS62.	   Only	   one	   other	   country	   showed	   a	  
significant	   shift	   away	   from	   quota	   imports,	   this	   being	  Mauritius;	   in	   2007	   only	   22.86	   units	   of	  
quota	  imports	  were	  imported	  from	  this	  region	  for	  every	  unit	  of	  non	  quota	  imports,	  almost	  half	  
of	  the	  45.31	  units	  in	  2006.	  However,	  most	  European	  Union	  countries	  i.e.	  Romania,	  UK,	  Italy	  and	  
France	  as	  well	  as	  the	  US	  also	  moved	  away	  from	  quota	  imports	  in	  2007.	  
	  
The	  opposite	  trend	  was	  apparent	  for	  most	  other	  individual	  countries	  i.e.	  there	  was	  a	  majority	  
shift	  toward	  quota	  lines.	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  percentage	  share	  of	  quota	  
imports	  in	  individual	  country	  total	  imports	  and	  in	  turn,	  the	  ratio	  of	  quota	  to	  non	  quota	  imports.	  
This	   was	   evident	   for	   Hong	   Kong	   (86.72%	   to	   94.24%),	   Indonesia	   (85.24%	   to	   91.34%)	   and	  
Bangladesh	   (91.20%	   to	   97.07%),	  who	  were	   South	  Africa’s	   2nd,	   5th	   and	  7th	   largest	   suppliers	   of	  
HS62	  imports	  by	  value	  in	  2007	  but	  more	  particularly,	  for	  the	  emerging	  Asian	  countries;	  Vietnam	  
(80.83%	   to	   92.67%),	   Malaysia	   (55.48%	   to	   85.27%),	   Thailand	   (73.93%	   to	   80.35%),	   Myanmar	  













African	  countries	  also	  increased	  their	  shares	  between	  2006	  and	  2007,	  for	  instance,	  Madagascar	  
(48.40%	  to	  77.18%)	  and	  Zimbabwe	  (99.50%	  to	  99.83%)	  (not	  shown).	  	  	  
	  
The	   picture	   for	   the	   full	   2007	   period	   was	   largely	   unchanged	   but	   the	   analysis	   revealed	   some	  
interesting	  trends.	  Aggregate	  imports	  into	  South	  Africa	  declined	  by	  8.66%	  from	  R6,902.78m	  in	  
2006	  to	  R6,304.87m	  in	  2007;	  China’s	  share	  of	  these	  imports	  also	  declined	  from	  78.49%	  in	  2006	  
to	  61.88%	  in	  2007	  as	  aggregate	  import	  values	  from	  China	  fell;	  by	  28.02%	  (from	  R5,419.02m	  to	  
R3,900.48m)(Figure	   38).	   In	   volume	   terms,	   the	   declines	   were	   larger;	   World	   imports	   fell	   by	  
21.16%	   between	   2006	   and	   2007,	   and	   China’s	   share	   in	   these	   imports	   fell	   from	   89.13%	   to	  
74.72%;	  import	  volumes	  from	  declined	  by	  33.91%.	  	  
	  
Figure	  38:	  Demonstration	  of	  China’s	  share	  in	  aggregate	  imports	  
	  
Data	  source:	  Quantec	  Statistical	  Database	  	   Own	  calculations	  
	  
Secondly,	  quota	  imports	  into	  South	  Africa	  declined	  sharply	  from	  a	  high	  of	  R4,754.29m	  in	  2006	  
to	  R3,587.61m	   in	  2007,	  which	  was	  matched	  by	   an	  equally	   dramatic	   fall	   in	   the	   percentage	  of	  
China	   in	  these	   imports	   from	  71.60%	   in	  2006	  to	  47.52%	   in	  2007	  (Figure	  39);	  quota	   imports	  by	  
value	  from	  China	  fell	  by	  50.10%	  from	  R3,867.81m	  to	  R1,930.03m.	  In	  volume	  terms	  the	  change	  
was	  also	  significant.	  World	  quota	  imports	  fell	  by	  50.06%	  and	  the	  share	  of	  China	  in	  these	  imports	  
fell	  by	  61.49%	  to	  reflect	  dramatically	  reduced	  import	  volumes	  in	  quota	  categories	  from	  China	  of	  














Figure	  39:	  Demonstration	  of	  China’s	  share	  in	  quota	  imports	  
	  
Source:	  Quantec	   	  Own	  calculations	  
	  
Finally,	   there	   was	   increased	   orientation	   by	   other	   major	   foreign	   suppliers	   towards	   quota	  
imports.	   A	   comparison	  of	   current	   import	   value	   and	  market	   share	   for	   individual	   countries	   for	  
2007	  shows	  precisely	  who	  got	  China’s	  share	  of	  quota	  imports	  in	  the	  immediate	  quota	  period.	  	  
	  
Table	   34	   ranks	   the	   current	   twenty-­‐five	   top	   countries	   in	   terms	   of	   import	   share	   in	   quota	  
categories	  and	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  major	  gainers	  in	  percentage	  and	  value	  terms	  in	  2007.	  The	  
data	   is	   ranked	   by	   2007	   sources,	   expressed	   in	   values.	   Changes	   in	   percentage	   and	   monetary	  




























% share % change 
Value change 
R (m) 
  2006 2007 2006 2007   
 The World 4,741.58 3,595.03 100.00 100.00 -24.18 -1,146.54 
1. China 3,857.47 1,955.49 81.35 54.39 -49.31 -1,901.98 
2. India 170.49 228.86 3.60 6.37 34.24 58.37 
3. Hong Kong 117.41 201.15 2.48 5.60 71.32 83.74 
4. Indonesia 34.52 128.11 0.73 3.56 271.16 93.60 
5. Mauritius 53.86 125.06 1.14 3.48 132.19 71.20 
6. Malawi 110.42 104.44 2.33 2.91 -5.42 -5.98 
7. Bangladesh 28.35 101.51 0.60 2.82 258.13 73.17 
8. Malaysia 3.73 90.48 0.08 2.52 2,328.13 86.75 
9. Vietnam 15.35 88.32 0.32 2.46 475.4 72.97 
10. Myanmar 8.69 81.59 0.18 0.39 838.74 72.90 
11. Zimbabwe 42.29 79.00 0.89 2.82 86.81 36.71 
12. Thailand 37.77 64.81 0.80 1.80 71.60 27.04 
13. Italy 46.59 52.54 0.98 1.46 12.77 5.95 
14. Turkey 24.74 46.28 0.52 1.29 87.08 21.54 
15. Sri Lanka 3.08 24.01 0.06 0.67 679.13 20.93 
16. France 17.16 18.16 0.36 0.51 5.85 1.00 
17. Pakistan 9.37 17.33 0.20 0.48 84.97 7.96 
18. United States 14.95 15.47 0.32 0.43 3.47 0.52 
19. Romania 13.31 14.72 0.28 0.41 10.61 1.41 
20. Macau 2.63 13.87 0.06 0.39 427.86 11.24 
21. Tunisia 9.08 13.86 0.19 0.39 52.60 4.78 
22. Cambodia 3.37 13.27 0.07 0.37 293.93 9.90 
23. Madagascar 0.03 9.27 0.00 0.26 29,868.87 9.24 
24 UK 10.58 8.46 0.22 0.24 -26.98 -3.12 
25 Taiwan 7.16 8.29 0.15 0.23 15.72 1.13 














The	   data	   in	   Table	   34	   is	   now	   reformatted	   in	   Table	   35	   sorted	   on	   i)	   percentage	   gains	   and	   ii)	  
monetary	  gains	  between	  2006	  and	  2007.	  	  
	  
Table	  35:	  Major	  percentage	  and	  value	  movers	  in	  South	  African	  clothing	  quota	  categories	  
	   Imports	  Rand	  (millions)	   %	  share	   Change	  ’06-­‐‘07	  
Country	   2006	   2007	   2006	   2007	   %	   Rand	  (m)	  
Percentage	  gainers	   	   	   	   	  
1.	  Madagascar	   0.03	   9.27	   0.00	   0.26	   29,868.87	   9.24	  
2.	  Malaysia	   3.73	   90.48	   0.08	   2.52	   2,328.13	   86.75	  
3.	  Myanmar	   8.69	   81.59	   0.18	   2.27	   838.74	   72.90	  
4.	  Sri	  Lanka	   3.08	   24.01	   0.06	   0.67	   679.13	   20.93	  
5.	  Vietnam	   15.35	   88.32	   0.32	   2.49	   475.24	   72.97	  
6.	  Macau	   2.63	   13.87	   0.06	   0.39	   427.86	   11.24	  
7.	  Cambodia	   3.37	   13.27	   0.07	   0.37	   293.93	   9.90	  
8.	  Indonesia	   34.52	   128.11	   0.73	   3.56	   271.26	   93.60	  
9.	  Bangladesh	   28.35	   101.51	   0.60	   2.82	   258.13	   73.17	  
10.	  Mauritius	   53.86	   125.06	   1.14	   3.48	   132.19	   71.20	  
Value	  gainers	   	   	   	   	  
1.	  Indonesia	   34.52	   128.11	   0.73	   3.56	   271.26	   93.60	  
2.	  Malaysia	   3.73	   90.48	   0.08	   2.52	   2,328.13	   86.75	  
3.	  Hong	  Kong	   117.41	   201.15	   2.48	   5.60	   71.32	   83.74	  
4.	  Bangladesh	   28.35	   101.51	   0.60	   2.82	   258.13	   73.17	  
5.	  Vietnam	   15.35	   88.32	   0.32	   2.49	   475.24	   72.97	  
6.	  Myanmar	   8.69	   81.59	   0.18	   2.27	   838.74	   72.90	  
7.	  Mauritius	   53.86	   125.06	   1.14	   3.48	   132.19	   71.20	  
8.	  India	   170.49	   228.86	   3.60	   6.37	   34.24	   58.37	  
9.	  Zimbabwe	   42.29	   79.00	   0.89	   2.20	   86.81	   36.71	  
10.	  Thailand	   37.77	   64.81	   0.80	   1.80	   71.60	   27.04	  
Data	  Source:	  Clotrade	  Statistical	  Database	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
In	   the	   first	   classification	   (percentage	   change),	   the	   biggest	   gainers	  were	  Hong	   Kong	   (71.32%),	  
Mauritius	   (132.19%),	   Bangladesh	   (258.99%)	   and	   Zimbabwe	   (86.81%)	   followed	   by	   Malaysia	  
(2,408.61%),	  Sri	  Lanka	  (682.75%),	  Vietnam	  (488.31%)	  and	  Indonesia	  (270.55%)	  off	  a	  lower	  base.	  
Madagascar,	  in	  particular,	  showed	  impressive	  growth	  of	  29,383.07%	  albeit	  off	  a	  very	  low	  base	  
to	   secure	   a	   place	   in	   the	   top	   25	   supply	   countries.	   However,	   the	   table	   does	   not	   show	   the	  
proliferation	   of	   countries	   that	   although	   off	   a	   very	   low	   base,	   achieved	   significant	   percentage	  













importers	   (Sandrey	   2007).	   For	   example;	   Peru	   (231.91%),	   Egypt	   (212.97%),	   Macedonia	  
(440.13%),	   Dominican	   Republic	   (408.10%),	   Monaco	   (841.60%),	   El	   Salvador	   (446.34%),	  
Luxembourg	   (1,755.49%);	   as	  well	   as	  Mongolia	   (18,105.43%),	   Bahrain	   (3,323.41%),	   Costa	   Rica	  
(701.74%),	   Zambia	   (795.14%),	   Tanzania	   (62,852.66%),	   Albania	   (50,470.39%),	   Cyprus	  
(8,681.38%)	  and	  Chile	   (6,990.43%),	  albeit	  off	  an	  even	   lower	  base.	   In	   the	  second	  classification	  
(value	  change),	  the	  greatest	  gainers	  were	  Indonesia	  (R93.60m),	  Malaysia	  (R86.75m),	  Hong	  Kong	  
(R83.74m),	   Bangladesh	   (R73.17m),	   Vietnam	   (R72.97m),	   Myanmar	   (R72.90m),	   Mauritius	  
(R71.20m)	  and	  India	  (R58.37m).	  
	  
In	  both	  cases,	  the	  data	  evidences	  a	  growing	  market	  share	  for	  all	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  major	  clothing	  
suppliers	   in	  contrast	  with	  China’s	   falling	  share.	  This	  confirms	  conclusions	   in	  previous	  sections	  
and	   other	   studies	   that	   in	   the	   short	   run	   at	   least,	   Chinese	   imports	   were	   virtually	   replaced	   by	  
imports	  from	  other	  countries.	  
	  
Overview	  of	  trade	  in	  the	  short	  run	  
	  
If	   the	   objective	   was	   to	   reduce	   China’s	   participation	   in	   aggregate	   quota	   imports	   and	   overall	  
imports,	   the	   analysis	   shows	   that	   the	   China	   quotas	   to	   some	   extent	   achieved	   this.	   	   However,	  
closer	  scrutiny	  of	   trade	   flows	   in	  quota	  and	  non	  quota	   imports	   revealed	  two	  other	   issues	  that	  
needed	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  Firstly,	  an	  increased	  flow	  of	  imports	  (identified	  by	  Clotrade	  as	  
between	  38-­‐42	  million	  units)	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  2006	  due	  to	  forward	  purchasing	  by	  retailers	  
(ref	  previous	  discussion).	  	  In	  total,	  422.75	  million	  units	  were	  imported	  in	  2007,	  down	  22.3%	  on	  
543.91	  million	  units	   in	  2006.	  Given	   that	   the	   shortfall	   in	   volume	   imports	   from	  China	  between	  
June	  2006	  and	   June	  2007	  was	  46m	  units,	   this	   implies	   that	   the	   real	   fall	   in	   total	   imports	   from	  
China	   may	   be	   significantly	   distorted	   (inflated).	  However,	   imports	   of	   products	   recorded	   by	  
weight	  increased	  from	  23.00	  million	  kilos	  in	  2006	  to	  24.20	  million	  kilos	  (5.2%)	  in	  2007	  (Clotrade	  
2008).	   Once	   again,	   although	   this	   reflects	   an	   overall	   decline,	   Clotrade	   show	   that	   once	   these	  
figures	   are	   adjusted	   by	   the	   38.5	   to	   42	   million	   units	   brought	   forward,	   the	   net	   effect	   is	   an	  
increase	   of	   3-­‐4%	   year	   on	   year	   in	   the	   value	   of	   imports	   and	   a	   decline	   of	   7.4%	   to	   8.7%	   in	   unit	  
imports	  during	  2007.	  This	   is	  alternatively	  shown	  by	  a	  relative	  comparison	  of	  activity	   in	   fourth	  
quarter	   imports	   from	  China	   in	   2006	   and	   2007	   (Figure	   40)	   the	   latter	   is	   considerably	   subdued	  




























Source:	  Adapted	  from	  Sandrey	  2006	  
	  
Secondly,	   increased	   levels	   of	   activity	   in	   non	   quota	   imports	   from	   China	   in	   both	   clothing	  
Chapters,	   which	   could	   potentially	   compensate	   China	   for	   the	   loss	   of	   quota	   imports	   and	  
neutralize	   the	   effect	   of	   selective	   restrictions.	   Figure	   41	   (below)	   has	   non	   quota	   imports	   in	  
millions	  of	  Rands	  (in	  columns,	  on	  left	  hand	  scale)	  and	  China’s	  percentage	  share	  of	  these	  imports	  
(as	  a	  line,	  on	  right	  hand	  scale)	  and	  demonstrates;	  i)	  the	  sustained	  growth	  of	  non	  quota	  imports	  
into	  South	  Africa	  from	  2000	  through	  2007	  and	  ii)	  the	  simultaneous	  growth	  in	  China’s	  share	  in	  
these	  imports,	  albeit	  at	  a	  decelerating	  rate	  (72.19%	  in	  2006	  to	  71.80%	  in	  2007).	  	  
	  
Figure	  41:	  Demonstration	  of	  China’s	  share	  in	  non	  quota	  imports	  
	  













Conclusions	  for	  the	  short-­run	  macro	  trade	  impact	  of	  quotas	  
	  
The	  DTI	  failed	  to	  anticipate	  that	  shutting	  out	  China	  would	  simply	  drive	  importers	  towards	  the	  
proliferation	  of	  alternative	  cheap	  suppliers	  (Bleby	  2006;	  Sandrey	  and	  van	  Eeden	  2007).	  From	  a	  
supply	   perspective,	   the	   fact	   that	   many	   companies	   had	   already	   either	   scaled	   down	   or	  
completely	  closed	  doors	  prior	  to	  remedial	   intervention	  implied	  that	   it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  
restore	   supply	   capacity	   at	   short	   notice	   (Clotrade	   2007a).	   It	   was	   therefore	   inevitable	   and	  
immediately	   obvious	   to	   local	   manufacturers	   that	   importers	   would	   simply	   look	   elsewhere,	  
encouraged	  further	  by	  an	  increasingly	  favorable	  exchange	  rate.	  South	  African	  retailers	  followed	  
the	  lead	  of	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  and	  began	  importing	  from	  Vietnam,	  Indonesia,	  Bangladesh,	  Pakistan,	  
Sri	  Lanka	  and	  Thailand	  who,	  as	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  were	  able	  to	  successfully	  take	  advantage	  of	  
import	   restrictions.	   Imports	   in	   quota	   categories	   comprised	   a	   large	   share	   of	   total	   imports	   for	  
these	   countries	   and	   provided	   them	   with	   a	   toehold	   in	   the	   US	   markets.	   It	   is	   clear	   that,	   as	  
predicted,	  the	  China	  quotas,	  in	  the	  short	  run	  at	  least,	  led	  to	  significant	  import	  diversion	  without	  
generating	  any	  positive	  spin	  off	  to	  the	  local	  industry	  in	  the	  form	  of	  greater	  output	  volumes.	  	  
	  
Macro	  trade	  impacts	  of	  quotas	  in	  the	  medium	  run	  
	  
The	  analysis	  now	  extends	  to	  include	  the	  second	  year	  of	  quota	  operations	  (2008).	  	  
	  
Table	  36	  contains	  2008	  import	  data	  for	  China	  in	  both	  clothing	  Chapters	  by	  cumulative	  quarter,	  
expressed	  in	  Rand	  values,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  percentage	  share	  of	  World	  imports.	  The	  data	  tracks	  the	  
progressive	   recovery	   in	   clothing	   imports	   from	   China	   into	   South	   Africa	   during	   2008,	  with	   the	  
total	  for	  the	  full	  period	  up	  15.91%	  on	  the	  comparative	  2007	  value,	  a	  move	  in	  monetary	  terms	  of	  
R620.74m	  (R3,900.48m	  to	  R4,521.22m).	  This	  was	  more	  than	  three	  times	  the	  growth	  in	  imports	  
for	  Bangladesh,	  South	  Africa’s	  2nd	  largest	  clothing	  supplier	  in	  2008,	  of	  R185.25m;	  four	  and	  a	  half	  
times	  that	  for	  Mauritius	  in	  3rd	  place	  of	  R137.41m;	  and	  ten	  times	  plus	  that	  for	  India	  in	  4th	  place	  
of	  R59.85m.	  This	  notwithstanding,	  China’s	  market	  share	  retreated	  further	   in	  2008,	  albeit	  only	  
1.14%	  which	  indicates	  some	  stabilisation	  around	  61%	  following	  the	  sharp	  drop	  of	  almost	  17%	  
between	  2006	  and	  2007.	  World	   imports	  also	   increased	  by	  18.10%,	  equivalent	  to	  R1,140.98m,	  















Table	  36:	  Clothing	  imports	  from	  China	  by	  cumulative	  quarter	  2007-­‐2008	  
	   2007	   Q1	  2008	   Q2	  2008	   Q3	  2008	   Q4	  2008	  
World	   6,304.87	   1,957.20	   3,546.57	   5,486.57	   7,445.84	  
China	   3,900.48	   1,273.98	   2,309.80	   3,417.73	   4,521.22	  
China	  2007	   100.00%	   32.66%	   59.22%	   87.62%	   115.91%	  
%	  market	  share	   61.86%	   65.09%	   64.56%	   62.29%	   60.72%	  


























































































Source:	  Clotrade	  	  	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
This	  was	  mainly	   due	   to	   sustained	   value	   gains	   in	   imports	   during	   the	   period	   by	  most	   of	   those	  
countries	   identified	   as	   immediate	   beneficiaries	   of	   the	   quotas,	   specifically,	   India,	   Mauritius,	  
Bangladesh,	   Indonesia	   and	   Vietnam,	   although	   Hong	   Kong	   was	   an	   exception	   (Table	   37).	   Also	  
noteworthy,	   though,	   are	   the	   large	   percentage	   gains	   achieved	   by	   a	   number	   other	   countries,	  
although	  off	  a	  smaller	  base.	  This	  supports	  predictions	  by	  Clotrade	  (2006)	  that	  the	  quotas	  would	  
prematurely	   introduce	   local	   retailers	   to	  sources	  alternative	   to	  China,	  who	  may	  be	  even	  more	  













who	  were	  also	  the	  greatest	  losers	  in	  percentage	  terms,	  during	  the	  second	  year	  of	  quotas	  were	  
(ranked	  by	  fall	   in	   import	  value);	  Hong	  Kong	  (R79.13m;	  30.65%);	  Myanmar	  (R24.49m;	  25.45%);	  
Zimbabwe	  (R23.05m;	  28.32%).	  Macau	  (R4.02m;	  25.97%);	  Germany	  (R3.49m;	  27.47%);	  Sri	  Lanka	  
(R3.37m;	  9.79%);	  France	  (R2.38m;	  7.61%)	  and	  Turkey	  (R2.43m;	  3.16%).	  	  
	  
Table	  37:	  Major	  percentage	  and	  value	  movers	  in	  South	  African	  clothing	  imports	  in	  2008	  
	   Imports	  Rand	  (millions)	   %	  share	   Change	  ’07-­‐‘08	  
Country	   2007	   2008	   2007	   2008	   %	   Rand	  (m)	  
Percentage	  gainers	   	   	   	   	  
China	   3,900.48	   4,521.22	   61.86	   65.09	   15.91	   620.74	  
1.	  Sweden	   0.84	   8.18	   0.01	   0.07	   898.42	   7.34	  
2.	  Canada	   2.27	   5.73	   0.04	   0.14	   152.31	   3.46	  
3.	  Madagascar	   24.24	   58.62	   0.38	   1.23	   141.81	   34.38	  
4.	  Bangladesh	   141.58	   325.82	   2.25	   2.99	   130.14	   184.25	  
5.	  Portugal	   12.03	   21.49	   0.19	   0.43	   78.59	   9.46	  
6.	  Poland	   3.83	   6.74	   0.06	   0.04	   75.98	   2.91	  
7.	  Morocco	   8.81	   14.74	   0.14	   0.09	   67.37	   5.93	  
8.	  Spain	   4.16	   6.66	   0.07	   0.06	   60.16	   2.50	  
9.	  Mauritius	   255.69	   393.10	   4.06	   4.00	   53.74	   137.41	  
10.	  Slovenia	   3.15	   4.64	   0.05	   0.04	   47.20	   1.49	  
Value	  gainers	   	   	   	   	  
	  China	   3,900.48	   4,521.22	   61.86	   65.09	   15.91	   620.74	  
1.	  Bangladesh	   141.58	   325.82	   2.25	   2.99	   130.14	   184.25	  
2.	  Mauritius	   255.69	   393.10	   4.06	   4.00	   53.74	   137.41	  
3.	  India	   358.72	   418.57	   5.69	   3.77	   16.68	   59.85	  
4.	  Malaysia	   112.77	   151.68	   1.79	   1.61	   34.50	   38.91	  
5.	  Madagascar	   24.24	   58.62	   0.38	   1.23	   141.81	   34.38	  
6.	  Vietnam	   109.18	   142.22	   1.73	   2.37	   30.26	   33.04	  
7.	  Thailand	   102.15	   129.89	   1.62	   1.51	   27.15	   27.24	  
8.	  Malawi	   115.67	   141.32	   1.83	   1.26	   22.18	   25.65	  
9.	  Italy	   84.02	   105.94	   1.33	   1.24	   26.10	   21.93	  
10.	  Cambodia	   35.46	   47.02	   0.56	   0.88	   32.58	   11.55	  

















World	  clothing	  imports	  in	  the	  two	  main	  Chapters	  HS61	  and	  HS62	  increased	  between	  2007	  and	  
2008	  by	  R1,140.97m	  (18.10%)	  with	  this	  growth	  more	  or	   less	  evenly	  split	  between	  China	  (55%	  
with	  R620.74m)	  and	  the	  conglomerate	  of	  other	  supply	  countries	  (ROW	  in	  the	  table)	  (45%	  with	  
R520.24m).	  However,	  the	  impetus	  for	  growth	  differed	  in	  each	  case;	  for	  China,	  an	  expansion	  in	  
non	   quota	   imports	   accounted	   for	   64.04%	   (R397.50m)	   of	   China’s	   overall	   import	   growth	   of	  
R620.74m	   during	   the	   period,	   whilst	   for	   the	   Rest	   of	   the	   World,	   growth	   in	   quota	   imports	  
accounted	  for	  the	  bulk	  (70.72%/R367.89m)	  of	  the	  overall	   increase	  of	  R520.24m	  in	  imports	  for	  
this	  cohort	  in	  2008	  (Table	  38).	  	  
	  
Table	  38:	  Decomposition	  of	  imports	  by	  clothing	  Chapters	  2007-­‐2008	  
 HS61 
Country R(m) value % change R(m) change 
 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
World 2,934.97 3,613.59 -0.69 23.12 -20.26 678.61 
China 1,903.04 2,311.05 -16.46 21.44 -375.03 408.01 
ROW 1,031.94 1,302.53 52.39 26.22 354.77 270.60 

























 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
World 2,018.76 2,438.58 19.59 20.80 330.65 419.82 916.22 1,175.01 -27.69 28.25 -350.91 258.80 
China 1,424.67 1,708.49 16.61 19.92 202.93 283.83 478.37 602.56 -54.71 25.96 -577.96 124.19 




R(m) value % change R(m) change 
 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
World 3,369.89 3,832.26 -14.63 13.72 -577.65 462.36 
China 1,997.44 2,210.17 -36.41 10.65 -1,143.45 212.72 
ROW 1,372.45 1,622.09 70.15 18.19 565.85 249.64 

























 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
World 698.50 828.52 51.72 18.62 238.12 130.03 2,671.40 3,003.73 -23.39 12.44 -815.76 332.34 
China 545.78 659.46 65.66 20.83 216.32 113.68 1,451.66 1,550.70 -48.37 6.82 -1,359.82 99.05 














These	   shifts	   are	   illustrated	   as	   a	   ratio	   of	   quota	   to	   non-­‐quota	   imports	   in	   Table	   39	   for	   both	  
clothing	  Chapters	  combined	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  individual	  clothing	  Chapters.	  	  
	  
The	  weakening	  of	  the	  ratio	  for	  China	  from	  0.98	  to	  0.91	  (i.e.	  for	  every	  unit	  of	  non	  quota	  imports,	  
only	   0.91	   of	   quota	   imports	   was	   imported	   in	   2008	   compared	   with	   0.98	   in	   2007)	   reflects	  
increased	  orientation	  towards	  non	  quota	  imports	  for	  the	  region.	  At	  a	  Chapter	  level,	  this	  change	  
is	  most	  pertinent	  for	  Chapter	  62	  imports	  given	  the	  greater	  concentration	  of	  quota	  categories	  in	  
this	  Chapter;	  the	  ratio	  of	  CH62	  quota	  to	  non	  quota	  imports	  fell	  from	  2.66	  to	  2.35,	  with	  a	  move	  
in	  the	  same	  direction	  for	  Chapter	  61,	  albeit	  of	  much	  smaller	  magnitude.	  Converse	  to	  that	   for	  
China,	  the	  ratio	  for	  ROW	  strengthened	  at	  the	  aggregate	  level	  from	  2.22	  to	  2.55,	  demonstrating	  
the	  greater	  positioning	  of	  the	  conglomerate	  of	  other	  suppliers	  toward	  quota	  imports	  relative	  to	  
non	  quota	  imports.	  Again,	  for	  reasons	  given,	  this	  change	  is	  more	  obvious	  for	  imports	  in	  Chapter	  
62	  than	  Chapter	  61.	  In	  2008,	  for	  every	  unit	  of	  non	  quota	  imports,	  8.59	  units	  of	  quota	  imports	  
were	  imported	  compared	  with	  7.99	  in	  2007.	  	  
	  
Table	  39:	  Ratio	  of	  HS61	  and	  HS62	  quota	  to	  non-­‐quota	  imports	  
Country Total HS61 & HS62 Chapters Chapter HS61 Chapter HS62 
 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
World 2.21 1.32 1.28 0.75 0.45 0.48 7.57 3.82 3.63 
China 2.49 0.98 0.91 0.86 0.34 0.35 8.53 2.66 2.35 
ROW 1.48 2.22 2.25 0.45 0.74 0.78 5.16 7.99 8.59 
	  
Overview	  of	  macro	  trade	  impacts	  during	  the	  medium	  run:	  2006-­2008	  
	  
The	  China	  quotas	  had	  two	  explicit	  objectives;	  to	  reduce	  imports	  from	  China	  and	  to	  boost	  local	  
clothing	  output.	  This	  would	  require	   that	  aggregate	   (World)	  clothing	   imports	   into	  South	  Africa	  
remain,	   at	   least	   constant	  and	  at	  best	   fall	   in	   response	   to	   restrictions.	   For	   this	   to	  happen,	   two	  
necessary	  conditions	  must	  hold:	   i)	  non	  quota	  imports	  from	  China	  must	  remain	  constant	  while	  
quota	   imports	  from	  China	  are	  reduced;	  and	  ii)	   imports	  from	  the	  Rest	  of	  the	  World	  (ROW)(i.e.	  















The	  output	   from	  analysis	  of	   import	  data	   for	   the	   full	  quota	  period	   is	  presented	   in	  Table	  40.	   It	  
shows	  aggregate	  import	  values,	  for	  the	  World,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  China	  and	  the	  “Rest	  of	  the	  World”	  
(World	  minus	  China)	  in	  2006,	  2007	  and	  2008	  in	  millions	  of	  Rands,	  which	  are	  also	  expressed	  as;	  a	  
share	  of	  total	  imports	  in	  that	  year;	  year	  on	  year	  changes	  in	  percentage	  and	  value	  terms.	  Values	  
for	  quota	  and	  non-­‐quota	   categories	   are	   shown	  as	  well	   as	   the	   share	  of	   these	   cohorts	   in	   total	  
imports.	  Table	  41	  then	  gives	  import	  values	  for	  China	  and	  the	  Rest	  of	  the	  World	  as	  a	  percentage	  
share	  of	  total	  clothing	  imports	  into	  South	  Africa	  in	  2006,	  2007	  and	  2008.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  40:	  Decomposition	  of	  aggregate	  imports	  into	  quota	  and	  non	  quota	  categories:	  China	  vs	  ROW	  
 Total imports Non quota Quota 
 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
World 6,902.78 6,304.87 7,445.84 2,148.49 2,717.25 3,267.10 4,754.29 3,587.61 4,178.74 
% share 100% 100% 100% 31.12 43.10 43.88 68.88 56.90 56.12 
R(m) change 2,113.78 -597.91 1,140.98 605.99 568.77 549.85 1,507.79 1,166.68 591.13 
% change 44.14 -8.66 18.10 39.29 26.47 20.24 46.44 -24.54 16.48 
China 5,419.02 3,900.48 4,521.22 1,551.30 1,970.45 2,367.95 3,867.71 1,930.03 2,153.27 
% share 100% 100% 100% 28.63 50.52 52.37 71.37 49.48 47.63 
R(m) change 1,864.28 -1,518.53 620.74 426.50 419.15 397.50 1,437.77 -1,937.68 223.23 
% change 52.44 -28.02 15.91 37.92 27.02 20.17 59.10 -50.10 11.57 
ROW 1,483.76 2,404.38 2,924.62 597.18 746.80 899.15 886.58 1,657.58 2,025.48 
% share 100% 100% 100% 40.25 31.06 30.74 59.75 68.94 69.26 
R(m) change 249.51 920.62 520.23 179.48 149.62 152.34 70.02 771.00 367.89 
% change 20.22 62.05 21.64 42.97 25.05 20.40 8.58 86.96 22.19 
	  
Table	  41:	  Share	  in	  aggregate	  imports:	  China	  vs	  Rest	  of	  World	  2006-­‐2008	  
 Aggregate imports Non quota imports Quota imports 
 Change  
R(m) 
Share in 
World imports (%) 
Change  
R(m) 
Share in  




World Quota (%) 
 ’06-‘08 ’06 ‘07 ‘08 ’06-‘08 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ’06-‘08 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 
World 543.06 100 100 100 1,118.61 100 100 100 -575.55 100 100 100 
China -897.79 78.50 61.86 60.72 816.75 72.20 72.52 72.48 -1,714.55 81.35 53.80 51.53 
















The	  data	  in	  Table	  40	  and	  Table	  41	  shows	  that	  the	  restrictions	  were	  successful	  in	  their	  objective	  
to	   reduce	   imports	   from	   China.	   Aggregate	   imports	   from	   China	   fell	   by	   R897.97m	   or	   12.11%	  
between	  2006	  and	  2008,	  which	  showed	  a	  significant	  retardation	  in	  the	  growth	  rate	  for	  the	  pre	  
quota	   period	   (2005-­‐2006)	   of	   52.44%	   (equivalent	   to	   R1,864.18m).	   China’s	   share	   of	   the	   South	  
African	   clothing	  market	   hemorrhaged	   by	   almost	   20%	  during	   the	   period	   of	   quota	   operations,	  
from	  78.50%	  in	  2006	  to	  60.72%	  in	  2008.	  This	  was	  due	  in	  principle	  to	  a	  significant	  contraction	  in	  
its	  share	  of	  South	  African	  quota	   imports	  -­‐	  by	  almost	  30%	  -­‐	  from	  81.35%	  in	  2006	  to	  51.53%	  in	  
2008,	   equivalent	   to	   R1,714.55m	   in	   monetary	   terms.	   This	   compared	   with	   growth	   in	   quota	  
imports	   of	   R1,436.72m	  between	  2005	   and	  2006.	   In	   sum,	   China	   switched	   focus	   to	   non	  quota	  
imports	   in	   response	  to	   the	  restrictions.	  The	  proportion	  of	  non	  quota	   imports	   in	   total	   imports	  
from	  China	  rose	  from	  28.63%	  in	  2006	  to	  52.37%	  in	  2008.	  However,	  since	  growth	  in	  non	  quota	  
imports	  only	  compensated	  for	  R816.75m	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  R1,714.55m	  in	  quota	  imports,	  condition	  
(i)	  was	  supported.	  	  
	  
In	   relation	   to	   condition	   (ii),	   imports	   from	   the	   ROW	   increased	   on	   aggregate	   by	   R1,440.69m	  
(83.69%)	  for	  the	  full	  the	  quota	  period;	  R1,139m	  of	  this	   increase	  occurred	  in	  quota	  categories,	  
which	   was	   R109.15%	  more	   than	   the	   R886.48m	   imported	   in	   2006.	   Imports	   were	   diverted	   to	  
alternative	   supply	   countries,	   and	  especially	   those	   in	   restricted	   categories;	   the	   share	  of	  quota	  
imports	   in	   total	   imports	   from	   this	   cohort	   increased	   from	   59.75%	   in	   2006	   to	   69.26%	   in	   2008	  
demonstrating	  increased	  orientation	  of	  emerging	  supply	  countries	  towards	  quota	  categories	  in	  
response	  to	  quotas.	  The	  result	  was	  that	  the	  restrictions	  fell	  far	  short	  of	  their	  broader	  objective	  
of	  reducing	  aggregate	  imports	  into	  South	  Africa.	  Growth	  in	  imports	  from	  the	  Rest	  of	  the	  World	  
and	   non	   quota	   imports	   from	   China	   between	   2006	   and	   2008	   offset	   the	   contraction	   in	   quota	  
imports	   from	   China	   generating	   positive	   aggregate	   import	   growth	   of	   9.44%	   (equivalent	   to	  
R543.06m).	   However,	   the	   rate	   of	   growth	   was	   significantly	   lower	   than	   the	   44.14%	   (or	  
R2,113.78m	  in	  Rand	  terms)	  recorded	  for	  the	  2005	  to	  2006	  period;	  this	  slow	  down	  was	  due	  to	  
the	   contraction	   in	   imports	   from	   China.	   Although	   this	   was	   likely	   principally	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
restrictions,	  the	  deepening	  global	  economic	  crisis	  that	  began	  to	  take	  hold	  on	  the	  South	  African	  
economy	  in	  2008	  may	  also	  be	  a	  factor	  here.	  
	  
The	  important	  question	  is	  whether	  this	  shift	  away	  from	  China	  was	  sustained	  when	  restrictions	  













(2008-­‐2010)	   which	   is	   deemed	   an	   adequate	   period	   to	   capture	   the	   long	   run	   impacts	   of	   the	  
intervention.	  The	  objective	  here	   is	   to	  establish	   to	  what	  extent	   the	  observed	  shifts	   in	   trade	   in	  
quota	   and	   non	   quota	   imports	   were	   entrenched	   in	   the	   mid	   to	   long	   term.	   A	   successful	  
intervention	  would	  imply	  a	  sustained	  drop	  in	  imports	  both	  from	  China	  and	  overall	  which	  would	  
imply	  greater	  levels	  of	  local	  sourcing.	  
	  
Macro	  trade	  impact	  of	  the	  quotas	  in	  the	  long	  run	  
	  
The	  immediate	  response	  of	  buyers	  to	  quota	  removal…	  	  	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2009,	  total	  clothing	  imports	  jumped	  32.38%	  (equivalent	  to	  R633.80m)	  on	  
the	  comparable	  2008	  period	  and	  more	   importantly,	   the	  bulk	  of	   these	   (84.91%)	   imports	  came	  
from	   China,	   which	   increased	   by	   42.24%	   or	   R538.18m	   in	   value	   terms.	   The	   flurry	   of	   import	  
activity	   from	  China	   in	   immediate	   response	   to	  quota	   removal	   caused	  a	   spike	   in	   imports,	  both	  
from	  China	  and	  overall	  akin	  to	  that	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  quota	  announcement	  (Figure	  42).	  	  
	  
Figure	  42:	  Clothing	  imports	  by	  quarter:	  China	  vs	  World	  2005-­‐2010	  
	  














Table	  42	  below	  compares	  the	  first	  quarter	  performance	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  top	  supply	  countries	  
in	  2007,	  2008	  and	  2009,	  ranked	  by	  value	  gain	  on	  the	  comparable	  period	  of	  the	  previous	  year.	  
Percentage	  changes	  are	  also	  given.	  China’s	  resurgence	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2009	  came	  mainly	  
at	   the	  expense	  of	   the	   immediate	  beneficiaries	  of	   the	   restrictions	   (ref	  previous	  sections),	  who	  
were	  also	  likely	  trans-­‐shipment	  hubs,	  namely,	  Hong	  Kong,	  Myanmar	  and	  Malaysia,	  for	  each	  of	  
which	   large	   respective	   year-­‐on-­‐year	   drop	   in	   imports	   were	   recorded	   of	   70.51%	   (R37.48m),	  
66.46%	  (R26.46m)	  and	  65.47%	  (R22.16m)	  between	  January	  and	  March	  2009;	  and	  also	  Taiwan,	  
Sri	  Lanka	  and	  Macau	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent.	  	  
	  
However,	   some	   emerging	   suppliers	   showed	   resilient	   import	   growth	   despite	   resurgent	  
competition	   from	   China,	   for	   example;	   Bangladesh	   (R57.65m/98.41%),	   Mauritius	  
(R49.01m/62.59%);	   India	   (R25.28m/34.24%)	   and	   Madagascar	   (R17.40/72.29%)	   as	   well	   as	  
Morocco	   (143.50%),	   Bulgaria	   (120.18%),	   Poland	   (93.27%)	   and	  Germany	   (51.48%)	   albeit	   off	   a	  
lower	  base.	  	  
	  
Table	  42:	  Comparison	  of	  q1	  imports	  by	  major	  supplier	  countries	  pre	  and	  post	  quotas	  
	  















…	  And	  their	  long	  run	  response	  to	  quota	  removal...	  
	  
Import	  data	  for	  the	  full	  2008	  to	  2010	  period	  confirms	  a	  decisive	  shift	  in	  sourcing	  back	  to	  China.	  
Imports	  from	  the	  region	  rose	  by	  26.05%	  in	  2009	  and	  by	  a	  further	  17.99%	  in	  2010,	  a	  compound	  
rise	   of	   48.72%	   for	   the	   two	   year	   period	   equivalent	   to	   R2,202.27m;	   89.27%	   of	   this	   increase	  
occurred	  in	  categories	  previously	  restricted	  by	  quotas,	  which	  almost	  doubled	  (91.32%)	  in	  value	  
terms.	  This	  compares	  with	  increases	  at	  the	  aggregate	  level	  of	  22.50%	  and	  33.12%	  in	  total	  and	  
(previously)	  quota	  imports	  respectively.	  Comparatively,	  the	  Rest	  of	  the	  World	  saw	  decreases	  of	  
18.04%	  (overall	  imports)	  and	  28.76%	  (previously	  quota	  imports)	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  Figure	  
43	   gives	   a	   graphical	   illustration	   of	   imports	   for	   South	   Africa’s	   main	   suppliers	   in	   2010	   both	  
immediately	  upon	  quota	  removal	  as	  well	  as	  into	  the	  longer	  term.	  China	  displaced	  imports	  from	  
most	  of	   the	  small	  East	  Asian	  countries,	   such	  as	  Cambodia,	  Thailand	  and	  even	   Indonesia,	  who	  
showed	   robust	   growth	   in	   the	   first	   half	   of	   2008.	   Even	   the	   larger	   import	   countries,	  Mauritius,	  
Bangladesh	   and	   Indonesia	   experienced	   a	   sharp	   correction	   to	   2008	   import	   levels	   in	   the	   first	  
quarter	  of	  2009,	  although	  again,	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  period	  coincided	  with	  the	  deepening	  financial	  
crisis	  muddies	  the	  waters	  since	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  disentangle	  the	  impacts	  of	  quota	  removal	  and	  
the	   global	   depression.	   The	   case	   of	   Malaysia	   is	   an	   exception	   and	   is	   left	   for	   more	   detailed	  
discussion	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
	  
Figure	  43:	  Performance	  of	  selected	  supply	  countries	  in	  the	  post	  quota	  period	  
	  














Relative	  comparison	  of	  China’s	  performance:	  Pre	  versus	  post	  quotas	  
	  
In	  2010,	  South	  Africa	   imported	  32.13%	  more	  clothing	  than	   in	  2006;	  24.08%	  more	   from	  China	  
and	   61.54%	   more	   from	   other	   countries	   and	   China	   had	   re-­‐established	   its	   dominance	   in	   the	  
South	   African	   clothing	   market,	   commandeering	   73.72%	   (equivalent	   to	   R6,724m)	   of	   total	  
clothing	   imports,	   and	   74.06%	   (equivalent	   to	   R4,119.73m)	   of	   quota	   imports.	   Although	   these	  
shares	  were	  smaller	  in	  percentage	  terms	  than	  in	  2006	  (78.50%	  for	  total	  and	  81.35%	  for	  quota	  
imports),	   they	  were	   larger	   in	  value	   terms	   (R5,419.02m	   (total)	   and	  R3,867.81m	   (quota)(Figure	  
44).	  
	  
Figure	  44:	  Demonstration	  of	  China	  in	  total,	  quota	  and	  non	  quota	  imports:	  2006-­‐2010	  
	  
Source:	  Clotrade	  	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
To	   put	   an	   alternative	   spin	   on	   the	   argument,	   Chinese	   export	   data	   showed	   that	   South	   Africa	  
resumed	   importance	   as	   a	   market	   for	   Chinese	   clothing	   exports	   in	   the	   two	   year	   period	   after	  
quota	   removal;	   the	   share	   of	   South	   Africa	   in	   total	   Chinese	   exports	   fell	   from	   0.92%	   to	   0.48%	  
between	   2006	   and	   2008,	   presumably	   in	   response	   to	   the	   China	   quotas,	   but	   trended	   strongly	  

















Figure	  45:	  Demonstration	  of	  SA	  share	  in	  Chinese	  clothing	  exports	  
	  
Source:	  Trade	  map	   	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
Conclusions	  for	  the	  macro	  trade	  impact	  of	  the	  quotas	  and	  implications	  for	  local	  output	  
	  
The	   China	   quotas	  were	   successful	   in	   their	   objective	   to	   reduce	   imports	   from	  China.	   Although	  
some	  recovery	  occurred	  in	  quota	   imports	  from	  China	   in	  2008,	  with	  the	  decline	  moderating	   in	  
pace,	   the	   value	   of	   these	   imports	   was	   still	   considerably	   lower	   than	   in	   2006	   before	   the	  
intervention	  was	  made.	  	  
	  
Analysis	   for	   the	   full	   quota	   period	   suggests	   that	   the	   quotas	   significantly	   impeded	   China’s	  
penetration	  into	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  market,	  and	  especially	  in	  quota	  categories	  in	  which	  
the	   fall	   in	   China’s	   market	   share	   in	   both	   value	   and	   volume	   terms	   was	   significant.	   However,	  
analysis	  for	  the	  post-­‐quota	  period	  suggests	  that	  there	  was	  significant	  reversion	  of	  sourcing	  back	  
to	   China	   when	   the	   restrictions	   were	   lifted.	   Qualitative	   evidence	   confirmed	   that	   suppliers	  
preemptively	  resumed	  sourcing	  from	  China	  before	  quota	  removal	  by	  delaying	  orders	  for	  Winter	  
200978.	  Furthermore,	  market	  share	  was	  redeemed	  largely	  through	  the	  displacement	  of	  imports	  
from	  other	  countries.	  	  
	  














The	  China	  quota	  intervention	  may	  thus	  have	  notched	  one	  success	  by	  slowing	  the	  rate	  of	  China’s	  
penetration	  into	  the	  South	  African	  market.	  The	  cumulative	  growth	  rates	  for	  total	   imports	  and	  
quota	  imports	  by	  value	  from	  China	  between	  2006	  and	  2010	  represented	  a	  massive	  drop	  from	  
previous	  levels	  between	  2002	  and	  2006.	  This	  said,	  the	  slowdown	  in	  imports	  from	  China	  cannot	  
summarily	  be	  racked	  up	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  China	  quotas.	  Qualitative	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  
there	  may	  be	  other	  drivers	  behind	  this,	  including	  a	  general	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  China	  toward	  its	  
own	  domestic	  market	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  emerging	  Asia,	  which	  was	  quick	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  left	  by	  
the	  quotas;	  and	  the	  global	  economic	  crisis	  which	  depressed	  markets	  generally,	  so	  that	  not	  all	  
developments	  in	  terms	  of	  volumes	  and	  prices	  in	  2008	  and	  2009	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  safeguards	  
and	  their	  removal.	  
	  
However,	   the	   China	   quotas	   fell	   short	   of	   their	   broader	   objectives	   to	   reduce	   clothing	   imports	  
overall	  and	  to	  encourage	  greater	  levels	  of	  local	  sourcing.	  Although	  imports	  on	  aggregate	  fell	  in	  
the	   immediate	   wake	   of	   quota	   imposition,	   having	   been	   forewarned	   about	   the	   impending	  
implementation	  of	   the	   restrictions,	   retailers	   stockpiled	  product	   to	  mitigate	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  
restrictions.	   In	  the	  medium	  run,	   imports	  were	  diverted	  to	  a	  host	  of	  other	  foreign,	  and	  mainly	  
Asian	   countries	   that	   had	   geared	   their	   supply	   around	   the	   US	   and	   EU	   markets	   during	   their	  
safeguard	  periods.	  The	  relief	  from	  import	  competition	  from	  China	  thus	  gave	  some	  other	  supply	  
countries	  an	  opportunity	   to	  demonstrate	   their	   competence	  as	  clothing	  manufacturers	  and	   to	  
carve	  a	  niche	  in	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  market	  which	  they	  may	  otherwise	  not	  have	  had.	  In	  
effect,	   the	   China	   quotas	   simply	   preempted	   the	   premature	   discovery	   of	   alternative	   and	  
potentially	   lower	   cost	   suppliers	   to	   China.	   The	   import	   data	   shows	   that	   a	   handful	   of	   these	  
countries,	  notably	  Mauritius,	  India	  and	  Indonesia	  remained	  core	  suppliers	  to	  the	  South	  African	  
market	  after	  restrictions	  on	  China	  were	  removed.	  	  
	  
Contrary	   to	   its	   initiative	   to	   encourage	   greater	   levels	   of	   local	   sourcing,	   the	   China	   quota	  
intervention	  motivated	  more	  dispersed	  global	  sourcing.	  The	  growth	   in	   imports	  between	  2009	  
and	  2010	  shows	  that	  South	  African	  demand	  for	  clothing	  shifted	  largely	  toward	  imports	  and	  not	  
toward	  the	  domestic	  supply	  base.	  The	  higher	   level	  of	   imports	   from	  China	  and	  overall	   in	  2010	  
indicates	  a	  persistent	  reliance	  on	  imports	  to	  feed	  domestic	  demand	  and	  a	  broad	  failure	  of	  local	  













casts	   doubt	  on	   the	  premise	   that	   local	   clothing	  manufacturers	   received	   any	   sustained	  benefit	  
from	  the	  intervention	  either	  during,	  or	  beyond	  its	  effective	  period	  of	  operation.	  	  
	  
Apart	   from	   demand	   generally	   shifting	   back	   to	   China	   after	   quota	   removal,	   supply	   also	  
consolidated	   around	   a	   smaller	   number	   of	   countries	   between	   2006	   and	   2010.	   At	   the	   end	   of	  
2010,	  the	  collective	  share	  of	  the	  top	  five	  and	  top	  ten	  supply	  countries	  had	  largely	  restored	  to	  
pre	   quota	   levels	   of	   93.72%	   and	   88.74%	   respectively.	   This	   is	   demonstrated	   by	   the	   rise	   in	   the	  
Herfindahl-­‐Hirschman	  Index	  (Figure	  46	  below)	  during	  this	  period79.	  This	   index	   is	  a	  measure	  of	  
concentration	   of	   export	   sources;	   a	   fall	   in	   the	   index	   =	   less	   concentration	   i.e.	   greater	   spatial	  
dispersion.	   The	   consolidation	  between	  2008	   and	   2010	   likely	   reflects	   a	   global	   trend	   in	   supply	  
rationalization,	   which	   has	   intensified	  with	   the	   global	   economic	   crisis,	   particularly	   since	   2008	  
(Gereffi	  and	  Frederick	  2010).	  However,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  a	  reversion	  to	  the	  formerly	  high	  levels	  of	  
concentration	   that	   existed	   pre	   quotas;	   or	   a	   combination	   of	   both.	   The	   effects	   are	   difficult	   to	  
disentangle.	  Whatever	   the	   case,	   the	   increase	   in	   spatial	   dispersion	   between	   2006	   and	   2008,	  
shown	   as	   a	   decline	   in	   the	   index	   during	   this	   period,	   broadly	   confirms	   import	   diversion	   in	  
consequence	  to	  the	  China	  quotas.	  	  
	  
Figure	  46:	  Concentration	  of	  South	  African	  supply	  base	  	  
	  
Source:	  Clotrade	  	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  














Whilst	   the	   concentration	   ratios	   of	   the	   top	   5	   and	   10	   countries	   did	   not	   change	   significantly	  
between	   the	   quota	   and	   post	   quota	   periods,	   there	   were	   some	   material	   changes	   in	   the	  
magnitude	  and	  composition	  of	   the	  collective	   import	  share	  of	   these	  cohorts	  between	  the	  two	  
periods	  (Table	  43).	  South	  Africa	  imported	  31.16%	  more	  clothing	  from	  the	  top	  five	  and	  32.34%	  
from	   the	   top	   ten	   supply	   countries	   in	   2010	   than	   in	   2006.	   What	   is	   more,	   there	   was	   greater	  
orientation	   around	   suppliers	   in	   close	   geographical	   proximity	   to	   the	   South	   African	   market.	  
Imports	   from	   Mauritius	   and	   Madagascar	   grew	   by	   220.82%	   between	   2006	   and	   2010;	   this	  
compares	   with	   collective	   growth	   of	   162.64%	   for	   the	   remaining	   six	   countries	   in	   the	   top	   ten	  
cohort	   in	  2010.	  This	  may	  be	  due	   to	  preferential	  access	   for	   these	  countries	   to	  South	  Africa	  as	  
members	  of	   SADC;	   clothing	  exports	   face	   some	  of	   the	  highest	   tariffs	  on	  manufactured	  goods,	  
and	   preferential	   market	   access	   has	   a	   substantial	   impact	   on	   global	   production	   and	   trade	  
patterns	   (Minor,	  Velia	  and	  Hughes	  2002;	  Morris	  and	  Barnes	  2006).	  However,	   tighter	   financial	  
conditions	   have	   also	   shortened	   lead	   times	   which	   gives	   countries	   like	   Mauritius,	   who	   have	  
vertically	  integrated	  value	  chains	  a	  competitive	  advantage.	  In	  an	  environment	  where	  buyers	  are	  
being	   forced	   to	   ‘cut	   the	   fat’,	   the	   objective	   to	   is	   to	   work	  with	   few,	   large,	   capable	   and	   often	  
vertically	  integrated	  core	  suppliers	  (Gereffi	  and	  Frederick	  2011).	  
	  
Table	  43:	  Top	  ten	  clothing	  suppliers	  to	  South	  Africa:	  2006,	  2008,	  2010	  
	  














Transshipment	  and	  illegal	  activity	  
	  
One	  of	  the	   industry’s	  greatest	  concerns	  was	  that	  quotas	  would	  entrench	  the	  culture	  of	   illegal	  
import	  activity	  ranging	  from	  mis-­‐declarations	  of	  tariff	  codes,	  under-­‐valuations	  to	  avoid	  import	  
duties	   and	   avoiding	   importer	   registration	   requirements	   (Sandrey	   2006;	   Clotrade	   2006a).	  
Although	  country-­‐of-­‐origin	  legislation	  had	  been	  recently	  introduced,	  a	  pervasive	  view	  was	  that	  
SARS	  and	  UTIC	  lacked	  the	  capacity	  to	  monitor	  imports	  and	  enforce	  restrictions	  on	  a	  continuous	  
basis.	  In	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  China	  quotas,	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  sector	  was	  being	  targeted	  
by	  what	  appeared	  to	  be	  illegal	  import	  activity	  aimed	  at	  directly	  destroying	  South	  Africa’s	  tariff	  
regime80.	  The	  DTI	  and	  ITAC	  were	  forewarned	  that	  undervalued	  imports	  were	  the	  most	  exigent	  
issue	   facing	   the	   local	   clothing	   industry	   and	   that	   the	   problem	   would	   likely	   escalate	   under	   a	  
system	  of	   theoretically	   rigid	   import	   restrictions	   that	  were	  not	   rigorously	  enforced	   in	  practice	  
(Sandrey	  2006).	  In	  2003,	  Clotrade	  sought	  protection	  for	  the	  industry	  against	  illegal	  imports	  and	  
dumping;	   and	   the	   huge	   distortion	   factor	   posed	   by	   undervaluations	   and	   underinvoicing	   of	  
imports81.	  The	  surge	  in	  imports	  in	  2003	  exposed	  cutom’s	  inability	  to	  control	  and	  prevent	  illegal	  
imports	  and	  transshipments	  through	  South	  Africa	  “porous”	  borders	  (Kipling	  2006).	  As	  a	  result,	  
the	   potential	   for	   transshipments	   (where	   imports	   from	   China	   are	   funneled	   through	   other	  
countries	  into	  South	  Africa),	  a	  global	  problem	  driven	  by	  quotas,	  was	  widely	  foreseen	  (Clotrade	  
2006a;	  Bisseker	  2006a;	  Sandrey	  2006).	  South	  Africa’s	  immediate	  African	  neighbours,	  whom	  did	  
not	  have	  restrictions	  on	  China	   i.e.	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Malawi,	  and/or	  former	  China	  establishment	  
countries	  such	  as	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Singapore,	  whose	  exports	   to	  South	  Africa	  were	  not	   limited,	  
were	  all	  fingered	  as	  potential	  transshipment	  hubs.	  	  
	  
Transshipment	  activity	  at	  the	  trade	  data	  level	  is	  evidenced	  either	  by	  a	  large	  relative	  increase	  in	  
the	  level	  of	  imports	  for	  an	  individual	  country	  immediately	  after	  quota	  imposition,	  which	  may	  or	  
may	  not	  be	  sustained	  through	  the	  quota	  period,	  and	  a	  subsequent	  fall	  in	  imports	  to	  pre-­‐quota	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 This was a view expressed by jack Kipling during an interview in 2011. 
81  When a large importer places an order with its Chinese supplier, there is an automatic 10% 
redundancy/reject margin built into production. On a global scale, this translates into billions of Dollars worth 
of overruns. Furthermore, since these garments are fully costed into the invoice amount and thus are thus 
effectively already paid for, they are available to spillover markets for “literally beans”.  Since South Africa 
has similar styles and tastes to the United States, coupled with the convenience that it runs 6 months behind 
US fashion, its market is particularly suited to these overruns. In 2003, once this was realised, overruns 















levels,	  and	  especially	  immediately	  after	  quota	  removal;	  or	  a	  sharp	  increase	  in	  the	  ratio	  of	  quota	  
to	  non	  quota	  imports	  for	  an	  individual	  country	  	  -­‐	  an	  increase	  in	  quota	  imports,	  coupled	  with	  a	  
fall	   in	  non	  quota	   imports	  (ref.	  preceding	  discussions	  and	  Tables).	  On	  this	  basis,	  countries	  that	  
were	   both	   the	   greatest	   gainers	   in	   the	   initial	   quota	   period	   and	   the	   greatest	   losers	   after	   their	  
removal	   Table	   45	   raised	   immediate	   red	   flags.	   The	   exact	   magnitude	   of	   transshipments	   and	  
round-­‐tripping	  was	  revealed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2008	  (and	  corroborated	  in	  2010)	  when	  imports	  from	  
suspect	   countries	   fell	   away	   following	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   restrictions	   and	   sourcing	   patterns	  
changed.	  	  
	  
A	  comparison	  of	   imports	   in	   the	   first	   two	  quarters	  of	  2006	  with	  comparable	  2007	  data	  shows	  
extraordinarily	   rapid	   import	   growth	   for;	   Vietnam	   of	   528.12%	   (R24.14),	   Zimbabwe	   of	   66.65%	  
(R19.96m);	  Myanmar	  of	  1,451.65%	  (R19.14m);	  Malaysia	  of	  1008.56%	  (R26.99m),	   Indonesia	  of	  
83.02%	   (R16.31m),	   Thailand	   of	   34.05%	   (R8.46m),	   Sri	   Lanka	   of	   666.28%	   (R8.45m),	   Turkey	   of	  
29.99%	  (R7.08m),	  Hong	  Kong	  of	  R9.97%	  (R6.01m),	  Bangladesh	  of	  40.79%	  (R5.29m),	  Macau	  of	  
357.69%(R4.39m),	   Cambodia	   of	   93.79%	   (R1.61m),	   Kenya	   of	   849.70%	   (R0.41m),	   Dominican	  
Republic	   of	   2,423.96%	   (R0.26m)	   and	   Zambia	   of	   91.42%	   (R0.22m).	   For	   all	   of	   these	   countries,	  
along	  with	  Malawi,	  a	  subsequent	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  catastrophic	  fall	  in	  import	  value	  between	  
2008	   and	   2009	   was	   recorded;	   most	   notably,	   Hong	   Kong	   (R122.81m);	   Malaysia	   (R132.50m),	  
Indonesia	   (R46.36m),	  Vietnam	  (R30.81m),	  Myanmar	   (R28.44m),	  Malawi	   (R20.84m),	  Cambodia	  
(R14.40m),	  Macau	  (R9.75m),	  Zimbabwe	  (R8.34m),	  and	  Taiwan	  (R6.25m).	  	  
	  
Table	  44:	  Greatest	  gainers	  and	  losers	  of	  quotas	  
	  













Additional	  support	  for	  under-­‐declarations	  is	  gained	  from	  unit	  price	  data.	  Artificially	  low	  import	  
values,	   in	   particular,	   would	   place	   local	   manufacturers	   under	   even	   greater	   price	   suppression	  
than	   they	   faced	   before	   the	   restrictions.	   Mis-­‐declarations	   are	   difficult	   to	   establish	   at	   the	  
aggregate	  level,	  but	  the	  rise	  in	  kilogram	  non	  quota	  imports	  during	  the	  quota	  period	  lends	  some	  
support	   to	   this	  hypothesis	  since	   irregularities	   in	   these	  categories	  are	  more	  difficult	   to	  detect.	  
The	  price	  effects	  of	  quotas	  are	  examined	   in	  detail	   in	  Chapter	  8	  but	   the	  principles	  behind	   the	  
argument	  for	  price	  distortions	  due	  to	  the	  China	  quotas	  is	  established	  here.	  	  
	  
Figure	   47	   (below)	   shows	   that	   between	   2000	   and	   2006,	   aggregate	   quota	   imports	   increased	  
steadily	  by	  396.52%	  and	  337.89%	  in	  value	  and	  volume	  terms	  respectively.	  Similarly,	  total	  non	  
quota	   imports	   increased	   by	   364.70%	   and	   409.19%	   in	   value	   and	   volume	   terms	   respectively,	  
during	   the	   same	   period.	   After	   2006,	   however,	   the	   trends	   in	   quota	   and	   non	   quota	   imports	  
diverge;	   whereas	   quota	   imports	   fell	   in	   both	   value	   (7.94%)	   and	   volume	   (48.49%)	   terms,	   non	  
quota	   imports	   continued	   to	   grow	   by	   26.47%	   (value)	   and	   40.97%	   (volume)	   in	   2007.	   The	  
divergence	  of	   the	  value	  and	  volume	   indices	   in	  2007	   indicate	   rising	  prices	   in	  quota	  categories	  
and	  falling	  prices	  in	  non	  quota	  categories.	  	  
	  
Figure	  47:	  Demonstration	  of	  imports	  in	  quota	  and	  non-­‐quota	  categories:	  2000-­‐2007	  
	  
Source:	  Reproduced	  from	  Sandrey	  2006	  with	  Clotrade	  data	   Own	  calculations	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This	  divergence	  was	  even	  more	  dramatic	  for	  imports	  from	  China,	  which	  is	  amplified	  at	  the	  unit	  
and	   kilogram	   category	   level	   (Figure	   48	   and	   Figure	   49).	   Before	   quotas	   there	   were	   always	  
unusually	   large	  divergences	  between	   the	   value	   and	   volume	   for	   kilogram	  categories	   recorded	  
from	   China	   compared	   with	   unit	   categories,	   which	   until	   quotas	   were	   relatively	   stable.	   This	  
changed	  after	  quota	  imposition,	  with	  unit	  categories	  exhibiting	  more	  volatility	  during	  the	  quota	  
period.	  
	  
Figure	  48:	  Divergence	  of	  volume	  and	  value	  unit	  imports	  from	  China	  in	  quota	  and	  non	  quota	  categories	  
	   	  
Source:	  Clotrade	   (Own	  calculations)	  
	  
Figure	  49:	  Divergence	  of	  volume	  and	  value	  kilogram	  imports	  from	  China	  in	  quota	  and	  non-­‐quota	  
categories	  
	  













A	   comparison	   of	   Chinese	   export	   data	   and	   South	   African	   import	   data	   shows	   that	   there	   was	  
significant	   inconsistency	  between	   reported	  export	   levels	  by	   the	  Chinese	  and	   reported	   import	  
levels	  of	  the	  same	  goods	  into	  South	  Africa,	  and	  especially	  in	  HS62	  categories	  which	  are	  largely	  
declared	   by	   kilogram	   and	   for	   which	  monitoring	   is	  more	   difficult	   since	   garments	   of	   different	  
cost,	  quality	  and	  complexity	  are	  mixed	   in	  a	   container	  and	  customs	  officials	  are	  not	  equipped	  
with	  sufficient	  knowledge	  to	  differentiate	  between	  them	  at	  the	  product	  level.	  On	  balance,	  the	  
trade	  data	  confirms	   that	   some	   level	  of	  underreporting	  was	   likely	  occurring	   (Figure	  50	  below)	  
(Sandrey	  and	  van	  Eeden	  2007).	  	  
	  
Figure	  50:	  Ratio	  of	  annual	  South	  African	  imports	  to	  annual	  Chinese	  exports:	  1996-­‐2006	  	  
	  
Source:	  Sandrey	  and	  van	  Eeden	  2007	  
	  
Under-­‐invoicing	   was	   not	   a	   problem	   unique	   to	   South	   Africa.	   Concerns	   about	   undervalued	  
imports	   from	  China	  were	  being	  expressed	  globally.	   In	  2004,	   the	  World	  Customs	  Organisation	  
called	  a	  meeting	  at	  the	  WTO	  to	  explore	  different	  ways	  to	  assess	  under-­‐valuations	  but	  without	  
resolution.	  There	  were	  two	  separate	  issues	  in	  this	  respect,	  the	  first	  was	  the	  problem	  posed	  by	  
‘distressed	   goods’	   and	   the	   second,	   was	   the	   issue	   of	   structured	   under-­‐invoicing.	   ‘Distressed’	  
merchandise	   is	   the	   byproduct	   of	   large	   production	   runs.	   Since	   the	   cost	   is	   factored	   into	   the	  
contract	  price	  and	  thus	  borne	  by	  the	  customer,	  these	  garments	  can	  be	  sold	  at	  a	   jobless	  price	  
(Ref	  Footnote	  80).	  Under	  WTO	  rules,	  if	  the	  price	  paid	  is	  the	  same	  price	  that	  would	  be	  fetched	  in	  
the	   local	   market,	   i.e.	   the	   home	   price	   is	   the	   same	   as	   the	   export	   price,	   the	   goods	   cannot	   be	  













bought	  at	  a	  price	  that	  has	  no	  relation	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  goods.	  Whilst	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  plan	  a	  
retail	   strategy	   solely	   around	   distressed	   goods,	   they	   do	   offer	   pockets	   of	   value	   and	   working	  
through	  intermediaries	  and	  agents	  allows	  for	  plausible	  deniability	  of	  source.	  	  
	  
The	   South	   African	   market	   presents	   a	   particularly	   ideal	   solution	   to	   distressed	   goods	   for	   a	  
number	  of	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  there	  are	  no	  major	  US	  retailers	  operating	  in	  the	  domestic	  market	  to	  
create	  a	  conflict	  of	  interest;	  and	  secondly,	  the	  South	  African	  market	  is	  fundamentally	  the	  same	  
as	  the	  US	  market	  but	  with	  one	  season	  time	  lag	  between	  Northern	  and	  Southern	  hemispheres.	  
In	  2003,	  local	  firms	  were	  being	  subjected	  to	  intense	  price	  suppression	  from	  retailers	  due	  to	  the	  
abundance	  of	  distressed	  goods,	  and	  many	  closed	  down	  in	  consequence	  to	  this.	  Interviews	  with	  
large	   retailers	   revealed	   that	  quotas	  had	  encouraged	   them	   to	   cut	  out	   third	  party	   suppliers	   to	  
create	   transparency	   in	   their	   supply	   chain	   and	   avoid	   being	   implicated	   in	   illegal	   imports.	  
Qualitative	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  quotas	  drove	  a	  significant	  rationalisation	  of	   the	  supply	  
base	   as	   “honest”	   retailers	   eliminated	   potentially	   compromising	   supply	   sources.	   One	  
interviewee	   stated:	   “If	   the	   price	   was	   to	   cheap,	   we	   took	   them	   out.	  We	   have	   rationlised	   our	  
supply	  base	  on	  supplier	  performance	  and	  compliance.”	  The	  same	  source	  confirmed	  that	  illegal	  
activity	  had	  hiked	  under	  the	  quotas	  but	  that	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  any	  concerted	  effort	  by	  
government	  to	  tackle	  it.	  	  
	  
A	  greater	  problem	  however	  lay	  with	  ‘structured	  under-­‐invoicing’,	  which	  is	  broadly	  practiced	  by	  
importers	  to	  avoid	  payment	  of	  full	  duties.	  In	  respect	  of	  the	  macro	  trade	  price	  data,	  the	  clearest	  
case	   for	   under-­‐declarations	   is	   Malaysia,	   which	   was	   flagged	   by	   Clotrade	   as	   a	   potential	  
transshipment	   hub	   before	   the	   China	   quotas	   had	   even	   been	   introduced.	   Clotrade	   (2007b)	  
showed	  that	   imports	   from	  Malaysia	  grew	  555%	  -­‐	   from	  R2.5m	  (2006)	   to	  R16.5m	  (2007).	  Units	  
grew	  from	  38,000	  to	  2	  million,	  a	  growth	  of	  over	  5000%.	  Imports	  declared	  under	  kilograms	  grew	  
from	  7,500	  kg	  to	  62,000kg,	  a	  growth	  of	  726%.	  Average	  prices	  dropped	  from	  R47.73	  in	  2006	  to	  
R6.72	   in	   200782	  before	   rising	   again	   to	   R59.76	   in	   2009	   (Ref	   Table	   45).	   Similarly,	   imports	   from	  
Macau	  grew	  from	  R613,000	  in	  2006	  to	  R4.82m	  in	  2007,	  a	  growth	  of	  687%.	  Unit	  imports	  grew	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 In a circular to members September 2007, Clotrade made this point very forcibly “Malaysia, coming from a 
position of exporting only 80,000 units to South Africa in 2006, has now passed India to become the second 
largest exporter to South Africa after China in volume terms.  Exports from Malaysia are now 10.4 million 
units at an average price of R5.09 for a total value of only R52.8 million, a 26,000% growth year-on-













700%	   (5000	   to	  40	  000)	   and	   kilo	   imports	  by	  53,025%	   (32	   to	  17	  000).	  Average	  prices	  dropped	  
from	  R66.58	   in	   2007	   to	   R42.85	   in	   2008	   and	   increased	   to	   R113.03	   in	   2009.	   Finally,	   prices	   for	  
imports	   from	  Turkey	  behaved	  erratically	  between	  2007	  and	  2009	   -­‐	  R19.57	   to	  R77.44	   -­‐	  which	  
opens	  the	  door	  to	  questions	  about	   transshipment	  through	  some	  Eastern	  European	  as	  well	  as	  
Asian	  countries.	  
	  
Table	  45:	  Import	  prices	  from	  Malaysia:	  2005-­‐2010	  
Year   Volume  Value   Price   Price 
(’000)    (‘000)    R(‘000)   (China)         (Malaysia) 
2005   287   8,378   4.22   29.19 
2006   236   9,447   10.72   39.69 
2007   19,257   112,773  11.68   5.86 
2008   21,263   151,680  14.24   7.13 
2009   321   19,183   17.60   59.76 
2010   338   19,019   15.14   56.27 
	  
Conclusions	  on	  illegal	  imports	  
	  
Consistent	  with	  expectations,	  the	  trade	  data	  suggests	  that	  the	  quotas	  encouraged	  importers	  to	  
“cheat”	   more.	   This	   is	   gleaned	   from	   massive	   increases	   in	   imports	   from	   regions	   which	   have	  
historically	  low	  levels	  of	  imports,	  such	  as	  Zimbabwe,	  although	  Singapore	  was	  also	  fingered	  as	  a	  
gateway	   country,	   along	   with	   Hong	   Kong	   and	   Myanmar.	   Furthermore,	   the	   highly	   irregular	  
behavior	   of	   unit	   price	   data	   between	   quota	   and	   non	   quota	   imports	   and	   between	   imports	  
recorded	   by	   unit	   and	   by	   kilogram	   within	   these	   categories	   broadly	   evidenced	   undervalued	  
imports.	  The	   low	   import	  values	   from	  Malaysia	  are	   incorrigible	  proof	   that	   imports	  were	  being	  
transshipped	  and	  under-­‐declared	  through	  certain	  regions.	  Government	  failed	  and	  as	  some	  have	  
argued,	   inexcusably	   so,	   to	  acknowledge	   the	  at	   times	  preposterously	   low	   import	  values	  which	  














Despite	   the	   evidence,	   only	   one	   case	   of	   quota	   prosecution	   was	   recorded,	   which	   is	   a	   poor	  
indictment	  on	  the	  South	  African	  customs	  system	  and	  the	  DTI83.	  Two	  possible	  explanations	  for	  
government’s	  sluggish	  concern	  over	  this	  issue	  were	  firstly,	  the	  implication	  of	  strong	  action	  from	  
the	  informal	  sector	  –	  which	  is	  large	  and	  growing	  –	  and	  fear	  of	  recriminations	  from	  grass	  roots	  
consumers	  that	  depend	  on	  these	  imports;	  and	  secondly,	  the	  involvement	  of	  organised	  crime84.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 According to one ITAC official, South Africa compromised its ability to prosecute China for anti-dumping 
allegations by granting China market economy status in reciprocation for its co-operation on their quota plan 
(Business day 2007).  













Chapter	  6:	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  quotas	  on	  the	  clothing	  industry:	  
The	  manufacturer	  response	  	  
	  
This	  Chapter	  examines	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  on	  the	  clothing	  industry,	  which	  was	  the	  
explicit	   intended	   beneficiary	   of	   the	   intervention	   (Sharma	   2006).	   An	   explicit	   objective	   of	   the	  
China	  quotas	  was	  to	  give	  the	  sector	  a	  two	  year	  pause	  from	  Chinese	  import	  competition	  for	  it	  to	  
“restructure	   and	   become	   globally	   competitive…by	   encouraging	   local	   retailers	   to	   source	   from	  
local	   manufacturers”	   (DTI	   2006).	   This	   optimistic	   outcome	   was	   predicted	   on	   several	  
assumptions:	  Firstly,	  that	  constraints	  on	  local	  output	  expansion	  were	  exclusively	  demand	  side	  
i.e.	   that	  greater	  demand	  for	   local	  produce	  would	  unequivocally	  translate	   into	  higher	   levels	  of	  
local	  production	  and	  that	  local	  firms	  could	  infinitely	  meet	  this	  new	  demand;	  and	  secondly,	  that	  
the	  South	  African	  clothing	  industry	  would	  be	  internationally	  competitive	  once	  Chinese	  imports	  
were	  disregarded	  i.e.	  that	  Chinese	  imports	  would	  be	  substituted	  by	  locally	  made	  substitutes.	  	  
	  
Local	   firms	  were	   advised	   to	   optimize	   on	   their	   locational	   competitive	   advantage	   of	   proximity	  
and	   speed	   to	   market	   and	   to	   focus	   production	   efforts	   on	   high-­‐end	   disposable	   fashion	   items	  
rather	   than	   compete	   in	   low-­‐end	   mass-­‐produced	   items	   where	   imports	   are	   concentrated.	  
However,	   this	   era	   of	   globalisation	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   buyer	   driven	   value	   chains	   have	  
fundamentally	  altered	  the	  basis	  on	  which	  firms	  can	  compete.	  In	  addition	  to	  offering	  good	  value	  
in	   terms	   of	   price	   and	   quality,	   firms	   need	   to	   have	  manufacturing	   and	   knowledge	   capabilities	  
encompassing	   all	   aspects	   of	   production;	   including	   sourcing	   and	   financing	   of	   raw	   materials,	  
assembly	  of	  garments,	  packaging	  and	  delivery	  (Gereffi	  and	  Memedovich	  2003;	  Kaplinsky,	  2005;	  
Barnes	  et	  al	  2006;	  Gereffi	  2005);	  and	  they	  must	  be	  able	  to	  fulfill	  many	  non	  production	  functions	  
such	  as	  having	  a	  “feel”	  for	  their	  customers’	  market	  and	  culture	  (Gibbon	  2002a).	  
	  
The	   assessment	   of	   whether	   the	   quotas	   secured	   the	   competitiveness	   dimension	   shall	   be	  
informed	  by	  the	  response	  of	  both	  firms	  and	  the	  sector	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  diminishing	  competition	  
from	   China	   and	   the	   consistency	   of	   these	   outcomes	   with	   WCM	   principles	   and	   the	   DTI’s	  
objectives.	  The	  quotas	  were	  a	  temporary	  measure	  with	  the	  implication	  that	  the	  industry	  would	  
inevitably	   be	   reopened	   to	   foreign	   competition;	   at	   this	   juncture,	   the	   future	   survival	   of	   the	  













chain,	  but	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  insert	  themselves	  into	  the	  upper	  and	  more	  profitable	  segments	  of	  
the	   value	   chain.	   The	   impact	   of	   the	   quotas	   on	   domestic	   competitiveness	   requires	   evaluating	  
how	   rather	   than	   if,	   local	   firms	  are	   inserted	   in	   the	  value	   chain	   (Kaplinsky	  2005;	  Kaplinsky	  and	  
Morris	  2006;	  Barnes	  and	  Esselaar	  2006).	  This	   requires	  asking	  questions	   such	  as:	  How	  did	   the	  
relative	  position	  of	  local	  firms	  in	  the	  value	  chain	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  China	  quotas?	  Were	  
identified	  constraints	  on	  competitiveness	  lifted	  by	  the	  intervention?	  	  
	  
Three	  outcomes	  were	  possible	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2008,	  the	  scheduled	  expiration	  date	  for	  the	  China	  
quotas.	   There	   would	   either	   be	   i)	   more	   local	   firms	   supplying	   the	   market	   with	   increased	  
employment,	  indicative	  of	  a	  reinvigorated	  clothing	  manufacturing	  sector	  which	  is	  responsive	  to	  
the	  growing	  internal	  market;	  or	  ii)	  the	  same	  number	  of	   local	  firms	  with	  more	  imported	  goods	  
and	  increased	  employment,	  where	  the	  relative	  percentage	  of	  local	  to	  imported	  goods	  remains	  
constant	   but	   grows	   as	   domestic	   demand	   expands	   or	   iii)	   less	   local	   firms	   and	   decreased	  
employment	  despite	  growing	  internal	  demand	  as	  imports	  are	  substituted	  for	  locally	  produced	  
items;	   this	   would	   portend	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   local	   industry	   as	   local	   firms	   fold	   under	   the	  




An	   overarching	   aim	   of	   the	   China	   quotas	   was	   to	   address	   –	   to	   stave	   and	   even	   reverse	   –	   the	  
employment	  loss	  in	  the	  industry.	  The	  South	  African	  Clothing	  Workers	  Union	  (SACTWU)	  claimed	  
that	  64	  744	  jobs	  were	  lost	  in	  the	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  sector	  between	  2003	  and	  2006;	  and	  that	  
these	   losses	   had	   occurred	   in	   direct	   consequence	   to	   clothing	   imports	   from	   China.	   The	   DTI	  
expressly	  motivated	  their	  quota	  plan	  with	  these	   job	   losses.	  Since	  clothing	   is	   the	  most	   labour-­‐
intensive	  industry	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  sector,	  its	  labour	  absorbing	  bias	  is	  often	  emphasised	  in	  
policy	  debates	  where	  reducing	  unemployment	  is	  the	  key	  policy	  objective.	  The	  China	  quotas	  are	  
a	  strong	  point	  in	  case.	  The	  vociferous	  concern	  for	  formal	  sector	  job	  loss	  by	  the	  unions	  resulted	  
in	  public	   focus	  being	  exclusively	  drawn	  to	   the	   impact	  of	   imports	  on	  employment	   (Morris	  and	  
Einhorn	  2008).	  The	  discussion	  on	  employment	   shall	  proceed	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  employment	  
trends	  during	  the	  quota	  period	  followed	  by	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  economic	  justification	  for	  the	  














Employment	  trends	  during	  the	  quotas	  	  
	  
Most	  studies	  of	  employment	  in	  the	  clothing	  and	  textile	  industry	  cite	  the	  official	  Statistics	  South	  
Africa	  (StatsSA)	  data;	  for	  example,	  Kriel	  2006	  uses	  this	  data	  to	  argue	  that	  employment	  dropped	  
from	   206	  947	   in	   January	   2003	   to	   142	  203	   in	   June	   2006	   (a	   loss	   of	   64	  744	   jobs).	   However	   as	  
Edwards	  and	  Morris	  2007	  demonstrated,	  there	  are	  major	  problems	  with	  using	  this	  data	  source	  
as	   an	   indicator	   of	   employment	   trends	   since	   inappropriate	   comparisons	   of	   data	   drawn	   from	  
different	   employment	   surveys	   create	   distorting	   breaks	   in	   the	   employment	   series,	   which	  
considerably	  exaggerates	  the	  estimated	  job	  losses85.	  StatsSA	  conducts	  a	  bi-­‐annual	  Labour	  Force	  
Survey	   (LFS),	   which	   captures	   national	   household	   data	   on	   approximately	   30	   000	   households.	  
Given	   the	   small	   sample	   size,	   sub-­‐sectoral	   or	   geographical	   levels,	   breakdowns	   are	   statistically	  
problematic.	   	  However	   the	  data	  does	  provide	  a	   cautious	   indication	  of	   the	   clothing	   industry’s	  
informal	  economy	  size,	  which	  is	  not	  available	  from	  the	  industrial	  data.	  The	  LFS	  8	  data	  reveals	  
that	  approximately	  30%	  of	  clothing	  workers	  are	  employed	  by	  informal	  enterprises	  (IES	  2000).	  	  
	  
The	  National	  Bargaining	  Council	   (NBC)	  register	  of	  all	   firms	  and	  employees	   in	  the	  sector	   is	   the	  
most	   reliable	   and	   continuous	   data	   source	   available	   (Morris	   and	   Reed	   2008b).	   Analysis	   of	  
employment	   in	   this	   thesis	   draws	   on	   this	   data	   although	   several	   caveats	   are	   made.	   	   Firstly,	  
according	   to	   NBC	   records,	   registered	   employment	   actually	   increased	   in	   2004,	   which	   makes	  
January	  2003	  an	  unreliable	  base	  line86;	  for	  this	  reason,	  I	  use	  2004	  as	  a	  baseline	  for	  estimates.	  	  
Secondly,	   the	   estimated	   job	   losses	   fail	   to	   take	   into	   account	   changes	   in	   employment	   in	   the	  
entire	   value	   chain	   from	   production	   to	   retail;	   the	   focus	   on	   employment	   losses	   in	   production	  
alone	  whilst	  ignoring	  simultaneous	  (and	  possibly	  larger	  than	  commensurate)	  employment	  gains	  
in	  the	  retail	  sector	  may	  present	  a	  downwardly	  biased	  view	  of	  employment	  changes.	  Thirdly,	  the	  
data	   does	   not	   capture	   and	   account	   for	   changes	   in	   the	   composition	   of	   employment	   brought	  
about	   by	   a	   shift	   from	   formal	   to	   informal	   sector	   trade,	   non-­‐registered	   companies,	   CMTs	   and	  
micro	  enterprises	   since	   it	  does	  not	   include	   firms	  who	  avoided	  compliance	  officers'	  detection,	  
nor	  those	  small	  CMT	  operations	  with	  less	  than	  five	  or	  six	  workers.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Edwards and Morris 2007 posit that at least 50% of the 60 000 plus decline in employment estimated by 
the DTI obtains from statistical breaks between the underlying employment series used such that rather than 
actual job losses these declines are statistical artifacts arising from differences in surveys (p. 5)  
86 Using 2004 as a base shows that the number of clothing workers employed in the formal sector declined 
by 26,269 workers (25.9%) between December 2004 and December 2007, although the number of firms 













The	  bold	  statement	  that	  “more	  than	  55	  000	  jobs	  could	  be	  created	  by	  quotas”	  (Sharma	  2006)	  is	  
unsupported	  by	  employment	  trends	  in	  the	  industry.	  Table	  46	  contains	  data	  from	  the	  National	  
Bargaining	  Council	  on	  the	  number	  of	  firms	  and	  employees	   in	  each	  region,	  and	  in	  the	  industry	  
overall,	  for	  the	  two	  years	  of	  quota	  operation	  (highlighted	  in	  yellow),	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  two	  years	  
prior	  to	  quota	  imposition	  and	  the	  two	  years	  subsequent	  to	  quota	  removal	  (highlighted	  in	  blue).	  
	  	  
Table	  46:	  Total	  clothing	  manufacturing	  firms	  and	  employee	  strengths	  2004	  -­‐	  2010	  
	   WESTERN	  CAPE	   EASTERN	  CAPE	   KWAZULU-­‐-­‐NATAL	   NORTHERN	  AREAS	   NATIONAL	  TOTAL	  
As	  at	   Firms	   Emply’s	   Firms	   Emply’s	   Firms	   Emply’s	   Firms	   Emply’s	   Firms	   Emply’s	  
31.03.2004	   346	   34,130	   47	   4,673	   375	   37,077	   361	   22,659	  	   1,129	   98,539	  
30.06.2004	   345	   32,981	   45	   4,501	   371	   38,156	   367	   22,828	  	   1,128	   98,466	  
30.09.2004	   350	   33,220	   45	   4,501	   404	   39,487	   358	   21,999	  	   1,157	   99,207	  
31.12.2004	   353	   33,508	   45	   2,715	   417	   39,715	   354	   22,020	   1,169	   97,958	  
31.03.2005	   362	   33,196	   47	   2,732	   421	   38,538	   347	   20,878	   1,177	   95,344	  
30.06.2005	   360	   31,628	   47	   2,330	   420	   36,401	   344	   19,249	   1,171	   89,608	  
30.09.2005	   359	   30,896	   44	   1,427	   407	   34,627	   363	   18,473	   1,173	   85,423	  
31.12.2005	   346	   29,547	   43	   1,384	   396	   34,204	   353	   17,946	   1,138	   83,081	  
	   30.40%	   35.56%	   3.78%	   1.67%	   34.80%	   41.17%	   31.02%	   21.60%	   100%	   100%	  
31.03.2006	   329	   28,680	   44	   1,582	   386	   32,476	   341	   15,946	   1,100	   78,684	  
30.06.2006	   326	   28,375	   44	   1,462	   379	   31,977	   332	   15,034	   1,081	   76,848	  
30.09.2006	   325	   28,591	   44	   1,473	   370	   31,492	   326	   14,296	   1,065	   75,852	  
31.12.2006	   321	   28,451	   46	   1,903	   358	   30,147	   323	   13,955	   1,048	   74,456	  
	   30.63%	   38.21%	   4.39%	   2.56%	   34.16%	   40.49%	   30.82%	   18.74%	   100%	   100%	  
31.03.2007	   311	   28,369	   46	   1,930	   350	   29,846	   316	   13,467	   1,023	   73,612	  
30.06.2007	   307	   27,878	   48	   1,946	   348	   29,065	   312	   13,682	   1,015	   72,571	  
30.09.2007	   309	   28,291	   49	   2,215	   352	   29,210	   328	   13,974	   1,038	   73,690	  
31.12.2007	   302	   27,502	   50	   2,517	   348	   27,463	   338	   14,207	   1,038	   71,689	  
	   29.77%	   38.39%	   4.72%	   3.01%	   33.91%	   39.64%	   31.60%	   18.96%	   100%	   100%	  
31.03.2008	   311	   26,750	   50	   2,260	   343	   26,940	   336	   13,335	   1,040	   69,285	  
30.06.2008	   315	   25,995	   46	   2,136	   352	   26,520	   353	   14,057	   1,066	   68,708	  
30.09.2008	   308	   25,481	   36	   1,611	   348	   26,008	   348	   13,864	   1,040	   66,964	  
31.12.2008	   293	   24,962	   36	   1,611	   372	   26,829	   352	   14,029	   1,053	   67,431	  
	   27.85%	   37.07%	   3.42%	   2.39%	   35.27%	   39.70%	   33.46%	   20.84%	   100%	   100%	  
31.03.2009	   303	   24,437	   36	   1,611	   358	   24,221	   352	   13,532	   1,049	   63,801	  
30.06.2009	   296	   24,277	   -­‐	   -­‐	   365	   23,819	   347	   13,077	   1,008	   61,173	  
30.09.2009	   297	   23,629	   -­‐	   -­‐	   358	   22,941	   347	   13,077	   1,002	   59,647	  
31.12.2009	   305	   25,189	   -­‐	   -­‐	   373	   23,675	   347	   13,077	   1,025	   61,941	  
	   29.76%	   40.67%	   -­‐	   -­‐	   36.39%	   38.22%	   33.85%	   21.11%	   100%	   100%	  
30.03.2010	   309	   24,721	   -­‐	   -­‐	   345	   21,182	   347	   13,077	   1,001	   58,980	  
30.06.2010	   298	   24.023	   -­‐	   -­‐	   341	   20.306	   347	   13.077	   986	   57.406	  
30.09.2010	   298	   24.210	   -­‐	   -­‐	   338	   20.055	   312	   12.076	   948	   56.341	  
31.12.2010	   295	   23.379	   -­‐	   -­‐	   345	   21.353	   317	   12.253	   957	   56.985	  
	   29.89%	   41.03%	   -­‐	   -­‐	   34.52%	   37.47%	   32.12%	   21.50%	   100%	   100%	  













The	  same	  data	  is	  depicted	  graphically	  in	  Figure	  51	  and	  Figure	  52	  and	  illustrates	  the	  real	  decline	  
in	  clothing	  sector	  employment	  and	  industry	  strength	  between	  2004(3)	  and	  2010	  respectively.	  	  	  
	  
 Figure	  51:	  Total	  clothing	  manufacturing	  industry	  strengths:	  2003-­‐2010	  
	  
Source:	  Clothing	  National	  Bargaining	  Council	  
	  
Figure	  52:	  Clothing	  employment	  by	  region:	  2003-­‐2010	  
	  














NBC	  data	  records	  show	  that	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  quotas,	  2,767	  formal	  sector	  jobs	  were	  lost	  and	  
10	  firms	  closed	  down;	  and	   in	  the	  second	  year,	  despite	  14	  new	  firms	  opening	  doors,	  a	   further	  
4,359	  employees	  lost	  their	  jobs.	  The	  net	  loss	  to	  the	  formal	  clothing	  sector	  for	  the	  entire	  quota	  
period	  was	  7,126	   jobs.	   If	  one	   takes	   the	  heartland	  of	   the	   sector	   (Western	  Cape	  and	  KwaZulu-­‐
Natal),	  which	  was	  supposed	  to	  benefit	  the	  most	  from	  the	  China	  quotas,	  the	  employment	  losses	  
were	  an	  even	  greater	  6,897	  (comprising	  3,579	  and	  3,318	  respectively).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  
pace	  of	  the	  decline	  did	  slow	  during	  the	  quota	  period	  to	  9.57%	  compared	  with	  23.99%	  for	  the	  
two-­‐year	  period	  prior	  to	  quota	  imposition	  during	  which	  23,502	  jobs	  were	  shed.	  However,	  once	  
quotas	  were	  removed,	  employment	  in	  the	  sector	  hemorrhaged	  badly.	  Between	  2008	  and	  2010,	  
10,345	   jobs	  were	   lost	  and	  95	   firms	  went	  out	  of	  business	   (Table	  47).	  At	   the	  end	  of	  2010,	  957	  
firms	  formally	  employed	  56,985	  workers;	  this	  compares	  with	  98,539	  workers	  in	  2004.	  	  
	  
Table	  47:	  Employment	  and	  industry	  strength	  post	  quotas	  
 Employees Employers 
 Employee % Employee no Employers % Employers no 
Dec 04- 05 -15.19% -14877 -2.65% -31 
Dec 05-06 -10.38% -8625 -7.91% -90 
Dec 04-06 -23.99% -23502 -10.35% -121 
Dec 06-07 - 3.72% -2767 -0.95% -10 
Dec 07-08 - 6.08% -4359 1.35% 14 
Dec 06-08 - 9.57% -7126 0.38% 4 
Dec 08-09 - 8.00% -5389 -2.57% -27 
Dec 09-10 - 8.00% -4956 -6.63% -68 
Dec 08-10 -18.15% -10345 -9.93% -95 
Source:	  Clothing	  National	  Bargaining	  Council	  	   Own	  calculations	  
	  
It	  is	  thus	  very	  clear	  that	  the	  quotas	  fell	  far	  short	  of	  their	  mark	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  DTI’s	  projections	  
for	  employment	  generation,	  which	  supports	  predictions	  by	  analysts	  that	  this	  was	  a	  completely	  
unrealistic	  expectation	  based	  on	  the	  fundamentals	  (Edwards	  et	  al	  2006).	  The	  statistical	  results	  
on	  employment	  presented	  above	  are	  backed	  by	  evidence	  gathered	  from	  qualitative	  interviews	  
with	  20	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  manufacturers	  in	  KwaZulu-­‐Natal	  and	  Western	  Cape	  conducted	  in	  
September	  2007	  and	  a	  survey	  of	  32	  clothing	  manufacturers	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  and	  KwaZulu-­‐















13%	  of	  the	  firms	  interviewed	  reported	  that	  they	  had	  expanded	  their	  workforce,	  40%	  reported	  
no	  changes	  at	  all,	  and	  47%	  of	  firms	  reported	  either	  a	  reduction	   in	  the	  workforce	  or	   that	  they	  
had	  put	  workers	  on	  short	  time,	  or	  both.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  last	  group,	  it	   is	   important	  to	  note	  
that	  most	   of	   the	   downsizing	  was	   not	  wholly	   or	   directly	   the	   result	   of	   quotas	  which	   occurred	  
exclusively	  in	  non-­‐core	  production	  areas.	  For	  one	  firm,	  it	  was	  part	  of	  a	  strategic	  move	  to	  shrink	  
its	  merchandise	  design	  band.	  In	  the	  remaining	  firms,	  it	  was	  largely	  driven	  by	  a	  consolidation	  of	  
the	  management	  function	  in	  response	  to	  a	  general	  downturn	  of	  the	  industry.	  	  
	  
However,	   the	   real	   impact	   of	   quotas	   on	   employment	   is	   better	  measured	  by	   the	   “opportunity	  
cost”	  to	  employment	  –	  i.e.	  how	  much	  employment	  firms	  believe	  they	  could	  have	  created	  had	  
quotas	  not	  been	  imposed.	  By	  these	  counts,	  the	  cost	  was	  significant.	  	  
	  
“We	  were	  growing	  nicely	  before	  quotas	  and	  we	  could	  have	  employed	  more	  people,	  but	  
the	  quota	  on	  fabric	  has	  cut	  all	  possibility	  of	  increases.”	  
	  
Even	  in	  the	  two	  exceptional	  cases	  where	  the	  firms	  had	  actually	  expanded	  their	  workforce,	  this	  
growth	  was	  either	  not	  attributed	  to	  quotas,	  
	  
“Our	  growth	   is	   entirely	  due	   to	  our	  adoption	  of	  WCM	  practices;	   it	   is	   a	   classic	  product	  of	  
proper	   value	   chain	   alignment	   and	   forging	   collaborative	   relationships	   with	   other	  
stakeholders.”	  
	  
or,	  was	  expected	  to	  reverse	  once	  quotas	  disappeared.	  	  
	  
“The	  quotas	  have	  helped	  us	  with	  our	  political	  battle	  to	  grow	  employment,	  but	  since	  it	  has	  
occurred	  exclusively	  in	  an	  area	  in	  which	  competition	  from	  Chinese	  imports	  is	  most	  fierce,	  
we	  cannot	  guarantee	  that	  it	  will	  continue	  once	  quotas	  go.”	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  surge	  of	  imports	  from	  China	  must	  have	  contributed	  to	  job	  losses	  in	  certain	  areas,	  it	  
should	   rather	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   context	   of	   lost	   opportunity	   to	   grow	   the	   local	   clothing	   sector.	  
Hence,	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  should	  be	  based	  on	  estimations	  about	  how	  many	  jobs	  may	  
have	  been	  saved	  had	  the	  CSP	  been	  implemented	  instead	  of	  this	  intervention	  (Kipling	  2011).	  For	  













member	   firms	   intended	   on	   increasing	   staff	   in	   the	   following	   six	   months,	   15%	   still	   intended	  
reducing	  employment	  whilst	  66%	  intended	  remaining	  the	  same.	  In	  particular,	  the	  delay	  in	  the	  
CSP	  due	  to	  the	  fall	  out	  between	  business	  and	  the	  DTI	  over	  the	  China	  quotas	  was	  accountable	  
for	  much	   of	   the	   job	   loss	   between	   August	   2006	   and	   July	   2007.	   This	   is	   because	   a	   Key	   Action	  
Program	   in	   the	   CSP,	   specifically,	   the	   KAP	   that	   proposed	   the	   removal	   of	   duties	   on	   fabric	   and	  
trim,	  would	  have	  made	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  job	  creation	  (Clotrade	  2007b).	  
Sources	  of	  unemployment	  in	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  sector	  
	  
In	   theory,	   the	   employment	   argument	   for	   quotas	   is	   underpinned	   by	   the	   assumption	   that	  
restricting	   imports	  will	   generate	   greater	   demand	   for	   locally	   produced	   substitutes,	   which	  will	  
generate	  an	  increase	  in	  local	  output	  and	  in	  the	  process,	  in	  the	  demand	  for	  labour.	  In	  this	  way,	  
import	  restrictions,	  such	  as	  quotas,	  hypothetically	  contribute	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  unemployment	  
in	   the	   sector.	   The	   new	   labour	   hired,	   it	   is	   argued,	  will	   earn	   spendable	   income,	  which	   via	   the	  
Keynesian	  multiplier	  process	  will	  cause	  other	   industries	  to	  expand	  and	  add	  more	   jobs	  (Bivens	  
2003)	   is	  widely	  accepted	  that	  employment	  multipliers	   in	  manufacturing	  as	  a	  whole	  are	   larger	  
than	   in	  other	  sectors	  of	   the	  economy	  with	   the	   implication	   that	   job	   loss	   in	   the	  manufacturing	  
sector	  has	  large	  ripple	  effects	  throughout	  the	  larger	  economy.	  	  
	  
The	   Industrial	   Policy	   Action	   Plan	   (IPAP),	   released	   in	   August	   2007	   as	   the	   implementation	  
program	  for	  the	  NIPF	  noted	  that	  “(…)	  the	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  sector	  has	  been	  under	   intense	  
pressure	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990’s,	  negatively	  impacted	  by	  periods	  of	  currency	  strength	  and	  fierce	  
import	  competition,	  especially	  from	  China.	  Notwithstanding,	  the	  sector	  cannot	  be	  left	  to	  wither	  
away	  due	  to	  both	  its	  contribution	  to	  employment	  as	  well	  as	  to	  retain	  core	  capabilities	  that	  have	  
been	  built	  in	  the	  sector.”	  (CSP	  2004).	  The	  DTI	  dialogue	  on	  employment	  and	  the	  clothing	  sector	  
in	  the	  IPAP	  is	  transparent	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  DTI’s	  views	  on	  imports	  and	  jobs:	  Firstly,	  China	  is	  
the	   primary	   cause	   of	   the	   sector’s	   demise	   and	   secondly,	   trade	   protection	   would	   allow	   the	  
industry	   to	   restructure	   to	   become	   internationally	   competitive	   and	   create	   new	   jobs,	   both	  
directly	  and	  indirectly	  through	  its	  multiplier	  effect.	  	  
	  
The	  use	  of	  quotas	  to	  address	  unemployment	  in	  the	  sector	  was	  predicated	  on	  a	  direct	  causal	  link	  
between	   job	   losses	   and	   imports	   from	  China.	   However,	   experts	   argued	   that	   the	   employment	  













than	  were	  reflected	   in	  SACTWU’s	  claims	   (Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008	  ).	  Unemployment	  was	  not	  
solely	  a	  consequence	  of	  trade	  liberalisation	  but	  was	  a	  function	  of	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  playing	  
out	  at	  the	  time,	  of	  which	  rising	  imports	  were	  but	  one.	  	  
	  
Firstly,	   the	   spike	   in	   exports	   between	   2001	   and	   2003	   (Ref	   previous	   sections)	   generated	   an	  
estimated	   12,000	   jobs;	   hence	   Kipling	   2006	   argued	   that	   12,000	   of	   the	   total	   job	   loss	   between	  
2002	  and	  2007	  was	   in	   fact	  due	   to	  a	   collapse	   in	  exports,	  which	  was	   in	   turn	  as	  a	   result	  of	   the	  
strengthening	   Rand	   and	   rising	   production	   costs	   which	   were	   unaccompanied	   by	   productivity	  
improvements.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	   a	   key	   finding	   from	   firm	   interviews	  was	   that	   despite	   the	   employment	   losses	   being	  
experienced	   by	   the	   formal	   sector	   due	   to	   firm	   closures	   and	   retrenchments,	   surviving	   formal	  
sector	   manufacturers	   were	   unable	   to	   find	   qualified	   machinists	   to	   recruit.	   Furthermore,	   the	  
labour	  pool,	  particularly	  at	  operator	   level,	  but	   increasingly	   in	  other	  production	  areas	  too,	  was	  
diminishing	   at	   an	   alarming	   rate.	   Evidence	   from	   firms	   suggested	   (particularly	   in	   clothing)	   that	  
some	   unemployment	   in	   lower	   occupational	   spheres	   was	   voluntary,	   motivated	   by	   debt	   and	  
access	   to	   UIF	   and	   provident	   funds	   to	   settle	   this	   debt,	  migration	   to	   higher	  wage	   sectors	   and	  
staying	  at	  home	  to	  maintain	  a	  subsistence	  level	  of	  income	  from	  government	  grants.	  	  	  
	  
“At	   the	  end	  of	   the	  day,	   all	   people	   care	   about	   is	   take-­‐home	  pay.	   So	   if	   they	   can	  work	   from	  
home	  where	  they	  can	  take	  care	  of	  their	  kids	  and	  not	  have	  to	  expend	  money	  for	  travel,	  avoid	  
deductions	   for	   UIF,	   union	   dues,	   industrial	   council	   contributions	   etc.,	   they	   probably	   earn	  
more	  by	  working	  in	  the	  informal	  sector	  than	  they	  do	  working	  in	  the	  formal	  sector.”	  
	  
“Of	  all	  the	  thousands	  and	  thousands	  (of	  machinists)	  that	  have	  lost	  jobs,	  none	  want	  to	  come	  
back	   into	   the	   formal	   industry.	   Bottom	   line	   is	   they	   get	  more	  money	  working	   for	   backyard	  
CMTs	  than	  they	  would	  get	  working	  for	  a	  formal	  enterprise...”	  
	  
“What	  people	  want	   is	   flexibility.	  When	  they	   join	  a	  CMT,	  they	  can	  work	  four	  days	  a	  week	   if	  














This	   implied	   that	   the	   employment	   problem	  was	   fundamentally	   a	   formal	   sector	   problem	   and	  
that	   net	   involuntary	   job	   loss	   in	   the	   sector	   was	   significantly	   less	   than	   the	   official	   numbers	  
implied.	  The	  sloughing	  of	  formal	  sector	  employment	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  is	  best	  interpreted	  as	  
a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  radical	  restructuring	  of	  the	  industry	  in	  response	  to	  competitive	  pressures	  
from	  imports	  (Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008).	  This	  spurred	  a	  drive	  towards	  cost	  efficiency	  and	  lower	  
overhead	   structures	   and	   a	   re-­‐composition	   of	   labour	   as	   workers	   traded	   employment	   in	   the	  
formal	   sector	   for	   self-­‐employment	   in	   small,	   often	   home-­‐run	   enterprises	   sub-­‐contracting	   to	  
large	  manufacturers	  or	  supplying	  retailers	  directly	  (Morris	  and	  Reed	  2008b;	  2008c).	  One	  of	  the	  
problems	   facing	   analysts	   is	   the	   insufficient	   knowledge	   of	   employment	   numbers,	   working	  
conditions	  and	  wages	   for	   the	   informal	   sector	  but	   the	  scale	  of	   their	  existence	  means	   that	   the	  
CASE	  STUDY:	  INFORMALISATION	  OF	  EMPLOYMENT:	  A	  RACE	  TO	  THE	  BOTTOM?	  
	  
Aruna	   Clothing	   and	   Textiles	   is	   a	   small	   clothing	   manufacturer	   supplying	   women’s	   wear	   ranging	   from	  
dresses	   to	   cocktail	   dresses,	   tops,	   skirts	   and	   pants	   to	   high	   end	   boutiques	   throughout	   South	   Africa	  
servicing	  mid	  to	  high	  end	  consumers.	  20	  to	  30	  units	  of	  each	  style	  are	  produced	  to	  preserve	  exclusivity.	  
The	  garments	  are	  highly	  fashion	  oriented	  which	  implies	  that	  remaining	  on	  par	  with	  the	  European	  fashion	  
season	   is	   imperative.	   Fast	   fashion	   has	   increased	   both	   the	   frequency	   of	   seasons	   and	   reduced	   the	   lag	  
between	  South	  Africa	  and	  Europe	  to	  a	  few	  weeks.	  	  
	  
Initially	   the	   company,	  which	  employed	  25	  workers,	  maintained	  production	  exclusively	   in	   India	   to	   take	  
advantage	  of	   access	   to	   the	   large	   variety	  of	   good	  quality	   locally	  produced	   fabric	   and	  highly	   skilled	  and	  
productive	  labour	  force.	  Having	  established	  a	  sustainable	  customer	  base	  in	  South	  Africa,	  two	  years	  ago	  
the	   company	  explored	  possibilities	   for	  production	   in	   South	  Africa.	   This	  was	  driven	  mainly	  by	   logistical	  
contingencies	  such	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  physically	  monitor	  and	  control	  production	  (the	  owner	  is	  resident	  in	  
South	  Africa)	  and	  reduce	  replenishment	  times,	  although	  import	  duties,	  which	  raised	  the	  landed	  cost	  of	  
the	  garments,	  also	  played	  a	  role.	  	  
	  
Over	   the	   past	   few	   years	   a	   small	   portion	   of	   production	   has	   been	   shifted	   to	   South	   Africa	   on	   an	  
experimental	   basis.	   Work	   is	   outsourced	   to	   CMTs	   based	   in	   and	   around	   Athlone,	   Mitchells	   Plain	   and	  
Woodstock.	  The	  operations	  comprise	  4	  to	  5	  people	  who	  charge	  between	  R50-­‐R150	  per	  unit	  depending	  
on	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  garment.	  Due	  to	  their	  nature,	  the	  garments	  (which	  are	  silk)	  have	  a	  high	  skills	  
requirement	   and	   special	   on	   the	   job	   training	   was	   required	   to	   upskill	   the	   CMT'ers	   in	   basic	   operations	  
relating	  to	  silk.	  	  
	  
Despite	   the	  advantages	   -­‐	  outsourcing	  all	  production	   to	  CMTs	  would	  avoid	   the	  overhead	  costs	  and	   full	  
time	  employees	  that	  the	  company	  is	  obligated	  to	  in	  India	  -­‐	  a	  decisive	  shift	  in	  production	  to	  South	  Africa	  
was	  hampered	  by	  a	  number	  of	  factors;	  primarily,	  the	  lack	  of	  skills,	  low	  quality	  of	  work,	  poor	  work	  ethic	  
and	  lack	  of	  commitment.	  Not	  only	  are	  wages	  in	  India	  lower	  (for	  instance	  a	  patternmaker	  earns	  R8000	  or	  
Rs50000	  per	  month	  vs	  R10000;	  and	  a	  machinist	  Rs1587	  vs	  R6000),	  productivity	   is	  also	  very	  high	   since	  
production	   is	   geared	   for	   the	   US	   and	   EU	   markets.	   The	   company	   acknowledged	   that	   low	   levels	   of	  
motivation	   and	   productivity	   in	   South	   Africa	   likely	   stem	   from	   informal	   employment	   and	   the	   insecurity	  
that	   accompanies	   it.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   could	   not	   envisage	   a	   profitable	   formally	   established	   CMT	  
operation	   in	  South	  Africa	  due	   to	  high	  and	   inflexible	   formal	   sector	  wages	  and	  working	  hours	   (although	  
India	  also	  works	  on	  a	  fixed	  wage	  basis	  and	  firms	  employing	  over	  50	  workers	  are	  unionised),	  the	  high	  cost	  
of	  fabric	  (which	   is	  R27/m	  in	   India	  compared	  with	  R200/m	  in	  SA	  due	  to	   import	  duties)	  and	  lack	  of	   local	  
alternatives	   therefor;	   and	   finally,	   lack	   of	   government	   effort	   around	   training	   incentives	   and	   upskilling	  














whole	   formal	   sector	   job	   loss	   issue	   is	   distorted	   by	   the	   concurrent	   rise	   in	   informal	   sector	  
employment	  (Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008).	  	  Whilst	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  determine	  precisely	  
the	  number	  of	  jobs	  lost	  in	  total	  in	  both	  formal	  and	  informal	  sectors	  of	  the	  clothing	  industry	  due	  
directly	   to	   the	  surge	  of	   imports,	  what	   is	  absolutely	  clear	   is	   that	   there	  has	  been	  an	  enormous	  
loss	  of	  opportunity	  to	  grow	  the	  clothing	  industry	  (Kipling	  2011).	  
Motivation	  for	  the	  quotas:	  Unemployment	  or	  non-­compliance?	  
	  
Enforcement	  of	  collective	  wage	  agreements,	   legislated	  working	  hours	  and	  working	  conditions	  
fall	   under	   the	   purview	   of	   the	   National	   Bargaining	   Council	   (NBC),	   which	   is	   the	   institutional	  
mouthpiece	   for	   the	  South	  African	  Clothing	  Workers	  Union	   (SACTWU).	  This	   is	  by	  virtue	  of	   the	  
current	   configuration	   of	   South	   African	   politics;	   COSATU	   (Confederated	   SA	   Trade	   Union)	   is	   a	  
partner	   in	   the	   governing	   coalition	   (the	   ANC).	   National	   Bargaining	   Council	   (i.e.	   union)	   power	  
ensures	  that	  clothing	  sector	  wages	  remain	  at	  rigidly	  higher	  levels	  than	  those	  required	  to	  clear	  
the	  labour	  market;	  this	  despite	  the	  obvious	  contradiction	  to	  the	  ANC’s	  Manifesto	  commitment	  
of	   employment	   creation.	   Wage	   rates	   and	   working	   hours	   were	   a	   major	   hindrance	   to	   local	  
competitiveness	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  quotas	  (Edwards	  et	  al	  2006).	  The	  minimum	  wage	  of	  South	  
African	  workers	   in	  2005	  was	  the	  equivalent	  of	  US$2,40	  per	  hour,	  compared	  with	  US$0,40	  per	  
hour	  for	  Chinese	  workers	  (du	  Toit	  2005)87.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  most	  Asian	  competitors	  work	  on	  a	  
piecemeal	   system	   that	   significantly	   raises	   productivity.	   Requests	   by	   industry	   to	   alter	   the	  
dispensation	   of	   wages	   to	   reflect	   the	   varying	   levels	   of	   productivity	   and	   different	   economic	  
conditions	  across	  metro	  and	  non-­‐metro	  areas	  were	  consistently	  rejected	  by	  SACTWU,	  as	  were	  
those	  to	  lower	  the	  minimum	  wage	  to	  legalise	  non-­‐compliant	  firms.	  	  
	  
As	   members	   of	   the	   Bargaining	   Council,	   employers	   are	   legally	   obliged	   to	   unionise	   their	  
employees.	  Furthermore,	  union	  membership	  fees	  are	  calculated	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  a	  worker’s	  
wage.	  These	  two	  factors	  –	  compulsory	  union	  membership	  and	  payment	  of	  the	  minimum	  wage	  -­‐	  
by	   design	   create	   an	   incentive	   for	   SACTWU	   to	   enforce	   compliance,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   for	  
firms	  and	  employees	  to	  avoid	  detection.	  This	  led	  to	  high	  and	  rising	  levels	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  in	  
the	  industry	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  quotas	  (Ref	  previous	  section).	  Primarily	  in	  KZN,	  firms	  relocated	  
from	  urban	  to	  rural	  areas	  where	  wages	  are	  lower,	  a	  more	  flexible	  labour	  regime	  operates,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













lower	   rates	   of	   unionisation	   are	   evident.	   Some	   firms	   have	   gone	   as	   far	   as	   relocating	   across	  
borders	   to	   neighbouring	   countries	   such	   as	   Lesotho	   and	   Swaziland	   where	   the	   wage	   and	  
regulatory	  environment	  is	  even	  less	  onerous.	  
	  
To	  compound	  problems	  for	  SACTWU,	  employment	  in	  formal	  sector	  firms	  and	  hence	  in	  those	  in	  
SACTWU’s	   purview,	   was	   falling	   as	   many	   workers	   were	   retrenched	   or	   voluntarily	   exited	   the	  
formal	  sector,	  partly	  and	  ironically,	  to	  avoid	  Bargaining	  Council	  levies	  (ref	  previous	  section).	  The	  
upshot	  is	  that	  the	  unions	  were	  losing	  on	  all	  fronts.	  A	  large	  part	  of	  the	  unemployment	  problem	  
was	   experienced	   by	   the	   union	   and	   superimposed	   on	   the	   industry	   with	   union	   membership	  
losses	  presenting	  as	  a	  loss	  of	  clothing	  sector	  employment.	  SACTWU	  could	  not	  publicise	  this	  fact	  
without	  simultaneously	  undermining	  its	  own	  motivations	  for	  the	  China	  quotas.	  	  
	  
Output	  and	  competitiveness	  
Output	  volume	  and	  composition	  	  
	  
To	  measure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  quotas	  in	  stimulating	  local	  manufacturing	  activity,	  firms	  were	  
asked	   to	   report	  on	   their	  output	   levels	  on	   separate	  occasions	   in	  2007	  and	  200888.	   	   Firm	   level	  
interviews	  confirmed	  that,	  on	  the	  whole,	  the	  impact	  of	  quotas	  on	  clothing	  manufacturing	  firms	  
was	  negative	   in	   terms	  of	  output.	  26%	  of	   firms	   interviewed	   in	  2007	   reported	  a	  contraction	  of	  
between	   20%-­‐40%	   in	   output	   (in	   units).	   	   48%	   reported	   unchanged	   volumes.	   In	   2008,	   14%	  
reported	   that	   they	   had	   produced	  more	   garments	   since	   quotas,	   59%	   produced	   less	   and	   28%	  
produced	   the	   same	   as	   before	   quotas.	   The	   failure	   of	   the	   intervention	   to	   provide	   a	   sustained	  
impetus	   to	   output	   growth	   and	   innovation	   during	   the	   initial	   period	   of	   the	   quotas	  was	   largely	  
blamed	  on	  forward	  purchasing	  by	  retailers,	  which	  led	  to	  a	  complete	  over-­‐stocking	  of	  the	  retail	  
chain.	   In	   particular,	   firms	   revealed	   that	   the	   delay	   in	   implementation	   closed	   the	   window	   of	  
opportunity	   that	   quotas	   were	   supposed	   to	   offer	   local	   suppliers	   since	   importers	   brought	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According	  to	  one	  firm	  interviewed:	  
	  
“There	  was	  a	  total	  overstocking	  in	  the	  whole	  retail	  chain	  in	  preparation	  of	  quotas.	  Quota-­‐
wise,	  retailers	  got	  what	  they	  wanted	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  supply	  base	  and	  local	  business	  has	  not	  
been	  flooded	  with	  orders	  as	  government	  anticipated.”	  
	  
These	   findings	  were	   supported	  by	  a	  Clotrade	  survey	   in	  2007,	  which	   revealed	   that	  only	  9%	  of	  
respondents	   thought	   that	  quotas	  had	  had	  a	  positive	   impact	  on	   their	  business	  whilst	  31%	   felt	  
that	  it	  had	  actually	  hampered	  their	  business	  and	  60%	  reported	  that	  they	  had	  had	  no	  impact	  at	  
all	   (Clotrade	   2007b	   p.8).	   If	   anything,	   quotas	   aggravated	   the	   situation	   for	   clothing	  
manufacturers,	   particularly	  where	   restrictions	   on	   fabric	  were	   linked	   to	   unprecedented	   fabric	  
price	  increases	  following	  the	  announcement	  of	  quotas	  (Clotrade	  2007b).	  	  
	  
“We	  were	  just	  starting	  to	  grow	  nicely	  when	  our	  whole	  ability	  to	  expand	  was	  curtailed.	  
In	  six	  months,	  we	  have	  shrunk	  by	  30%;	  not	  only	  did	  we	  not	  increase	  orders,	  but	  we	  lost	  
our	  existing	  supply	  base	  because	  we	  couldn’t	  fill	  orders.	  ”	  
	  
“If	  not	  for	  quotas,	  we	  would	  have	  had	  two	  full	  production	  lines	  with	  20	  people	  per	  line.	  
Instead	  we	  have	  seen	  a	  20%	  drop	   in	  output	  because	  our	  design	  house	  cannot	  source	  
the	  fabric.”	  
	  
From	  a	  manufacturer	  point	  of	  view,	  capacity	  shortages	  were	  the	  greatest	  hurdle	  to	  exploiting	  
the	   opportunity	   that	   quotas	  would	   hypothetically	   create	   since	  many	   textiles	   producers	  were	  
simply	  unable	  or,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  many	  unwilling	  to,	  gear	  supply	  to	  the	  clothing	  industry.	  	  
	  
“The	  local	   industry	  did	  absolutely	  nothing	  to	  step	  up	  to	  the	  plate	  in	  delivering	  extra	  
capacity	  to	  make	  up	  for	  quota	  restrictions	  and	  this	  cost	  us	  market	  share.”	  
	  
Interviews	   with	   local	   textiles	   firms	   in	   2007	   revealed	   an	   increased	   shift	   away	   from	   the	  
manufacturing	   of	   inputs	   to	   supply	   local	   apparel	   production	   toward	   production	   of	   industrial	  
textiles	  and	  supply	  to	  niche	  export	  markets.	  This	  was	  a	  continuation	  of	  a	  trend	  that	  commenced	  
post	  2001	  when	  access	   to	   imported	   fabric	   culminated	   in	   falling	  demand	   for	   locally	  produced	  













the	   quotas	   or	   even	   in	   the	   medium	   run	   since	   they	   had	   retooled	   and	   restructured	   their	  
production	  platform	   to	  meet	  export	  demand,	  which	   implied	   long-­‐term	   financial	   commitment	  
and	  structural	  rigidities.	  	  
	  
The	   void	   in	   local	   fabric	   supply	   compounded	   a	   more	   exigent	   problem	   facing	   manufacturers,	  
namely	   the	   shortage	   of	   imported	   fabric.	   This	   stemmed	   from	   the	   fundamentally	   flawed	  
allocation	  mechanism	  for	  quota,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  basis	  for	  their	   initial	  calculation	  and	  the	  
sanctioning	  of	  additional	  quota.	  Quota	   for	   the	  next	  period	  was	  based	  on	  quantity	  ordered	   in	  
the	  current	  period.	  Consequently,	  only	  those	  firms	  who	  previously	  imported	  fabric	  from	  China	  
in	   those	  precise	   categories	  under	  quota	  were	  eligible	   to	   apply	   for	   additional	  quota	   (Clotrade	  
2007b).	  Calculations	  for	  quota	  were	  based	  on	  an	  18-­‐month	  formula	  spanning	  one	  Summer	  and	  
two	  Winter	   seasons.	   Since	  most	  manufacturers	   had	   finalized	  most	   of	   their	   orders	   (75%)	   for	  
Summer	   2008,	   this	   significantly	   jeopardized	   the	   percentages	   and	   created	   tremendous	  
imbalances	   in	   (fabric)	   supplies.	   An	   examination	   of	   the	   restrictions	   shows	   that	   quantities	   for	  
2006	  were	   anchored	   to	   between	   10%	   and	   15%	   above	   the	   2003	   imports	   in	   almost	   all	   cases,	  
suggesting	   that	   these	   were	   the	   criteria	   used	   to	   base	   the	   regime	   upon	   rather	   than	   an	  more	  
detailed	  approach	  (Sandrey	  and	  Jansen	  2007)	  
	  
Underutilisation	  of	  quota	  in	  both	  2007	  and	  2008	  (Table	  48	  below)	  broadly	  confirmed	  problems	  
with	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  quotas	  were	  allocated	  and	   the	  procedures	  and	   regulations	   for	   the	  
granting	  of	  additional	  quota.	  	  
	  
Table	  48:	  Quota	  utilisation	  for	  fabrics:	  2007	  and	  2008	  
Period	   Knits	   Wovens	  
	   60.05	   60.06	   52.08	   52.09	   52.10	   56.14	  
Jan-­‐Dec	  07	   30.4%	   39.1%	   71.3%	   15.3%	   56.2%	   55.4%	  
Jan-­‐Dec	  08	   9.9%	   16.7%	   26.5%	   5.7%	   20.5%	   26.2%	  
















Given	  market	  unpredictability	  due	  to	  volatile	  consumer	  tastes	  and	  frequent	  fashion	  changes,	  it	  
is	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  place	  future	  orders	  based	  on	  current	  demand	  patterns.	  
	  
	  As	  one	  firm	  interviewed	  put	  it,	  
	  
“If	  we	  have	  an	  order	  on,	  say,	  code	  6405	  for	  this	  year,	  then	  we	  get	  quota	  for	  next	  year	  on	  
this	  code	  ….	  But	  we	  may	  not	  need	  it	  next	  year	  because	  fashions	  may	  have	  changed.	  And	  the	  
fabric	  that	  we	  do	  need	  we	  can’t	  get	  because	  we	  didn’t	  order	  it	  this	  year…”	  
	  
According	  to	  interviews	  conducted,	  three	  areas	  which	  were	  hardest	  hit	  in	  terms	  of	  reduction	  in	  
percentage	  were	   ironically	   those	  which,	   from	  a	  retail	  and	  consumer	  perspective,	  experienced	  
the	  most	  significant	  shifts	   in	  demand;	   in	  particular,	  woven	  cotton	  fabrics	   (5208	  and	  5210),	  as	  
well	   as	   knits	   (6006).	  Comparatively,	   too	  much	  quota	  was	  granted	   for	  other	   categories	   (5514,	  
6005	  and	  6006).	  In	  some	  instances,	  the	  design	  of	  the	  restrictions	  in	  terms	  of	  product	  coverage	  
and	  scope	  completely	  lacked	  economic	  foundation	  or	  logic.	  Kipling	  2008	  illustrated	  one	  specific	  
case	   in	   point.	   T-­‐shirts	   was	   a	   product	   specifically	   excluded	   from	   quota	   whilst	   quota	   was	  
implemented	   on	   fabric	   for	   the	   use	   in	   the	   manufacture	   of	   T-­‐shirts.	   This	   led	   to	   the	   bizarre	  
consequence	   of	   increasing	   the	   incentive	   to	   import	   the	   ready-­‐made	   garments.	   Imports	   of	   T-­‐
shirts	   from	   China	   totaled	   81	   million	   units	   in	   2007,	   up	   36%	   on	   2006	   imports	   and	   this	   trend	  
continued	   into	   2008.	   Imports	   of	   T-­‐shirts	   for	   the	   first	   six	  months	   of	   2008	   totaled	   R36.6m;	   an	  
increase	   of	   16%	   on	   the	   comparable	   2007	   period.	   This	   growth	   in	   imports	   during	   the	   quota	  
period	  likely	  occurred	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  local	  T-­‐shirts	  manufactured	  in	  2006,	  which	  may	  explain	  
the	  low	  utilisation	  of	  the	  quota	  (Clotrade	  2007a).	  
	  
The	   survey	   of	   manufacturers	   in	   the	   Western	   Cape	   and	   KZN	   conducted	   co	   operatively	   with	  
Clotrade	   in	   2008,	   by	   which	   time	   the	   (beneficial)	   impact	   of	   quotas	   should	   have	   been	   largely	  
entrenched,	  showed	  that	   this	  picture	  had	  barely	  changed.	   If	  anything,	   the	  negative	   impact	   in	  
respect	  of	  quotas	  on	  fabric	  compounded	  with	  time.	  Figure	  53	  summarises	  the	  response	  pattern	  
















Figure	  53:	  Demonstration	  of	  perceived	  impact	  of	  quotas	  on	  fabric	  availability	  and	  prices	  










60%	  of	  firms	  reported	  that	  they	  had	  produced	  less	  than	  before	  quotas.	  Three	  of	  the	  firms	  in	  the	  
sample	  (10%)	  did	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  question	  on	  price.	  In	  two	  cases,	  this	  was	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	   the	   fabric	  was	  not	  available	   in	  South	  Africa	  at	  any	  price.	   In	   the	  third	  case,	   it	  was	  argued	  
that	   local	   mills	   were	   so	   incompetent	   that	   they	   were	   not	   even	   worth	   consideration	   as	   a	  
potential	  supply	  source,	  thus	  ruling	  out	  the	  possibility	  for	  price	  comparisons.	  Of	  the	  remaining	  
90%	  of	   the	   sample,	   66%	  of	   respondents	   indicated	   that	   they	  had	  been	  negatively	   affected	  by	  
fabric	  shortages	  or	  delays.	  Of	  these,	  45%	  reported	  they	  had	  suffered	  a	  severe	  adverse	  impact	  
whilst	  the	  remaining	  55%	  felt	  that	  the	  negative	  impact	  was	  manageable.	  Where	  some	  firms	  did	  
not	   suffer	   fabric	   shortages,	   th y	   reported	   problems	   relating	   to	   deteriorating	   fabric	   quality89.	  
Furthermore,	  41%	  of	  respondents	  believed	  that	  quotas	  had	  led	  to	  significant	  increases	  in	  local	  
fabric	  prices.	  	  
	  
Only	  30%	  of	   firms	  believed	   they	  were	  unaffected	  by	   fabric	  quotas	  at	  all.	  37%	  of	   respondents	  
were	   affected	   by	   both	   fabric	   non	   availability	   and	   increasing	   prices.	   7%	   reported	   increasing	  
prices	   but	   no	   problems	  with	   supply;	   26%	   reported	   supply	   problems	   but	   did	   not	   believe	   that	  
prices	   had	   increased.	   One	   firm	   argued	   that	   the	   closure	   of	   some	  major	   South	   African	   fabric	  
factories	  (such	  as	  BMD	  and	  Gregory)	  also	  reduced	  the	  options	  of	  local	  manufacturers.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Firm 29 reported ongoing problems with quality of fabric from China and some new sources such as 
Bangladesh. 
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60%	  of	  those	  firms	  who	  were	  unaffected	  by	  fabric	  shortages	  experienced	  a	  drop	  in	  the	  quality	  
of	   fabric	  available	   from	  both	   local	  and	   foreign	  suppliers,	  as	  well	  as	   increasingly	  poor	  delivery	  
times.	  Even	  firms	  who	  had	  invested	  in	  upgrading	  their	  plant	  and	  workforce	  to	  be	  internationally	  
competitive	   and	   should	   thus	   have	   been	   ideally	   poised	   to	   benefit	   from	   quotas,	   experienced	  
losses	   due	   to	   fabric	   shortages	   and	   mounting	   problems	   in	   the	   supply	   chain.	   These	   were	  
exacerbated	   by	   poorly	   contrived	   quota	   allocation	  mechanisms	   and	   implementation	   systems.	  
Some	  clothing	  manufacturers	  experienced	  a	  drop	  in	  turnover	  due	  to	  quota,	  not	  on	  fabric,	  but	  
on	   fully	   assembled	   garments.	   This	   happened	   where;	   manufacturers	   were	   importing	  
components	   to	   make	   up	   garments;	   manufacturers	   were	   importing	   garments	   to	   make	  
combination	  packs	  (Case	  Study	  1);	  or	  manufacturers	  were	  cross	  subsidising	  their	  own	  products	  
by	   importing	   high	   minute	   rate	   garments	   to	   balance	   their	   bottom	   line	   in	   production.	   In	  
anticipation	  of	  falling	  prices	  received	  from	  retailers	  (due	  to	  low	  cost	  imports)	  and	  hence	  falling	  
margins	  on	  their	  own	  products	  in	  the	  future,	  many	  local	  clothing	  firms	  had	  recently	  established	  
or	  expanded	  their	  own	  imported	  clothing	  lines	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  profits.	  Furthermore,	  60%	  
of	   those	   firms	  who	  reported	  they	  were	  unaffected	  by	   fabric	  shortages	   in	  2007	  experienced	  a	  
drop	   in	   the	   quality	   of	   fabric	   available	   from	   both	   local	   and	   foreign	   suppliers,	   as	   well	   as	  
increasingly	   poor	   delivery	   times.	   This	   flagged	  mounting	   problems	   in	   the	   supply	   chain,	  which	  
would	  not	  be	  directly	  addressed	  by	  quotas.	  	  
CASE	  STUDY	  1:	  FAULTY	  QUOTA	  MECHANISMS	  
Seven	  years	  ago,	  a	  large	  CMT	  identified	  a	  market	  gap	  for	  an	  underwire	  bra,	  which	  requires	  specific	  
competency.	   It	   developed	   a	   product	   line	   with	   two	   bra	   lines,	   underwire	   and	   T-­‐shirt	   to	   sell	   in	  
combination	   with	   two	   of	   their	   established	   underwear	   lines,	   the	   g-­‐leg	   and	   panty.	   The	   firm	  
subsequently	   landed	   a	   contract	   to	   supply	   a	   large	   retailer	   contingent	   on	   its	   ability	   to	   supply	   a	  
combination	   pack,	   which	   included	   a	   padded	   bra.	   This	   latter	   component	   incorporates	   seam-­‐free	  
technology,	   which	   is	   available	   exclusively	   from	   China.	   The	   firm	   began	   to	   import	   padded	   bras	   in	  
February	  2006.	  When	  quotas	  were	   introduced	   in	   January	  2007,	   since	   it	  was	   a	  new	  entrant	  with	   a	  
historically	   low	  import	  volume	  of	  this	  category,	  the	  firm	  was	  awarded	  zero	  quota	  for	  padded	  bras.	  
The	  quota	  was	  awarded	  mainly	  to	  one	  large	  established	  company	  who	  had	  previously	  imported	  large	  
volumes	  of	  padded	  bras.	  However,	  since	  there	  was	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  unallocated	  quota	  for	  panties,	  
the	   firm	  was	   awarded	   substantial	   quota	   for	   this	   category,	  which	   it	   did	   not	   need.	   The	   firm	   lost	   its	  
contract	  with	  the	  retailer	  and	  had	  to	  retrench	  15%	  of	  its	  intimate	  wear	  workforce,	  the	  equivalent	  of	  
8%	  of	  its	  total	  workforce.	  This	  was	  the	  first	  retrenchment	  that	  the	  firm	  had	  witnessed	  in	  18	  years	  of	  
operation.	   For	   the	   first	   six	  months	   of	   2007,	   solely	   because	   of	   quotas,	   the	   firm’s	   average	  monthly	  













The	   negative	   impact	   of	   the	   China	   quotas	   was	   exemplified	   at	   the	   smaller	   operator	   level.	   I	  
gathered	  information	  from	  a	  small	  number	  of	  firms	  who	  pre	  quotas	  all	  supplied	  a	  retail	  chain	  
that	  exclusively	  spearheaded	  South	  African	  designers.	  As	  symbols	  for	  the	  “buy	  local”	  campaign,	  
these	  firms	  should	  have	  been	  the	  primary	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  intervention	  that	  touted	  support	  
of	  the	  local	  industry.	  The	  inability	  to	  secure	  quota	  for	  imported	  fabric	  due	  to	  their	  insignificant	  
size	   and	   the	   high	   cost	   of	   local	   alternatives,	   or	   the	   lack	   of	   availability	   othereof,	   forced	   a	  
considerable	  number	  of	   small	   firms	   to	   close	   their	  doors	  within	   the	   first	   six	  months	  and	  even	  
more	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  year	  and	  before	  quota	  expiry	  (this	  was	  based	  on	  “hear	  say”	  not	  
actual	  evidence).	  According	  to	  the	  representative	  of	  one	  firm	  that	  supplies	  fabric	  to	  a	  significant	  
base	  of	  small	  clothing	  manufacturers,	  fabric	  was	  the	  most	  binding	  constraint	  on	  productivity;	  in	  
terms	  of	  quantity,	  quality,	   long	  delivery	  times	  and	  the	  delay	  in	  getting	  quota	  approved.	  Many	  
never	   received	   concessions	   that	   they	   applied	   for.	   Their	   small	   size	   not	   only	   counted	   against	  
them	   in	  pledging	   for	  concessions	   for	  extra	  quota	  on	  Chinese	   fabric,	  but	  also	   in	   their	  dealings	  
with	  alternative	  foreign	  suppliers,	  such	  as	  Bangladesh	  and	  Pakistan	  who	  cater	  for	  large	  orders.	  
Skills	   shortgages	   and	   labour	   costs	   were	   identified	   as	   the	   second	   constraint	   but	   these	   were	  
largely	   circumvented	   by	   stepping	   up	   outsourcing	   to	   (informal)	   CMT’ers.	   Another	   source	  
reported	   that	  many	   small	   firms	   subcontracted	   between	   35%	  and	   50%	  of	   their	   production	   to	  
CMT	  operations	  before	  the	  quotas;	  this	   increased	  significantly	  during	  the	  quota	  period	  driven	  
by	  an	  effort	  to	  reduce	  overhead	  costs	  to	  counter	  higher	  fabric	  costs.	  As	  one	  interviewee	  put	  it:	  
	  
“We	  have	  to	  maintain	  our	  prices	  on	  the	  shelf	  because	  we	  know	  that	  our	  customers	  buy	  
our	  clothes	  beause	  they	  offer	  high	  fasion	  at	  good	  value.	  We	  can’t	  suddenly	  hike	  our	  prices	  
and	  expect	  the	  customer	  to	  understand.	   	  Fabric	  and	  labour	  are	  our	  two	  big	  costs,	  so	  we	  
balance	  the	  increase	  in	  one	  (fabric)	  by	  lowering	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  other.	  If	  I	  employ	  a	  worker,	  
I	  have	  to	  pay	  them	  a	  fixed	  wage,	  the	  CMT’ers	  charge	  by	  batch	  or	  even	  per	  garment,	  which	  
makes	  a	  big	  difference	  when	  you	  average	  it	  out.”	  
	  
Few	   firms	   managed	   to	   preserve	   their	   pre-­‐quota	   levels	   of	   inhouse	   production	   for	   the	   full	  
duration	  of	  the	  quotas.	  Based	  on	  available	  evidence,	  most	  small	  firms	  had	  either	  scaled	  down	  
their	   own	   operations	   by	   contracting	   a	   larger	   portion	   or,	   all	   of	   the	   production	   to	   informal	  













small	  independent	  retailers	  and	  shifted	  some,	  or	  in	  two	  cases,	  all	  of	  their	  production	  offshore	  
to	  India.	  	  
	  
In	   meeting	   their	   objective	   of	   affording	   local	   firms	   protection	   from	   foreign	   competition,	  
qualitative	  evidence	   from	   firms	   surveyed	   in	  both	  2007	  and	  2008	   indicated	   that	  China	  quotas	  
had	   merely	   added	   an	   additional	   layer	   of	   complexity	   to	   operations.	   The	   lengthy	   application	  
processes	   and	   red	   tape	   delayed	   the	   granting	   of	   additional	   quota	   to	   firms,	   which	   prejudiced	  
their	  ability	  to	  service	  their	  customers	  and	  extract	  future	  orders	  from	  retailers,	  which	  resulted	  
in	   business	   going	   to	   overseas	   firms.	   Comments	   from	   firm	   representatives	   emphasised	   the	  
significant	   supply	   chain	   disruption	   that	   quotas	   caused	   whilst	   creating	   an	   extra	   layer	   of	  
inefficiency:	  
	  
“As	  far	  as	  the	  beneficial	  impact	  of	  quotas	  on	  the	  local	  market	  is	  concerned,	  these	  have	  been	  
negligible.	   But	   they	   have	   made	   doing	   business	   more	   difficult.	   The	   quotas	   are	   a	   blunt	  
instrument	  and	  have	  not	  taken	  into	  account	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  number	  of	  fabrics	  and	  garments	  
that	  were	  being	  imported	  from	  China	  are	  not	  readily	  available	  in	  SA.”	  
	  
“Application	  for	  extra	  quota	  took	  over	  four	  months.	  This	  resulted	  in	  numerous	  orders	  being	  
cancelled	  while	  our	  fabric	  was	  stuck	  in	  the	  docks	  awaiting	  clearance.”	  
	  
Relationship	  with	  retailers	  
	  
Problems	  with	  fabric	  quality,	  the	  lack	  of	  ranges	  and	  postponed	  delivery	  dates	  for	  garments,	  all	  
directly	   as	   a	   result	   of	   quotas,	   had	   an	   adverse	   impact	   on	   customer	   relations	   for	   37%	   of	  
respondents	   in	   the	   2008	   survey.	   3%	   of	   respondents	   (one	   firm)	   believed	   that	   quotas	   had	  
positively	  impacted	  on	  their	  customer	  relations.	  60%	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  that	  there	  had	  been	  
any	  change	  at	  all.	  Although	  retailers	  in	  principle	  supported	  the	  “buy	  local”	  campaign,	  they	  were	  
cautious	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  local	  fabric	  suppliers	  to	  deliver	  on	  quantity	  and	  quality	  across	  the	  
board.	  As	  one	  major	  retailer	  explained,	  there	  were	  limits	  to	  this	  process:	  
	  
“We	  intend	  to	  increase	  our	  local	  component	  significantly,	  but	  are	  extremely	  concerned	  that	  
there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  fabrics	  that	  the	  local	  market	  cannot	  make	  that	  are	  identical	  or	  similar,	  













In	   addition	   they	   warned	   that	   a	   price	   that	   was	   “too	   far	   out”	   would	   simply	   lead	   to	   the	  
procurement	   of	   ready-­‐made	   garments	   from	   quota-­‐free	   areas.	  What	   is	   more,	   manufacturers	  
conveyed	  retailer	  sentiments	  that	  their	  predicament	  was	  largely	  their	  own	  creation:	  
	  
“Our	  customers	  have	  become	  more	  distant	  with	  price	  being	  the	  only	  criteria...”	  
	  
“Our	  customers	  believe	  that	  as	  manufacturers	  we	  requested	  the	  quotas	  which	  is	  simply	  not	  
true.	  As	   a	   result,	   they	   sought	   cheaper	   garments	   elsewhere,	   and	   found	   even	  better	   value	  
than	  China	   in	  Bangladesh,	  Vietnam,	  Malaysia	  and	  Myanmar,	  or	   simply	   resorted	   to	  buying	  
transhipped	  garments.”	  
	  
Finally,	  manufacturers	  believed	  that	  the	  full	  brunt	  of	  the	  restrictions	  was	  never	  brought	  to	  bear	  
on	  importers	  who	  simply	  transshipped	  a	  large	  bulk	  of	  their	  product.	  The	  belief	  that	  local	  firms	  
lost	  business	  to	  illegal	  imports	  was	  incongruent.	  
	  
“A	  lot	  of	  my	  customers	  buy	  from	  the	  Chinese	  who	  are	  able	  to	  supply	  quota	  items...”	  
	  
An	  importer	  of	  a	  well-­‐known	  branded	  product	  confirmed	  these	  suspicions:	  
“As	  soon	  as	  I	  heard	  about	  quotas,	  my	  first	  thought	  was:	  How	  can	  I	  get	  around	  this?	  I	  
flew	   straight	   to	   Bangladesh	   and	   enquired	   how	   I	   could	   get	   my	   garments	   made	   up	  
there	  and	  sent	  to	  South	  Africa	  with	  my	  company’s	  label	  on.	  The	  answer	  was:	  There	  is	  
no	  difference,	  the	  stuff	  is	  still	  made	  in	  China,	  just	  the	  paperwork	  changes	  because	  it	  
leaves	  from	  Singapore!”	  
	  
Firms	   were	   asked	   to	   rank	   on	   a	   scale	   of	   1	   to	   10	   (1=lowest;	   10=highest)	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  
quotas	   in	   providing	   protection	   from	   import	   competition.	   A	   breakdown	   of	   their	   responses	  
appears	  in	  Table	  49	  below.	  	  
	  
Table	  49:	  Demonstration	  of	  perceived	  impact	  of	  quotas	  on	  import	  competition	  	   
Scale	   Respondents	  
1	   53%	  
2	   20%	  
3	   3%	  
4	   7%	  
5	   10%	  














In	   general,	   firms	   argued	   that	   relief	   from	   foreign	   competition	  was	   temporary	   and	   short-­‐lived	  
because	   customers	   sought	   goods	   elsewhere	   and	   new	   sources	   were	   found.	   However	   when	  
asked	  whether	  they	  believed	  their	  orders	  would	  increase	  or	  decrease	  once	  quotas	  had	  expired,	  
responses	  showed	  that	  although	  37%	  of	  firms	  expected	  their	  orders	  to	  fall	  -­‐	  with	  17%	  a	  major	  
fall	  -­‐	  30%	  expected	  their	  order	  books	  to	  grow.	  33%	  expected	  their	  orders	  to	  be	  unchanged	  post	  
quota.	   Firms	   argued	   that	   rising	   costs	   in	   China	  would	   be	   a	  major	   factor	   in	   influencing	   future	  
sourcing	   decisions	   and	   that	   this	  would	   govern	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   orders	   reverted	   to	   China	  
upon	   quota	   removal.	   However,	   retailers	   emphasised	   the	   non-­‐cost	   benefits	   of	   dealing	   with	  
Chinese	  suppliers	  which	  override	  price	  concerns:	  
	  
“China	  prices	  are	  not	  the	  best	  in	  the	  World	  in	  quota	  and	  non	  quota	  classifications...China	  is	  
however,	  more	  reliable	   in	  delivery	  date	  achievement	  and	  quality	  predictability	   than	  some	  
of	  the	  cheaper	  sources.”	  
Skills	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  competitiveness	  	  
	  
Establishing	  whether	  firms	  had	  increased	  their	  skills	  demand	  shed	  some	  additional	  light	  on	  the	  
issue	   of	   upgrading	   (and	   employment).	   A	   growing	   supply	   base	   would	   translate	   as	   increased	  
employment	  and	  an	  expansion	  in	  the	  demand	  for	  skills.	  A	  change	  in	  skills	  requirements	  would	  
indicate	  that	   firms	  had	  changed	  place	   in	  the	  value	  chain.	  The	   latter	  also	  partly	  addressed	  the	  
question	   of	   whether	   firms	   were	   encouraged	   to	   innovate	   and	   progress	   to	   more	   complex	  
garments	  or	  whether	  they	  remained	  locked	  into	  producing	  basics	  due	  to	  fabric	  shortages	  and	  
other	  constraints.	  	  
	  
The	   level	   and	   composition	   of	   demand	   for	   skills	   provide	   an	   important	   measure	   of	   the	  
competitiveness	  of	   firms	  but	   it	   is	  not	  always	  possible	   to	   isolate	  changes	   in	  skills	  needs	  at	   the	  
firm	   level	   (Morris	  and	  Reed	  2008b).	  Nevertheless,	   two	  clear	  patterns	  did	  emerge:	  Firstly,	   the	  
prophecy	  that	  quotas	  would	  assist	  in	  driving	  firms	  up	  the	  value	  chain	  was	  largely	  unfulfilled	  and	  
secondly,	  quotas	  alone	  were	  insufficient	  to	  engender	  a	  sustained	  shift	  up	  the	  value	  chain	  due	  to	  
compounding	   problems	   with	   skills	   shortages	   and	   skills	   gaps	   in	   the	   sector,	   which	   the	  
intervention	  was	  not	  able	  to	  address.	  In	  2007	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  evidence	  that	  firms	  had	  













rate	  garments	   from	  China	  prior	   to	  quotas	   to	  supplement	  their	   local	   range	  simply	  switched	  to	  
alternative	  sources,	  mainly	  Bangladesh,	  Malaysia	  and	  India,	  as	  did	  the	  retailers.	  	  
	  
Of	  the	  twenty	  firms	  interviewed	  in	  2007,	  there	  were	  only	  two	  cases	  where	  firms	  changed	  their	  
output	   mix	   as	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   the	   restrictions.	   In	   neither	   case	   was	   the	   shift	   toward	  more	  
complex,	  higher-­‐end	  garments	  nor	  was	   the	  trend	  expected	  to	   last	  beyond	  quotas.	  Both	   firms	  
concurred	  that	  they	  been	  forced	  into	  niche	  markets	  in	  which	  they	  would	  not	  be	  competitive	  in	  
an	  open	  economy.	  Both	  cases	  demonstrated	  the	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  quotas	  for	  local	  
clothing	   manufacturers	   and	   illustrated	   how	   the	   quota	   allocation	   mechanism	   inherently	  
favoured	  firms	  who	  were	  historically	  least	  supportive	  of	  the	  local	  market.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  CASE	  STUDY	  9:	  TRANSITORY	  IMPACTS	  OF	  QUOTA	  
One	  large	  clothing	  firm	  significantly	  expanded	  its	  schoolwear	  division	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  quota	  
on	   “woven	   shirts”	   which	   was	   sufficient	   only	   to	   cover	   its	   customer’s	   requirements	   for	  
outerwear.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  firm	  opened	  a	  new	  factory	  to	  manufacture	  male	  underwear,	  
a	   product,	   which	   it	   had	   previously	   imported	   and	   did	   not	   make	   locally.	   This	   was	   a	   strategic	  
decision	  pre-­‐empted	  by	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  the	  amount	  of	  quota	  that	  the	  firm	  would	  be	  
granted	  as	  an	  importer	  of	  this	  product.	  The	  project	  cost	  billions	  of	  Rands	  and	  created	  200	  new	  
jobs.	  However,	   in	  neither	  case	  were	  the	  gains	  expected	  to	  sustain	  once	  the	  constraints	  were	  
lifted.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  in	  particular,	  the	  project	  was	  expected	  to	  generate	  a	  net	  financial	  loss	  
to	  the	  company	  and	  the	  firm	  anticipated	  that	  the	  employment	  gains	  would	  also	  be	  reversed.	  	  
	  
The	  2008	   survey	  of	   32	   clothing	  manufacturing	   firms	   yielded	  more	   interesting	   results.	   43%	  of	  
respondents	   reported	   that	   they	   had	   changed	   their	   output	   mix	   due	   to	   quotas.	   A	   somewhat	  
unexpected	   result	   was	   that	   this	   shift	   was	   predominantly	   (69%)	   toward	   more	   complex,	   high	  
value	  added	  garments	  with	  only	  23%	  reporting	  a	   shift	   toward	  garments	  of	   lower	  complexity.	  
This	   is	  the	  antithesis	  of	  what	  was	  expected	  from	  the	  quantitative	  restrictions.	  However,	  there	  
was	  significant	  qualitative	  evidence	  that	  firms	  struggled	  to	  meet	  the	  new	  requirements	  in	  terms	  
of	  greater	  garment	  complexity	  and	  enhanced	  quality.	  
	  
“Having	   no	   quota	   available	   forced	   us	   to	   task	   local	   contractors	   with	   production	  
complexity	  beyond	  their	  capacity	  and/or	  capability.	  Orders	  were	  delayed	  and	  customers	  
cancelled.”	  
	  













With	   regard	   to	   skills,	   problems	   with	   recruiting	   machinists	   and	   other	   production	   staff	   had	  
intensified	   due	   to	   a	   skills	   exodus	   from	   the	   industry.	   67%	   of	   respondents	   reported	   skills	  
shortages	  and	  gaps	   in	   their	  production	   line	  with	   fill	   times	  ranging	   from	  two	  to	  twelve	  weeks.	  
27%	  of	   respondents	   reported	   that	   they	  were	   tackling	  skills	   shortages	  by	   training	   internally.	  A	  
key	   finding	  was	   that	   firms	   regarded	   skills	   to	   be	   their	  greatest	   constraint	   to	   growth,	   not	   the	  
availability	   of	   fabric	   or	   the	  potential	   to	   secure	  orders.	   Even	   the	  most	   severely	   affected	   firms	  
believed	  that	  a	  skilled	  workforce	  could	  have	  mitigated	  the	  negative	   impact	  of	  quotas.	  Quotas	  
simply	   made	   a	   bad	   situation	   worse.	   Reasons	   given	   as	   to	   why	   machinists	   were	   leaving	   the	  
industry	   partially	   related	   to	   the	  provident	   fund	   (55%)	   and	   flight	   to	   the	   informal	   industry	   but	  
were	  also	  linked	  to	  the	  fading	  popularity	  of	  manufacturing	  jobs	  amongst	  young	  people:	  	  
	  
“We	  initially	  thought	  that	  the	   lack	  of	  machinists	  was	  due	  to	  the	  provident	  fund	  and	  
UIF	  but	  we	  are	  now	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  machinists	  feel	  that	  they	  work	  too	  hard	  and	  
the	  new	  generation	  has	  an	  attitude	  of	  not	  wanting	  to	  work	  in	  a	  factory.”	  
	  
This	   was	   due	   to	   the	   generally	   negative	   image	   of	   the	   industry,	   as	   graduates	   opted	   for	  
employment	   in	   the	  more	   glamorous,	   lucrative	   and	   thriving	   clothing	   retail	   or	   design	   sectors.	  
Furthermore,	  poaching	  management	  skills	  fr m	  other	  economic	  sectors	  was	  limited.	  Given	  that	  
managerial	  skills	  are	  generic,	  this	  skills	  pool	  was	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  attrition	  from	  skills	  
migration	  (Morris	  and	  Reed	  2008c).	  	  
	  
These	  outcomes	  come	  with	  several	  caveats	  based	  on	  findings	  from	  the	  first	  wash	  of	  interviews	  
in	   2007.	   These	   importantly	   revealed	   that,	   whilst	   manufacturers	   all	   operate	   under	   the	   same	  
competitive	  conditions	  and	  challenges	  pervasive	  in	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  industry,	  a	  firm’s	  
potential	  to	  an	  become	  industry	  leader,	  and	  its	  relative	  dominance	  in	  the	  sector,	   is	  not	  based	  
on	   these	   factors	   but	   rather	   on	   the	   firm’s	   strategic	   vision	   of	   the	   future	   and	   extent	   to	   which	  
World	   Class	   Manufacturing	   principles	   are	   engaged	   (Morris	   and	   Reed	   2008c).	   Firms	   are	  
differentiated	  by	  their	  strategic	  approaches	  to	  address	  competitiveness	  barriers	  based	  on	  their	  
response	  to	   industry	  restructuring;	  and	  which	   fundamentally	  determined	  how	  the	  firm	  would	  
respond	  to	  and	  to	  a	   large	  extent,	  how	   it	  would	  be	   impacted	  by	  the	  China	  quotas.	   In	  general,	  
firms	  embracing	  WCM	  principles	  in	  their	  operational	  performance	  platforms	  -­‐	  and	  thus	  opting	  













internalising	   the	   problem	   and	   solving	   it	   within	   their	   own	   parameters;	   for	   instance,	   skills	  
shortages	  were	  being	  tackled	  by	  training	  and	  upskilling	  existing	  staff	  or	  mallable	  new	  recruits.	  
These	   firms	  had	  all	   but	   abandoned	  old	  and	  unproductive	  methodologies	  of	   recruitment	   (and	  
ironically	  those	  which	  government	  policies	  ostensibly	  aim	  to	  reinforce).	  	  
	  
Alternatively,	   firms	   trapped	   in	   the	   old	   methodology,	   reproducing	   an	   historically	   obsolete	  
operational	  platform,	  were	  persisting	  with	  the	  old	  methodology	  of	  recruitment	  from	  the	  formal	  
labour	  market,	  and	  this	  with	  diminishing	  success	  owing	  to	  skills	  migration	  to	  the	  informal	  sector	  
(Morris	   and	  Reed	   2008b;	   2008c);	   or	   alternatively,	   by	   promoting	   existing	   staff,	  who	  were	   not	  
necessarily	  equipped	  with	  the	  requisite	  skills	  or	  capabilities,	  into	  more	  senior	  positions	  leading	  
to	  the	  paradoxical	  outcome	  that	  skills	  shortages	  were	  simply	  giving	  way	  to	  skills	  gaps	  at	  senior	  
management	  level.	  This	  exacerbated	  rather	  than	  attenuated	  competitiveness	  pressures.	  
	  
Fabric	  prices	  and	  middle	  man	  margins	  
	  
There	   were	   two	   important	   channels	   through	   which	   quotas	   could	   potentially	   impact	   on	  
manufacturers	  (and	  competitiveness);	  fabric	  prices	  and	  supply	  bottlenecks	  leading	  to	  shortages	  
(Edwards	   et	   al	   2006) 90 	  and	   import	   prices,	   both	   directly	   and	   indirectly	   by	   changing	   the	  
composition	   of	   the	   import	   basket	   with	   the	   result	   that	   local	   manufacturers	   would	   be	   forced	  
toward	   supplying	   the	   low	   end	   of	   the	   market.	   The	   latter	   is	   subsumed	   to	   Chapter	   7	   and	   the	  
discussion	  on	  the	  price	  impacts	  of	  the	  quotas.	  
	  
The	  principle	  issue	  for	  manufacturers	  was	  how	  the	  China	  quotas	  would	  impact	  the	  middleman	  
mark-­‐up,	  which	  reflects	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  manufacturers	  were	  able	   to	  pass	  on	  their	  higher	  
costs	  of	  production	   to	   retailers.	  This	  determined	   the	  distribution	  of	   the	  benefits	   from	  quotas	  
between	  value	  chain	  constituents.	  The	  available	  evidence	  from	  previous	  studies	  shows	  that	  the	  
distribution	  of	  rents	  along	  the	  chain	  has	  historically	  been	  unequal,	  accruing	  disproportionately	  
to	   retailers	   and	   consumers,	  with	   clothing	  producers	   struggling	  with	   very	   small	   profit	  margins	  
and	  hence	  remaining	  particularly	  vulnerable	   (Morris	  and	  Reed	  2008b;	  2008c).	  A	  key	  question	  
was	  whether	  manufacturers	  would	  be	  able	  to	  create	  a	  win-­‐win	  situation	  by	  being	  able	  to	  secure	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Edwards, Kantor and Ross 2006 model several scenarios using different demand elasticities and supply 













higher	  prices	  for	  their	  output	  and	  pass	  on	  their	  higher	  production	  costs	  –	  mainly	  due	  to	  higher	  
fabric	  prices	  –	   to	   their	   customers;	  or	  whether	   they	  would	   remain	   squeezed	  between	   textiles	  
manufacturers	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  retailers	  on	  the	  other,	  and	  hence	  face	  diminishing	  margins.	  	  
	  
Of	   those	  respondents	  who	   in	  200891	  reported	  that	   their	  output	  had	  expanded	  due	  to	  quotas,	  
60%	  said	  that	  margins	  had	  fallen	  whilst	  the	  remaining	  40%	  reported	  that	  margins	  had	  remained	  
the	   same.	   Of	   those	   who	   reported	   a	   contraction	   in	   output	   during	   the	   quota	   period,	   82%	  
reported	  a	   fall	   in	  margins	  and	  for	  57%	  of	   these,	   the	  fall	  was	  severe.	   In	  at	   least	  one	  case,	   this	  
resulted	  in	  the	  organisation	  running	  at	  a	  loss.	  6%	  managed	  to	  maintain	  their	  margins	  and	  only	  
12%	   (one	   firm	   with	   a	   highly	   specialised	   and	   technical	   product)	   reported	   that	   margins	   had	  
(marginally)	   increased.	   Finally,	   of	   those	   respondents	  who	   reported	   the	   same	   level	   of	   output	  
before	  and	  during	  quotas,	  50%	  reported	  that	  margins	  had	  fallen	  while	  the	  other	  50%	  said	  that	  
margins	   had	   been	   maintained.	   In	   summary,	   not	   one	   firm	   both	   increased	   its	   output	   and	   its	  
margins	   during	   the	   quota	   period;	   either	   the	   gains	   to	   be	   had	   from	   increased	   sales	   were	  
summarily	  negated	  by	   falling	  margins	  or	   those	   from	   increased	  margins	  were	  offset	  by	   falling	  
output	  volumes.	  	  
	  
Figure	  54:	  Comparative	  PPI	  for	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  2000-­‐2007	  
	  
Source:	  Stats	  SA	  	  Own	  calculations	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













The	  pressure	  on	  margins	  is	  clearly	  brought	  out	  in	  the	  PPI	  graph	  in	  Figure	  54.	  Compared	  to	  the	  
robust	   performance	   for	   general	   manufacturing,	   which	   climbed	   to	   39.63%,	   clothing	   PPI	  
languished	   at	   4.75%	   between	   2004	   and	   2008,	   which	   is	   simply	   not	   enough	   to	   ensure	   new	  
investment	   in	  upgrading	  of	  equipment	  and	  technology.	  Despite	  a	  general	   improvement	   in	  the	  
PPI	  for	  both	  textiles	  and	  spinning	  and	  weaving	  since	  2006,	  presumably	  due	  to	  quotas,	  the	  same	  
stimulus	   is	  not	  evident	   for	   clothing	   for	  which	   the	  PPI	   remained	   relatively	   flat	   throughout	   the	  
period.	  	  
	  
Falling	   margins	   was	   a	   counterintuitive	   result	   given	   the	   evidence	   of	   quota	   trading92.	   Higher	  
import	  prices	  should	  have	  alleviated	  some	  of	  the	  price	  pressure	  that	  manufacturers	  faced	  from	  
retailers	   who	   benchmark	   local	   prices	   against	   import	   prices	   (Morris	   and	   Einhorn	   2008).	  
However,	  several	  factors	  undermined	  this	  price	  advantage	  and	  negated	  the	  ability	  of	  local	  firms	  
to	  negotiate	  higher	  prices	  for	  their	  output.	  	  
	  
First,	  although	  quota	  trading	  did	  occur	  in	  the	  immediate	  wake	  of	  the	  restrictions	  (ref	  Footnote	  
94),	   this	  margin	  may	   have	   been	   significantly	   lower	  where	   the	   restricted	   items	  were	   sourced	  
from	  an	  alternative,	  possibly	  even	  lower	  cost	  supplier	  to	  China,	  or	  where	  they	  were	  imported	  
illegally	  or	  at	  a	  significantly	  under-­‐declared	  value	  (Clotrade	  2007b;	  2008a).	  Transshipments	  and	  
irregular	   import	   activity	   from	   China	   services	   a	   large	   chunk	   of	   the	   informal	   clothing	   trade,	  
especially	  at	  the	  discount	  end	  of	  the	  market	  where	  declared	  values	  may	  be	  underreported	  by	  
as	  much	  as	  three	  times	  (Robbins	  2007).	  
	  
	  Table	  50	  shows	  average	  declared	  values	   from	  some	  of	   the	  new	  emerging	  exporters	   to	  South	  
Africa.	  These	  figures	  suggest	  that	  some	  new	  supply	  countries	  to	  South	  Africa	  were	  a	  potentially	  
lower	   cost	   source	   than	   China;	   although	   average	   declared	   values	  might	   be	   influenced	   by	   the	  
type	  of	  product	  being	  produced,	  so	  that	  the	  aggregated	  figure	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  like-­‐for-­‐like	  
comparison93	  (Sandrey	  2006).	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Although retail defends all allegations of quota trading, there is some evidence that it did occur in the 
immediate wake of restrictions with agents commanding a premium of 20-30% (Bisseker 2006a; 2006b). 













Table	  50:	  Comparative	  average	  declared	  values:	  China	  versus	  competitors	  






China (adjusted) R37.02 
Source:	  (Clotrade	  2007)	  
	  
Second,	   with	   regard	   to	   input	   costs,	   quotas	   definitely	   had	   their	   own	   impact.	   Clothing	   firms	  
reported	   price	   increases	   from	   textile	   mills	   in	   September	   2006	   shortly	   after	   quotas	   were	  
announced	  (Clotrade	  2007a).	  According	  to	  one	  of	  the	  firms	  interviewed:	  
	  
“After	  quotas	  were	  announced,	  ‘X’	  Textiles	  increased	  their	  prices	  on	  shirting	  by	  16%,	  just	  
like	  that!”	  
	  
Figure	  55:	  Comparative	  Producer	  Price	  Index	  (PPI)	  	  for	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  2000-­‐2007	  
	   	  
	  Source:	  Stats	  SA	  
Figure	   55	   (above)	   indicates	   the	   sharp	   improvement	   in	   the	   PPI	   for	   Textiles	   and	   Spinning	   and	  
Weaving	  in	  reply	  to	  the	  DTI’S	  quota	  revelation.	  Feedback	  from	  the	  clothing	  industry	  dismissed	  
this	   as	   simple	   coincidence.	   The	   textile	   industry	   claimed	   that	   it	   had	  merely	   passed	   on	   recent	  













Despite	   rising	   prices	   due	   to	   fabric	   shortages	   and	   deteriorating	   quality,	   local	   clothing	  
manufacturers	  found	  themselves	   in	  a	  position	  of	  having	  to	  absorb	  increased	  prices	  for	  fabrics	  
but	  were	  unable	  to	  pass	  on	  these	  increased	  costs	  in	  total	  to	  retailers	  who	  “squeezed	  them	  to	  
barely	   operable	   margins”.	   Furthermore,	   even	   where	   firms	   were	   not	   directly	   affected	   by	  
restrictions	  on	  fabric,	  one	  senior	  official	  contended	  that	  quotas	  were	  a	  “psychological	  problem”	  
since	   they	   strengthened	   the	  position	  of	   fabric	   suppliers	  and	   reduced	  clothing	  manufacturers’	  
bargaining	  power.	  As	  a	  result,	   lead	  times	  increased,	  which	  put	  manufacturers	  under	  pressure.	  
Firms	   were	   similarly	   subjugated	   in	   their	   negotiation	   with	   retailers.	   The	   countervailing	   view	  
among	  manufacturers	  who	  were	  hardest	  hit	  by	  quotas	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  garment	  that	  can	  be	  
made	   locally	   that	   is	   not	   available	   everywhere	   else	   in	   the	   world.	   This	   simple	   fact	   increased	  
retailers’	   bargaining	  power	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   pricing	  has	  become	  a	  unilateral	   process.	   Firms	  
quite	   simply	  believed	   that	   retailers	  were	  not	   committed	   to	   supporting	   the	   local	   industry	  and	  
followed	  the	  best	  price.	  They	  argued	  that	  the	  only	  benefit	  to	  sourcing	  locally	  was	  that	  retailers	  
had	   the	   option	   of	   stopping	   production	  midstream	   to	   restyle.	  However,	   for	   this	   convenience,	  
retailers	  offer	  no	  premium,	  which	   leaves	   local	   firms	  to	  compete	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   labour	  alone.	  
This	  many	  saw	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  futility	  given	  the	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  unions	  on	  wages	  and	  
working	  hours.	  	  
	  
“We	  sell	  labour	  with	  the	  constraints	  and	  costs	  of	  producing	  a	  brand.	  We	  design	  a	  garment,	  
source	  the	  fabric	  and	  carry	  all	  the	  costs	  of	  getting	  it	  to	  market,	  but	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  
all	   that	   we	   sell	   is	   labour…If	   we	  weren’t	   unionized,	   we	  would	   survive.	   And,	   if	   we	   had	   a	  
piecework	  system,	  our	  productivity	  would	  go	  through	  the	  roof,	  but	  the	  bargaining	  council	  
would	  shut	  us	  down.”	  
	  
“All	  we	  hear	  now	   from	   the	   retailers	   is:	   “We	  can	   import	   this	   garment	  at	   x	   cost.	  Can	  you	  
meet	   it?”	   They	   only	   favour	   local	   suppliers	   for	   speed	   to	  market	   and	   because	   they	   have	  
control	  over	  the	  product	  which	  allows	  them	  to	  make	  changes	  early	  in	  the	  process	  but	  all	  
the	  while	  they	  are	  squeezing	  companies	  down	  the	  value	  chain	  out	  of	  business.”	  
	  
Third,	  local	  firms	  by	  and	  large	  lacked	  the	  production	  capacity	  and	  skills	  to	  support	  the	  sudden	  
expansion	  in	  output	  volumes	  implied	  by	  the	  restrictions.	  At	  the	  higher	  end	  of	  the	  market,	  skills	  
shortages	   and	   rising	   fabric	   prices	   hindered	   local	   competitiveness	   by	   raising	   production	   costs	  













An	  export	  perspective	  on	  the	  China	  quotas	  
	  
Some	  pundits	  argued	  that	  imports	  would	  be	  less	  of	  a	  problem	  if	  South	  African	  firms	  were	  able	  
to	   export	  more	   effectively;	   that	   is,	   if	   local	   firms	   were	   able	   to	   boost	   their	   exports,	   and	   thus	  
reduce	  their	  dependence	  on	  the	  domestic	  market,	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  imports	  would	  
be	   partly	   ameliorated.	   However,	   there	   are	   several	   caveats	   to	   using	   exports	   as	   a	  measure	   of	  
competitiveness	  in	  the	  South	  African	  case.	  Firstly,	  all	  our	  knowledge	  from	  industry	  experts	  and	  
academics	  eschews	  any	  connection	  between	  the	  collapse	  of	  exports	  and	  the	  surge	  of	  Chinese	  
imports.	  Unlike	  all	  other	  Sub	  Saharan	  African	  (SSA)	  countries,	  South	  Africa	  does	  not	  necessarily	  
need	  to	  pursue	  an	  export-­‐led	  industrialization	  strategy	  to	  grow	  its	  clothing	  sector.	  Kipling	  2011	  
contends	  that	  if	  1	  million	  of	  the	  34–	  42	  million	  garments	  that	  went	  to	  China	  had	  stayed	  in	  South	  
Africa,	  thousands	  of	   jobs	  would	  have	  been	  created.	  The	  collapse	  of	  the	  export	  sector	  and	  the	  
inability	  to	  grow	  exports	  arises	  from	  a	  host	  of	  other	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  stricter	  rules	  of	  origin	  
facing	   South	  African	   exports	   into	   the	  US	   under	   AGOA	   and	   the	   exchange	   rate	   (Morris	   2006a;	  
2007;	  Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008).	   Secondly,	   the	  competitiveness	  picture	   for	   the	  South	  African	  
clothing	   sector	   is	   complicated	   by	   numerous	   artificial	   market	   distortions,	   including	   the	  
combination	  of	  preference	   tariffs	   into	  developed	   (and	  particularly	  US)	  markets	  on	   the	  export	  
side,	   SACU	   subsidies	   to	   its	   clothing	   sectors	   and	   on	   the	   import	   side,	   a	   20%	   specific	  minimum	  
duty	  on	  fabrics	  and	  40-­‐50%	  import	  tariffs	  on	  clothing	  into	  South	  Africa	  (Sandrey	  2006).	  	  
	  
Despite	   these	   inherent	   limitations,	   I	   included	  exports	   in	   the	   analysis	   for	   two	   reasons.	   Firstly,	  
exports	  are	  relevant	   in	  respect	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  imports.	  Poor	  export	  
performance	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  China	  quotas	  undoubtedly	  contributed	  to	  the	  general	  decline	  
of	  the	  sector	  by	  protracting	  and	  deepening	  the	  dependence	  on	  the	  domestic	  market.	  In	  relation	  
to	  this,	  Kipling	  2011	  argues	  that	  it	  only	  takes	  5%	  more	  capacity	  than	  demand	  to	  create	  doubt	  in	  
the	  mind	   of	   the	   seller.	   Exports	   leveled	   the	   playing	   field	   to	   an	   extent	   that	   they	   removed	   the	  
problem	  of	  the	  5%	  under	  capacity	  and	  afforded	  exporters	  a	  small	  degree	  of	  bargaining	  power	  
by	  marginally	  tipping	  the	  balance	  in	  their	  favour.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	   a	   specific	   objective	   of	   the	   China	   quotas	  was	   to	   assist	   the	   domestic	  manufacturing	  
industry	   to	  develop	   into	   an	   internationally	   competitive	  World	  Class	  producer	   (Sharma	  2006).	  













relative	  to	  its	  world	  class	  competitors”	  (Rodrik	  2007a).	  Large	  corporations	  play	  an	  increasingly	  
important	  role	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  export-­‐oriented	  production	  of	  clothing	  such	  that	  the	  location	  
of	   clothing	  production	   is	   largely	  dictated	   to	  developing	  countries	   (Gibbon	  2008).	  Crucially	   for	  
South	  Africa,	  amongst	  the	  factors	  that	  influence	  sourcing	  decisions	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  participate	  in	  
high	   value	   products	   and	   engage	   in	   full	   package	   production.	   An	   assessment	   of	   South	   Africa’s	  
export	  performance	  during	  the	  quota	  period	  could	  thus	  provide	  an	  initial,	  albeit	  crude	  read	  on	  
whether	  local	  firms	  were	  more	  competitive	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  intervention.	  
Comparative	  export	  performance	  of	  South	  Africa	  versus	  SSA	  and	  China	  
	  
I	  shall	  start	  the	  discussion	  by	  situating	  South	  Africa’s	  export	  performance	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  
of	  global	  export	  markets	  by	  examining	  its	  performance	  relative	  to	  other	  SSA	  countries,	  who	  are	  
its	   immediate	  competitors,	  but	  also	   to	  China	  whose	  domination	   in	  global	  export	  markets	  has	  
constrained	   the	   ability	   of	   SSA	   countries,	   including	   South	   Africa,	   to	   penetrate	   global	   and	  
particularly,	  US	  markets.	  The	  sheer	  volume	  of	  Chinese	  exports	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  exports	  
from	  developing	  and	  especially	  African	  countries	  would	  be	  “crowded	  out”	  by	  China	   following	  
MFA	  quota	   liberalisation,	  underpinned	  generally	  negative	  sentiment	  around	  the	  prospects	  for	  
developing	   country	   export	   growth	   in	   the	   post	   MFA	   era	   (Flanagan	   2005a;	   Kaplinsky	   2005;	  
Kaplinsky	  and	  Morris	  2006).	  A	  comparison	  of	  US	  import	  values	  for	  the	  top	  20	  product	  groupings	  
exported	  by	  South	  Africa	  in	  2006,	  2008	  and	  2010	  with	  those	  for	  China	  (i.e.	  US	  import	  values	  for	  
China)	  in	  the	  same	  product	  groupings	  clearly	  demonstrates	  the	  insignificance	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  
exports	  to	  the	  US	  market	  in	  a	  global	  context.	  In	  2006,	  the	  export	  value	  for	  South	  Africa’s	  top	  20	  
product	   categories	   constituted	   just	   0.69%	   of	   China’s	   export	   value	   for	   the	   same	   basket	   of	  
products	  to	  the	  US;	  this	  share	  fell	  to	  0.21%	  in	  2008	  and	  to	  just	  0.06%	  in	  2010.	  And	  to	  further	  
exemplify	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  South	  Africa	  is	  dwarfed	  by	  China	  in	  the	  US	  market,	  knitted	  cotton	  
pullovers	   and	   sweaters	   (611020)	  was	   the	   top	   export	   category	   to	   the	   US	   for	   both	   China	   and	  
South	  Africa	  in	  2006;	  China	  exported	  US$1,047.04m	  compared	  with	  South	  Africa’s	  US$17.55m	  
(although	  the	  unit	  price	  does	  suggest	  significant	  product	  differentiation;	  SA’s	  export	  price	  was	  
almost	  half	  (US$36.79)	  that	  of	  China’s	  (US$60.46)).	  	  
	  
The	  data	   in	   Tables	   51	   to	  53	   clearly	  demonstrates	  declining	  export	   competitiveness	   for	   South	  
Africa	  during	  the	  quota	  period.	  Exports	  from	  South	  Africa	  to	  the	  US	  fell	  rapidly	  from	  a	  high	  of	  













of	  86.19%	  between	  2006	  (the	  start	  of	  the	  China	  quotas)	  and	  2010.	  65.55%	  of	  this	  fall	  occurred	  
during	  the	  period	  that	  quotas	  were	  in	  operation.	  	  
	  
Table	  51:	  Demonstration	  of	  South	  Africa	  vs	  SSA	  competitors	  in	  US	  and	  EU	  imports	  
	  
Source:	  Comtrade	   Own	  calculations	  
	  
Table	  52:	  Demonstration	  of	  SA	  performance	  in	  US	  imports	  vs	  China,	  AGOA	  and	  other	  SSA	  
 
Source:	  Comtrade	  	   Own	  calculations	  
	  
Table	  53:	  Demonstration	  of	  SA	  performance	  in	  EU(27)	  imports	  vs	  China	  and	  other	  SSA	   
 
Source:	  Comtrade	  Accessed	  October	  2011	  	   Own	  calculations	  
	  
South	  Africa’s	  exports	  to	  the	  EU	  also	  fell,	  albeit	  more	  moderately	  by	  62.76%	  between	  2006	  and	  
2010	   and	   by	   48.44%	   between	   2006	   and	   2008.	   Deteriorating	   export	   performance	   for	   South	  














However,	   the	  persistent	   fall	   in	   South	  Africa’s	  exports	  between	  2006	  and	  2008,	   this	  at	  a	   time	  
when	  its	  SSA	  competitors	  had	  managed	  their	  losses	  and	  even	  turned	  them	  into	  gains,	  suggests	  
that	   South	   Africa’s	   export	   competitiveness	   was	   hampered	   by	   other	   factors	   that	   did	   not	  
simultaneously	  encumber	   its	  competitors.	  The	  stricter	  Rules	  of	  Origin	  requirements	   (RoO)	   for	  
South	  Africa’s	  exports	  under	  AGOA	  relative	  other	  SSA	  countries,	  and	  in	  particular,	  the	  waiver	  of	  
those	  for	  Lesotho,	  were	  undoubtedly	  a	  factor	  here	  (Sandrey	  2006).	  South	  Africa	   is	  one	  of	  the	  
most	  disadvantaged	  SSA	  countries	  in	  terms	  of	  AGOA,	  along	  with	  Mauritius,	  both	  of	  whom	  face	  
a	  triple	  transformation	  –	  or	  yarn	  forward	  -­‐	  rule	  compared	  with	  the	  more	  basic	  qualification	  of	  
their	  SSA	  competitors	  of	  mere	  garment	  assembly	   (Morris	  2006a;	  AGOA	  2007).	  The	  possibility	  
that	   prices	   spiked	   in	   response	   to	   the	   China	   quotas	   cannot	   be	   dismissed	   out	   of	   hand	   either.	  
Restrictions	   on	   fabric	   would	   negatively	   impact	   on	   export	   competitiveness	   by	   creating	   fabric	  
shortages	  and	  pushing	  up	  production	  costs.	  
 
Exports	  in	  quota	  categories	  
	  
An	  examination	  of	  the	  export	  profile	  in	  categories	  receiving	  protection	  from	  imports,	  and	  which	  
by	   implication,	   are	   also	   those	   categories	   targeted	   in	   global	  markets	  by	  China,	   show	  a	   similar	  
trend.	  Figure	  56	  tracks	  quarterly	  exports	  in	  quota	  categories	  from	  1996	  to	  2010	  and	  shows	  that	  
aggregate	  quota	   exports	   rose	   steadily	   until	  mid	   2002	  where	   after	   they	  began	   to	   fall	   sharply.	  
After	  a	  brief	  recovery	  in	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  2003,	  aggregate	  quota	  exports	  fell	  by	  77.71%	  from	  
R1,572m	   in	   2003	   to	   R351.74m	   in	   2007.	   Exports	   to	   the	   US,	   until	   very	   recently	   South	   Africa’s	  
main	   export	   destination,	   fell	   by	   a	   dramatic	   93.81%	   in	  Rand	   terms	   from	  R945.68m	   to	   a	  mere	  
R441.49m	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  The	  imposition	  of	  safeguards	  did	  not	  reverse	  this	  trend	  either.	  
Quota	   exports	   to	   the	   US	   almost	   halved	   again	   between	   2006	   and	   2010,	   falling	   by	   a	   further	  
93.51%	   during	   this	   period	   to	   reach	   their	   lowest	   levels	   in	   a	   decade	   of	   just	   R3.08m	   in	   2010.	  
Although	  quota	  exports	   to	   the	  UK	  showed	  a	  brief	   recovery	   in	  2009,	   they	  also	   fell	   throughout	  
the	  period	  of	  quota	  operation,	  by	  54.41%,	  also	  to	  a	  decade	  low	  level	  of	  R53.06m	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
2008.	  Exports	  to	  the	  UK	  as	  a	  whole	  also	  fell	  by	  40.52%	  between	  2006	  and	  2008	  as	  well	  as	  by	  a	  















Figure	  56:	  South	  African	  export	  performance	  in	  quota	  categories;	  aggregate,	  US,	  UK:	  1996-­‐2007	  
	  
Source:	  Quantec	  and	  Trade	  map	  
	  
Figure	  57	  below	  shows	  the	  ratio	  of	  exports	  to	   imports	   in	  quota	  categories	  between	  1996	  and	  
2010.	  In	  2010	  the	  outlook	  was	  acutely	  negative.	  Despite	  restrictions	  exports	  continued	  to	  drift	  
downward	  to	  hit	  their	  lowest	  level	  in	  a	  decade	  in	  2009.	  	  
	  
Figure	  57:	  Ratio	  SA	  exports	  to	  SA	  imports	  in	  quota	  categories:	  1996-­‐2010	  
	  














The	   trend	   in	  quota	  exports	  mirrored	   that	  of	   clothing	  exports	   in	  general	   (Figure	  58).	  Between	  
2002	   and	   2006	   total	   exports	   fell	   dramatically	   by	   67.71%	   from	   their	   peak	   of	   R2,590.27m	   to	  
R836.50m.	   The	   2006	   to	   2008	   period	   shows	   some	   changes	   to	   this	   scenario.	   Although	   the	  
tumultuous	  drop	  moderated	   to	   4.61%	  during	   the	  period	  of	   quota	  operation,	   exports	   did	  not	  
grow.	  	  
	  
Figure	  58:	  	  South	  African	  clothing	  exports	  by	  HS	  Chapter:	  1996-­‐2010	  
	  
Source:	  Quantec	  Statistical	  database	  and	  Comtrade	  
	  
The	  proportion	  of	   quota	   categories	   in	   exports	   to	   the	  US	   in	   the	   two	   clothing	  Chapters	   is	   also	  
noteworthy	  (Figure	  59).	  	  
	  
Figure	  59:	  Demonstration	  of	  South	  African	  clothing	  exports	  to	  the	  US	  by	  HS	  Chapter	  	  
	  













For	  Chapter	  62	  the	  proportion	  of	  exports	  in	  quota	  categories	  was	  a	  relatively	  insignificant	  5%-­‐
10%	  of	  total	  exports	  in	  this	  Chapter	  to	  the	  US	  before	  the	  China	  quotas.	  Despite	  a	  sharp	  uptick	  in	  
2006,	  exports	  in	  these	  categories	  contributed	  increasingly	  less	  to	  overall	  Chapter	  62	  exports	  to	  
the	  US	  during	  the	  quota	  period,	  comprising	  only	  5%	  of	  these	  exports	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2008.	  The	  
analysis	  of	  exports	   in	  Chapter	  61	   is	  more	   informative.	   In	  2001,	  Chapter	  61	  exports	   to	   the	  US	  
occurred	   almost	   exclusively	   (98%)	   in	   quota	   categories.	   This	   share	   reduced	   sharply	   to	   45%	   in	  
2002	  before	  climbing	  again	  to	  60%	  in	  2003.	  However,	  between	  2003	  and	  2006,	  the	  proportion	  
of	   Chapter	   61	   exports	   in	   quota	   categories	   fell	   sharply,	   hitting	   a	   bottom	   of	   9%	   in	   2006	   and	  
remained	   at	   a	   consistently	   low	   level	   for	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   quota	   period.	   This	   has	   two	  
implications.	   Firstly,	   Chinese	   imports	   cannot	   be	   blamed	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   industry	   was	  
unable	   to	   compete	   globally	   until	   2005	   (Sandrey	   and	   Fundira	   2008)	   and	   secondly,	   the	  
expectation	  that	  the	  China	  quotas	  would	  improve	  competitiveness	  in	  protected	  categories	  has	  
been	  largely	  unfulfilled.	  	  
	  
One	  final	  point	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  poor	  export	  performance	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  
quota	   period	   South	   African	   exporters	   faced	   an	   increasingly	   favourable	   exchange	   rate,	  which	  
weakened	  by	  21,32%	  between	  2006	  and	  2008	  and	  was	  likely	  the	  sole	  impetus	  to	  exports	  during	  
this	   period	   (Figure	   60).	   Nevertheless,	   according	   to	   one	   interviewee,	   the	   Rand:US$	   exchange	  
rate	   has	   some	   way	   to	   go	   (between	   10	   and	   12)	   before	   South	   African	   exporters	   are	   able	   to	  
effectively	  compete	  on	  price	  due	  to	  relatively	  the	  low	  levels	  of	  worker	  productivity	  compared	  
























Figure	  60:	  	  Rand-­‐dollar	  exchange	  rate:	  2000-­‐2009	  
	  
Source:	  South	  African	  Reserve	  Bank	  
	  
Export	  prices	  and	  competitiveness	  
	  
Fieldwork	  conducted	  in	  2007	  suggested	  that	  most	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  export	  activity	  at	  the	  time	  
was	  concentrated	  in	  basic	  low-­‐value	  added	  segments.	  Aggregate	  export	  data	  gives	  a	  rough	  read	  
on	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  on	  the	  manufacturing	  industry	  in	  so	  far	  as	   it	  measures	  the	  
level	  of	  export	  activity	  in	  the	  sector.	  Based	  on	  these	  criteria,	  the	  China	  quotas	  appeared	  to	  have	  
provided	   little	  or	  no	  stimulus	  to	  export	  –	  or	  other	   -­‐	  manufacturing	  activity.	  However,	  beyond	  
this	   the	   data	   is	   inherently	   limited	   in	   its	   ability	   to	   comment	   on	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   the	  
industry.	  An	  alternative	  approach	  to	  assess	  whether	  firms	  had	  upgraded	  their	  export	  basket	  by	  
becoming	  more	  competitive	  due	   to	   the	  quotas	   is	   to	  analyse	  unit	  export	  price	  data	   (although	  
this	  too	  has	  its	  limitations)	  where	  greater	  levels	  of	  competitiveness	  generally	  reflect	  as	  a	  fall	  in	  
export	   prices.	   The	   relative	   position	   of	   local	   firms	   in	   the	   value	   chain	   is	   important;	   dynamic	  
technology-­‐intensive	  products	  are	  widely	  regarded	  to	  provide	  developing	  countries	  with	  better	  
opportunities	   for	   expansion	   and	   the	   ability	   to	   overcome	   declining	   terms	   of	   trade	   for	   their	  













An	   accurate	   read	   on	   export	   prices	   between	   2006	   and	   2008	   proved	   somewhat	   elusive	   but	   I	  
eventually	  pinned	  it	  down	  by	  converging	  a	  series	  of	  analyses	  of	  export	  data	  commencing	  at	  the	  
HTS-­‐2	   level,	   and	  moving	  progressively	   towards	   greater	   levels	   of	   disaggregation	   to	   the	  HTS-­‐6,	  
HTS-­‐8	  and	  finally,	  HTS-­‐10	  levels.	  I	  confined	  the	  analysis	  to	  US	  import	  data	  given	  its	  availability,	  
which	  as	  mentioned	  previously,	  does	  not	   correlate	  well	  with	  South	  African	  export	  data.	   Sub-­‐
Saharan	   Africa	   was	   selected	   as	   a	   sub-­‐group	   for	   analysis,	   although	   the	   SSA	   data	   in	   many	  
instances	  mirrors	  that	  for	  AGOA,	  which	  demonstrates	  the	  extensive	  exploitation	  of	  this	  scheme	  
by	  SSA	  countries	  to	  penetrate	  US	  markets.	  I	  calculated	  the	  average	  price	  for	  the	  top	  25	  and	  top	  
10	  products	  exported	  by	  South	  Africa	  in	  each	  year	  between	  2006	  and	  2010	  to	  allow	  comparison	  
of	  price	  movements	  for	  these	  product	  groupings	  for	  South	  Africa.	  These	  I	  compared	  with	  price	  
changes	   for	  exports	   in	   the	  same	  product	  groups	   into	  the	  US	  for	  China	  and	  SSA	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  
assess	   South	   Africa’s	   competitiveness	   in	   its	  major	   export	  markets.	   The	   output	   of	   analysis	   of	  
data	  for	  the	  top	  25	  products	  at	  the	  HTS	  6,	  top	  50	  at	  the	  HTS	  8	  and	  top	  10	  at	  the	  HTS	  8	  levels	  
appear	  sequentially	  in	  Tables	  54	  to	  56	  below.	  	  
	  
The	  average	  price	  across	  South	  Africa’s	  top	  25	  export	  categories	  spiked	  alarmingly	  by	  73.10%	  in	  
2008,	  after	  dipping	  slightly	   in	  2007,	  compared	  with	  7.7%	  for	  other	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  countries	  and	  
4.7%	  for	  China	   in	   the	  same	  product	  groupings.	  This	  change	  might	  have	   indicated	  a	  change	   in	  
the	  composition	  of	  exports	  -­‐	  a	  switch	  to	  high	  end,	  more	  complex	  garments	  would	  reflect	  as	  a	  
higher	  average	  export	  price	  –	  but	  when	  referenced	  to	  the	  product	  mix,	  this	  theory	  did	  not	  hold	  
up.	  In	  fact,	  the	  South	  African	  exporters	  slid	  down	  the	  value	  chain	  toward	  low-­‐end	  basics.	  	  
	  
Table	  54:	  Change	  in	  value	  and	  price	  of	  top	  50	  SA	  exports	  by	  year	  
Top 50     
  2007 2008 2009 2008/06 
 Year on year change (%) 
Price 12.92% 48.20% -1.21% 67.34% 
Value -49.07% -24.28% -40.72% -61.43% 














South	   Africa	   exported	   more	   small,	   low	   value	   bulk	   items	   under	   categories	   61102020	   and	  
category	  6115	  (pantyhose	  etc.)	   in	  2010	  than	  previously	   (Table	  57).	  Higher	  unit	  prices	  showed	  
declining	   levels	   of	   competitiveness	  which	   likely	   reflected	   cost	   pressures	   due	   to	   higher	   fabric	  
prices.	  These	  results	  were	  robust	  when	  tested	  at	  the	  top	  50,	  top	  25	  and	  top	  10	  category	  levels	  
by	  HS6	  and	  HS8	  digit.	  
	  
Table	  55:	  Change	  in	  value	  and	  price	  of	  top	  25	  SA	  exports	  by	  year:	  SA	  vs	  SSA	  and	  China	  
Top	  25	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
  SOUTH AFRICA SSA CHINA 
  Value Price Value Price Value Price 
2007/06 -48.7 -7.7  15.3 8.4 22.5 - 2.0 
2008/07 -24.5 73.1 -23.8 7.7  7.2   4.7 
2009/08 -40.8 13.3 -31.1 9.3 19.0 -11.3 
2010/09 -39.9 31.9 -15.1 7.5 14.3 -18.9 
2006-2008 -61.3 59.8 -12.2 1.4 31.3    2.6 
2008-2010 -64.5 22.8 -41.6 1.2 36.0 -28.0 
2006-2010 -86.3 23.4 -48.7 -0.3 78.6 -26.1 
Source:	  Comtrade	  	   Own	  calculations	  
	  
Table	  56:	  Change	  in	  price	  and	  value	  of	  top	  10	  SA	  exports	  by	  year:	  SA	  vs	  SSA	  and	  China	  
Top	  10	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
  SOUTH AFRICA SSA CHINA 
  Value Price Value Price Value Price 
2007/06 -48.0 0.4 21.3 -0.3 38.1  5.6 
2008/07 -23.3 18.8 -29.7 -2.1  5.5   3.0 
2009/08 -42.2 20.1 -27.1 21.8 14.9   5.1 
2010/09 -39.8 -1.7 -46.0 -1.4 -50.0 -34.5 
2008/06 -60.1 19.3 -14.8 -2.3 45.7   8.8 
2010/08 -65.2 18.1 -60.6 20.0 -42.5 -31.1 
2010/06 -86.1 40.8 -66.5 17.2 -16.2 -25.1 


















Table	  57:	  Product	  description	  of	  South	  African	  exports	  in	  top	  10	  categories:	  2006-­‐2010	  
	  
	  
Conclusions	  on	  exports	  and	  the	  implications	  for	  competitiveness	  
	  
There	   is	   no	   evidence	   from	   the	   export	   data	   that	   the	   China	   quotas	   assisted	   domestic	  
manufacturers	   to	   upgrade	   their	   export	   production	   capabilities	   or	   to	   become	   internationally	  
competitive.	  The	  analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  converse	  is	  true;	  exporters	  have	  been	  sliding	  down	  the	  
value	   chain	   and	   in	   2010,	   South	   Africa	   exported	   more	   basic	   low	   value	   products	   (socks	   and	  













South	  Africa’s	  poor	  export	  performance	  pertains	  more	   to	   its	   inability	   to	  effectively	  penetrate	  
international	  markets	  due	  to	  restrictions	  on	  export	  access	  and	  extraneous	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  
exchange	  rate,	  than	  to	  domestic	  factors.	  In	  particular,	  the	  benefits	  from	  preferential	  access	  to	  
US	   markets	   in	   terms	   of	   AGOA	   have	   been	   outweighed	   by	   stricter	   rules	   of	   origin	   (RoO)	  
requirements	  relative	  to	   its	  SSA	  competitors.	  This	  protracted	  the	  depression	   in	  South	  Africa’s	  
exports	  subsequent	  to	  ATC	  expiry	  in	  2005	  compared	  with	  export	  recovery	  for	  many	  other	  SSA	  
countries.	  	  
	  
There	   are	   several	   reasons	   to	   speculate	   that	   the	   competitiveness	   impact	   of	   China	   on	   export	  
markets,	  which	  has	  been	   relentless	   and	  particularly	   severe	   since	  2005,	  may	  moderate	   in	   the	  
future:	  Firstly,	  costs	  and	  wages	  in	  China	  are	  rising,	  although	  the	  latter	  is	  offset	  by	  high	  levels	  of	  
productivity;	   and	   secondly,	   and	   more	   poignantly,	   China	   is	   refocusing	   its	   production	   efforts	  
towards	  supply	  to	  its	  own	  domestic	  market	  which	  offers	  better	  prices.	  As	  the	  supply	  of	  Chinese-­‐
made	   clothing	   falls,	   by	   pure	   demand	   dynamics,	   prices	   should	   rise.	   This	  would	   both	   alleviate	  
some	   of	   the	   pressure	   on	   clothing	   imports	   and	   create	   better	   opportunities	   for	   South	   African	  
exports.	  However,	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  counterbalanced	  by	  competition	  from	  the	  proliferation	  of	  
emerging	  East	  Asian	  countries	  that	  have	  already	  developed	  or	  are	  in	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  
sustainable	  export	  models	  based	  on	  supply	  to	  US	  and	  EU	  markets	  and	  who	  are	  free	  from	  the	  
institutional	   and	   infrastructural	   constraints	   that	   hinder	   competitiveness	   in	   the	   South	   African	  
clothing	  industry.	  	  As	  one	  interviewee	  put	  it:	  
	  
	  “The	  big	  US	  retailers	  only	  care	  about	  price	  and	  there	  are	  literally	  hundreds	  of	  small	  East	  
Asian	  countries	  who	  can	  supply	  basic	  garments	  at	  low	  cost.	  So	  there	  is	  always	  a	  new	  low	  
cost	   location	  waiting	   in	  the	  wings	  to	  replace	  the	   last;	   the	  US	  rapes	   it	  and	  moves	  on	  to	  
the	  next.	  South	  Africa	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  effectively	  export	  to	  the	  US	  based	  on	  price.	  
When	  the	  Rand	  is	  at	  10-­‐12	  to	  the	  US	  Dollar,	  then	  US	  buyers	  may	  be	  interested,	  but	  this	  
is	   not	   a	   sustainable	   basis	   for	   exports.	   It	   therefore	  makes	   sense	   for	   manufacturers	   to	  
focus	  on	  our	  domestic	  market	  rather	  than	  exports.”	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   safeguards,	   industrial	   policies	   that	   favour	  movement	   to	   higher	   value	   products	  
could	  also	  have	  played	  a	   role.	  This	   trend	  of	   increasing	  unit	  values	   (related	   to	   the	  safeguards,	  













by	  quota	  removal	  but	  also	  by	  the	  global	  economic	  crisis	  where	  a	  strategy	  to	  cope	  with	  declining	  
demand	  was	  to	  re-­‐focus	  again	  on	  larger	  volume,	  basic	  products	  where	  demand	  was	  sustained	  
or	  even	  increasing	  due	  to	  changing	  consumer	  behaviour	  (the	  “Wall-­‐mart	  effect”).	  	  
	  
Before	   closing	   the	   discussion	   on	   exports,	   there	   is	   a	   final	   dimension	   to	   exports	   and	  
competitiveness,	  which	  relates	  to	  institutional	  factors	  and	  policies.	  I	  shall	  revisit	  the	  discussion	  
on	  industrial	  policy	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  China	  quotas	  in	  Chapter	  8,	  but	  the	  principle	  argument	  is	  
the	  same.	  The	  institutional	  framework	  that	  dominates	  the	  clothing	  sector	  is	  widely	  regarded	  to	  
have	  hindered	  rather	  than	  aided	  firms	  to	  aspire	  to	  WCM	  generally,	  and	  to	  develop	  an	  export	  
mentality.	   The	   clothing	   sector	   is	   plagued	   by	   poorly	   contrived	   and	   implemented	   policies	   that	  
often	  contradict	  their	  own	  initiatives,	  falling	  captive	  to	  certain	  interest	  groups	  and	  bureaucrats.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Duty	  Credit	  Certificate	  Scheme,	  (DCCS)	  this	  was	  the	  large	  retailers	  whom	  the	  
scheme	  assisted	  by	   lowering	   the	  cost	  of	   their	   imports;	  and	   this	   ironically	   to	   the	  detriment	  of	  
local	   suppliers	   whom	   it	   was	   intended	   to	   benefit.	   Production	   for	   export	   by	   local	   enterprises	  
historically	   occurred	   largely	   in	   the	   context	   of	   ‘triangular	   manufacturing’	   (Gereffi	   1994).	  
Extensive	  studies	  showed	  that	  schemes	  such	  as	   the	  DCCS	  –	  which	  allowed	  exporters	   to	  claim	  
duties	  for	  their	  imports	  -­‐	  encouraged	  local	  retailers	  to	  import	  apparel	  and	  textiles	  by	  reducing	  
the	  costs	  of	  imported	  goods	  rather	  than	  serving	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  exporters	  (Kaplan	  2003).	  	  
	  
The	  efficacy	  of	  the	  DCCS,	  which	  should	  have	  served	  as	  a	  powerful	  export	  incentive	  and	  assisted	  
with	   the	  upgrading	  of	   the	   industry	   in	  general,	  was	   constrained	  by	  a	  number	  of	   factors,	  most	  
critically,	   the	   limited	  usage	   to	  which	   the	  DCCS	   could	   be	   applied.	  On	  27	  November	   2008,	   the	  
DCCS	  scheme	  was	  extended	  with	  some	   important	  modifications,	   including	  the	  banning	  of	  the	  
sale	   of	   duty	   credits	   to	   retailers	   (Bisseker	   2007b).	   This	   was	   hoped	   to	   throw	   a	   much-­‐needed	  
lifeline	   to	   clothing	   exporters	   but	   the	   persistently	   poor	   performance	   of	   South	  African	   exports	  
suggests	  that	  beneficial	  impact	  of	  these	  changes	  are	  still	  to	  be	  realised.	  	  
	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  China	  quotas,	  shortage	  of	  local	  fabric	  was	  cited	  as	  a	  major	  reason	  why	  South	  
Africa	  failed	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  window	  of	  opportunity	  provided	  by	  AGOA,	  and	  its	  failure	  
to	   assume	   the	   anticipated	   position	   as	   the	   scheme’s	   main	   beneficiary	   (Gibbon	   2003;	   2008;	  
Kaplan,	  2003).	  Rather	  than	  assist	   firms	  to	  upgrade	  their	  export	  basket	  and	  participate	   in	  high	  













restrictions	  on	  fabric	  (although	  this	  was	  not	  qualitatively	  validated).	  This	  not	  only	  hindered	  local	  
firms’	   ability	   to	   compete	   with	   Chinese	   imports	   in	   their	   own	   market,	   but	   also	   to	   break	   the	  














Chapter	  7:	  The	  price	  impacts	  of	  the	  China	  quotas:	  Welfare	  
versus	  competitiveness	  
	  
“Over	   the	   past	   four	   years,	   the	   local	   fashion	   manufacturing	   industry	   has	   lost	  
approximately	  67	  000	  jobs,	   largely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  surge	  of	   imports	  from	  China.	  
Over	  the	  same	  period,	  the	  five	  big	  retailers	  have	  recorded	  R18.1	  billion	  in	  pre-­‐tax	  
profits.	  It	  is	  now	  time	  for	  retailers	  to	  work	  with	  the	  local	  manufacturing	  industry	  
to	   place	   the	   country	   and	   employment	   before	   profits.	  Why	   can't	   some	   of	   these	  
super	  profits	  be	  deployed	  to	  create	  local	  jobs	  and	  to	  lower	  the	  costs	  of	  domestic	  
clothing	  and	  textile	  goods?”	  (The	  DTI	  2006)	  
	  
The	  core	  issue	  in	  any	  welfare	  debate	  is	  the	  impact	  on	  consumers.	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  quotas	  on	  
garment	   price	   and	   their	   effect	   on	   consumer	   welfare	   via	   consumer	   retail	   prices	   is	   of	   central	  
concern	   for	   this	   thesis.	   The	   China	   quotas	   were	   expected	   to	   have	   an	   inflationary	   impact	   on	  
garment	  prices,	  which	  would	  reduce	  consumer	  welfare	  by	   lowering	   the	  disposable	   income	  of	  
consumers	  (Hazelhurst	  2006a).	  Furthermore,	  the	  unemployed	  and	  those	  with	  temporary	  work	  
would	   be	   particularly	   impoverished	   by	   higher	   garment	   prices	   since	   clothing	   is	   a	   necessary	  
consumer	   product	   and	   constitutes	   a	   larger	   share	   of	   spending	   for	   the	   poor	   relative	   to	   rich	  
consumers94.	  
	  
The	   price	   deflation	   from	   China	   had	   two	   aspects:	   First,	   the	   competitiveness	   aspect	   which	   is	  
concerned	   with	   the	   pressure	   that	   imports	   applied	   on	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   local	  
manufacturers	   forcing	   them	   to	   radically	   upgrade	   to	   meet	   new	   price,	   quality	   and	   reliability	  
demands	   (Barnes	   and	   Esselaar	   2005;	   Morris	   2007).	   Second,	   the	   welfare	   aspect	   which	   is	  
concerned	  with	   the	   impact	   of	   imports	   on	   employment	   in	   the	   local	   clothing	   industry	   and	   the	  
standard	  of	  living	  of	  the	  masses	  of	  consumers	  (Morris	  and	  Reed	  2008a).	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  
the	  impact	  of	  quotas	  on	  welfare	   in	  their	  totality,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  understand	  the	  effect	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Poor consumers spend on average between 2.83% and 4.05% of their spending on clothing where 














quotas	  had	  on	  import	  prices	  and	  on	  the	  local	  price	  of	  garments	  generally.	  Both	  of	  these	  issues	  
are	   dealt	   with	   extensively	   by	  Morris	   and	   Einhorn	   2008	   who	   show	   that	   cheap	   imports	   from	  
China	  imparted	  significant	  benefits	  on	  consumers	  both	  directly,	  and	  indirectly	  by	  lowering	  the	  
price	   of	   both	   imported	   garments	   and	   their	   domestic	   substitutes	   since	   “as	   imported	   inflation	  
falls,	   local	   producers	   are	   forced	   to	   compete	   and	   domestic	   prices	   fall	   into	   line.”	   (Hazelhurst	  
2006a;	  Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008).	  Demand	  for	  clothing	  is	  income	  inelastic	  implying	  that	  with	  an	  
increase	   in	   income,	   there	   is	   a	   less	   than	   proportional	   increase	   in	   expenditure	   on	   clothing.	  
(Blackiforti	  et	  al.	  1983	  in	  Einhorn	  2006).	  In	  this	  sense,	  deflation	  of	  clothing	  prices	  due	  to	  cheap	  
Chinese	  imports	  helped	  to	  combat	  inequality	  of	  incomes	  (Hazelhurst	  2006a).	  The	  broader	  task	  
for	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  explore	  these	  two	  price	  dimensions	  –	  how	  quotas	  changed	  import	  prices	  and	  
overall	  garment	  prices.	  Comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  the	   impact	  of	  quotas	  on	  consumer	  welfare	  
requires	   a	   threefold	   analysis	   –	   a	   macro	   analysis	   of	   imports,	   a	   sample	   of	   retail	   prices	   in	   the	  
stores	  and	  a	  qualitative	  analysis	  of	  price	  trends	  elaborated	  by	  retailers	  and	  pundits.	  I	  dealt	  with	  
the	  first	  leg	  in	  Chapter	  4	  where	  I	  established	  that	  unit	  prices	  for	  imported	  garments	  increased	  
during	  the	  quota	  period.	  I	  shall	  now	  investigate	  the	  second	  and	  third	  components.	  
What	  happened	  to	  clothing	  prices	  during	  the	  quotas?	  
	  
An	   examination	   of	   the	   clothing	   Consumer	   Price	   Index	   (CPI)	   in	   Figure	   61	   shows	   that	   garment	  
prices	   fell	   during	   the	   first	   year	   of	   the	   quotas	   by	   8.23%	   and	   increased	   in	   the	   second	   year	   by	  
10.40%,	  implying	  an	  overall	  inflation	  in	  clothing	  prices	  of	  2.17%	  for	  the	  full	  quota	  period.	  	  
Figure	  61:	  Clothing	  Consumer	  price	  index:	  2004-­‐2010	  
	  














Furthermore,	  once	  garment	  prices	  started	  to	  climb	  in	  2008,	  they	  maintained	  this	  upward	  trend	  
after	   import	   restrictions	   were	   withdrawn	   to	   rise	   by	   a	   further	   7%	   between	   2008	   and	   2010.	  
Compared	   with	   clothing	   deflation	   of	   13.67%	   between	   2003	   and	   2007,	   which	   was	   primarily	  
fueled	  by	   low	  priced	   imports	   (Hazelhurst	   2006a;	  Morris	   and	   Einhorn	   2008),	   there	  was	   broad-­‐
based	  clothing	  price	  inflation	  (shown	  by	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  clothing	  CPI)	  of	  17.27%	  between	  2007	  and	  
2010.	  	  
	  
Direct	  and	  indirect	  impacts	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  on	  garment	  price	  
The	  impact	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  on	  import	  price	  
	  
The	  effect	  of	  the	  restrictions	  on	  import	  prices	  was	  analysed	  by	  estimating	  an	  index	  for	  the	  price	  
of	  imported	  garments95.	  The	  constructed	  CPI	  for	  imports,	  which	  is	  presented	  together	  with	  the	  
clothing	  CPI	   in	   Figure	  62,	   shows	   that	  prices	   for	   imported	  garments	   increased	  by	  around	  40%	  
during	  the	  quota	  period.	  	  
	  
Figure	  62:	  Demonstration	  of	  movements	  in	  clothing	  prices:	  imports	  vs	  general	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













Analysis	  of	  the	  components	  underlying	  the	  clothing	  CPI	  allows	  closer	  scrutiny	  of	  trends	   in	  the	  
individual	   factors	   that	   caused	   the	   variation	   in	   indexed	   garment	   prices.	   These	  were	   primarily	  
inflation	   in	   unit	   (FOB)	   import	   prices	   which	   rose	   by	   15%	   and	   deterioration	   of	   the	   Rand/US$	  
exchange	  rate	  by	  21%	  (moving	  from	  R6.78:1US$	  to	  R8.26:US$1)96	  during	  the	  period.	  However,	  
even	  at	  this	  level	  of	  aggregation,	  the	  more	  subtle	  and	  important	  price	  effects	  are	  masked.	  The	  
full	  impact	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  on	  import	  prices	  is	  exposed	  by	  analysing	  quota	  and	  non	  quota	  
categories	   separately.	   This	   reveals	   that	   the	   variation	  between	   the	   import	   CPIs	   for	   quota	   and	  
non	  quota	  categories	  was	  due	  exclusively	  to	  differences	  in	  FOB	  prices	  for	  quota	  and	  non	  quota	  
imports.	  This	   is	  even	  more	  obvious	  when	   import	  prices	   from	  China	  are	  used	  to	  construct	   the	  
indices	  (Figure	  63).	  Inflation	  in	  aggregate	  FOB	  prices	  from	  China	  was	  driven	  by	  quota	  imports	  to	  
the	  extent	  that	  the	  aggregate	  index	  tracks	  the	  quota	  index.	  	  
	  
Figure	  63:	  The	  variation	  in	  the	  import	  CPI	  for	  quota/non	  quota	  imports	  
	  
Source:	  Clotrade	   Own	  calculations	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Duties and shipping costs are contants in the calculation; duties on clothing imports remained at 40% 
between 2006 and 2008 and shipping costs at around 24%; the latter was established during interviews with 














Table	  58	  below	  summarises	  the	  percentage	  changes	  in	  the	  average	  unit	  price	  in	  quota	  and	  non	  
quota	  categories	  and	  clearly	  demonstrates	  the	  variation	  in	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  price	  change	  
between	  these	  cohorts	  during	  the	  quota	  period.	  	  
	  
The	   average	   unit	   price	   of	   quota	   imports	   from	   China	   increased	   by	   59.13%	   during	   the	   quota	  
period,	  with	  30.47%	  of	   this	   rise	  occurring	  between	  2006	  and	  2007	  alone;	   this	  compares	  with	  
that	   for	   non	   quota	   categories,	  which	   actually	   fell	   by	   13.97%	   (and	  mainly	   in	   2007	   by	   15.73%	  
after	  a	  slight	  uptick	  in	  2008).	  Similar	  price	  movements	  were	  evident	  in	  World	  quota	  categories	  
when	  averaged	  across	  the	  entire	  quota	  period;	  unit	  prices	  on	  average	  increased	  by	  48.03%	  in	  
quota	  categories,	  and	  decreased	  by	  11.51%	  in	  non	  quota	  categories.	  At	  an	  aggregate	  level,	  unit	  
prices	  for	  imports	  from	  China	  increased	  by	  5.48%	  and	  for	  the	  World	  by	  12.12%.	  
	  
Table	  58:	  Changes	  in	  Dollar	  denominated	  FOB	  prices	  in	  quota	  and	  non	  quota	  categories	  
  All categories Unit categories Kilogram categories 
  2007/06 2008/07 2008/06 2007/06 2008/07 2008/06 2007/06 2008/07 2008/06 




2.88% 5.57% 8.61% 2.50% 2.91% 5.48% -7.53% -7.99% -14.92% 
Quota 
imports 
28.69% 23.65% 59.13% 30.47% 18.69% 54.85% 76.65% 1.65% 79.57% 
Non quota 
imports 




7.54% 6.33% 14.35% 6.53% 5.24% 12.12% 2.40% -7.27% -5.05% 
Quota 
imports 
71.87% -2.01% 68.42% 30.10% 13.79% 48.03% 72.91% -1.70% 69.97% 
Non quota 
imports 
-13.73% 2.50% -11.57% -14.13% 3.05% -11.51% -16.80% -9.46% -24.67% 
Source:	  Own	  calculations	  (Prices	  have	  been	  adjusted	  for	  forward	  purchasing	  of	  40.25m	  units	  @	  R10.21/unit)	  
	  
Even	  within	  quota	  and	  non	  quota	   categories,	   there	   is	   substantial	   variation	   in	  prices	  between	  














Table	  59	   summarises	   changes	   in	  unit	   values	   in	   respective	  quota	  and	  non	  quota	  and	  unit	  and	  
kilogram	   categories	   for	   both	   the	   World	   and	   China.	   These	   are	   denominated	   in	   Dollars	   to	  
eliminate	  the	  exchange	  rate	  effect.	  
	  
	  
Table	  59:	  Changes	  in	  Dollar	  denominated	  FOB	  prices	  in	  unit	  and	  kilogram	  categories 
	  	   All categories Unit categories Kilogram categories 
  % change 2006-2008 % change 2006-2008 % change 2006-2008 
  Value Vol Price Value Vol Price Value Vol Price 
  CHINA 
All  -9.72% -31.74% 8.61% -14.80% -33.67% 5.48% 15.96% 11.93% -14.92% 
Quota -37.71% -67.85% 59.13% -39.47% -67.90% 54.85% -26.33% -66.31% 79.57% 
Non quota 52.64% 43.59% -12.70% 47.36% 40.67% -13.97% 69.89% 83.38% -23.92% 
  WORLD 
All  14.70% -17.63% 14.35% 10.09% -19.37% 12.12% 39.24% 20.42% -5.05% 
Quota -3.79% -53.09% 68.42% -6.92% -48.37% 48.03% 18.97% -42.52% 69.97% 
Non quota 52.07% 41.21% -11.57% 49.50% 38.74% -11.51% 60.49% 74.95% -24.67% 
Source:	  Clotrade	   Own	  calculations	  
	  
Figure	   64	   gives	   a	   graphical	   illustration	   of	  movements	   in	   import	   prices;	   again,	   the	   analysis	   is	  
done	  in	  US	  Dollar	  terms	  to	  eliminate	  the	  exchange	  rate	  effect.	  	  
	  
Figure	  64:	  A	  demonstration	  of	  movements	  in	  average	  Dollar	  denominated	  import	  prices	  	  	  
	  














Analysing	   data	   at	   this	   bare	   bones	   level	   exposes	   anomalies	   in	   the	   data,	   which	   broadly	  
corroborates	   undervoicing	   or	   other	   irregular	   import	   practices.	   For	   example,	   in	   kilogram	  
categories	  (quota	  and	  non	  quota	  combined),	  the	  aggregate	  price	  fell	  by	  5%;	  this	  compared	  with	  
an	  increase	  of	  12.12%	  for	  unit	  categories.	  In	  quota	  categories	  the	  price	  of	  kilogram	  imports	  rose	  
by	   70%;	   all	   of	   this	   increase	   occurred	   in	   2007	   with	   a	   small	   decrease	   of	   1.70%	   in	   2008.	   This	  
compared	   with	   a	   48%	   increase	   for	   quota	   imports	   in	   unit	   categories,	   most	   of	   which	   also	  
occurred	  in	  2007	  (30.10%).	  Finally,	  in	  non	  quota	  categories	  the	  price	  of	  kilogram	  imports	  fell	  by	  
25%	   compared	   with	   a	   fall	   of	   11.51%	   in	   unit	   categories	   during	   the	   quota	   period.	   Again,	   the	  
distribution	  of	   the	  price	   change	  between	   the	   two	  years	  was	  uneven;	   for	  non	  quota	   kilogram	  
imports,	  16.80%	  (2007)	  and	  9.46%	  (2008);	  and	  for	  unit	  imports	  14.13%	  in	  2007	  and	  3%	  in	  2008.	  	  
	  
The	   results	   for	  China	  are	   similar.	   The	  aggregate	  price	  of	   kilogram	   imports	   fell	  by	  almost	  15%	  
(which	  was	  roughly	  even	  between	  the	  two	  years),	  whilst	  the	  price	  of	  unit	  imports	  increased	  by	  
5.48%.	  In	  quota	  categories,	  the	  price	  of	  kilogram	  imports	  rose	  by	  almost	  80%,	  whilst	  the	  price	  
of	  unit	  quota	   imports	   increased	  by	  only	  54.85%.	  Prices	  rose	  on	  aggregate	  by	  59.13%	  in	  quota	  
categories.	   In	   non	  quota	   categories,	   the	  price	   of	   kilogram	   imports	   fell	   by	   23.92%	   for	   the	   full	  
quota	   period;	   15%	   in	   2007	   and	   10.50%	   in	   2008.	   The	   price	   of	   unit	   imports	   in	   non	   quota	  
categories	  also	  fell	  on	  aggregate	  over	  the	  quota	  period	  but	  the	  decrease	  occurred	  exclusively	  
during	  2007	  (by	  15.73%).	  Prices	  for	  both	  unit	  imports	  and	  on	  aggregate	  in	  non	  quota	  categories	  
actually	  increased	  in	  2008	  by	  2%.	  
	  
The	  finding	  that	  the	  price	  of	  kilogram	  imports	  in	  quota	  categories	  from	  China	  and	  on	  aggregate	  
increased	  was	  an	   intuitive,	  but	  not	  broadly	  anticipated	  and	  according	  to	  some,	  even	  quite	  an	  
ironic	   result.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   large	   bulk	   of	   imports	   that	   fell	   under	   kilogram	   headings	   was	  
children’s	  and	  babies’	  wear	  (the	  latter	  constituted	  32%	  of	  kilogram	  imports	  by	  value	  in	  2006),	  
which	   is	   relatively	   demand	   inelastic,	   implied	   that	   restrictions	   on	   import	   quanities	   would	  
irrevocably	   fuel	  prices	   (Morris	   and	  Einhorn	  2006).	  Another	   rational	  explanation	   for	   the	   trend	  
was	  the	  possibility	  that,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  quota	  allocation	  mechanism,	  which	  calculated	  future	  
allowance	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  past	  import	  history,	  importers	  were	  having	  to	  adhere	  more	  strictly	  to	  
tariff	   headings	   and	   declare	   items	   under	   the	   correct	   headings.	   As	   a	   result,	   prices	   in	   these	  
categories	   increased.	   The	   irony	   lies	  with	   the	   fact	   that	   historically	   kilogram	   import	   categories	  













mixed	  bag	  imports,	  in	  consequence	  to	  which	  declared	  prices	  under	  these	  headings	  have	  always	  
erred	  on	  the	  low	  side.	  As	  Sandrey	  and	  Fundira	  2008	  observed,	  it	  would	  be	  naïve	  to	  believe	  that	  
the	  quotas	  had	  solved	  the	  illegal	  import	  problem;	  the	  large	  fall	  in	  price	  for	  non	  quota	  kilogram	  
imports	  suggested	  that	  underdeclared	  imports	  were	  simply	  re-­‐directed.	  	  
	  
The	   behavior	   of	   import	   prices	   in	   quota	   categories	   from	  China	  may	   indicate	   that	   the	   Chinese	  
were	  engaging	   in	  price	  discrimination	   in	  these	  categories.	  Table	  60	  shows	   import	  values	  from	  
China	   in	   the	   twelve	  main	   quota	   categories	   during	   2007	   and	   the	   associated	   change	   in	   these	  
values	  expressed	  as	  imports	  relative	  to	  2006;	  2007	  import	  volumes	  from	  China	  and	  the	  relative	  
changes	  against	  2006	  values;	  and	  finally	  average	  2007	  import	  prices	  and	  the	  changes	  relative	  to	  
2006	  prices.	  Imports	  in	  these	  twelve	  categories	  comprised	  62%	  and	  69%	  of	  quota	  imports	  from	  
China	   by	   volume	   and	   value	   respectively.	   The	   units	   of	   measurement	   for	   the	   quantities	   are	  
mainly	  given	  in	  thousands	  of	  units	  (U)	  although	  some	  are	  given	  in	  metric	  tonnes	  (kg).	  
	  
Table	  60:	  Details	  of	  South	  African	  quota	  import	  values,	  volumes	  and	  prices	  from	  China 
	   	   	   Value	  R(m)	   Quantity	   Average	  price	  R/unit	  
HS	   Description	   unit	  
	  
2007	   change	   2007	   change	   2007	   change	  
All	  quota	   1,930.21	   -­50%	   118,813	   -­67%	   16.25	   49%	  
62034200	   M&B	  woven	  cot	  trousers	   U	   295.04	   -­‐32%	   12,592	   -­‐49%	   23.43	   33%	  
62046200	   W&G	  cotton	  trousers	  	   U	   265.11	   -­‐51%	   12,203	   -­‐59%	   21.73	   21%	  
6111	   Babies	  garments	   Kg	   183.66	   -­‐30%	   2,195	   -­‐41%	   83.67	   19%	  
6205	   M&B	  woven	  shirts	   U	   157.54	   -­‐44%	   10,408	   -­‐61%	   15.14	   44%	  
6206	   W&G	  woven	  blouses	   U	   116.17	   -­‐53%	   7,674	   -­‐68%	   15.14	   47%	  
6105	   M&B	  knit	  shirts	   U	   97.62	   -­‐51%	   5,404	   -­‐67%	   18.06	   50%	  
62034300	   M&B	  synthetic	  trousers	   U	   85.60	   -­‐50%	   6,858.93	   -­‐58%	   12.48	   18%	  
6106	   W&G	  knit	  blouses	   U	   78.59	   -­‐52%	   547.33	   -­‐62%	   11.16	   27%	  
621210	   Brassieres	   Kg	   69.05	   -­‐47%	   547	   -­‐56%	   126.15	   21%	  
6201	   M&B	  overcoats	   U	   53.34	   -­‐22%	   1,473.86	   -­‐45%	   36.19	   41%	  
6202	   W&G	  overcoats	   U	   50.01	   -­‐16%	   1,633.58	   -­‐54%	   30.62	   82%	  
6108	   W&G	  sleepwear	   U	   41.68	   -­‐57%	   20,882.65	   -­‐59%	   2.00	   5%	  
Source:	  Adapted	  from	  Sandrey	  and	  Van	  Eeden	  2007	  
	  
The	  average	  value	  decline	  for	  all	  imports	  was	  50.10%	  (50.97%	  for	  unit	  and	  43.72%	  for	  kilogram	  
categories).	  For	  the	  analysed	  categories,	  the	  value	  range	  was	  from	  a	  low	  16%	  (6202)	  to	  57.22%	  
(6206)	   for	  unit	   imports	  and	   from	  29.82%	  to	  46.76%	  for	  kilogram	   imports	   in	  2007.	  Due	  to	   the	  













but	   it	   was	   not	   possible	   at	   a	   disaggregated	   level.	   The	   average	   volume	   decline	   for	   unit	   quota	  
imports	  was	  66.42%	  and	  69.34%	  for	  kilogram	  quota	   imports.	  For	  the	  analysed	  categories,	  the	  
decline	   ranged	   from	   45.41%	   to	   68.28%	   for	   unit	   imports	   and	   from	   41.28%	   to	   55.90%	   for	  
kilogram	   imports.	   Average	   prices	   increased	   by	   an	   average	   of	   48.93%	   for	   all	   quota	   imports	  
(46.00%	  for	  unit	  and	  83.69%	  for	  kilo	  categories).	  The	  price	  increases	  ranged	  from	  4.53%	  (6108)	  
to	  81.55%	  (6202).	  	  
	  
The	   above	   analysis	   shows	   that,	   whilst	   import	   values	   from	   China	   in	   quota	   categories	   halved	  
during	   2007,	   the	   accompanying	   fall	   in	   import	   volumes	   was	   significantly	   more	   than	  
proportionate	  and	   in	  some	  cases	  the	   fall	   in	   import	  volumes	  was	  more	  than	  double	  the	   fall	   in	  
import	  values	  (6201,	  6202).	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  rising	  average	  prices	  across	  the	  twelve	  top	  quota	  
categories	  as	  shown	   in	  Table	  60.	   In	  2008,	   for	  the	  same	  sample,	  which	  comprised	  79.18%	  and	  
76.45%	  of	  quota	  imports	  by	  value	  and	  volume	  in	  this	  year	  respectively,	  import	  values	  increased	  
for	   ten	   of	   the	   twelve	   categories	   by	   between	   0.96%	   (62046200)	   and	   65.15%	   (6201),	   the	  
exceptions	  being	  62034200	  and	  6205.	  Import	  volumes	  fell	   in	  eight	  of	  the	  twelve	  categories	  or	  
increased	   less	   than	  proportionately	   than	   the	   value	   increase.	  As	   a	   result,	   prices	   across	   all	   the	  
sampled	  categories	  rose	  by	  between	  16.34%	  (6111)	  and	  44.22%	  (6108).	  This	  compared	  with	  an	  
average	  price	  increase	  of	  31.38%;	  a	  value	  increase	  of	  11.57%	  and	  a	  volume	  decline	  of	  14.95%	  
for	  all	  quota	  imports	  in	  2008.	  	  
Direct	  impact	  of	  import	  price	  on	  garment	  prices	  
	  
The	  primary	  source	  of	  inflation	  in	  the	  clothing	  CPI	  between	  2006	  and	  2008,	  was	  rising	  prices	  of	  
quota	   imports,	  which	   increased	  by	  48.03%	  during	   this	  period.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  price	  of	  
non	   quota	   imports	   fell.	   Since	   quota	   imports	   had	   the	   dominant	   value	   share	   in	   aggregate	  
imports,	  63%	  and	  59%	  in	  2007	  and	  2008	  respectively,	  the	  net	  effect	  on	  import	  values	  would	  be	  
positive.	   This	   was	   possibly	   driven	   by	   increases	   in	   import	   prices	   from	   China	   which	   rose	   by	  
54.85%.	  The	  similar	  magnitude	  of	  changes	  in	  prices	  from	  China	  and	  World	  prices	  suggests	  that	  
China	  still	  drove	  the	  latter	  despite	  the	  quotas.	  The	  question	   is	  how	  much	  of	  this	   inflation	  was	  
due	   to	   the	   China	   quotas?	   Qualitative	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   dollar	   denominated	   FOB	   unit	  
prices	  from	  China	  are	  gradually	  increasing	  due	  to	  currency	  revaluations,	  the	  weakening	  of	  the	  
US	   Dollar,	   a	   reduction	   in	   export	   incentives	   and	   increased	   labour	   demands.	   However,	   these	  













increased.	  The	   fact	   that	  price	   inflation	  was	   limited	   to	   imports	   in	   restricted	  categories	   implies	  
that	  quotas	  were	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  sharp	  increases	  during	  the	  quota	  period.	  	  
	  
In	  conclusion,	  my	  analysis	  of	  macro	  trade	  unit	  price	  data	  shows	  that	  rising	  import	  prices	  during	  
the	  quota	  period	  contributed	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  consumer	  price	  of	  garments	  of	  2.17%	  during	  
the	  quota	  period,	  driven	  almost	  exclusively	  by	  rising	  prices	  for	  quota	  imports	  from	  China.	  What	  
is	  more,	  the	  probability	  that	  China	  was	  engaging	  in	  some	  price	  discrimination	  in	  protest	  to	  the	  
restrictions	  suggests	  a	  pyrrhic	  victory	  for	  South	  Africa	  since	  cheaper	  clothing	  imports	  from	  China	  
were	   historically	   a	   major	   deflationary	   factor	   on	   South	   African	   clothing	   prices	   (Sandrey	   and	  
Fundira	  2008). 
Indirect	  impacts	  of	  import	  price	  on	  garment	  prices	  (via	  producers)	  
	  
The	   impact	   of	   quotas	   on	   price	   distinguishes	   two	   separate	   effects:	   i)	   The	   change	   in	   producer	  
prices	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  manufacturers	  (and	  competitiveness)	  and	  ii)	  the	  change	  in	  retail	  prices	  
and	  its	  effect	  on	  consumers	  (welfare).	  	  
Indirect	  price	  impacts:	  Product	  downgrading	  
	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	   impact	  of	  quotas	  on	  product	  downgrading,	  expectations	  were	  that	  quotas	  
would	   lead	   to	   a	   change	   in	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   import	   basket.	   Not	   only	   were	   quotas	  
expected	   to	  have	   an	   inflationary	   impact	   on	   clothing	  prices	  directly,	   by	  principles	  of	   standard	  
trade	  theory,	  but	  also,	  indirectly,	  due	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  were	  implemented.	  To	  get	  
around	   the	   restrictions	  on	   fabric,	   firms	   “bought”	  quota	   from	  clearing	   agents	   at	   a	   flat	   rate	  of	  
R3.00	  per	  item	  or	  they	  used	  more	  innovative	  methods	  such	  as	  applying	  for	  quota	  on	  behalf	  of	  
others	  as	  new	  entrants,	  albeit	  at	  greater	  cost	  or	  using	  the	  quota	  of	  their	  customers.	  In	  the	  first	  
case,	   the	   flat	   rate	   premium	   is	   analogous	   to	   a	   fixed	   cost	   added	   to	   the	   price	   of	   the	   garment,	  
which	  provides	  an	  incentive	  to	  import	  high	  cost	  garments	  and	  source	  the	  cheap	  one	  locally	  with	  
the	  obvious	  effect	  of	  driving	  local	  manufacturers	  down	  the	  value	  chain.	  	  
	  
A	  well	  recognised	  outcome	  of	  quantitative	  restrictions	  is	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  higher	  value-­‐
added,	   higher	   quality	   goods	   because	   margins	   on	   these	   goods	   are	   generally	   higher.	  
Consequently,	   importers	  substitute	  high-­‐end	  expensive	  garments	   for	  cheap	  basics	   in	  order	   to	  













in	   the	  data.	   Statistics	   show	   that	   aggregate	   import	   volumes	  decreased	  by	  22%	  between	  2006	  
and	   2007	  whilst	   import	   values	   fell	   by	   only	   12%	  with	   the	   implication	   that	   less	   garments	   of	   a	  
higher	  price	  were	  imported	  since	  the	  value	  falls	  by	  less	  than	  the	  volume	  flux.	  This	  difference	  is	  
even	  more	   pronounced	   for	   quota	   categories	   where	   import	   volumes	   fell	   by	   50%	  with	   a	   27%	  
decrease	  in	  the	  value.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  non	  quota	  categories,	  import	  volumes	  and	  values	  (in	  unit	  
categories)	  rose	  by	  40%	  and	  25%	  respectively,	  indicating	  a	  fall	  in	  prices.	  	  
	  
The	   statistical	   evidence	  on	  clothing	  production	   calculated	  at	   the	  SIC	   level	   confirmed	   that	   the	  
impact	  of	   the	  China	  quotas	  on	  output	  was	  at	  best	   temporary	  and	   short-­‐lived	  –	   the	  domestic	  
share	  in	  sales	  ticked	  up	  in	  2007	  by	  around	  2%	  to	  70%	  before	  falling	  back	  to	  an	  historical	  low	  of	  
58%	  in	  2010	  (Figure	  65).	  Imports	  have	  steadily	  gnawed	  away	  at	  the	  domestic	  share	  in	  demand,	  
which	  has	  shrunk	  by	  35%	  since	  2002.	  This	  is	  a	  sad	  indictment	  on	  the	  SA	  government	  when	  one	  
considers	  that	  this	  share	  was	  shy	  of	  100%	  just	  a	  decade	  ago.	  
	  
Figure	  65:	  Share	  of	  domestic	  production	  total	  domestic	  demand:	  2002-­‐2010	  
	  
	  
The	  increased	  price	  of	  imported	  garments	  might	  have	  provided	  local	  manufacturers	  with	  some	  
margin	  of	  competitiveness	  had	  they	  been	  poised	  to	  exploit	  this	  comparative	  price	  advantage.	  













related	  contingencies,	  such	  as	  fabric	  shortages	  and	  price	  increases	  and	  skills	  migration.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  imports	  from	  other	  low	  cost	  supply	  locations,	  and	  under-­‐declared	  imports	  exerted	  
downward	   pressure	   on	   import	   prices	   and	   local	   producer	   prices,	   which	   translated	   into	  
diminishing	  margins	  for	  manufacturers.	  	  
	  
The	   analysis	   of	   macro	   and	   trade	   data	   showed	   that	   the	   China	   quotas	   had	   a	   direct	   effect	   of	  
raising	  the	  landed	  price	  of	  imported	  garments	  and	  an	  indirect	  effect	  on	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  
local	  firms,	  which	  was	  eroded	  by	  rising	  costs	  and	  price	  suppression.	  	  
	  
The	  welfare	  impact	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  via	  clothing	  retail	  prices	  
	  
The	   foregoing	   analysis	   shows	   that	   retailers	  were	  paying	  higher	   prices	   for	   both	   imported	   and	  
locally	   produced	   garments.	   The	   welfare	   impact	   of	   higher	   import	   prices	   –	   i.e.	   the	   impact	   on	  
consumer	  retail	  prices	  -­‐	  depended	  on	  several	  factors.	  
	  
Firstly,	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   retailers	   absorbed	   the	  higher	   costs	   in	   the	   form	  of	   lower	  margins	  
would	   determine	   how	  much	   inflation	   was	   passed	   onto	   consumers	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  
garment	   prices	   increased	   and	   consumer	  welfare	  was	   reduced.	  One	   commentator	   contended	  
that	  having	  created	  a	   legacy	  of	   low	  cost	  clothing,	   retailers	  had	  to	  keep	  prices	  down,	  but	   that	  
this	  had	  largely	  been	  achieved	  by	  squeezing	  their	  suppliers	  to	  breaking	  point:	  	  
	  
“The	  retailers’	  ability	  to	  squeeze	  its	  suppliers	  to	  compensate	  for	  its	  losses	  is	  not	  there	  
any	  more.	  Manufacturing	   has	   funded	   the	   expansion	   seen	   in	   retail	   in	   the	   past	   few	  
years.	   The	  only	  way	   to	   compensate	   is	   through	   closure	   and	  we	  predict	   a	   significant	  
closure	  of	  stores	  over	  the	  next	  18-­‐24	  months.”	  
	  
However,	   retailers	   consistently	  expelled	   the	  notion	   that	   the	   total	   cost	  of	  alternative	   sourcing	  
was	   priced	   into	   the	   product	   price	   and	   passed	   onto	   consumers	   (Retailers	   Joint	   Press	   Release	  
2006).	  One	  retailer	  claimed	  that	  they	  had	  absorbed	  most	  of	  the	  cost	  increases	  associated	  with	  
the	  China	  quotas	  in	  the	  form	  of	  lower	  margins	  to	  cushion	  cash	  constrained	  consumers	  from	  the	  
blow	  of	   the	  restrictions.	   It	  must	  be	  noted,	  however,	   that	   this	  opinion	  of	  a	  single	   retailer	   that	  















“What	  does	  happen	   is	   that	   the	  pressure	  to	  keep	  prices	  down,	  especially	   in	   tougher	  
trading	   conditions,	   has	   tended	   to	   put	   local	   suppliers	   under	   even	   greater	   cost	  
pressure	   than	   during	   the	   pre-­‐quota	   period.	   I	   think	   you	   will	   see	   some	   evidence	   in	  
annual	  reports	  of	  retail	  margins	  under	  pressure.	  The	  key	  message	  from	  retail	  is	  that	  
retail	  does	  not	  set	  prices;	  the	  customer	  desire	  for	  product	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  pay	  is	  
what	  sets	  prices	  and	  retailers	  will	  compete	  vigourously	  to	  best	  satisfy	  their	  customer	  
segment	  needs.”	  
	  
Another	   interviewee	   argued	   that	   compared	   to	   small	   importers	   who	   have	   to	   take	   prices	   as	  
given,	   their	   (the	   large	   retailers)	   extensive	   buying	   power	   allows	   them	   to	   maintain	   constant	  
prices	   in	  dealing	  with	  China,	   and	   to	   adjust	   their	  margins	   and	   shuffle	   them	  between	   items	   to	  
compensate	   for	   variance	   between	   product	   prices;	   items	   which	   yielded	   low	   margins	   due	   to	  
fierce	  competition	  were	  compensated	  for	  by	  higher	  margins	  on	  products	  that	  did	  not	  have	  local	  
substitutes.	   In	   this	   manner,	   large	   retailers	   contended,	   they	   had	   performed	   an	   important	  
welfare	  function	  by	  redistributing	  surpluses	  between	  different	  income	  groups,	  and	  inherently	  in	  
favour	  of	  poorer	  consumers	  (Retailer	  Joint	  Press	  Release	  2006).	  
	  
Secondly,	   consumers	   are	   impacted	   by	   quality	   as	   well	   as	   price.	   This	   is	   particularly	   pertinent	  
where	  the	  market	  saturates.	  In	  this	  case,	  Harrigan	  and	  Evans	  2003	  suggest	  that	  focus	  shifts	  from	  
price	  to	  include	  a	  range	  of	  issues	  such	  as	  quality,	  variety,	  rapid	  product	  innovation,	  fashionbility	  
and	  delivery	  reliability.	  More	  recently,	  eco	  friendliness	  has	  also	  become	  a	  consideration	  for	  all	  
but	  the	  very	  price	  conscious	  consumer.	  In	  this	  respect,	  a	  price	  analysis	  is	  limited	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  
capture	   non-­‐price	   dimensions	   to	   the	   wefare	   impact	   of	   the	   quotas.	   If	   consumers	   were	  
compensated	  for	  the	  price	   increases	  by	  enhancements	  and	   improvements	   in	  garment	  quality,	  
complexity	   and	   variety,	   this	   would	   mitigate	   (some)	   of	   the	   welfare	   loss	   associated	   with	  
decreased	  spending	  power.	  Conversely,	  if	  in	  consequence	  to	  the	  	  China	  quotas,	  consumers	  were	  
paying	  more,	  or	  even	  the	  same	  for	  a	  garment	  of	  lower	  quality,	  the	  negative	  welfare	  impact	  of	  
the	  quotas	  would	  be	  compounded.	   
	  
Whilst	  the	  price	   index	  can	  reliably	   indicate	  the	  direction	  of	  price	  changes,	   it	  cannot	  comment	  
on	   the	   nature	   and	   quality	   of	   garments,	   nor	   is	   able	   to	   give	   an	   accurate	   indication	   of	  market	  













be	   vadidated	   qualitatively	   through	   retailer	   interviews.	   Similarly,	   aggregate	   import	   price	   data	  
may	  mask	  real	  price	  trends.	  It	  was	  impossible	  to	  determine	  from	  the	  trade	  data	  whether	  unit	  
prices	  increased	  due	  to	  importers	  buying	  more	  expensive	  high-­‐end	  garments,	  or	  whether	  they	  
were	   paying	  more	   for	   existing	   garments.	   Retailer	   interviews	   and	   interrogation	   of	   store	   level	  
retail	  price	  data	  would	  elucidate	  both	  these	  issues.	  
	  
Retail	  garment	  prices	  and	  retailer	  margins	  	  
	  
The	  focus	  of	  analysis	  of	  the	  welfare	  impacts	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  falls	  on	  low	  income	  consumer	  
groups	   for	   two	   primary	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   although	   the	   average	   South	   African	   household	  
apportions	   approximatey	   5%	  of	   its	   income	   to	   spending	   on	   clothing	   and	   footwear97(IES	   2005)	  
equivalent	   to	   R2,781.00	   per	   annum,	   the	   CPI	   weights	   bias	   the	   results	   toward	   the	   spending	  
patterns	  of	  upper-­‐end	  consumers.	   	  This	  share	  increases	  to	  between	  6%	  and	  6.4%	  in	  the	  lower	  
expenditure	   deciles. 98 	  Given	   their	   relatively	   greater	   share	   of	   spending	   on	   clothing,	   poor	  
consumers	  would	  be	  most	  affected	  by	  changes	  in	  clothing	  prices.	  This	   is	  particularly	  pertinent	  
given	   the	  ANC’s	  manifesto	  commitment	   to	  a	  decent	   living	   for	  all	   citizens,	  and	  especially	  poor	  
consumers.	  To	  explore	  price	  movements	  and	  margins	  during	  the	  quota	  period,	  I	  aked	  six	  large	  
retailers	   to	  volunteer	  data	   for	  retail	   sales	  prices,	  sales	  volumes	  and	  cost	  data	   for	   items	  which	  
had	   remained	   relatively	   constant	   in	   terms	   of	   composition	   and	   style,	   or	  where	   changes	  were	  
minimal	  and	  easily	  motivated,	  and	  for	  which	  continuous	  data	  was	  available.	  	  
Change	  in	  aggregate	  retail	  prices	  and	  retailer	  margins	  
	  
To	  establish	  broad	  trends	  in	  garment	  prices	  at	  the	  two	  extreme	  ends	  of	  the	  market	  during	  the	  
quota	  period,	   I	   analysed	  a	   large	   sample	  of	  data	   from	  one	  discount	   retailer	  and	  one	  high	  end	  
retailer.	  The	  changes	  in	  garment	  prices	  are	  depicted	  in	  the	  graphs	  and	  tables	  below.	  
	  
Figure	  66	  and	  Figure	  67	  pertain	   to	   the	  discount	  mass	   retailer	  servicing	   low	   income	  and	  more	  
price	  conscious	  consumers,	  who	  spend	  a	  larger	  proportion	  of	  their	  income	  on	  clothing,	  and	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  	  
98 For the following income (per annum) ranges: R0-R6480, 2.83%; R6480-R11090, 3.44%; R11091-
R19440, 4.05%; R19441-R41485, 4.04%; R41486 and above 2.17%; Total 2.60% (StatsSA 2003). The 













assumption,	  Chinese	   imports.	  This	  analysis	  differentiated	  only	  by	  product	  group	   (men’s,	  girls’	  
etc).	  Table	  61	  pertains	  to	  the	  retailer	  servicing	  the	  upper	  market	  segment.	  
	  
Figure	  66:	  Demonstration	  of	  price	  movements	  in	  broad	  categories	  for	  low-­‐end	  retailer	  
	   	  
Source:	  Retailer	  B	  
	  
	  
Figure	  67:	  Demonstration	  of	  price	  movements	  by	  product	  category	  for	  low-­‐end	  retailer	  	  
	  













Table	  61:	  Demonstration	  of	  change	  in	  Retail	  Selling	  Price	  for	  mid	  to	  high-­‐end	  retailer	  	  
	  
Source:	  Retailer	  C	  
	  
The	  analysis	  of	  retail	  selling	  prices	  for	  471	  product	  categories99	  pitched	  at	  the	  mid	  to	  low	  end	  of	  
the	  market	  showed	  a	  strongly	  upward	  trend	  in	  garment	  prices	  aggregated	  across	  three	  broad	  
categories	   for	  men’s	  and	  women’s	  wear,	   infants’	  wear	  and	  children’s	  wear.	  For	  all	   categories	  
combined,	  59%	  experienced	  rising	  prices	  (by	  an	  average	  of	  R7.85);	  36%	  experienced	  a	  negative	  
price	  change	  (by	  an	  average	  R7.11)	  and	  in	  4.88%	  of	  categories,	  prices	  were	  unchanged	  during	  
the	  quota	  period.	  A	  more	  important	  finding	  was	  that	  the	  retailer	  had	  faced	  increased	  costs	  in	  
75.76%	  of	   these	   same	   categories	   by	   an	   average	  of	   R4.67.	   Input	   costs	   fell	   in	   only	   23%	  of	   the	  
categories	   by	   an	   average	   of	   R3.62.	   The	   analysis	   also	   revealed	   that	   mark	   ups	   for	   retailers	  
servicing	  low	  income	  consumers	  were	  almost	  half	  of	  those	  at	  the	  top	  end	  of	  the	  market.	  This	  
suggests	  that	  even	  once	  Chinese	  imports	  were	  disregarded,	  competition	  at	  the	  bottom	  end	  of	  
the	  market	  where	  imports	  are	  concentrated	  was	  still	  very	  fierce.	  	  
	  
For	   the	   retailer	   supplying	   the	   mid	   to	   upper	   end	   of	   the	   market,	   the	   analysis	   showed	   that	  
consumers	   were	   paying	   more	   in	   2008	   for	   existing	   garments	   than	   in	   2006.	   Of	   252	   garment	  
categories	   (134	   ladies;	  84	  mens;	  34	   childrens’)	  analysed,	   shelf	  prices	   increased	   in	  76%	  of	   the	  
categories	  (by	  an	  average	  of	  R6.72),	  fell	  in	  20%	  (by	  an	  average	  of	  R3.72)	  with	  no	  price	  variation	  
recorded	   for	   2%	   of	   the	   categories.	   Furthermore,	   despite	   a	   slight	   (2%)	   dip	   in	   2007,	  mark-­‐ups	  
stayed	  relatively	  constant	  during	  the	  quota	  period.	  Analysis	  of	  a	  subset	  of	  data	  for	  595	  garment	  
categories	  of	  winter	  clothes	  showed	  that	  unit	  sales	  increased	  by	  10%	  between	  2006	  and	  2008	  
relative	   to	   a	   20%	   increase	   between	   2005	   and	   2006.	   These	   results	   were	   broadly	   in	   line	  with	  
expectations	  and	   industry	   forecasts	  but	  at	   this	  highly	  aggregated	   level	   the	  data	  was	  a	  mix	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













import	   and	   local	   prices	   and	   garments	   of	   different	   complexities	   which	   obscured	   the	   precise	  
welfare	  impacts	  of	  the	  quotas.	  	  
	  
Clearer	   insights	   were	   gleaned	   from	   a	   more	   specific	   sample	   analysis	   of	   imported	   products	  
satisfying	  demand	  from	  different	  consumer	  goups.	  To	  isolate	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  on	  
import	   prices,	   I	   honed	   the	   analysis	   to	   two	   samples	   of	   imported	   clothing	   from	   a	   retailer	  
(different	  to	  that	  above)	  who	  targeted	  the	  bottom	  segment	  of	  the	  market;	  the	  first	  comprised	  
men’s	   wear	   and	   underwear	   and	   ladies’	   bras	   and	   the	   second	   children’s	   tracksuit	   pants	   and	  
infant	   leggings.	   All	   of	   these	   items	   are	   considered	   by	   the	   supplier	   to	   constitute	   “necessary	  
goods”	   i.e.	  demand	  for	  these	  products	   is	   income-­‐inelastic.	  The	  graphs	  in	  Figure	  68	  and	  Figure	  
69	  demonstrate	  the	  direct	  negative	  impact	  of	  the	  quotas	  on	  workers	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  short	  
term	  (2007)	  whilst	  alternative	  supply	  sources	  to	  China	  were	  still	  being	  established.	  Prices	  across	  
all	   categories	   analysed	   for	   men’s	   wear	   and	   underwear	   increased	   between	   2006	   and	   2008,	  
except	   for	  mens’	   jackets,	   for	  which	  prices	   remained	  constant.	  The	   largest	   increase	   -­‐	  of	  40%	   -­‐	  
was	  for	  men’s	  briefs	  but	  in	  the	  short	  term	  (2007),	  the	  price	  for	  ladies’	  bras	  spiked	  the	  most	  –	  by	  
20%	  -­‐	  before	   falling	  back	  slightly	   in	  2008.	  This	  was	  unsurprising	  given	  that	  China	  supplies	   the	  
world	  with	  bras	  and	  bra	  components	  to	  which	  South	  Africa	  is	  no	  exception.	  In	  2006	  South	  Africa	  
imported	   R158m	   (132m	   kg)	   of	   bras.	   The	   unit	   price	   of	   imported	   bras	   increased	   by	   151.69%	  
between	  2006	  and	  2007.	  	  
	  
A	  recent	  study	  by	  Edwards	  and	  Rankin	  (2012)	  reveals	  some	  interesting	  findings	  in	  this	  respect.	  
They	   concluded	   that,	   in	   fact,	   prices	   for	   low	  priced	  basic	   garments	   demonstrated	   larger	   price	  
increases	   than	   those	   for	   higher	   priced	   more	   complex	   garments.	   This	   is	   explained	   by	   the	  
theoretical	  specific	  tariff	  equivalence	  of	  quotas	  which	  predicts	  that	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  fixed	  cost	  
to	  the	  price	  of	  heterogenous	  garments	  will	  cause	  a	  disproportionately	  greater	  rise	  in	  the	  price	  



















	  Figure	  68:	  Demonstration	  of	  change	  in	  RSP	  for	  basic	  clothing	  items	  for	  discount	  retailer	  
	  
Source:	  Retailer	  C	  
	  
Figure	  69:	  Demonstration	  of	  change	  in	  Retail	  Selling	  Price	  of	  imported	  tracksuit	  pants	  	  
	  
Source:	  Retailer	  E	  
	  
For	   the	   six	   categories	   analysed	   for	   children’s	   wear,	   prices	   increased	   in	   2007	   in	   all	   but	   one	  
category	  (newborn	  trackpants).	  Again,	  even	  here,	  prices	  simply	  remained	  constant	  and	  did	  not	  
fall.	   Prices	   for	   girls’	   and	   boys’	   tracksuit	   pants	   experienced	   the	   greatest	   increase	   of	   15%,	  













longer	  term	  was	  based	  on	  projections	  rather	  than	  actual	  data;	  prices	  for	  babies’	  leggings	  were	  
expected	   to	   increase	  by	   a	   further	   5%	  whilst	   guidance	   for	   all	   other	   categories	   suggested	   that	  
prices	  would	  at	  best,	  remain	  constant.	  	  
	  
To	   verify	   these	   findings,	   I	   cross-­‐checked	   these	   predictions	   against	   actual	   data	   from	   another	  
retailer	  with	  a	  similar	  market	  orientation	  (i.e.	  low	  income	  groups).	  The	  results	  from	  this	  analysis	  
appear	  in	  Table	  62	  below.	  Price	  changes	  across	  ten	  clothing	  categories	  spanning	  1200	  products	  
were	   mixed,	   although	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   boys’	   wear,	   sales	   volumes	   and	   revenue	   for	  
imported	  products	  fell	  significantly	  season	  on	  season	  between	  2007	  and	  2009.	  	  
	  
Table	  62:	  Percentage	  change	  in	  RSP	  and	  sales	  by	  value	  and	  volume	  in	  childrens’	  wear	  	  	  
	  
Source:	  Retailer	  B	  	  
	  
A	  case	  study	  on	  babies’	  wear	  threw	  up	  some	  additional	   insights	  on	  the	  welfare	   impact	  of	  the	  
quotas.	  Babies’	  wear	  is	  largely	  imported	  because	  labour	  inputs	  are	  high,	  which	  makes	  it	  prone	  
to	  sourcing	  from	  countries	  with	  a	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  labour	  (Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008).	  
Price	   competition	   in	   this	   segment	   is	   particularly	   aggressive	   and	  was	  particularly	   impacted	   by	  
globalisation	  and	  China.	  
	  
The	  data	  in	  Table	  63	  clearly	  demonstrates	  both	  the	  initial	  effect	  of	  China’s	  liberalisation	  and	  its	  
subsequent	  dominance	  in	  babies’	  wear	  in	  the	  US	  market	  from	  the	  competitive	  advantage	  that	  it	  
has	   developed	   globally,	   if	   nothing	   else	   in	   terms	   of	   sheer	   volumes	   alone,	   in	   this	   particular	  













wear	   from	  China	   consistently	   hovered	   between	   95-­‐100	  million	   kilograms,	   growing	   by	   3104%	  
between	  2001	  and	  2007.	   In	  2007,	  66%	  of	  all	  babies’	  wear	   imports	   into	  the	  US	  by	  volume	  and	  
62%	  by	  value	  came	  from	  China,	  and	  this	  despite	  sustained	  safeguards	  on	  these	  products.	  South	  
Africa	  demonstrates	   similar	   reliance	  on	   imports	  of	  babies’	  wear.	  Given	   its	   relatively	   short	   life	  
span	  and	  size,	  consumers	  are	  less	  willing	  to	  pay	  a	  premium	  for	  this	  type	  of	  clothing,	  so	  margins	  
are	  slim	  (around	  30%	  compared	  with	  the	  40%	  average).	  Consequently,	  domestic	  production	  for	  
babies’	  wear	  had	  all	  but	  disappeared	  prior	  to	  the	  quotas	  and	  since	  imports	  constitute	  the	  bulk	  
of	   sales,	   these	   products	   were	   particularly	   vulnerable	   to	   restrictions.	   Given	   the	   lack	   of	   local	  
capacity	  and	  China’s	  competitive	  superiority	  in	  imports,	  it	  was	  a	  foregone	  conclusion	  that	  prices	  
for	  babies’	  wear	  would	  rise	  both	  for	  imports	  and	  local	  substitutes	  (if	  they	  were	  available	  at	  all),	  
which	  would	  have	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  consumers.	  
	  
Table	  63:	  Demonstration	  of	  China	  in	  US	  imports	  of	  babies’	  wear	  	  
	  













A	  quantitative	  analysis	  using	  unit	   import	  price	  data	   indicated	  that	   the	   landed	  price	  of	  babies’	  
wear	   (HS	  categories	  6111	  and	  6209)	   increased	  significantly	  during	   the	  quota	  period,	  both	   for	  
China	  (41.20%)	  and	  overall	  (44%)	  (Figure	  70).	  	  
	  
Figure	  70:	  Demonstration	  of	  inflation	  in	  import	  price	  for	  babies’	  wear:	  China	  vs	  World	  	  
	  
Source:	  OTEXA	   Own	  calculations	  
	  
This	   result	   was	   referenced	   to	   a	   very	   restricted	   data	   set	   of	   retail	   prices	   spanning	   9	   product	  
categories	  for	  babies’	  and	  infants’	  wear	  sourced	  from	  a	  retailer	  pitched	  at	  the	  high	  end	  of	  the	  
market	   between	   2005	   and	   2008,	   for	  which	   output	   appears	   in	   Table	   64.	   This	   shows	   that	   the	  
retail	  selling	  price	  across	  all	  categories	  increased	  on	  average	  by	  9.2%	  during	  the	  quota	  period;	  
this	  compares	  with	  price	  deflation	  of	  7.1%	  between	  2005	  and	  2006.	  Furthermore,	  although	  the	  
retailer’s	   cost	   price	   also	   jumped	   by	   11%,	   almost	   all	   of	   this	   increase	   was	   passed	   on	   to	  
consumers.	  Compared	  with	  a	  negative	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  mark	  up	  of	  2.2%	  for	  2005-­‐2006,	  the	  retailer	  
mark-­‐up	  increased	  between	  2006	  and	  2008	  by	  6%.	  
	  
Where	   garment	   prices	   remained	   stable	   i.e.	   did	   not	   rise	   significantly,	   this	   had	   been	   achieved	  
either	  through	  a	  change	  in	  packaging	  (more	  conservative);	  economising	  on	  fabric	  (a	  switch	  to	  
lighter	  cotton	  fabric);	  or	  destyling	  (mainly	  through	  the	  substitution	  of	  mock	  flys	  and	  pockets).	  
Furthermore,	   where	   quotas	   had	   compelled	   a	   switch	   back	   to	   local	   sourcing,	   there	   was	   an	  













significant	   cost	   increase,	  however,	   came	   from	  switching	   to	   local	   fabric,	  which	  was	  50%	  more	  
than	  its	   import	  substitute.	  Three	  out	  of	  the	  eleven	  categories	  analysed	  showed	  cost	  increases	  
of	  between	  2.6%	  and	  30.8%	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  higher	  import	  prices	  for	  garments	  and	  where	  
only	  the	  fabric	  was	  imported,	  costs	  increased	  by	  4%.	  The	  impact	  of	  quotas	  was	  also	  evident	  in	  
the	  sales	  volumes,	  which	  grew	  by	  50.8%	  between	  2005	  and	  2006	  but	  shrank	  by	  19.3%	  whilst	  
quotas	  were	  in	  place.	  Only	  one	  category,	  i.e.toddlers	  T-­‐shirts	  demonstrated	  robust	  sales	  growth	  
during	  the	  quota	  period	  and	  coincidentally	  experienced	  one	  of	  the	  smallest	  price	  increases.	  	  
	  
Table	  64:	  Demonstration	  of	  change	  in	  RSP	  and	  mark	  up	  for	  babies’	  wear	  at	  top	  end	  of	  the	  market	  
   
 
% Change in Retail Selling 
Price Mark-Up Unit Vol  
Product line (age) 2005/6 2006/8 2006/8 2006/8 
Boys hoodie (6-10)a 0.0% 16.7% 2.4% -22.9% 
Woven Tracksuit pants (6-10)b -16.7% 20.0% 22.8% -65.3% 
2 Shorts (3-8)b -7.1% 23.0% 9.4% 0.5% 
Knitted Boy's tracksuit pants (6-10)c* 0.0% 0.0% -4.7% -80.0% 
Infants leggings (0-1.5)** -11.3% 0.0% -6.0% 56.0% 
Basic T-Shirts (3-8)d -20.1% 25.2% -16.7% -11.9% 
2 T-Shirts (0.5-3)e 0.0% -1.3% -11.0% 97.3% 
5 pairs underweare*** -16.7% 0.0% -5.8% -27.9% 
2 T-Shirts (3-8) -9.2% -20.0% -15.8% -41.6% 
5 piece baby suite -10.0% 33.4% 40.1% -83.3% 
5 body vests (0-1) 0.0% 40.0% 39.4% -33.5% 
Average -8.3% 12.5% 4.9% -19.3% 
 
Change in quality/composition key 
a  Shifted more money into zip-thru version 
b Destyled - mock pockets and fly  
c New packaging 
d Shifted to local fabric - cotton/lycra; 2 pack 
e Switched from 160 to 145gms cotton fabric. 
Other information key 
*	  Negotiated better prices with suppliers; very key item so important to maintain low constant price	  
** Calculated by halving repail pack and costs for 2 pack to make item comparable with 2006 
*** Negotiated better bulk price with supplier and cheaper packaging helped with price 
**** Switched to local sourcing due partly to quotas but also partly since garment requires flexibility in production. Intend to 
maintain local sourcing unless the price changes significantly. 













In	  theory,	  the	  inflationary	  impact	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  could	  be	  guaged	  from	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  
price	   trends	   after	   quota	   removal.	   Analysis	   of	   price	   data	   for	   92	   babies’	   and	   infants’	   wear	  
categories	   spanning	   Summer	   2007	   to	  Winter	   2009	   sourced	   from	   a	   high	   end	   retailer	   showed	  
that	  prices	  rose	  by	  47%	  on	  average	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  between	  Winter	  2008	  and	  Winter	  2009	  (Table	  
65).	  This	  was	  explained	  by	  the	  sharp	  depreciation	  in	  the	  Rand	  (from	  R6.85	  in	  December	  2007	  to	  
R10	   in	   December	   2008)	   which	   coincided	   with	   the	   buying	   season.	   Some	   retailers	   postponed	  
their	   orders	   for	  Winter	   2009	   from	  December	   2008	   to	   January	   2009	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   a	   better	  
exchange	   rate	   (although	   some	   of	   this	   was	   motivated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   could	   resume	  
unrestricted	   sourcing	   from	   January	   2009).	   The	   exchange	   rate	   movements	   hinder	   clear	  
interpretation	   of	   price	   movements	   which	   showed	   an	   average	   price	   increase	   of	   6.64%	   for	  
children’s	   wear	   year-­‐on-­‐year	   (W09/08)	   and	   of	   10.88%	   season-­‐on-­‐season	   (W09/S08);	   and	   for	  
infants’	  and	  babies’	  wear	  (across	  the	  11	  categories)	  an	  increase	  in	  price	  of	  36.67%	  (W09/W08)	  
and	  price	  deflation	  of	  143.53%	  (W09/S08).	  
	  
Table	  65:	  	  Change	  in	  retail	  selling	  price	  (RSP)	  for	  children’s	  wear	  after	  quota	  removal	  
	  
Source:	  Retailer	  B	  
	  
A	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  sales	  volumes	  was	  more	  enlightening	  (Table	  66).	  For	  children’s	  wear	  
averaged	  across	  the	  19	  broad	  categories,	  volumes	  increased	  by	  6.64%	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  (W09/W08)	  
and	  by	  24.19%	  season-­‐on-­‐season;	  the	  increases	  in	  sales	  volumes	  for	  babies’	  and	  infants’	  wear	  
were	  just	  as	  decisive;	  	  these	  were	  210%	  year-­‐on-­‐year	  and	  1,361%	  season-­‐on-­‐season,	  although	  
the	   averages	   were	   skewed	   by	   a	   few	   outliers.	   In	   babies’	   and	   infants’	   wear,	   the	   year-­‐on-­‐year	  
increases	   in	   units	   sold	   were	   significant;	   infant	   sets	   (633%);	   infant	   pants	   (1,277%);	   pyjamas	  
(495%).	  Although	  the	  drop	  in	  sales	  volumes	  during	  2008	  may	  be	  partly	  attributed	  to	  the	  China	  













which	   intensified	   during	   2008.	   In	   their	   financial	   statements,	   retailers	   emphasised	   the	   danger	  
that	   the	   tightening	   credit	   cycle	   posed	   to	   their	   sales	   outlook.	   Their	   comparative	   lack	   of	  
commentary	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   quotas	   (at	   all)	   suggests	   that	   they	   were	   largely	  
inconsequential	  from	  a	  retailer	  perspective	  by	  2008	  due	  to	  their	  imminent	  withdrawal.	  
	  
Table	  66:	  Change	  in	  Retail	  Selling	  Price	  (RSP)	  for	  children’s	  wear	  after	  quota	  removal	  
	  
Source:	  Retailer	  B	  
	  
An	  alternative	  way	  of	  appraising	  the	  retailers’	  stance	  that	  they	  had	  partially	  borne	  the	  costs	  of	  
the	   quotas	   to	   minimise	   the	   negative	   impact	   on	   consumers	   is	   through	   an	   analysis	   of	   their	  
financial	  statements	  during	  the	  period	  that	  quotas	  were	  in	  operation.	  This	  analysis	  comes	  with	  
several	  caveats:	  Firstly,	  most	  retailers	  are	  not	  exclusively	  clothing	  retailers	  (and	  even	  where	  this	  
is	  the	  case,	  footwear	  is	  included)	  so	  that	  the	  profit	  before	  tax	  figures	  are	  an	  aggregation	  across	  
a	  vast	  range	  of	  products	  with	  varying	  profit	  margins.	  Secondly,	  as	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  retailers	  
engaged	  numerous	  combative	  actions	  to	  mitigate	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  restrictions	  on	  their	  bottom	  
line,	  both	  in	  the	  initial	  period	  by	  bringing	  forward	  a	  bulk	  of	  their	  purchasing	  and	  in	  the	  paeriod	  
pending	  quota	  removal	  by	  deferring	  2008	  orders	  to	  2009.	  	  
	  
Table	  67	  shows	  the	  turnover	  of	  South	  African	  clothing	  retailers	  for	  2004	  to	  2008.	  Despite	  the	  














Table	  67:	  Retail	  sales	  growth	  2005-­‐2008	  in	  2008	  prices(Rand	  millions)	  
Year	   Sales	  (clothing,	  textiles	  and	  footwear)	   Year	  on	  year	  growth	  in	  sales	  
2005	   67,964	   	  
2006	   76,587	   11,2%	  
2007	   84,727	   9,6%	  
2008	   96,032	   11,7%	  
Source:	  Stats	  SA	  Statistical	  Release	  P6242.1	  –	  Retail	  trade	  sales	  
	  
What	   is	  more,	   South	   Africa’s	   six	   largest	   clothing	   retailers	   continued	   to	   grow	   their	   operating	  
profits	   throughout	   the	   quota	   period,	   albeit	   at	   a	   diminishing	   rate	   (Table	   68).	   Again,	   the	  
simultaneous	  impact	  of	  the	  economic	  crisis	  and	  the	  import	  restrictions	  on	  retail	  performance	  in	  
2008	   hinders	   clear	   interpretation	   of	   the	   financial	   impact	   of	   the	   China	   quotas.	   However,	  
commentary	   in	   the	   Retailer	   Financial	   Statements	   suggests	   that	   the	   sharp	   drop	   in	   operating	  
profits	  between	  2007	  and	  2008	  was	  attributable	  to	  the	  former	  rather	  than	  the	  latter	  .	  
	  
Table	  68:	  Demonstration	  of	  retailer	  profits	  before	  tax	  
Rand (Milllions) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Edcon R930 R1,733 R2,074 Delisted Delisted 
Mr Price Group R296 R336 R580 R672 R770 
Foschini Group R753 R1,146 R1,488 R1,782 R1,786 
Truworths R761 R979 R1,244 R1,617 R1,880 
Woolworths R898 R1,079 R1,246       R1,521 R1,504 
Total R3,638 R5,273 R6,632 - - 
Total (ex Edcon) R2,708 R3,540 R4,558 R5,592 R5,940 
Growth in comparative profit 41% 45% 26% 23% 9% 
Source:	  Financial	  Statements	  of	  Edcon,	  Mr	  Price	  Group,	  Foschini	  Group,	  Truworths	  and	  Woolworths	  
	  
Although	  one	   interviewee	   racked	  his	   firm’s	   incongruously	   robust	   financial	  performance	  up	   to	  
enhanced	   supply	   chain	   management	   and	   judicious	   sourcing	   decisions	   (again	   this	   was	   not	  
validated	   to	  be	  a	  generalised	  practise),	   the	   fact	   that	   retailers	   continued	   to	  grow	   their	  profits	  
despite	   quotas	   and	   weak	   economic	   conditions	   calls	   into	   question	   their	   claims	   that	   they	  
cushioned	  cash-­‐constrained	  consumers	  from	  the	  blow	  by	  absorbing	  the	  cost	  increases	  from	  the	  
quotas	   in	   the	   form	   of	   lower	  margins.	   It	   also	   undermines	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	   retailers’	   self	  













said,	  commentary	  in	  the	  financial	  reports	  citing	  high	  volumes	  of	  mark	  downs	  due	  to	  large	  stock	  
imbalances	   as	   a	   primary	   source	   of	   falling	   profitability	   in	   ladies’	   and	  mens’	  wear	   in	   2007	   and	  
2008	  suggests	  that	  some	  retailers	  may	  have	  been	  bitten	  by	  their	  forward	  purchasing	  strategies.	  
To	  this	  extent,	  quotas	  may	  have	  been	  an	  inconvenience	  to	  large	  clothing	  retailers	  but	  beyond	  
this	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  say	  definitively	  what	  the	  precise	  impact	  of	  the	  restrictions	  was	  on	  them	  
financially,	  or	  to	  quantitatively	  validate	  their	  claims	  that	  they	  had	  partially	  borne	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  
quotas.	  
	  
Changes	  in	  consumer	  trends:	  Substitution	  in	  demand	  
	  
The	  second	   issue	   that	  could	  not	  be	  established	   through	  price	   trends	  was	  whether	   the	  higher	  
import	   prices	   reflected	   substitution	   in	   demand	   i.e.	   were	   a	   result	   of	   demand-­‐side	   shifts	   -­‐	  
consumers	   “buying	   up”	   and	   demanding	   more	   complex	   garments,	   or	   whether	   they	   were	   in	  
consequence	  to	   importers	  upgrading	  their	   import	  basket	   in	  response	  to	   limitations	  on	   import	  
quantities.	   A	   lower	   import	   volume	   accompanied	   by	   a	   higher	   import	   value	   implies	   a	   higher	  
average	  price,	  which	  may	  be	  an	  indication	  that	  higher	  value	  items	  are	  contributing	  more	  to	  the	  
import	   basket.	   Whereas	   statistical	   interrogation	   of	   trade	   data	   could	   confirm	   quantitatively	  
whether	   or	   not	   this	   had	   occurred,	   there	   are	   two	   caveats	   to	   this	   approach.	   First,	   data	  
inconsistencies	  and	  distortions	  may	  yield	  dubious	   results.	  Second,	  consumers	  may	  have	  been	  
“buying-­‐down”	  in	  which	  case	  this	  effect	  would	  not	  be	  evident	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Consequently,	  
qualitative	  evidence	  from	  local	  firms	  on	  changes	  to	  output	  composition	  during	  quotas	  may	  be	  a	  
more	  reliable	  indicator	  of	  local	  firm	  performance.	  In	  the	  first	  instance,	  deterioration	  in	  quality	  
for	   local	   and	   alternative	   foreign	   subtitutes	   to	   Chinese	   garments	  may	   create	   an	   incentive	   for	  
consumers	  to	  substitute	  relatively	  more	  expensive	  clothing.	  	  
	  
Analysis	  of	  import	  data	  for	  the	  top	  25	  import	  categories	  by	  volume	  (Table	  69)	  and	  value	  (Table	  
70)	   into	  South	  Africa	   from	  China	  between	  2006	  and	  2008,	   shown	  as	  a	  percentage	  change	  on	  
the	  previous	  year’s	  values	  as	  well	  as	  the	  change	  for	  the	  full	  quota	  period,	  indicated	  that	  some	  
changes	  in	  import	  composition	  had	  occurred	  during	  the	  quota	  period.	  Furthermore,	  	  for	  some	  
categories,	   this	   change	  was	   quite	   significant.	   For	   instance,	   South	   Africa	   imported	   a	   lot	  more	  
overcoats	   and	   women’s	   suits	   and	   babies’	   wear	   from	   China	   in	   2008	   than	   in	   2006,	   but	   less	  













highly	  differentiated	  by	  complexity	  and	  quality	  which	  are	  masked	  by	  aggregate	  price	  data	  even	  















Table	  69:	  Top	  20	  imports	  from	  China	  by	  volume	  in	  2008	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   CHINA	  










	   	  	   2007/06	   2008/07	   2008/06	   2007/06	   2008/07	   2008/06	   2008	  
61099000	   Knitted	  t-­‐shirts	   119.5	   -­‐1.0	   117.3	   -­‐45.1	   -­‐1.4	   -­‐45.9	   92.5	   70.3	  
61091000	   Cotton	  t-­‐shirts	  (knitted)	   -­‐1.5	   -­‐1.0	   -­‐2.5	   5.0	   19.9	   25.9	   63.3	   90.2	  
61103000	   MMF	  Jerseys	  	   34.8	   16.4	   56.9	   6.9	   26.3	   35.0	   94.2	   96.5	  
62041900	   Other	  womens	  suits	   415.7	   348.9	   2214.9	   -­‐61.2	   -­‐50.0	   -­‐80.6	   96.4	   90.4	  
61082100	   Womens	  panties	  (knitted)	   -­‐38.7	   66.3	   2.0	   7.3	   1.7	   9.1	   46.3	   90.2	  
62034200	   Mens	  cotton	  trousers	  	   -­‐20.4	   -­‐29.9	   -­‐44.2	   29.7	   45.9	   89.2	   55.9	   84.7	  
62046200	   Womens	  cotton	  trousers	   -­‐37.9	   -­‐25.8	   -­‐53.9	   19.4	   24.2	   48.3	   64.2	   104.7	  
61082200	   Womens	  MMF	  panties	  (knitted)	   -­‐44.6	   -­‐17.2	   -­‐54.1	   134.4	   63.4	   283.0	   65.1	   52.9	  
61071100	   Mens	  cotton	  underpants	  	  (knitted)	   55.5	   67.4	   160.3	   -­‐0.7	   140.9	   139.3	   36.1	   98.6	  
62034300	   Mens	  synth	  fibre	  trousers	   -­‐40.8	   0.0	   -­‐40.8	   28.1	   35.6	   73.7	   75.1	   80.0	  
62052000	   Mens	  cotton	  shirts	   -­‐27.5	   -­‐12.9	   -­‐36.8	   12.9	   36.7	   54.3	   47.2	   76.5	  
61051000	   Mens	  cotton	  shirts	  (knitted)	   -­‐2.1	   -­‐1.7	   -­‐3.7	   19.0	   32.0	   57.0	   36.0	   87.2	  
61102000	   Cotton	  Jerseys	  	   161.5	   -­‐16.8	   117.6	   -­‐32.1	   60.6	   9.1	   77.2	   80.1	  
61171000	   Shawls	  &	  scarves	  (knitted)	   11.3	   -­‐28.1	   -­‐19.9	   -­‐21.3	   89.3	   49.0	   97.3	   91.6	  
62063000	   Womens	  cotton	  blouses	   -­‐45.6	   82.2	   -­‐0.9	   37.4	   57.8	   116.9	   53.5	   88.8	  
61013000	   Mens	  MMF	  overcoats	  (knitted)	   42.9	   407.9	   626.0	   -­‐6.4	   -­‐41.6	   -­‐45.3	   94.8	   92.0	  
61061000	   Womens	  cotton	  blouses	  (knitted)	   -­‐22.4	   -­‐10.8	   -­‐30.8	   1.5	   46.1	   48.3	   69.6	   92.1	  
61149000	   Other	  knitted	  garments	   -­‐29.5	   17.4	   -­‐17.2	   55.7	   64.9	   156.8	   91.1	   98.4	  
62045200	   Cotton	  skirts	   -­‐59.7	   -­‐1.5	   -­‐60.3	   22.3	   22.7	   50.1	   57.5	   101.9	  
61109000	   Other	  jerseys	  	   4.5	   -­‐44.3	   -­‐41.8	   12.5	   58.2	   78.0	   74.9	   90.5	  


































Table	  70:	  Top	  imports	  from	  China	  by	  value	  2008	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   CHINA	  










	   	  	   2007/06	   2008/07	   2008/06	   2007/06	   2008/07	   2008/06	   2008	  
61091000	   Cotton	  t-­‐shirts	  (knitted)	   3.4	   18.7	   22.8	   5.0	   19.9	   25.9	   57.2	   90.2	  
62034200	   Mens	  cotton	  trousers	  	   3.3	   2.2	   5.6	   29.7	   45.9	   89.2	   47.3	   84.7	  
62046200	   Womens	  cotton	  trousers	   -­‐25.8	   -­‐7.9	   -­‐31.7	   19.4	   24.2	   48.3	   67.2	   104.7	  
61103000	   MMF	  Jerseys	  	   44.1	   47.0	   111.8	   6.9	   26.3	   35.0	   90.8	   96.5	  
62052000	   Mens	  cotton	  shirts	   -­‐18.1	   19.1	   -­‐2.4	   12.9	   36.7	   54.3	   36.1	   76.5	  
61051000	   Mens	  cotton	  shirts	  (knitted)	   16.5	   29.8	   51.2	   19.0	   32.0	   57.0	   31.4	   87.2	  
61102000	   Cotton	  jerseys	   77.6	   33.6	   137.3	   -­‐32.1	   60.6	   9.1	   61.8	   80.1	  
62092000	   Babies	  cotton	  garments	   284.7	   47.4	   466.9	   -­‐11.2	   13.2	   0.4	   95.5	   98.3	  
61099000	   T-­‐shirts	  (knitted)	   20.4	   -­‐2.4	   17.5	   -­‐45.1	   -­‐1.4	   -­‐45.9	   65.1	   70.3	  
62034300	   Mens	  synth	  fibre	  trousers	  	   -­‐24.2	   35.7	   2.8	   28.1	   35.6	   73.7	   60.1	   80.0	  
61112000	   Babies	  cotton	  garments	  (knitted)	   -­‐13.3	   17.3	   1.7	   23.4	   17.7	   45.2	   75.4	   102.1	  
62063000	   Womens	  cotton	  blouses	   -­‐25.5	   28.5	   -­‐4.3	   28.6	   29.4	   66.4	   47.5	   88.8	  
62121000	   Brassieres	   -­‐16.4	   23.4	   3.1	   28.6	   30.4	   67.7	   49.0	   82.3	  
61113000	   Babies	  synth	  fib	  garments	  	  (knitted)	   -­‐5.7	   67.5	   58.0	   27.2	   16.9	   48.7	   88.4	   102.0	  
61109000	   Other	  jerseys	   17.6	   -­‐11.9	   3.6	   12.5	   58.2	   78.0	   67.8	   90.5	  
61061000	   Womens	  cotton	  blouses	  (knitted)	   -­‐21.2	   30.3	   2.6	   1.5	   46.1	   48.3	   64.1	   92.1	  
62045200	   Cotton	  skirts	   -­‐50.7	   20.8	   -­‐40.4	   22.3	   22.7	   50.1	   58.6	   101.9	  
62113290	   Other	  cotton	  mens	  garments	   439.1	   1.3	   446.0	   55.3	   8.6	   68.6	   1.4	   105.9	  
62019300	   Mens	  MMF	  coats	  	   -­‐20.7	   72.1	   36.6	   46.0	   12.2	   63.8	   78.9	   90.1	  















The	   best	   read	   on	   local	   consumer	   behaviour	   came	   from	   global	   trends,	  which	   denoted	   a	   shift	  
away	   from	   higher	   priced	   apparel	   in	   response	   to	   tightening	   credit	   conditions100	  (Emerging	  
Textiles	  2008e).	  As	  one	  US	  commentator	  observed,	   this	   is	  a	  global	   trend	  with	  major	   retailers	  
worldwide	  feeling	  the	  squeeze	  from	  consumers:	  “Brand	  loyalty	  is	  being	  tested	  and	  only	  lifestyle	  
brands	  which	  reflect	  the	  consumer’s	  taste	  and	  attitude,	  overriding	  price	  concerns,	  are	  surviving	  
the	   crunch”	   (Barbaro	   2007)101.	   However,	   the	   notion	   that	   importers	   switched	   their	   import	  
basket	  due	  to	  quotas	  was	  soundly	  rebutted	  by	  one	  large	  South	  African	  retailer,	  who	  argued	  that	  
allocated	   quota	   was	   apportioned	   across	   all	   firms	   in	   the	   group	   who	   supply	   different	   market	  
segments102.	  	  
	  
	  “The	   DTI	   does	   not	   realise	   that	   there	   is	   not	   one	   buyer	   per	   quota	   classification	   in	   big	  
organisations.	  Each	  classification	  is	  shared	  across	  divisions	  with	  differing	  age	  groups	  within	  
gender	  such	  that	  it	  is	  not	  unusual	  for	  a	  single	  classification	  to	  be	  split	  between	  6	  or	  8	  buyers	  
who	  then	  manage	  this	  to	  ensure	  that	  we	  do	  not	  overbuy.”	  	  
	  
Again,	   I	  note	   that	   since	   this	  opinion	  was	  not	  qualitatively	  validated	  by	  other	   sources,	   it	  
may	  not	  be	  generalised	  as	  representative	  for	  the	  retail	  sector	  at	  large.	  
Conclusions	  on	  the	  welfare	  and	  competitiveness	  impact	  of	  quotas	  via	  price	  	  
	  
Whilst	   cautioning	   about	   the	   pitfalls	   and	   shortcomings	   of	   using	  macroeconomic	   price	   data	   to	  
estimate	  price	  trends,	  the	  main	  findings	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  price	  impacts	  of	  quotas	  are:	  i)	  
Retail	   prices	   increased	   for	   both	   locally	   produced	   and	   imported	   garments.	   For	   the	   low-­‐end	  
consumer,	  who	   is	   particularly	   price	   keen	   and	   thus	   dependent	   on	   Chinese	   imports,	   the	   price	  
movements	  were	  particularly	   important.	   ii)	   Local	  and	   foreign	  substitutes	  did	  not	  match	  up	   in	  
quality	  or	  durability	   to	  Chinese	   imports	  of	   similar	  price.	  By	   all	   accounts,	   quotas	   reversed	   the	  
fortuitous	   position	  where	   consumers	  were	   getting	   “more	   spend	   for	   their	   buck”.	   Even	  where	  
prices	   stayed	   constant	   due	   to	   intense	   competition	   at	   the	   discount	   end	   of	   the	   market,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Wal-Mart retail sales rose by 0.75% in March 2008. Comparable sales at Gap, for instance, who services 
the upper-end of the market, fell by 18% and J.C. Penney, which services the middle market segment, by 
12.30% (Emerging Textiles 2008e).  
101 Edwards and Rankin 2012 find statistical evidence that prices fell for relatively higher priced garments, 
which they postulate may evidence a switch in demand toward high-end substitutes in response to quotas. 













consumer	  was	  buying	  a	  product	  of	   lower	  quality	  and	  durability,	  or	  one	  that	  was	  considerably	  
destyled.	   Higher	   shelf	   prices	   of	   imported	   garments	   which	   remained	   relatively	   constant	   in	  
composition	  and	  complexity	   suggested	   that	  consumers	  were	  paying	  higher	  prices	   for	  existing	  
garments;	   and	   iii)	   quotas	  may	  have	  motivated	   importers	   to	  upgrade	   their	   import	  basket	   and	  
import	  more	  high-­‐end,	   sophisticated	  garments,	  with	   the	   implication	   that	   local	  manufacturers	  
may	  have	  been	  forced	  towards	  supplying	  the	  low	  end	  of	  the	  market	  where	  competition	  is	  most	  
fierce	   from	  alternative	   foreign	   suppliers.	  The	   limitations	  of	   the	  price	  analysis	   to	  prove	  down-­‐
grading,	   however,	  makes	   this	   final	   point	   at	   best	   a	   cautious	   conclusion.	   Higher	   import	   prices	  
alone	   cannot	   be	   interpretted	   as	   evidence	   of	   downgrading.	   They	   may	   reflect	   a	   change	   in	  















Chapter	  8:	  	  Putting	  it	  all	  together:	  An	  evaluation	  of	  the	  success	  
of	  the	  China	  quotas	  as	  an	  industrial	  policy	  
	  
In	  this	  Chapter,	  I	  shall	  evaluate	  the	  China	  quotas	  as	  an	  industrial	  policy.	  In	  Section	  One,	  I	  shall	  
assess	   the	   consistency	   of	   the	   actual	   outcomes	   of	   the	   China	   quotas	  with	   their	   own	   industrial	  
policy	  objectives	  and	  those	  of	   the	  DTI	  and	   I	  shall	   tie	   these	  to	  my	  anecdotal	   findings	   from	  the	  
research.	   In	   Section	   Two,	   I	   shall	   engage	   the	  body	  of	   academic	  discourse	  on	   industrial	   policy,	  
quotas	  and	  protectionism	  to	  establish	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  China	  
quotas.	   I	   shall	   review	  what	   the	  major	   opponents	   or	   proponents	   of	   quotas	   say	   in	   relation	   to	  
their	   to	   establish	  what	   the	   trade	   and	   industrial	   policy	   literature	   says	   about	   the	   potential	   for	  
short	  term	  quotas	  to	  alter	  industry	  development	  trajectories	  and	  I	  shall	  examine	  whether	  there	  
is	  any	  evidence	  suggesting	  or	  proving	  that	  quotas	  work	  in	  reversing	  negative	  trends	  in	  sectors	  
that	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  their	  implementation.	  I	  shall	  conclude	  by	  drawing	  
on	  the	  academic	  theory	  to	  substantiate	  my	  claim	  that	  the	  China	  quotas	  failed	  as	  an	  industrial	  
policy.	  
Section	  One:	  An	  evaluation	  of	  the	  success	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  in	  meeting	  their	  own	  
policy	  goals	  and	  the	  DTI’s	  objectives	  
	  
I	   shall	  now	  evaluate	  the	  China	  quotas	  as	  an	   industrial	  policy	   in	  relation	  to	   its	   industrial	  policy	  
goals	  and	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  DTI.	  There	  are	  four	  fundamental	  points	  that	  emerge	  from	  the	  
research	  that	  underpin	  my	  evaluation.	  	  
Domestic	  focus	  
	  
The	   first	   point	   is	   that	   the	   South	   African	   clothing	   value	   chain	   is	   domestically	   orientated.	   The	  
reason	  for	  the	  domestic	  focus	  is	  two	  fold:	  Firstly,	  South	  Africa,	  unlike	  most	  other	  SSA	  countries,	  
has	  a	   large	  and	  diverse	  domestic	  market	  that	   is	  capable	  of	  supporting	  a	  clothing	   industry.	  For	  
this	  reason,	   it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  to	  pursue	  an	  export-­‐oriented	  industrialisation	  path	  to	  
grow	  its	  clothing	  sector,	  although	  an	  export	  path	  added	  to	  domestic	  market	  growth	  would	  be	  
















Lack	  of	  competitiveness	  
	  
The	  South	  African	  clothing	  sector	  is	  by	  and	  large	  uncompetitive	  on	  a	  global	  basis,	  weighed	  down	  
by	  physical	  and	  infrastructural	  capacity	  constraints,	  skills	  shortages,	  the	  ideological	  trappings	  of	  
an	  import	  substitution	  regime	  and	  last	  but	  not	  least,	  a	  lack	  of	  systemic	  functionality.	  All	  of	  these	  
factors	  impacted	  directly	  on	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  firms	  who	  failed	  extensively	  to	  adopt	  WCM	  
principles	  into	  their	  factories.	  This	  was	  a	  major	  comparative	  weakness,	  which	  culminated	  firstly,	  
in	   an	   intensified	   dependence	   on	   the	   domestic	   market	   since	   firms	   struggled	   to	   develop	   an	  
effective	  export	  platform;	  and	  secondly,	  in	  a	  surge	  of	  imports,	  since	  local	  firms	  were	  unable	  to	  
compete	  even	  in	  their	  own	  market	  against	  foreign	  competitors	  (and	  mainly	  China).	  	  
	  
Buyer	  driven	  value	  chain	  
	  
The	   third	  point	   that	  emerges	   from	  the	   research	   is	   that	   the	  domestic	  value	  chain	   is	  driven	  by	  
local	  retailers,	  who	  demonstrate	  global	  characteristics.	  The	  high	  concentration	  of	  buying	  power	  
at	   the	   top	  end	  of	   the	  South	  African	   retail	   sector	   implies	   that	   large	   retailers	  are	  able	   to	  wield	  
significant	  power	  over	   local	  manufacturers;	   they	   are	  extremely	  demanding	   in	   terms	  of	   price,	  
quality	   and	   delivery	   and	   their	   sourcing	   behavior	   and	   strategies	   are	   deterministic	   for	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  local	  clothing	  sector.	  Given	  the	  rise	  of	  China,	  and	  more	  recently,	  South	  East	  
Asia,	   who	   together	   have	   taken	   a	   large	   bite	   out	   of	   the	   global	   clothing	   and	   textiles	   market,	  
sourcing	  has	  increasingly	  shifted	  towards	  these	  locations.	  	  
	  
Institutional	  rigidity	  	  
	  
The	   fourth	  and	   final	  point	   is	   that	   the	   sector	   is	  dominated	  by	  one	  particular	   institution	   in	   the	  
form	   of	   the	   clothing	   National	   Bargaining	   Council,	   which	   does	   not	   serve	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  
industry	   due	   to	   the	   power	   of	   the	   union,	  which	   buttresses	   high	  wages	   and	   inflexible	  working	  
hours	   despite	   the	   negative	   ramifications	   on	   employment	   and	   competitiveness.	   SACTWU’s	  
modus	  vivendi	  on	  various	  bureaucratic	  bodies	  in	  the	  clothing	  sector	  undermines	  the	  credibility	  














I	  shall	  now	  show	  why	  the	  DTI’s	  attempt	  to	  implant	  the	  China	  quotas	  in	  this	  framework	  failed.	  
There	   were	   three	   key	   reasons	   for	   this:	   i)	   the	   timing	   and	   motivation	   of	   the	   quotas;	   ii)	   their	  
manner	  of	   implementation	   and	   iii)	   the	  modus	  operandi	   of	   the	  quotas.	   I	   shall	   deal	  with	   each	  
systematically.	  
The	  timing	  and	  motivation	  of	  the	  quotas	  
	  
Clotrade	  and	  Jack	  Kipling	  argued	  that	  the	  crucial	  error	  lay	  not	  with	  the	  intervention	  itself,	  but	  
with	  the	  timing103 -­‐	   the	  quotas	  came	  too	   late.	  Clotrade	  asked	  for	  quantitative	  controls	   first	   in	  
2003	  and	  again	  in	  2005,	  emphasizing	  the	  need	  for	  swift	  and	  decisive	  efforts	  to	  curb	  illegal	  and	  
unfair	  imports.	  Action	  by	  the	  DTI	  only	  came	  in	  2007.	  By	  the	  time	  authorities	  acted,	  the	  industry	  
had	   lost	   much	   of	   its	   critical	   mass	   that	   it	   depends	   on	   to	   create	   cost-­‐effective	   production.	  
Remaining	  firms	  found	  it	  hard	  to	  compete	  effectively	  on	  a	  global	  stage	  where	  they	  were	  forced	  
to	  compete	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  efficiency	  and	  flexibility.	  Kipling	  concluded	  that:	  
	  
“Had	   the	   Voluntary	   Restraint	   been	   imposed	   in	   January	   2004,	   even	   at	   the	   current	  
level	  proposed,	  before	  20,500	  jobs	  had	  been	  lost	   in	  the	  clothing	   industry	  and	  when	  
the	  restraint	  would	  have	  been	  equal	  to	  80%	  of	  the	  imports	  of	  the	  previous	  year	  2003,	  
when	   215	   million	   units	   and	   8	   million	   kilos	   were	   imported,	   it	   would	   have	   been	   a	  
successful	  intervention	  (…)”	  (Kipling	  2008)	  
	  
Whilst	  this	  is	  true,	  the	  evidenc 	  from	  this	  thesis	  shows	  that	  this	  is	  an	  inadequate	  statement	  that	  
requires	  qualification.	  The	  China	  quotas	  were,	   in	  concept,	  similar	  to	  safeguards	   in	  the	  US	  and	  
EU,	  which	   responded	   to	  escalating	   job	   losses	  and	  a	  contraction	   in	  domestic	  output.	  Evidence	  
from	   the	   US	   shows	   that	   safeguards	   acted,	   at	   best,	   as	   a	   handbrake	   on	   Chinese	   import	  
penetration	  in	  the	  short	  run	  and	  in	  the	  longer	  run,	  led	  to	  import	  diversion	  to	  alternative	  foreign	  
suppliers	   (and	  a	   large	   reversion	   to	  Chinese	   sourcing	  upon	  quota	   removal).	   This	   suggests	   that	  
whilst	   trade	   remedies	   such	   as	   safeguards	  may	   afford	   short-­‐term	   and	   temporary	   relief	   to	   an	  
uncompetitive	   domestic	   industry,	   they	   will	   be	   ineffective	   in	   the	  medium	   to	   long	   run	   unless	  
domestic	   firms	   are	   encouraged	   (incentivized)	   to	   restructure	   and	   undertake	   the	   necessary	  
reforms	  required	  to	  achieve	  WCM	  excellence	  and	  global	  competitiveness.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  














Not	  only	  was	  the	  South	  African	  case	  unexceptional	  to	  this	  rule,	  there	  were	  additional	  caveats	  to	  
invoking	   a	   superficially	   similar	   safeguard	   mechanism	   to	   address	   rising	   unemployment	   as	  
prescribed	   by	   the	   DTI.	   Unlike	   the	   US	   and	   EU	   where	   rising	   imports	   were	   generally	   a	   direct	  
consequence	  of	  trade	   liberalisation,	   the	  fundamental	  problem	  in	  South	  Africa	  did	  not	   lie	  with	  
profiteering	  by	  retailers	  or	  the	  surge	  in	  Chinese	  imports,	  but	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  competitiveness	  of	  
the	  domestic	  clothing	  sector	  relative	  to	  Asia	  as	  a	  whole.	  China	  was	  simply	  the	  “vanguard	  of	  the	  
wedge”;	  a	  symptom	  of	  greater	  underlying	  problems,	  such	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  local	  firms	  generally	  
lacked	  the	  production	  capabilities	  –	  technology	  and	  knowledge	  of	  World	  Class	  manufacturing	  –	  
to	   compete	   on	   price,	   quality	   and	   flexibility	   (Business	   Alliance	   2006).	   The	   China	   quotas	  
responded	  to	  the	  wrong	  problem	  –	  unemployment	  -­‐	  they	  did	  not	  address	  the	  real	  problem	  at	  
its	   source	   i.e.	   the	   lack	   of	   firm	   level	   competitiveness.	   Whether	   this	   was	   simply	   a	   case	   of	  
misdiagnosis	   of	   the	   real	   cause,	   or	   a	   correct	   diagnosis	   with	   the	   wrong	   prescription,	   is	  
controversial.	  The	  point	   is	  that	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  other	  sustainable	   industrial	  policy	  and	  value	  
chain	   alignment	   measures	   to	   bolster	   competitiveness,	   the	   outcome	   of	   this	   particular	  
intervention,	  the	  China	  quotas,	  would	  have	  been	  the	  same	  whether	  the	  intervention	  was	  made	  
in	  2004	  or	  2007.	  In	  this	  broader	  context,	  the	  issue	  of	  timing	  is	  relatively	  unimportant.	  
Related	  to	   the	  point	  about	  misdiagnosis	  of	   the	  problem	   is	   the	  second	   issue	  raised	  by	  Kipling,	  
which	   speaks	   to	   the	  motivation	   for	   the	   quotas.	  When	   implemented	   correctly	   and	   timeously,	  
Kipling	   (2008)	   argued	   that	   quotas	  would	  have	  been	   an	   effective	  mechanism	   for	   dealing	  with	  
illegal	  imports:	  	  
“Clotrade	  was,	  and	  is	  in	  favour	  of	  quantitative	  controls	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  addressing	  
disruptive	  surges	  of	   imports	  brought	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  unfair	  trade	  practices,	  gross	  
under-­‐valuations	  or	  dumping	  of	  product	  in	  the	  SA	  market.”	  (Kipling	  2008)	  
	  
In	  2003,	  Clotrade	  wanted	  the	  state	  to	  take	  swift	  action	  against	  illegal	  and	  undervalued	  imports	  
that	  had	  escalated	  alarmingly	  post	  2001	  (ref	  Chapter	  5)	  and	  were	  open	  to	  any	  WTO	  compliant	  
measure,	   including	   safeguards,	   to	   address	   this	  problem.	  By	  2006,	  however,	  Clotrade	  and	   the	  
manufacturers	  were	   opposed	   to	   quotas	   in	   principle,	   since	   they	   threatened	   their	   relationship	  
between	  with	  retailers,	  value	  chain	  alignment	  and	  the	  CSP	  and	  hence	  a	  competitiveness	  path	  













2006	   as	   an	   industrial	   policy	   to	   address	   unemployment	   and	   competitiveness	   issues,	   was	  
unfounded	  and	  was	  indeed	  openly	  rejected	  and	  publically	  rebuked	  by	  Clotrade	  itself.	  	  
Skills	  constraints	  
	  
The	   reluctance	   of	   firms	   to	   extensively	   incorporate	   WCM	   practices	   into	   their	   factories	  
penetrated	   far	  deeper	   than	  competitive	  pressure	   from	  the	  Chinese.	  Morris	  and	  Reed	   (2008c)	  
revealed	   that	   local	   manufacturers	   faced	   significant	   skills	   shortages,	   which	   inhibited	   and	  
retarded	  efforts	  to	  make	  the	  transition	  to	  WCM.	  Firms	  identified	  skills	  shortages	  as	  the	  greatest	  
constraint	  on	  growth	  and	  the	  key	  reason	  why	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  use	  the	  period	  of	  relief	  from	  
Chinese	   import	   competition	   to	   upgrade	   and	   participate	   in	   production	   of	   more	   complex	  
garments,	  or	  even	  to	  expand	  their	  output	  of	  basics.	  Rising	  production	  costs	  (due	  in	  principle	  to	  
fabric	  prices)	  put	  additional	  pressure	  on	  already	   tight	  margins	  which	   led	   firms	   to	   scale	  down	  
their	  own	  manufacturing	  operations	  and	  outsource	  production	  to	  garage	  CMT’s	  who	  work	  on	  a	  
job	  rate.	  Many	  firms	  simply	  closed	  doors.	  This	  implied	  further	  attrition	  to	  an	  already	  diminished	  
skills	   pool	   available	   to	   firms	   operating	   in	   the	   formal	   sector	   and	   erosion	   of	   core	   production	  
capacity,	  which	   undermined	   the	   acquisition	   of	   dynamic	   production	   capabilities	   by	   remaining	  
firms.	   Rather	   than	   assist	   firms	   to	  upgrade	   and	   improve	   their	   position	   in	   the	   value	   chain,	   the	  
quotas	  had	   the	  antithetical	  effect	  of	  downgrading	   the	  value	  chain.	   Local	  manufacturers	  were	  
forced	   toward	   low	  margin	   basics	   as	   skills	   shortages	   precluded	   participation	   in	   production	   of	  
more	  complex	  garments.	  Here	   they	   faced	  even	  greater	  competitive	  pressure	   than	  before	   the	  
quotas	  due	  to	  imports	  from	  lower	  cost	  locations	  from	  China	  (and	  especially	  at	  the	  discount	  end	  
of	  the	  market	  where	  illegal	  imports	  were	  rife).	  
Institutional	  constraints	  
	  
Competitiveness	  is	  closely	  associated	  with	  wage	  costs	  and	  working	  hours	  (Edwards	  et	  al	  2006).	  
The	   former	   is	   rooted	   in	   general	   labour	  market	   rigidity	   in	   the	   South	  African	   economy	   toward	  
which	   the	   considerable	   power	   of	   unions	   is	   a	  major	   contributor.	   The	   latter	   is	   a	   controversial	  
point	  with	  many	  manufacturers	   arguing	   that	   a	   shift	   or	   piecework	   system	  would	   significantly	  
raise	  productivity	  and	  better	  enable	  them	  to	  compete	  with	  Asian	  countries	  which	  operate	  along	  
these	  lines.	  The	  quotas	  amplified	  institutional	  pressures	  in	  respect	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  as	  firms	  













and	  in	  respect	  of	  union	  membership,	  as	  firm	  closures	  and	  retrenchments	  intensified	  flight	  into	  
the	  informal	  sector.	  	  
Systemic	  inefficiency	  
	  
Finally,	  there	  was	  insufficient	  obligational	  cooperation	  along	  the	  value	  chain	  to	  achieve	  systemic	  
efficiency	   and	   alignment	   of	   the	   value	   chain,	   both	   of	   which	   are	   important	   mechanisms	   for	  
competitiveness.	  
	  
The	  single	  most	   significant	   input	   into	   the	  clothing	  sector	   is	   fabric,	  which	   ties	   the	  clothing	  and	  
textiles	   industries	   together.	  The	  endemic	   shortage	  of	   local	   fabric	  was	   recognised	  as	  a	  binding	  
constraint	   on	   the	   productivity	   of	   the	   South	   African	   clothing	   industry	  with	   the	   lack	   of	   vertical	  
integration	   in	   the	   domestic	   value	   chain	   affecting	   the	   ability	   of	   domestic	   firms	   to	   effectively	  
compete	  both	  in	  their	  own	  market	  with	  Chinese	  imports	  and	  in	  export	  markets.	  Once	  again,	  the	  
cause	  of	  the	  problem	  does	  not	  map	  directly	  back	  to	  Chinese	  competition	  but	  has	  political	  and	  
historical	   roots.	   Whereas	   the	   clothing	   sector	   responded	   to	   trade	   liberalisation	   post-­‐1994	   by	  
intensifying	   its	   dependence	   on	   product	   and	   functional	   diversification	   and	   producing	   for	   the	  
domestic	  market,	  the	  textiles	  sector	  restructured	  through	  greater	  specialisation,	  finding	  it	  more	  
profitable	   to	   export	   (Gibbon	   2002b).	   This	   culminated	   in	   a	   lack	   of	   strategic	   co	   ordination	   and	  
cooperation	  between	   the	   apparel	   and	   textile	  manufacturers	   and	   the	   functional	   divergence	  of	  
(what	  should	  be)	  two	  dependent	  sectors.	  As	  Kipling	  argued:	  	  	  
	  
“The	   idea	   that	   clothing	   and	   textiles	   are	   joined	   at	   the	   hip	   is	   a	   fallacy.	   One	   third	   of	  
textiles	  output	  supports	   the	  apparel	   industry	  and	  yet	  we	  have	  a	  policy	   that	  says	   that	  
you	  must	  be	  joined	  at	  the	  hip	  whilst	  clothing	  manufacturers	  are	  penalized	  (through	  the	  
20%	  duty	  on	   imported	  fabric)	   into	  supporting	  a	  textiles	   industry	  that	  cannot	  produce	  
the	   fabrics	   anyway.	  And	   then	   it	   says	   that	  we	  must	   compete	  against	  China	  with	   their	  
massive	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  fabric	  that	  they’ve	  built	  up	  over	  the	  past	  20	  years!”	  
(Kipling	  2011)	  
	  
The	  lack	  of	  obligational	  relationships	  between	  clothing	  and	  textiles	  manufacturers	  implied	  that	  
the	   requirement	   for	   systemic	   efficiency	   could	   not	   be	   fulfilled.	   This	   should	   have	   formed	   the	  
fundamental	   basis	   for	   any	   intervention	   in	   the	   sector.	   Rather	   than	   encouraging	   greater	  













historically	   fractious	   relationships	   between	   clothing	   and	   textiles	   manufacturers	   causing	   the	  
pipeline	   to	   fracture	   further.	   The	   temporary	   nature	   of	   the	   intervention	   discouraged	   textiles	  
manufacturers	   from	   refocusing	   production	   toward	   the	   domestic	   clothing	   market	   and	   away	  
from	  exports.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  clothing	  manufacturers	  were	  placed	  on	  the	  back	  foot	  because	  
quotas	   on	   imported	   fabric	   left	   them	   beholden	   to	   a	   textiles	   industry	   that	   could	   not	   or	   was	  
unwilling	  to	  meet	  their	  demands.	  Apart	  from	  higher	  prices	  and	  fabric	  shortages,	  manufacturers	  
reported	  increasingly	  poor	  delivery	  performance	  and	  product	  quality	  from	  local	  fabric	  suppliers	  
due	  to	  quotas,	  which	  strengthened	  the	  bargaining	  position	  of	  textiles	  firms.	  	  
Lack	  of	  value	  chain	  alignment	  
	  
Retailers	   are	   the	   critical	   link	   between	   the	   value	   chain	   and	   local	   firms.	   One	   of	   the	   major	  
hypotheses	   of	  GVC	   theory	   is	   that	   development	   requires	   linking	   up	  with	   the	   lead	   firms	   in	   the	  
industry	  (Gereffi	  and	  Memedovic	  2003).	  The	  ability	  of	  local	  firms	  t 	  become	  integrated	  into	  the	  
upper	  segments	  of	  the	  value	  chain	  and	  the	  possibilities	  for	  upgrading	  are	  critically	  dependent	  on	  
their	   relationship	   with	   local	   retailers.	   Local	   firms	   have	   a	   comparative	   advantage	   over	   their	  
foreign	  competitors;	  their	  proximity	  to	  the	   local	  market	  gives	  them	  the	  ability	  to	  get	  goods	  to	  
the	   stores	   fast,	   which	   allows	   retailers	   to	   respond	   to	   customer-­‐buying	   patterns	   (Barnes	   in	  
Bisseker	   2006c).	   However,	   this	   advantage	   has	   been	   rapidly	   eroded	   by	   China	   and	   other	   East	  
Asian	   suppliers,	   who	   have	   upgraded	   their	   production	   capabilities	   and	   invested	   in	  world-­‐class	  
manufacturing	   techniques	   and	   human	   resources	   to	   meet	   the	   new	   demands	   of	   lean	  
manufacturing.	   To	   exploit	   its	   locational	   advantage,	   the	   domestic	   industry	  must	   do	   the	   same.	  
However,	  given	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	  investment	  needed,	  manufacturers	  need	  to	  be	  sure	  of	  a	  
market	  by	  entering	   into	  obligational	   relationships	  with	  retailers	  who	  undertake	  to	  buy	  certain	  
quantities	  of	  their	  goods	  (Morris	  in	  Bisseker	  2006c).	  Pundits	  argued	  that	  the	  local	  industry	  was	  
uncompetitive	  because	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  between	  domestic	  retailers	  and	  manufacturers,	  which	  
precluded	   alignment	   of	   the	   value	   chain.	   Greater	   levels	   of	   competitiveness	   achieved	   through	  
strategic	   obligational	   and	   collaborative	   buyer-­‐supplier	   relationships	   would	   innately	   lead	   to	  
greater	   demand	   for	   local	   output.	   If	  manufacturers	   believed	   retailers’	   commitments	   to	   source	  
more	  from	  them	  in	  the	  future,	  they	  would	  reciprocate	  by	  striving	  to	  become	  more	  competitive	  
and	  innovative	  by	  investing	  in	  capital	  equipment,	  technology	  and	  resources.	  Again,	  this	  should	  














In	   the	   run	  up	   to	  quotas,	  manufacturers	  and	   retailers	  had	  embraced	  cooperation	  as	   the	  most	  
constructive	   way	   of	   laying	   a	   foundation	   for	   a	   sustainable	   future	   for	   the	   industry	   and	   some	  
beginnings	   of	   trust	   had	   been	   established	   through	   the	   Business	   Alliance.	   The	   quotas	   had	   the	  
potential	   to	   break	   down	   this	   trust	   and	   prompt	   retailers	   to	   view	   the	   industry	   with	   extreme	  
suspicion	  and	  to	  hedge	  their	  bets	  and	  further	  diversify	  their	  supply	  chain	  to	  foreign	  countries	  to	  
reduce	   their	   exposure	   to	   protectionist	   domestic	   policy	   in	   the	   future.	   As	   Morris	   in	   Bisseker	  
2006c	  argued:	  
	  
"The	  DTI	  has	  started	  a	  dynamic	  that	  it	  can't	  control.	  It	  will	  now	  take	  a	  great	  act	  of	  will	  
for	   retailers	  not	   to	   source	  more	  offshore.	   The	  only	   thing	   that	  will	   stop	   them	   is	   the	  
Business	  Alliance	  and	  the	  relationships	  they	  have	  forged	  with	  manufacturers.”	  
Under	  an	  import	  substitution	  regime,	  where	  the	  textiles	  firms	  drove	  the	  chain,	  it	  was	  possible	  
to	  penalise	  retailers	  into	  sourcing	  domestically.	  However,	  in	  the	  post	  MFA	  era	  of	  globalisation,	  
this	  approach	  is	  highly	  inappropriate	  and	  this	  is	  even	  more	  trite	  where,	  as	  in	  South	  Africa,	  the	  
value	  chain	  is	  domestically	  focused,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  is	  key	  to	  the	  future	  
success	   of	   the	   clothing	   industry	   and	   the	   potential	   for	   local	   firms	   to	   partake	   in	   this	   growth	  
process	  (or	  to	  be	  completely	  excluded	  from	  it),	  lies	  in	  the	  very	  hands	  of	  these	  retailers.	  In	  this	  
particular	   context,	   an	   industrial	   policy	   that	   makes	   the	   retailers	   the	   principle	   enemy	   of	  
manufacturers	   simply	  does	  not	  make	   sense104.	  This	   is	   the	  bust:	   In	   so	   far	  as	   the	  China	  quotas	  
were	  antagonistic	   to	   the	  retailers,	  not	  only	  were	   they	  were	  an	   inappropriate	   industrial	  policy	  
for	  the	  task	  at	  hand,	  they	  were	  intrinsically	  self-­‐defeating.	  	  
The	  implementation	  of	  the	  quotas	  
	  
With	   regard	   to	   the	   quotas	   themselves,	   the	   Business	   Alliance	   (2006)	   observed	   that	   without	  
consultation	   with	   key	   players	   (retailers	   and	   manufacturers),	   and	   direct	   feedback	   from	   key	  
players	  -­‐	  manufacturers	  and	  retailers	  -­‐	  who	  are	  the	  direct	  recipients	  of	  the	  intervention,	  the	  DTI	  
would	  lack	  the	  detailed	  knowledge	  necessary	  to	  design	  a	  quota	  mechanism	  with	  the	  necessary	  
flexibility	   to	   handle	   ongoing	   production	   incapacities	   and	   market	   distortions. From	   a	  
manufacturing	   perspective,	   restrictions	   on	   fabric	   were	   particularly	   problematic.	   The	   limited	  
production	   capacity	   of	   local	   fabric	   firms	   to	  meet	   demand,	   and	   in	   some	   cases,	   the	   complete	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













inability	  of	   local	   firms	  to	  produce	  the	  fabric	  at	  all,	  was	  a	  key	  reason	  why	  the	  quotas	   failed	  to	  
stimulate	   output	   and	   foster	   competitiveness	   in	   the	   industry.	   Fabric	   is	   the	   lifeblood	   to	   the	  
clothing	   industry.	   Restrictions	   on	   fabric	   implied	   that	   without	   an	   effective	   local	   supply	   base	  
clothing	  manufacturers	  could	  not	  expand	  their	  output	  and	  exploit	  the	  opportunity	  that	  quotas	  
created.	   Choking	   off	   supply	   to	   Chinese	   fabric	   placed	   local	   manufacturers	   at	   a	   distinct	  
competitive	  disadvantage	  relative	  to	  their	  Asian	  competitors,	  who	  all	  source	  fabric	  from	  China	  
(Edwards	  et	  al	  2006;	  Clotrade	  2006a).	   In	  addition,	  some	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  neighbours,	  such	  as	  
Mauritius	  and	  Lesotho,	  have	  developed	  vertically	   integrated	  value	   chains	   (Morris,	   Staritz	   and	  
Barnes	  2011),	  which	  enabled	   them	   to	  exploit	   their	   strategic	  position	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  South	  
African	  market	  and	  fill	  the	  void	  left	  by	  the	  quotas	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  local	  firms.	  
	  
The	   fixed	   allocation	   basis	   for	   the	   quotas	   locked	  manufacturers	   into	   pre-­‐formulated	   business	  
plans	   that	  were	   insensitive	   to	   changes	   in	   fashion	   and	   seasonal	   demand	  whilst	   the	   allocation	  
criteria	   ironically	  prejudiced	   firms	  who	  were	  historically	   the	   least	   supportive	  of	   local	   industry	  
since	  more	  quota	  was	  granted	  the	  greater	  the	  quantity	  imported	  in	  the	  past.	  Firms	  who	  tried	  to	  
source	   mainly	   locally	   received	   no	   quota.	   Furthermore,	   since	   quota	   was	   allocated	   against	  
previous	  imports,	  new	  firms	  were	  prevented	  from	  entering	  the	  market	  and	  existing	  firms	  could	  
not	  innovate	  and	  develop	  garments	  using	  new	  fabrics	  embodying	  the	  latest	  technology.	  SMEs	  
were	  particularly	  disadvantaged	  in	  pledging	  for	  concessions	  given	  their	  relatively	  low	  levels	  of	  
bargaining	   power,	   which	   undermined	   rather	   than	   improved	   their	   position	   in	   the	   industry.	  
Quota	   on	   fabric	   but	   not	   on	   the	   made-­‐up	   garments,	   led	   to	   contradictory	   and	   bizarre	  
consequences	  of	  increasing	  the	  incentive	  to	  import	  the	  ready-­‐made	  garments	  whilst	  quotas	  on	  
garment	  components	  and	  trim	  were	  also	  problematic.	  	  
	  
A	  key	  question	  was	  how	  many	  of	  the	  multitude	  of	  problems	  and	  disruptions	  to	  the	  industry	  that	  
the	   China	   quotas	   caused	   in	   their	   particular	   form	   and	   prescription,	   and	   in	   their	   manner	   of	  
allocation	  and	  implementation,	  were	  by	  default	  or	  design?	  Precedent	  to	  the	  China	  quotas,	  the	  
industry	  was	  in	  a	  process	  of	  restructuring,	  principally	  in	  response	  to	  the	  competitive	  impacts	  of	  
clothing	   imports	   from	  China.	  A	   key	  part	  of	   this	   process	  was	   a	  move	   towards	   sub-­‐contracting	  
and	  informalisation	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  lower	  overhead	  structures	  and	  a	  concurrent	  large	  shift	  away	  
from	  formal	  to	  informal	  sector	  employment,	  and	  out	  of	  the	  union’s	  reach.	  Ironically,	  the	  loss	  of	  













membership,	   had	   in	  many	   respects	   been	   fuelled	   by	   the	   challenges	   posed	   by	   the	   Bargaining	  
Council	  structure	  itself.	  In	  their	  self	  appointed	  role	  as	  arbitrators	  of	  the	  China	  quotas,	  SACTWU	  
was	  empowered	  to	  address	  this	  problem.	  	  
The	   prescriptive	   and	   inflexible	   nature	   of	   the	   interventions,	   the	   overly	   broad	   and	   conflicting	  
range	  of	  products	  affected,	   the	  allocation	  basis	   for	   initial	   and	  additional	  quota	  and	   the	   short	  
timing	   of	   its	   implementation	   all	   played	   into	   SACWTU’s	   hands.	   The	   DTI	   granted	   SACTWU	  
oversight	  of	  the	  Implementation	  Committee	  –	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  was	  the	  applicant	  -­‐	  which	  was	  
tasked	  with	  sanctioning	  additional	  quota.	  The	  function	  of	  the	  Implementation	  Committee	  in	  the	  
first	  few	  months	  of	  quotas	  was	  effectively	  negated	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  statistics	  on	  the	  quotas,	  which	  
ostensibly	   delayed	   the	   application	   process	   for	   additional	   quota.	   The	   upshot	   is	   that	   large	  
retailers	  and	  manufacturers	  caught	  in	  a	  tight	  position	  were	  compelled	  to	  conclude	  private	  deals	  
with	   SACTWU	   for	   additional	   quota.	   In	   the	   eyes	   of	   many,	   this	   was	   precisely	   what	   these	  
conditions	  were	  written	   to	  do.	  Most	  manufacturers	   interviewed	  dismissed	  quotas	  as	   a	   thinly	  
disguised	  political	  pool	   to	  achieve	   leverage	  with	  respect	  to	  Bargaining	  Council	  compliance.	  As	  
one	  interviewee	  put	  it,	  
“SACTWU	  decides	  who	  get	  additional	  quota.	  We	  import	  most	  of	  our	  fabric	  and	  use	  a	  fabric	  
that	   is	   not	   available	   anywhere	   in	   South	   Africa.	   Our	   quota	   has	   been	   used	   up.	   But	   to	   get	  
additional	   quota,	   you	   have	   to	   prostitute	   yourself	   in	   terms	   of	   additional	   machinists,	  
committing	  a	  percentage	  of	  turnover	  for	  training	  and	  undertaking	  to	  buy	  more	  local	  fabric.	  
Quotas	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  industry,	  they	  are	  a	  political	  instrument.”	  
Retail	  reinforced	  this	  view:	  	  
“(…)	  some	  retailers	  sold	  their	  souls	  for	  additional	  quota	  so	  that	  playing	  fields	  were	  manipulated	  at	  
labour	  whim.”	  
The	  modus	  operandi	  of	  quotas	  
	  
In	   formulating	  their	  China	  quota	  plan,	  there	  was	  no	  process	  and	  there	  was	  no	  “discovery”	  by	  
the	  DTI.	   The	  quotas	  were	   in	  principle,	   a	  pre-­‐formulated	   response	   to	  a	  problem	   (membership	  
loss)	  that	  was	  being	  experienced	  by	  one	  stakeholder,	  the	  union.	  The	  China	  quotas	  violated	  all	  
three	   principles	   of	   sound	   industrial	   policy	   (Chapter	   2);	   there	   was	   no	   political	   leadership,	   no	  













transparency	  and	  finally,	  no	  accountability	  for	  their	  bungled	  implementation	  (Bisseker	  2006c).	  
The	  quota	  proposals	  came	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli	  to	  the	  industry,	  having	  been	  finalized	  without	  any	  
collaboration	   with	   business	   and	   industry	   experts.	   A	   flawed	   policy	   process	   in	   the	   “wrong”	  
institutional	   setting	   generated	   a	   policy	   that	   was	   inherently	   incapable	   of	   fulfilling	   the	  
requirements	   of	   sustainable	   industrial	   policy,	   or	  meeting	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   DTI.	   This	  was	  
broadly	  confirmed	  by	  retailers	  who	  scored	  a	  zero	  when	  asked	  to	  rate	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  1-­‐5	  to	  what	  
extent	   they	   believed	   quotas	   achieved	   their	   objectives	   of	   stimulating	   local	   manufacturing	  
activity,	  improved	  productivity	  and	  efficiency	  of	  local	  producers.	  	  
	  
As	  one	  source	  commented:	  
	  
“There	  have	  been	  no	  published	  success	  stories,	  there	  are	  no	  new	  factories,	  the	  ones	  that	  are	  
operating	   are	   hanging	   in	   desperately,	   local	   suppliers	   have	   got	   even	  more	   clever	   at	   taking	  
product	   out	   to	   come	   in	   at	   a	   price,	   deliver	   performance	   is	   no	   better,	   quality	   is	   worse,	  
turnaround	   time	   is	  worse,	   innovation	   is	   no	  better,	   factories	   have	   still	   closed,	   suppliers	   are	  
complaining	  that	  it's	  all	  our	  fault	  because	  our	  price	  expectation	  is	  too	  high.”	  
	  
The	  welfare	  dimension	  of	  industrial	  policy	  
Sustainable	  industrial	  policy	  concerns	  welfare	  (consumer	  and	  employee)	  and	  competitiveness.	  
As	  an	  industrial	  policy,	  the	  China	  quotas	  must	  be	  tested	  against	  how	  it	  meets	  and	  balances	  both	  
of	   these	   agenda.	   Morris	   and	   Einhorn	   2008	   elaborate	   the	   trade-­‐off	   between	   these	   two	  
dimensions:	   Imports	   impart	   significant	   benefits	   on	   consumers	   and	   they	   act	   as	   a	   necessary	  
stimulus	   to	   domestic	   competitiveness,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   they	   lead	   to	   the	   erosion	   of	  
productive	  capacity.	  Since	  the	  industry	  depends	  on	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  firms	  and	  employment	  to	  
achieve	   scale	   efficiencies,	   this	   can	   undermine	   the	   acquisition	   of	   dynamic	   capabilities.	   An	  
appropriate	  industrial	  policy	  response	  would	  seek	  to	  use	  imports	  to	  stimulate	  competitiveness	  
so	  that	  this	  trade	  off	  is	  minimised	  (Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008).	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  China	  quotas,	  
balancing	  these	  foci	  was	  to	  chart	  a	  precarious	  course	  through	  the	  well	  being	  of	  consumers,	  who	  
benefitted	  from	  cheap	   imports	  and	  of	  manufacturers,	  who	  were	  adversely	   impacted	  by	  rising	  
import	   competition	   (Morris	   and	   Einhorn	   2008).	   In	   the	   run	   up	   to	   quotas,	   imports	   were	   at	  
unprecedented	   high	   levels	   which	   had	   precipitated	   a	   steep	   decline	   in	   employment	   and	  













competitiveness	   (and	   thus	   employment)	  without	   reversing	   the	   deflationary	   trend	   in	   clothing	  
prices.	  
	  
In	  respect	  of	  employment	  welfare,	  the	  employment	  impact	  of	  the	  quotas	  on	  the	  industry	  as	  a	  
whole	   is	   complicated	  by	   the	  growth	  of	   the	   informal	   sector.	  The	  quotas	  were	  accompanied	  by	  
further	   job	   losses	  and	   factory	   closures	   in	   the	   industry;	   and	  probably	  accelerated	   the	   trend	  as	  
firms	  buckled	  under	  higher	  production	  (fabric)	  costs	  and	  mounting	  supply	  chain	  pressures.	  Even	  
if	   displaced	  workers	  were	   reabsorbed	   into	   the	   industry	   in	   informal	   subsistence	   employment,	  
this	  occurs	  at	  a	  lower	  wage-­‐benefit	  than	  formal	  employment.	  If	  unemployment	  is	  more	  welfare	  
enhancing	  than	  employment	  at	  a	  subsistence	  wage,	  the	  China	  quotas	  undermined	  employment	  
welfare	  by	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  formal	  sector	  employees	  and	  possibly	  also	  by	  lowering	  the	  
social	  wage.	  	  
	  
Consumer	  welfare	  was	  also	  lowered	  by	  the	  quotas.	  The	  consumer	  welfare	  impact	  of	  the	  quotas	  
is	  confined	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  how	  consumers	  were	   impacted	  through	  garment	  prices	  that	  
are	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  standard	  of	  living.	  This	  distinguished	  a	  direct	  and	  an	  indirect	  effect.	  Quotas	  
impacted	  on	  consumer	  welfare	  directly	  by	  raising	   import	  prices;	  this	  fuelled	  a	  rise	   in	  garment	  
prices,	  which	  lowered	  disposable	  income	  of	  consumers	  and	  hence	  spendable	  income	  available	  
for	  the	  purchase	  of	  other	  goods.	  The	  quotas	  also	  impacted	  on	  consumer	  welfare	  indirectly	  by	  
undermining	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   local	   manufacturers.	   Rising	   fabric	   prices	   contributed	  
directly	   to	   higher	   prices	   for	   locally	   made	   garments.	   Although	   retailers	   claimed	   that	   they	  
absorbed	   some	   of	   this	   inflation	   in	   the	   form	   of	   lower	  margins	   in	   the	   short	   term,	   there	   is	   no	  
evidence	  that	  were	  able	  to	  do	  this	  on	  a	  sustainable	  basis.	  Not	  only	  have	  the	  retailers	  served	  an	  
important	  welfare	  function	  by	  directly	  lowering	  garment	  prices	  through	  imports,	  they	  have	  also	  
generated	  a	  positive	  welfare	  spin	  off	  to	  consumers	  by	  playing	  a	  constructive	  role	  in	  upgrading	  
the	  sector	  which	  indirectly	  lowered	  garment	  prices	  (Morris	  in	  Bisseker	  2006c).	  Quotas	  alienated	  
retailers	  from	  their	  local	  supply	  base	  and	  urged	  them	  to	  switch	  an	  even	  greater	  proportion	  of	  
their	   sourcing	   to	   other	   countries,	   some	   of	  which	  were	   even	   cheaper	   than	   China.	   This	   led	   to	  
even	   greater	   price	   suppression	   for	   basics,	  whilst	   skills	   shortages	   constrained	   firms’	   ability	   to	  
graduate	   to	  more	   complex	   garments.	   Diminishing	  margins	   and	   a	   shrinking	   order	   base	  would	  
more	  likely	  have	  stifled	  innovation	  and	  upgrading	  in	  local	  firms,	  which	  would	  feed	  into	  higher	  













Section	  Two:	  An	  evaluation	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  from	  an	  economic	  and	  theoretical	  
industrial	  policy	  perspective	  	  
	  
In	  this	  Section,	   I	  shall	   situate	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  China	  quotas	  as	  an	   industrial	  policy	   in	  the	  
context	  of	  some	  contemporary	  industrial	  policy	  literature	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  I	  shall	  try	  to	  address	  
a	  final	  hanging	  question:	  Were	  short-­‐term	  quotas	  on	  Chinese	  imports	  capable	  of	  reversing	  the	  
development	  trajectory	  of	  the	  South	  African	  industry?	  	  
	  
Contemporary	   industrial	   policy	   literature	   overwhelming	   features	   four	   prominent	   industrial	  
policy	   theorists;	   Justin	   Lin	   (World	   Bank	   Chief	   Economist),	   Ja-­‐Hoon	   Chang	   (Author	   of	   ‘Kicking	  
away	   the	   Ladder’),	   Dani	   Rodrik	   and	   Ricardo	   Hausmann.	   Whilst	   these	   four	   practitioners	  
commonly	   agree	   on	   a	   central	   role	   for	   the	   state	   in	   facilitating	   structural	   change,	   they	   are	  
nuanced	   in	   their	   definition	   of	   this	   role	   i.e.	   how	   the	   state	   should	   constructively	   intervene	   to	  
promote	  structural	  upgrading;	  and	  what	  form	  this	  intervention	  should	  take.	  	  
	  
The	   conflicting	   approaches	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   industrial	   upgrading	   of	   Chang,	   a	   staunch	  
heterodox	  and	  active	   advocate	  of	  protectionism	   (and	  quotas)	   and	   Lin,	   a	  neo-­‐classical	   loyalist	  
and	  fierce	  opponent	  of	  protectionism,	  mark	  the	  extreme	  boundaries	  of	  contemporary	  industrial	  
policy	  terrain.	  A	  prominent	  protagonist	  of	  protectionism,	  Lin	  argues	  that	  the	  central	  concern	  for	  
reformers	  is	  to	  promote	  industrial	  upgrading	  without	  generating	  industries	  and	  economies	  that	  
are	  kept	  on	  artificial	  life	  support	  by	  state	  subsidies	  and	  protectionist	  policies.	  In	  Lin’s	  paradigm,	  
which	  he	   labels	  a	  “Comparative	  Advantage	  Following”	  (CAF)	  approach,	   the	  facilitating	  state	   is	  
seen	  to	  provide	  a	  “helping	  nudge	  to	  overcome	  externalities,	  but	   then	   is	  able	   to	   let	   industries	  
grow	  and	  advance	  organically	  because	  of	   their	   comparative	  advantage.”	  A	   “facilitating”	   state	  
provides	   the	   necessary	   coordination	   to	   remove	   obstacles	   that	   are	   preventing	   existing	   firms	  
from	   upgrading	   their	   products	   or	   to	   lift	   the	   barriers	   that	   are	   discouraging	   new	   firms	   from	  
spontaneously	   entering	   the	   industry	   and	   related	   industries.	   In	   effect,	   the	   government	   picks	  
“winners”	   -­‐	   industries	   that	   have	   already	   developed	   according	   to	   their	   current	   comparative	  
advantage	  and	  for	  which	  success	  is	  thus	  reasonably	  certain	  –	  and	  implements	  policy	  to	  remove	  
the	  binding	  constraints	  on	  competitiveness.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  facilitating	  state	  is	  to	  encourage	  the	  
emergence	  of	  firms,	  industries,	  and	  sectors	  that,	  once	  launched,	  will	  make	  effective	  use	  of	  the	  













by	   imitating	  neighbours	  that	  are	  similar,	  but	  have	  travelled	  further	  along	  the	  upgrading	  path.	  
This	   is	   essentially	   the	  East	  Asian	   “flying	  geese”	  model.	  When	   industrial	  upgrading	  occurs	   this	  
stepwise	  fashion,	   in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  accumulation	  of	  capital	  and	  changes	  in	  comparative	  
advantage,	  rather	  than	  if	  a	  country	  attempts	  a	  big	  leap	  (which	  Chang	  proposes),	  Lin	  argues	  that	  
growth	   is	   more	   sustainable	   with	   lower	   adjustment	   (learning)	   costs.	   This	   is	   akin	   to	   an	   idea	  
developed	   by	   Hausmann	   and	   Klinger	   (2006),	   which	   describes	   a	   country’s	   upgrading	   path	   as	  
analogous	  to	  monkeys	  in	  a	  forest;	  they	  first	  jump	  onto	  the	  low	  branches	  of	  a	  nearby	  tree	  and	  
then	  traverse	  to	  the	  higher	  branches	  of	   the	  tree	  before	  moving	  to	  the	  next	  one.	  Sequentially	  
over	  time,	  the	  monkey	  (country)	  moves	  both	  further	  away	  from	  its	  initial	  tree	  (infant	  industry)	  
and	  to	  higher	  branches	  of	  subsequent	  trees	  (the	  production	  more	  advanced	  products).	  	  
	  
The	  virtues	  of	  his	  CAF	  approach	  according	  Lin	  are	  numerous.	  Firstly,	  since	  firms	  are	  globally	  as	  
well	   as	   domestically	   competitive,	   they	   are	   able	   to	   export	   their	   products,	   which	   negates	   the	  
need	  for	  a	  large	  domestic	  market	  to	  achieve	  scale	  economies.	  New	  entrants	  are	  encouraged	  to	  
enter	   the	   industry,	   which	   enforces	   vibrant	   domestic	   competition.	   Industrial	   clusters	   form	  
naturally	   as	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   industry	   grows	   and	   complementary	   investment	   in	   related	  
activities	   occurs.	   Furthermore,	   he	   contends,	   when	   a	   government	   opts	   to	   protect	   firms	   or	  
sectors	   that	   have	   a	   long	  window	  of	   viability,	   the	   diversion	   of	   resources	   away	   from	   activities	  
which	   have	   a	   current	   comparative	   advantage	   will	   slow	   the	   pace	   of	   absolute	   capital	  
accumulation	   and	   upgrading	   of	   the	   country’s	   endowment	   structure,	   which	   will	   protract	   the	  
infancy	   stage	   of	   new	   industries.	   Lin	   concludes:	   “Excessive	   protection	   risks	   institutionalizing	   a	  
culture	  of	   rent	   seeking	  especially	  where	   the	  quality	  of	  governance	   is	  poor	   in	  which	  case,	   the	  
indirect	  effects	  of	  protection	  may	  be	  even	  more	  damaging	  than	  the	  direct	  effects.”	  	  
	  
In	  support	  of	  his	  paradigm,	  Lin	  offers	  China’s	  transition	  from	  a	  planned	  economy	  to	  a	  market	  
approach	  as	  a	  sterling	  example	  of	  a	  gradual	  liberalisation	  process	  of	  phasing	  out	  CAD	  industries	  
whilst	  simultaneously	  facilitating	  growth	  of	  CAF	  industries.	  In	  sum,	  China’s	  success	  stems	  from	  
the	   fact	   that	   it	   started	  with	  many	   industries	   (clothing,	   textiles	  and	  toys)	   that	  were	  consistent	  
with	   their	   areas	   of	   current	   comparative	   advantage	   (labour	   and	   fabric)	   and	   progressively	  
transitioned	  into	  more	  technologically	  demanding	  industries	  as	   its	  capital	  and	  labour	  reserves	  
allowed.	  Korea	  and	  Mauritius	  are	  other	  cited	  examples.	  In	  the	  former	  case,	  a	  “facilitating	  state”	  













market	  discipline,	  which	  made	  large-­‐scale	  deviation	  from	  the	  country’s	  comparative	  advantage	  
impossible	  (Lin	  and	  Chang	  2009).	  Industries	  benefitting	  from	  subsidization	  and	  protection	  were	  
required	   to	  prove	   that	   their	   competitiveness	  on	  export	  markets	  was	   increasing	  over	   time.	   In	  
addition,	   the	   government	   ensured	   that	   Korean	   manufacturers	   could	   access	   to	   intermediate	  
inputs	   at	   world	   prices	   through	   duty	   drawback	   schemes	   and	   export-­‐processing	   zones.	   In	   the	  
latter	   case,	   Mauritius	   identified	   Hong	   Kong	   as	   its	   “compass	   economy”	   and	   in	   addition	   to	  
protection,	   developed	   export-­‐processing	   zones	   (EPZs)	   where	   a	   flexible	   labour	   employment	  
regime	   operated	   different	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   economy.	   Conversely,	   Lin	   argues,	   many	   of	   the	  
losers	   from	   liberalisation	   followed	   comparative	   advantage-­‐defying	   (CAD)	   strategies	   that	   their	  
governments	   had	   adopted	   in	   the	   past:	   “The	   pervasive	   failures	   in	   developing	   countries	   are	  
mostly	   due	   to	   the	   failure	   of	   governments	   to	   come	   up	   with	   good	   criteria	   for	   identifying	  
industries	   that	   are	   appropriate	   for	   a	   country’s	   endowment	   structure	   and	   level	   of	  
development.”	   (Lin	  and	  Monga	  2010;	  p.	  2)	  When	  protection	  was	  removed	   in	  a	  shock	  therapy	  
manner	  –	  such	  as	  the	  lifting	  of	  MFA	  quotas	  –	  this	  caused	  the	  inevitable	  collapse	  of	  non-­‐viable	  
firms.	  	  
	  
The	  key	  message	  from	  Lin	  is	  that	  industrial	  upgrading	  is	  best	  achieved	  when	  countries	  develop	  
an	   effective	   export	   platform	   by	   focusing	   on	   industries	   and	   sectors	   in	  which	   a	   latent	   level	   of	  
sector-­‐specific	  capital	  and	  labour	  inputs	  already	  exists	  –	  there	  are	  already	  firms	  in	  the	  industry	  -­‐	  
and	   in	   which	   success	   has	   already	   been	   demonstrated	   by	   countries	   with	   similar	   industrial	  
structures.	   Foreign	   investment	   should	   be	   encouraged	   to	   fund	   development,	   since	   it	   is	  
accompanied	  by	  knowledge.	  Once	  enough	  knowledge	  transfer	  has	  taken	  place,	  the	  investment	  
becomes	   an	   “incubator	   “	   for	   new	   entrants.	   According	   to	   Lin	   and	  Monga	   2010,	   Bangladesh’s	  
vibrant	   clothing	   industry	   started	   with	   direct	   in	   investment	   from	   Daiwoo,	   a	   manufacturer.	  
Furthermore,	  Lin	  argues	  that	  since	  the	  likelihood	  of	  capture	  is	  proportional	  to	  the	  magnitude	  of	  
protection	   and	   subsidies,	   if	   targeted	   sectors	   are	   consistent	   with	   a	   country’s	   inherent	  
comparative	   advantage,	   the	   protection	   and	   subsidies	   required	   to	   compensate	   firms	   for	  
information	  externalities	  are	  small	  and	  provide	  little	  incentive	  for	  the	  elites	  to	  use	  their	  political	  
clout	   to	  capture	   the	   small	   rents.	   The	  corollary	   to	   this	   is	   that	   targeting	  non-­‐viable	   sectors	  will	  
entrench	  the	  culture	  of	  rent	  seeking	  since	  the	  subsidies	  required	  to	  keep	  uncompetitive	  firms	  














In	  contrast	   to	  Lin,	  Chang	   is	  a	  staunch	  proponent	  of	  protectionism.	  From	  Chang’s	  perspective,	  
whilst	   comparative	   advantage	   is	   a	   useful	   baseline	   to	   determine	   how	   much	   a	   country	   is	  
sacrificing	  by	  protecting	  its	  infant	  industries	  -­‐	  the	  greater	  the	  deviation,	  the	  higher	  the	  cost	  -­‐	  it	  
is	   not	   the	   absolute	   constraint	   on	   a	   country’s	   growth.	   Rather	   than	   adhere	   to	   its	   comparative	  
advantage,	  Chang	  contends	  that	  a	  country	  needs	  to	  defy	  it	  in	  order	  to	  upgrade	  its	  industry.	  In	  
short,	  a	  country	  does	  not	  need	  to	  wait	  until	  it	  has	  accumulated	  the	  optimal	  factor	  endowments	  
to	  support	  a	  new	   industry	  before	  doing	  so.	  Chang’s	  approach,	  dubbed	  by	  Lin	  as	  Comparative	  
Advantage	  Defying	  (CDA),	  by	  nature	  implies	  a	  highly	  interventionist	  role	  for	  the	  state	  to	  allow	  
(usually	  poorly	  endowed)	  developing	  countries	  to	  “leap	  up	  the	  industrialisation	  ladder”.	  
	  
Chang	  gives	  two	  principle	  motivations	  for	  his	  reasoning:	  Firstly,	  the	  time	  that	  it	  will	  take	  for	  a	  
country	  to	  acquire	  the	  necessary	  technological	  capabilities	  is	  uncertain,	  and	  may	  be	  substantial.	  
Secondly,	   much	   of	   the	   learning	   is	   achieved	   by	   doing	   so	   that	   until	   the	   country	   has	   actually	  
entered	  the	  industry,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  know	  how	  long	  it	  will	  take	  before	  a	  country	  can	  become	  
internationally	   competitive.	   As	   Chang	   posits:	   Weighing	   the	   costs	   of	   technological	   upgrading	  
against	  the	  expected	  future	  returns	  using	  comparative	  advantage	  as	  a	  measuring	  rod	  is	  a	  logical	  
but	  ultimately	  misleading	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  process,	  because	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  say	  how	  
long	  the	  acquisition	  of	  the	  necessary	  technological	  capabilities	  is	  going	  to	  take	  and	  how	  much	  
‘return’	  it	  will	  bring	  in	  the	  end.	  	  Chang’s	  argument	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  factors	  of	  
production	  are	   fixed	   in	   ther	  physical	  quantities	  –	  due	   to	   their	   specificity	  –	  which	   implies	   that	  
structual	   adjustment	   costs	   will	   be	   higher	   and	   adjustment	   times	   longer	   than	   neo-­‐classical	  
models	  (such	  as	  the	  Heckscher-­‐Ohlin	  model)	  admit.	  Chang	  argues	  that	  the	  assumption	  of	  non-­‐
specific	   inputs	   underpinning	   neo-­‐classical	   models	   (e.g.	   the	   H-­‐O	   model)	   ignores	   pertinent	  
realities:	   Firstly,	   a	   country’s	   absolute	   capital	   to	   labour	   ratio	   does	   not	   correlate	   with	   the	  
quantities	   of	   capital	   and	   labour	   that	   can	   be	   costlessly	   and	   seamlessly	   deployed	   to	   new	  
activities.	  Secondly,	  many	  technological	  capabilities	  are	  acquired	  in	  an	  industry-­‐specific	  manner	  
through	   actual	   production	   experiences	   so	   that	   it	   is,	   by	   definition,	   necessary	   to	   defy	  
comparative	  advantage	  if	  a	  country	  is	  going	  to	  enter	  new	  industries.	  	  
	  
These	   two	   factors	   justifiy	   long	   term	   protection	   whilst	   industries	   accumulate	   the	   necessary	  













protection	  afforded	  to	  Japan’s	  car	   industry	  through	  direct	  and	   indirect	  subsidies	  and	  a	  virtual	  
ban	   on	   foreign	   direct	   investment	   that	   preceeded	   its	   competitiveness	   in	   global	   markets.	   In	  
addition,	  he	  notes	   that	   learning	  by	  doing	  was	  an	   invaluable	  part	  of	  Nokia’s	   success,	  although	  
protectionism	  was	  not	  a	   core	  element	  of	   their	   strategy.	  Chang	  concludes:	   “In	   the	   real	  world,	  
firms	  with	  uncertain	  prospects	  need	  to	  be	  created,	  protected,	  subsidised	  and	  nurtured,	  possibly	  
for	  decades,	  if	  industrial	  upgrading	  is	  to	  be	  achieved.”	  (Chang	  and	  Lin	  2009;	  p.19).	  	  	  
	  
I	  shall	  now	  examine	  the	  “in	  between”	  policy	  terrain,	  in	  which	  Dani	  Rodik	  and	  Ricardo	  Hausmann	  
(amongst	   others)	   position	   themselves.	  Despite	   being	   ardent	   critics	   of	   ‘neo-­‐liberalism’,	   Rodrik	  
and	  Hausmann	  find	  some	  common	  ground	  with	  both	  Lin	  and	  Chang.	  However,	  whereas	  Lin	  and	  
Chang’s	  models	  focus	  on	  comparative	  advantage	  and	  implicitly	  assume	  that	  states	  possess	  the	  
necessary	   information	   to	   intervene	   effectively	   in	   their	   industries	   (whilst	   at	   the	   same	   time	  
avoiding	   capture),	   Rodrik	   and	   Hausmann	   emphasise	   the	   importance	   of	   institutions	   and	   the	  
institutional	   setting	   in	   which	   the	   policy	   process	   occurs.	   Increasingly,	   their	   literature	   offers	  
institutional	   convergence	   as	   an	   explanation	   for	   the	   inexplicable	   outcomes	   of	   neo-­‐liberalist	  
policies	   that	   conventional	   economic	   theorists	   have	   grappled	  with.	   Consequently,	   Rodrik	   and	  
Hausmann’s	   have	   dedicated	   much	   effort	   to	   develop	   a	   “blueprint”	   for	   the	   institutional	  
architecture	   of	   industrial	   policy	   paradigms105.	   And	   here	   Rodrik	   and	   Lin	   diverge,	   whereas	   Lin	  
advocates	   a	   follower-­‐strategy	   based	   singularly	   on	   similarities	   in	   comparative	   advantage	   and	  
development,	   Rodrik	   2003	   shows	   that	   failure	   or	   success	   is	   largely	   determined	   by	   the	  
institutional	   environment	   into	  which	   these	  growth	   strategies	   are	   transplanted.	   Since	   growth-­‐
promoting	   strategies	   are	   context	   specific,	   requiring	   considerable	   local	   knowledge	   and	  where	  
the	  success	  of	  reforms	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  institutional	  structure	  which	  varies	  from	  country	  to	  
country,	   Rodrik	   notes	   that:	   “Successful	   reforms	   are	   those	   that	   package	   sound	   economic	  
principles	   around	   local	   capabilities,	   constraints	   and	   opportunities.	   Since	   these	   local	  
circumstances	  vary,	  so	  do	  the	  reforms	  that	  work.”	  (Rodrik	  2003	  p.17).	  	  
The	   main	   challenge	   for	   industrial	   policy	   from	   the	   Rodrik-­‐Hausmann	   perspective	   lies	   in	  
identifying	  where	  the	  binding	  constraints	  or	  promising	  opportunities	  lie.	  Compared	  to	  Lin,	  who	  
glosses	   over	   this	   issue,	   Rodrik	   and	   Hausmann	   2006	   place	   particular	   emphasis	   on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Rodrik 2003 describes a growth strategy as economic policies and institutional arrangements aimed at 













importance	  of	  policies	   that	  go	  beyond	  a	  macro	   level	  approach	  that	  aim	  to	  create	  a	  “business	  
enabling	  environment”	  to	  micro	  level	  interventions,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  collaboration	  and	  a	  
mutually	  enforcing	  learning	  relationship	  between	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sector.	  These	  theorists	  
stress	   the	   relational	   interdependency	   between	   state	   and	   business,	   the	   necessity	   but	  
uncertainty	   of	   any	   state	   directed	   interventions,	   and	   hence	   the	   crucial	   role	   of	   learning	   in	   the	  
process	  (Morris	  2011).	  	  
Hausmann,	   Rodrik	   and	   Sabel	   2007	   distinguish	   between	   industrial	   policy	   “in	   the	   small”	   and	  
industrial	  policy	   in	  the	   large.	  They	  propose	  that	   initial	  reforms	  that	  stimulate	  growth	  may	  not	  
lead	   to	   sustained	   long	   term	  growth,	   so	   that	  a	   two	  pronged	  strategy	   is	  needed	   to	  get	  growth	  
started	  and	  to	  keep	  it	  going.	  Industrial	  policy	  “in	  the	  large”	  is	  a	  difficult	  challenge	  as	  it	  “requires	  
constructing	  a	  sound	   institutional	  underpinning	  to	  maintain	  productive	  dynamism	  and	  endow	  
the	   economy	  with	   resilience	   to	   shocks	   over	   the	   longer	   term.”	   (Rodrik	   2003;	   p.	   3).	   Industrial	  
policy	   “in	   the	   small”	   refers	   to	   the	   initial	   and	  often	  unorthodox	   strategies	   that	   reformists	   can	  
employ	   to	  bring	  about	   a	   short-­‐term	  growth	   spurt,	  where	   the	   focus	   falls	   on	  existing	  activities	  
and	   putting	  mechanisms	   in	   place	   that	   identify	   and	   remove	   roadblocks	   facing	   these	   activities	  
where	   the	   best	   source	   of	   information	   for	   the	   identification	   and	   co-­‐development	   of	   public	  
inputs	  are	  existing	   firms	  (p.5).	  These	  reforms	  need	  not	  overly	   tax	  the	   institutional	  capacity	  of	  
the	  economy.	  	  
	  
The	  industrial	  policy	  discussion	  in	  this	  thesis	  concerns	  industrial	  policy	  “in	  the	  small”,	  since	  the	  
primary	  question	  here	  is:	  How	  can	  the	  DTI	  effectively	  intervene	  to	  achieve	  growth	  in	  the	  South	  
African	  clothing	  sector?	  However	  Rodrik,	  Hausmann	  and	  Sabel	   (2007)	  note	   that	  governments	  
face	   three	   problems	   in	   this	   respect;	   an	   information	   problem	   –	   they	   do	   not	   know	  where	   the	  
obstacles	  to	  and	  opportunities	  for	  growth	  lie;	  an	  incentive	  problem	  –	  bureaucrats	  are	  fallible	  to	  
corruption	   and	   bribes;	   and	   finally,	   a	   resource	   problem	   –	   the	   government	   does	   not	   have	   an	  
automatic	  mechanism	  like	  the	  market	  to	  efficiently	  allocate	  resources.	  These	  simple	  facts	  make	  
private	   embeddedness	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	   success	   and	   particularly	   where	   sectoral	  
capacity	   of	   government	   is	   limited.	   The	   mechanism	   to	   overcome	   these	   problems	   is	   sound	  
industrial	   policy	   architecture.	   The	   importance	   of	   institutional	   design	   in	   Rodrik’s	   theoretical	  
framework,	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  which	  is	  precisely	  built	  around	  the	  importance	  of	  creating	  the	  













heavily	  emphasised	  (Morris	  2011).	  Rodrik	  (2003)	  posits	  that	  “reformers	  can	  creatively	  package	  
first	  order	  economic	  principles	  into	  institutional	  designs	  that	  are	  sensitive	  to	  local	  opportunities	  
and	  constraints”	  (p.1)	  whilst	  adhering	  to	  three	  basic	  principles.	  
	  
First,	  industrial	  policy	  is	  a	  state	  of	  mind	  rather	  than	  a	  list	  of	  specific	  policies	  (Rodrik	  2003).	  The	  
importance	  of	  creating	  a	  climate	  of	  collaboration	  between	  government	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  
overrides	   that	  of	  providing	   financial	   incentives.	  Collaboration	  aims	  to	  elicit	   information	  about	  
investment	   opportunities	   and	   bottlenecks.	   To	   these	   ends,	   there	   must	   be	   an	   open	   dialogue	  
structure	  to	  allow	  the	  free	  flow	  of	   information	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  such	  as	  
through	  a	  deliberation	  council	  or	  supplier	  development	  forum.	  This	  requires	  a	  government	  that	  
is	  “embedded”	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  but	  not	  in	  bed	  with	  it.	  	  
	  
Second,	   industrial	   policy	   needs	   to	   rely	   on	   both	   carrots	   and	   sticks.	   Incentives	   to	   spawn	   new	  
industries	  need	  to	  be	  short-­‐lived	  and	  based	  on	  performance.	  Hausmann	  and	  Rodrik	  2002	  show	  
that	  the	  success	  of	  many	  East	  Asian	  countries	  and	  the	  failure	  of	  many	  Latin	  American	  countries	  
to	   achieve	   growth	   through	   import	   substitution	   reform	   maps	   directly	   back	   to	   the	   balance	  
between	   incentives	   and	   competition,	   with	   the	   former	   striking	   the	   right	   combination	   –	   by	  
delivering	  an	  effective	  combination	  of	  carrot	   (incentives	   from	  protection)	  and	  stick	   (discipline	  
from	  foreign	  competition)	  and	  the	  latter	  one	  with	  too	  much	  carrot	  (incentive)	  combined	  with	  
too	   little	   stick	   (discipline). There	   must	   be	   a	   feedback	   mechanism	   and	   a	   monitoring	   council	  
(possibly	   in	   the	   form	   of	   benchmarking	   clubs)	   to	   assess	   the	   performance	   of	   industries	   on	   an	  
ongoing	  basis.	  	  
Third,	   industrial	  policy	  needs	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  transparent	  and	  accountable	  manner,	  and	  its	  
processes	  must	  be	  open	  to	  new	  entrants	  as	  well	  as	  incumbents.	  Transparency	  is	   important	  to	  
minimise	  rent-­‐seeking	  and	  corruption	  but	  also	  to	  ensure	  that	  an	  intervention	  is	  selected	  on	  its	  
ability	  to	  improve	  productivity	  rather	  than	  to	  provide	  life	  support	  for	  unproductive	  sectors	  and	  
firms.	   Rodrik	   2003	   argues	   that	   success	   in	   industrial	   policy	   is	   not	   determined	   by	   the	  
government’s	  ability	  to	  pick	  winners,	  but	  the	  capacity	  to	  let	  the	  losers	  go	  (which	  is	  a	  much	  less	  
demanding	  requirement).	  Uncertainty	  ensures	  that	  even	  optimal	  policies	  will	   lead	  to	  mistakes	  
so	  that	  the	  trick	  is	  for	  governments	  to	  recognize	  those	  mistakes	  and	  withdraw	  support	  before	  














The	   China	   quotas	   cannot	   be	   merited	   on	   their	   conformity	   or	   consistency	   with	   any	   of	   the	  
contemporary	   industrial	   policy	   paradigms	  outlined	  above.	  On	  one	  hand,	   it	   could	  be	   argued	   -­‐	  
with	  a	  lot	  of	  latitude	  -­‐	  that	  the	  China	  quotas	  formulated	  an	  attempt	  by	  government	  to	  engage	  
some	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  Lin’s	  CAF	  paradigm.	  Since	  clothing	  production	  is	  labour-­‐intensive	  but	  
not	  skill-­‐intensive,	  given	  South	  Africa’s	  comparatively	  large	  endowment	  of	  unskilled	  labour,	  one	  
of	   the	   basic	   conditions	   of	   the	   model	   –	   pick	   industries	   that	   are	   consistent	   with	   latent	  
comparative	  advantage	  -­‐	  is	  satisfied.	  What	  is	  more,	  South	  Africa’s	  development	  status	  is	  on	  par	  
with	  Mauritius	  who	   has	   successfully	   developed	   a	   vibrant,	   competitive	   clothing	   industry.	   This	  
satisfies	  a	  second	  condition	  of	  the	  model	  –	  imitate	  neighbouring	  countries	  of	  similar	  per	  capita	  
income	  that	  are	  slightly	  further	  along	  the	  path	  of	  upgrading.	  	  
	  
At	   first	   glance,	   the	   South	   African	   clothing	   industry	   appears	   a	   perfect	   fit	   to	   the	   theoretical	  
mould.	   The	   practical	   application,	   however,	   is	   mired	   with	   pitfalls.	   Firstly,	   the	   comparative	  
advantage	   from	   a	   large	   labour	   endowment	   	   -­‐	   i.e.	   a	   hy othetically	   flexible	   labour	   regime	   -­‐	   is	  
countered	  (and	  largely	  negated)	  by	  the	  institutional	  framework	  that	  governs	  the	  South	  African	  
clothing	   sector.	   The	   unprecedented	   (and	   predatory)	   power	   of	   the	   union	   and	   its	   influence	   in	  
wage	  negotiations	  ensures	   that	  wages	   remain	  at	   rigidly,	  and	  uncompetitively,	  high	   levels	  and	  
that	   working	   hours	   are	   fixed	   (ref	   Previous	   sections).	   Secondly,	   a	   precondition	   for	   a	   globally	  
competitive	  clothing	  industry	  is	  the	  reliable	  supply	  of	  affordable,	  good	  quality	  local	  or	  imported	  
fabric.	   In	   the	   first	   instance,	   the	   lack	   of	   pipeline	   development	   and	   systemic	   efficiency	   in	   the	  
domestic	   value	   chain	   is	   a	  major	   constraint	   on	   competitiveness,	   with	   only	   a	   small	   portion	   of	  
fabric	   production	   geared	   for	   supply	   to	   the	   apparel	   industry	   and	   even	   this,	   often	   not	  
satisfactorily	   to	   requirements.	   This	   compares	   with	   Mauritius	   and	   Lesotho	   who	   have	   both	  
developed	   vertically	   integrated	   value	   chains	   (Morris,	   Staritz	   and	  Barnes	   2011).	   In	   the	   second	  
instance,	   quotas	   on	   imported	   Chinese	   fabric	   not	   only	   placed	   local	   firms	   at	   a	   distinct	  
disadvantage	   relative	   to	   their	   global	   counterparts,	  who	   all	   source	   from	   China,	   but	   created	   a	  
whole	  host	  of	  problems	  of	  their	  own	  (Ref	  previous	  section).	  The	  inconvenient	  (and	  ugly)	  truth	  
for	  the	  South	  African	  textiles	  industry	  is	  unavoidable	  here.	  Within	  this	  paradigm,	  the	  demise	  of	  
the	  South	  African	  textiles	  industry	  in	  the	  post-­‐Apartheid	  era	  was	  inevitable;	  it	  was	  a	  product	  of	  
a	   politically	   charged	   industrialisation	  path,	  where	   the	   criteria	   for	   designing	   industrial	   policies	  













required	  significant	  surreptitious	  state	  subsidies	  to	  survive.	  When	  these	  were	  withdrawn	  post	  
Apartheid,	  the	  South	  African	  textiles	  industry	  systematically	  collapsed.	  	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  whilst	  the	  China	  quotas	  were	  unambiguously	  a	  protectionist	  policy,	  they	  do	  
not	   fit	  Chang’s	   theoretical	  model	  either.	   If	   the	   imposition	  of	  quotas	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  adopt	  
Chang’s	   paradigm	   for	   growth	   -­‐	   to	   shield	   the	   industry	   from	   foreign	   competition	   whilst	   it	  
metamorphosizes	   into	  a	  dynamic	  global	  player	   -­‐	  a	   short-­‐term	  selective	  quota	  was	  a	  dire	  mis-­‐
prescription.	  Chang’s	  paradigm	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  under	  conditions	  of	  limited	  
(foreign)	   competition,	   local	   firms	  will	   undertake	   the	   necessary	   operational	   and	   technological	  
upgrading	   required	   for	  World	   Class	  Manufacturing	   and	   that	   the	   institutional	   framework	   will	  
both	   foster	   and	   reinforce	   this	   transition.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   clothing	   and	   textiles	   sector,	  
industrial	  upgrading	  requires	  simultaneous	  large-­‐scale	  investments	  in	  technologies	  and	  skills	  in	  
both	  upstream	  (manufacturing)	  and	  downstream	  (textiles)	  industries,	  which	  in	  most	  successful	  
East	  Asian	  cases,	  was	  heavily	  or	  in	  the	  case	  of	  China,	  fully	  subsidized	  by	  the	  state.	  Furthermore,	  
the	  “incubation	  period”	   is	  not	  pre-­‐determined	  since	  one	  of	  Chang’s	  pivotal	  arguments	   is	   that	  
the	  time	  that	  it	  may	  take	  for	  an	  industry	  to	  develop	  a	  globally	  competitive	  advantage	  is	  one	  of	  
the	  great	  unknowns	  –	  and	  precisely	  why	  comparative	  advantage	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  a	  measuring	  
stick	   for	   the	   returns	   on	   protectionism.	   The	   China	   quotas	   were	   a	   short-­‐term,	   isolated	  
intervention	  that	  was	  unaccompanied	  by	  any	  effort	  –	  industrial	  policy	  or	  otherwise	  -­‐	  to	  address	  
the	  lack	  of	  pipeline	  development,	  low	  levels	  of	  investment	  and	  lack	  of	  skills	  in	  the	  sector	  or	  to	  
improve	   systemic	   efficiency	   by	   fostering	   collaboration	   between	   clothing	   and	   textiles	  
manufacturers.	   	   Textiles	   firms	  perceived	   the	  quotas	  as	  at	  best,	   a	   temporary	  bridge	   (although	  
they	  were	  quick	   to	   exploit	   the	   price	   advantage	   that	   it	   afforded	   them)	   and	  were	  unwilling	   to	  
commit	  to	  long-­‐term	  restructuring	  of	  their	  output	  plans	  whilst	  clothing	  manufacturers	  suffered	  
rising	  fabric	  prices	  and	  shortages,	  and	  deteriorating	  fabric	  quality	  (Ref	  previous	  section).	  	  
	  
The	  thrust	  of	  the	  argument	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  fundamental	  problem	  with	  the	  China	  quota	  
intervention	   lay	  not	  with	   the	  policy	   tool	   itself	  but	  with	   its	  pedigree	  –	  a	   flawed	  policy	  process	  
and	   “wrong”	   institutional	   setting.	   A	   key	  message	   from	   Rodrik	   and	   Hausmann	   2006	   is	   that	   a	  
second	  best	  policy	  tool	  in	  the	  correct	  policy	  setting	  will	  yield	  more	  optimal	  results	  than	  the	  first	  
best	   policy	   tool	   in	   the	   wrong	   institutional	   setting	   (Rodrik	   2004).	   The	   theoretical	   models	   of	  













useful	   policy	   instrument	   when	   implemented	   in	   the	   correct	   manner.	   In	   response	   to	   a	   study	  
commissioned	   by	   the	   South	   African	   government	   on	   policy	   formulation	   for	   ASGISA,	   Rodrik,	  
Hausmann	   and	   Sabel	   2007	   concluded	   that	   “(…)	   there	   is	   too	   much	   disconnect	   between	  
government	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  such	  that	  information	  flows	  are	  inadequate,	  needs	  are	  not	  
properly	  identified,	  instruments	  are	  not	  appropriately	  targeted	  and	  self-­‐correction	  mechanisms	  
are	  not	  in	  place.”	  (p.	  12).	  A	  recurrent	  theme	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  industrial	  policy	  literature	  is	  the	  
inability	   of	   government	   to	   effectively	   engage	   key	   stakeholders.	   Rodrik,	   Hausmann	   and	   Sabel	  
(2007)	   posit	   that	   the	   acid	   test	   for	   an	   industrial	   policy	   framework	   is	   whether	   there	   exist	  
institutions	   that	   engage	   policy	   officials	   in	   an	   ongoing	   collaboration	   with	   the	   private	   sector;	  
whether	  government	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  respond	  quickly	  and	  selectively	  to	  identified	  economic	  
opportunities	   and	   constraints	   and	   whether	   there	   exist	   effective	   monitoring	   and	   feedback	  
procedures	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  policy	  is	  self	  correcting.	  When	  tested	  against	  these	  criteria,	  the	  
China	  quotas,	  which	  were	  formulated	  without	  consultation	  or	  collaboration	  with	  industry	  (Ref	  














Chapter	  9:	  Conclusion	  	  
	  
The	  evidence	  from	  firms	  suggests	  that	  the	  China	  quotas	  snuffed	  out	  the	  beginnings	  of	  recovery	  
of	   the	   sector	   in	   2006	   in	   response	   to	   the	   global	   economic	   boom	   and	   several	   cluster	   driven	  
initiatives	  that	  were	  beginning	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  productivity	  in	  some	  firms.	  Not	  only	  
did	  the	  quotas	  fail	  dismally	  as	  an	  industrial	  policy,	  they	  did	  not	  meet	  their	  objectives	  even	  on	  
their	  own	  terms.	  My	  empirical	  findings	  show	  that	  quotas	  had	  little	  impact	  on	  employment	  and	  
output.	   In	   the	   short	   run,	   the	   delay	   between	   quota	   announcement	   and	   their	   imposition	  
provided	   retailers	   with	   an	   opportunity	   to	   stockpile	   product	   to	   mitigate	   the	   impact	   of	   the	  
restrictions;	   and	   in	   the	   longer	   run,	   consistent	   with	   the	   US	   experience,	   retailers	   were	  
encouraged	  to	  prematurely	  identify	  alternative	  supply	  bases.	  Macr economic	  trade	  data	  shows	  
that	  whilst	  quotas	  effectively	  curtailed	  Chinese	  clothing	  imports,	  especially	  in	  quota	  categories,	  
local	  firms	  were	  challenged	  by	  competitors	  from	  emergent	  supplier	  locations	  which	  were	  even	  
cheaper	  than	  China.	  This	  had	  a	  deleterious	  effect	  on	  the	  reprieve	  from	  foreign	  competition	  that	  
quotas	   were	   intended	   to	   afford	   the	   local	   industry.	   Quotas	   neither	   prevented	   further	  
haemorrhaging	  of	   the	  employment	  base,	  promoted	   skills	   retention	  nor	  meaningfully	   assisted	  
local	  firms	  to	  upgrade	  and	  improve	  their	  position	  in	  the	  value	  chain.	  	  
	  
On	  the	  contrary,	  quotas	  in	  many	  cases	  frustrated	  already	  tenuous	  supplier-­‐buyer	  relationships	  
with	   many	   local	   manufacturers	   believing	   that	   the	   increase	   in	   the	   use	   of	   local	   suppliers	   by	  
retailers	  was	  at	  best	  merely	  a	  bridge	  until	  the	  quotas	  were	  withdrawn	  and	  supply	  from	  China	  
resumed.	   Given	   rising	   costs	   in	   China,	   this	   robbed	   local	   manufacturers	   of	   a	   window	   of	  
opportunity	  to	  lure	  orders	  back	  to	  the	  domestic	  supply	  base	  before	  alternative	  foreign	  suppliers	  
were	   established.	   According	   to	   one	   firm	   interviewed,	   whereas	   retailers	   previously	   “just	  
imported	   from	   China,	   they	   have	   now	   developed	   a	   whole	   import	   strategy”.	   Furthermore,	  
imports	   from	  even	   lower	  cost	   locations	  than	  China	  exerted	  additional	  downward	  pressure	  on	  
local	   supplier	   prices	   that	   undermined	   their	   bargaining	   position	   relative	   to	   their	   customers,	  













The	   government	   demonstrated	   a	   tunneled	   vision	   perspective	   on	   the	   clothing	   sector	   crisis,	  
bowing	  to	  the	  narrow	  political	  agendas	  of	  sectoral	  interest	  groups.	  This	  is	  despite	  considerable	  
international	  evidence	  that	  import	  restrictions	  would	  not	  be	  the	  silver	  bullet	  that	  would	  boost	  
employment	  and	  revive	  output.	  The	  belief	  that	   low	  cost	  Chinese	   imports	  are	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  
crisis	   reflects	   a	   simplistic	   and	   shallow	   understanding	   of	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   problems	   that	  
engulf	  the	  sector. Not	  only	  does	  discriminate	  trade	  action	  against	  the	  Chinese	  fly	  broadly	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  sustainable	  trade	  relations,	  but	  it	  will	  bear	  no	  fruit	  unless	  domestic	  firms	  are	  able	  to	  take	  
advantage	  of	  the	  opportunities	  that	  are	  created	  by	  protectionist	  policies	  such	  as	  quotas.	  	  
	  
The	  policy	  messages	  from	  this	  thesis	  echo	  some	  of	  those	  of	  other	  studies.	  Imports	  are	  not	  the	  
big	   bad,	   but	   serve	   as	   a	   healthy	   stimulus	   to	   domestic	   competition	   (Morris	   and	   Einhorn	   2008)	  
provided	  local	  firms	  are	  able	  to	  compete	  on	  a	  comparative	  basis	  with	  their	  global	  counterparts.	  
The	  transformation	  that	  has	  occurred	  in	  the	  South	  African	  clothing	  sector	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  
must	   be	   recognized	   and	   captured	   at	   an	   industrial	   policy	   level.	   Rather	   than	   as	   a	   threat,	  
globalisation	   should	   be	   perceived	   as	   an	   opportunity	   to	   upgrade	   the	   sector	   using	   global	  
competitors	   as	   a	   benchmark.	   The	   domestic	   clothing	   market	   is	   diverse	   and	   growing	   but	   the	  
extent	  to	  which	  the	  local	  clothing	  industry	  will	  reap	  the	  rewards	  from	  this	  process	  will	  depend	  
critically	  on	  its	  ability	  to	  utilise	  its	  locational	  advantage	  –	  i.e.	  speed	  and	  flexibility	  –	  to	  meet	  the	  
requirements	  of	  domestic	  retailers	  (Business	  Alliance	  2006).	  	  
	  
In	   this	   new	   era	   of	   globalisation,	   competitiveness	  must	   be	   achieved	   by	   raising	   the	   production	  
capabilities	   of	   individual	   firms	   to	  drive	   costs	   down	   in	   a	   sustainable	   long-­‐term	  manner	   and	  by	  
driving	   these	   efficiencies	   down	   the	   value	   chain	   to	   raise	   the	   systemic	   competitiveness	   of	   the	  
sector.	   China	  derives	   a	  major	   competitive	   advantage	   from	   the	  production	  of	   low	   cost	   inputs.	  
Although	  China’s	  wages	  are	  on	  a	  par	  with	  South	  Africa’s,	  its	  productivity	  is	  much	  higher	  due	  to	  
its	   piecework	   system 106 .	   Furthermore,	   many	   Asian	   countries	   are	   rapidly	   developing	   a	  
comparative	  advantage	   from	  access	   to	  cheap	   fabric	  and	   low	  wages	  and	  may	  present	  an	  even	  
greater	   threat	   to	   the	   local	   industry	   in	   the	   longer	   term.	   Efficiency	   gains	   are	   the	  only	  way	   that	  
local	   firms	   can	   sustainably	   counter	   rising	   fuel	   and	   electricity	   costs	   and	   low	   levels	   of	   labour	  
productivity,	   weighed	   down	   by	   high	   rates	   of	   absenteeism,	   inflexible	  wage	   rates	   and	  working	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













hours.	  This	  requires	  a	  sustained	  initiative	  around	  WCM	  standards	  and	  techniques	  aimed	  at	  both	  
small	  (mainly	  PDI)	  CMTs	  and	  large	  firms	  (Nordas	  2004;	  Business	  Alliance	  2006).	  It	  also	  requires	  
educating	   retail	   buyers	   in	   the	  principles	  of	   best	  practice	   supply	   chain	  development	   to	   ensure	  
that	  competitiveness	  is	  driven	  down	  the	  value	  chain.	  Failure	  to	  upgrade	  would	  leave	  local	  firms	  
to	  compete	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  low	  wages,	  which	  as	  Morris	  and	  Einhorn	  2008	  observe,	  would	  be	  an	  
exercise	  in	  futility	  and	  would	  leave	  the	  South	  African	  market	  vulnerable	  to	  attack	  from	  imports	  
from	  mushrooming	  low	  cost	  Asian	  clothing	  suppliers	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
	  
Meanwhile,	  a	  significant	  barrier	   to	  any	  meaningful	   transformation	   in	  the	  sector	   is	   the	  present	  
constitutional	   structure	   of	   the	  National	   Bargaining	   Council	   –	   i.e.	   COSATU’s	   partnership	   in	   the	  
Tripartite	  Alliance	   -­‐	   that	   allows	   SACTWU	   to	   suck	  up	   resources	   through	   the	   constitutional	   and	  
operating	  provisions	  of	  other	  bodies	  in	  the	  clothing	  sector	  and	  to	  penalise	  non-­‐compliant	  firms.	  
For	   example,	   the	   low	   levels	   of	   training	   in	   the	   industry	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   overall	   skills	  
attrition	   that	   is	   a	   major	   constraint	   on	   competitiveness.	   However,	   access	   to	   critical	   training	  
resources	  is	  being	  withheld	  to	  non-­‐compliant	  firms	  by	  SACTWU’s	  reach	  through	  the	  CTL	  SETA:	  
	  
“In	  present	  industry	  support	  structures	  SMMEs	  are	  starved	  by	  Big	  Business	  and	  SACTWU	  of	  resources	  
and	   training	   desperately	   needed	   to	   improve	   their	   efficiencies	   as	   a	   consequence	  of	   their	  non-­‐
compliance.	   These	   efficiencies	   are	   sorely	  needed	  by	   them	   to	   become	   sustainable	   before	   they	   can	  
afford	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  regulation	  imposed	  on	  them.	  It's	  a	  catch	  22	  situation.	  The	  purpose	  is	  to	  ensure	  
that	  through	  starving	  them	  of	  resources,	  the	  compliance	  managers	  of	  the	  Bargaining	  Council	  and	  the	  
threat	  of	   jail,	   they	  will	   eventually	  be	   forced	   to	   comply.	  The	   fact	   is	   as	  much	  as	   they	  want	   to…	   they	  
have	  no	  means	  to…”	  (Morris	  and	  Reed	  2008c)	  
In	  its	  current	  institutional	  form,	  the	  National	  Bargaining	  council	  does	  not	  serve	  the	  diverse	  and	  
concrete	  needs	  of	   the	   industry.	   It	   is	   generally	   highly	  problematic	   and	   inappropriate	   and	   runs	  
counter	  to	  any	  sound	  industrial	  policy	  to	  use	  one	  separate	  and	  independent	  institution	  to	  solve	  
problems	  encountered	  in	  another.	  If	  the	  National	  Bargaining	  Council	  has	  a	  massive	  problem	  of	  
non-­‐compliance	  (as	  is	  clearly	  reflected	  in	  the	  data),	  then	  it	  should	  solve	  that	  problem	  on	  its	  own	  
and	  within	   its	   own	   parameters.	   This	   is	   all	   the	  more	   so	   given	   the	   critical	   and	   crying	   need	   for	  
assistance	  in	  the	  industry,	  especially	  when	  the	  firms	  being	  penalised	  are	  the	  smaller	  enterprises	  













Depending	  on	  one’s	  perspective,	   the	  China	  quotas	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	   i)	  a	  genuine	  response	  to	  
the	   loss	   of	   67	   000	   jobs	   in	   the	   clothing	   and	   textiles	   industry	   during	   2003	   and	   2006;	   ii)	   a	   true	  
belief	  by	  government	  of	  SACTWU’s	  assurance	  that	  the	  quotas	  would	  increase	  jobs	  by	  60	  000;	  iii)	  
an	  attempt	  by	  SACTWU	  to	  punish	  retailers	  for	  the	  failed	  Section	  77	  Application	  through	  Nedlac;	  
iv)	   a	   strategy	   to	   increase	   SACTWU’s	   power	   to	   reward	   or	   penalize	   manufacturers	   as	   regards	  
other	  challenges	  that	  SACTWU	  was	  facing,	  such	  as	  non	  compliance	  or	  finally,	  v)	  a	  coup	  d’état	  by	  
government	  “to	  cover	  their	  a**es”	  upon	  a	   late	  realisation	  that	  they	  were	  directly	  responsible	  
for	   the	  massive	   job	   losses;	   that	   the	   industry	   had	  not	   been	   crying	  wolf,	   and	   that	   the	   clothing	  
sector	  was	  in	  fact	  teetering	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  crisis107.	  	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  found	  qualitative	  support	  for	  (iii)	  to	  (v);	  government	  had	  both	  neglected	  clothing	  
sector	   firms,	   who	   had	   a	   reputation	   as	   “whingers	   and	   whiners”	   and	   failed	   to	   the	   take	   the	  
enormity	  of	  the	  situation	  on	  board	  or	  were	  benignly	  neglectful	  given	  their	  historically	  fractious	  
relationship	  with	  the	  clothing	  industry.	  When	  the	  climax	  gripped	  the	  industry,	  government	  had	  
to	   take	  hasty	  and	  public	  action	  against	   the	  unemployment	  situation	   to	  avoid	  a	  backlash	   from	  
their	   constituency.	   SACTWU	  shrewdly	   stepped	   in	  and	  exploited	   the	   situation	   to	  gain	   leverage	  
over	   the	   industry.	   From	   an	   industry	   standpoint,	   the	   China	   quotas	   were	   racked	   up	   as	   just	  
another	   industrial	   policy	   initiative,	   along	   with	   a	   host	   of	   others,	   past	   and	   present108,	   which	  
conceptually	   aimed	   to	   improve	  productivity	   and	  employment	   levels	   in	   the	   sector,	   but	  was	   in	  
practice	  hijacked	  by	  SACTWU	  to	  get	  leverage	  over	  the	  industry	  to	  gain	  in	  other	  areas	  where	  it	  
was	  losing	  (Morris	  and	  Reed	  2008b).	  	  
I	  am	  now	  able	  to	  say,	  in	  conclusion,	  that	  the	  China	  quotas	  were	  a	  political	  and	  an	  institutional	  
failure	   in	   respect	   of	   the	   major	   stakeholders.	   The	   DTI	   was	   anti-­‐business	   and	   the	   failure	   of	  
business	  and	  government	  to	  reconcile	  their	  historical	  differences	  blocked	  constructive	  progress	  
towards	  a	  cooperative	  solution.109	  The	  shelving	  of	  the	  CSP	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  drive	  
the	  process	  forward	  without	  union	  backing	  was	  largely	  testimony	  to	  this.	  As	  one	  commentator	  
put	  it:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 These proposals were offered by an industry expert during an interview in 2011.  
108 One example here being the SETA (Morris and Reed 2008b) 













“In	   the	   end	  we	   are	   all	   victims	   of	   the	   past.	  We	   all	   came	   into	   the	   process	  with	   too	  much	  
baggage.	  The	  sheer	  lack	  of	  skills	  in	  the	  DTI	  and	  SARS	  customs,	  the	  failure	  of	  government	  to	  
get	  a	  strategy	  together	  that	  was	  right,	  was	  deterministic	  for	  the	  ultimate	  outcomes	  of	  the	  
quotas.”	  
There	  were	  no	  clear	  winners.	  	  
The	  negative	   impact	  on	  the	  clothing	  industry	  has	  been	  highlighted.	  Output	   levels	  fell;	  margins	  
were	   diminished	   by	   rising	   fabric	   prices;	   and	   poor	   fabric	   availability	   and	   quality	   undermined	  
manufacturing	   firms’	   competitiveness.	   These	   consequences	   were	   amplified	   at	   the	   small	   and	  
medium	  sized	  enterprise	  level	  where	  many	  firms	  simply	  shut	  down.	  Consumers	  lost	  because	  of	  
the	   inflationary	   impact	   of	   the	   quotas	   on	   garment	   prices	   and	   restrictions	   on	   their	   choice	   set.	  
Retailers	  (may	  have)	  lost	  due	  to	  falling	  margins;	  they	  claimed	  that	  they	  had	  absorbed	  the	  bulk	  
of	  the	  price	  increase	  to	  protect	  consumer	  welfare	  (although	  this	  was	  not	  empirically	  validated	  
as	  factual).	  Skills	  were	  drained	  from	  the	  sector	  as	  retailers	  set	  up	  sourcing	  agencies	  abroad.110	  
The	  position	  of	  smaller	   importers	  was	   further	  undermined	  due	  to	   their	   limited	  sway	  with	   the	  
unions	   in	   quota	   concessions	   and	   honest	   retailers	   were	   penalised	   for	   their	   integrity	   as	   the	  
quotas	  encouraged	  dishonest	  ones	   to	  cheat	  more.	  Clothing	  workers	  were	   immiserised	  by	   the	  
quotas,	   which	   spurred	   retrenchments	   and	   firm	   closures	   that	   forced	   workers	   into	  
unemployment.	   The	   legacy	   of	   the	   quotas	   still	   lingers.	   An	   interview	   with	   a	   small	   clothing	  
manufacturer	  who	   recently	   closed	   her	   factory,	   suggests	   that	   competition	   in	   the	   industry	   has	  
intensified	   significantly	   since	   quota	   abolition	   in	   2008.	  With	   China	   back	   in	   play	   alongside	   the	  
newly	  established	  foreign	  supply	  sources,	  South	  African	  firms	  battle	  against	  renewed	  pressure	  
from	  retailers	  to	  lower	  their	  prices:	  	  
“The	  industry	  is	  dog-­‐eat-­‐dog.	  Many	  of	  the	  large	  buyers	  source	  directly	  from	  their	  foreign	  
suppliers.	  They	  all	  have	  their	  own	  agents	  in	  foreign	  countries	  and	  they	  come	  to	  us	  and	  
tell	   us	   that	  we	  must	  make	   something	   for	   R2,	  which	   doesn’t	   even	   cover	   our	   cost.	   The	  
constant	  haggling	  just	  wore	  me	  down…”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 For a retailer to source locally they require a certain support level of skills. Many large retailers have 
achieved this by exporting their expertise. However this implies drawing against a skills pool that is small to 
start with; hence, as one commentator argued, “the business model that you have strategized will get 













Finally,	   in	  respect	  of	  the	  DTI	  and	  SACTWU,	  the	  quotas	  did	  not	  evidently	  drive	  greater	  levels	  of	  
unionization	  since	  formal	  sector	  employment	  did	  not	  rise.	  This	  was	  qualitatively	  confirmed	  by	  a	  
key	  source	  in	  2011:	  “To	  the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge,	  the	  retailers	  did	  not	  deliver	  on	  any	  of	  their	  
commitments,	   and	   SACTWU	   never	   raised	   it	   as	   an	   issue.”	  111.	   However	   incontrovertible	   proof	  
that	  the	  China	  quotas	  failed	  hands	  down	  to	  deliver	  on	  the	  union’s	  and	  the	  DTI’s	  expectations	  in	  
respect	  of	  employment	  came	   in	  October	  2011	  when	  SACTWU	  capitulated	  and	  agreed	   to	  30%	  
wage	  cuts	  for	  entry	  level	  employees	  (Phakathi	  2011).	  The	  deal	  was	  hailed	  as	  groundbreaking;	  a	  
platform	  for	  other	  South	  African	  sectors	  to	  emulate.	  It	  begs	  question	  as	  to	  why	  the	  industry	  had	  
to	  be	  put	  through	  the	  China	  quota	  wringer	  before	  SACTWU	  saw	  the	  light.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111  Information on non-compliance showed that high levels of non-compliance also trend persisted. 
According to an industry consultant, in 2008 43.6% in the Western Cape and 78.3% of firms in KZN were 
non-compliant. In KZN most non-compliance was minimum wage violations whereas in the Western Cape it 
was non-payment of bargaining council levies. This was established via telephonic interview with Leon 
















Sample	  of	  questionnaire	  for	  2007	  fieldwork	  
	  
1. What	  is	  your	  market	  orientation?	  
	  
2. What	  is	  the	  size	  of	  your	  labour	  force?	  How	  may	  machinists,	  cutters,	  patternmakers,	  
designers	  do	  you	  have?	  
	  
3. Has	  your	  workforce	  profile	  changed	  since	  2006?	  Where	  were	  the	  biggest	  cuts?	  
	  
4. Are	  you	  currently	  short	  of	  machinists?	  	  
	  
5. Have	  you	  encountered	  problems	  with	  recruitment	  of	  machinists?	  How	  many	  machinists	  
did	  you	  employ	  in	  the	  past	  year?	  
	  
6. How	  do	  you	  recruit	  new	  production	  staff?	  
	  
7. How	  long	  does	  it	  take	  to	  fill	  a	  vacant	  machinist	  position?	  And	  other	  production	  staff?	  
	  
8. What	  are	  the	  greatest	  obstacles	  to	  filling	  positions?	  What	  is	  your	  rate	  of	  absenteeism?	  
What	  is	  your	  labour	  turnover?	  
	  
9. How	  do	  you	  fill	  senior	  management	  positions;	  through	  recruitment	  or	  internal	  
promotion	  of	  existing	  staff?	  
	  
10. Why	  do	  you	  think	  there	  is	  a	  shortage	  of	  skills?	  
	  
11. Do	  you	  train	  staff	  internally?	  Do	  you	  use	  the	  SETA	  funding	  mechanism	  to	  fund	  training?	  	  
	  
12. Does	  the	  Bargaining	  Council/Industrial	  Council/SETA	  assist	  with	  recruitment	  in	  any	  way,	  
shape	  or	  form?	  
	  
13. Does	  any	  institution	  assist	  with	  technical	  training?	  
	  
14. How	  many	  learnerships	  do	  you	  have?	  How	  many	  people	  have	  you	  trained	  through	  the	  
SETA	  in	  the	  past	  twelve	  months?	  What	  proportion	  of	  training	  comes	  from	  the	  SETA	  and	  
what	  proportion	  from	  yourselves?	  
	  
15. What	  percentage	  of	  those	  who	  complete	  the	  learnerships	  are	  placed?	  
	  















17. Would	  a	  piecework	  system	  make	  you	  better	  off?	  
	  
18. How	  important	  has	  the	  rise	  of	  CMTs	  been?	  
	  
19. What	  have	  been	  the	  greatest	  constraints	  on	  your	  growth?	  
	  
20. How	  have	  the	  China	  quotas	  impacted	  on	  your	  business?	  Has	  your	  employment/output	  
increased/decreased	  since	  quotas	  were	  implemented?	  
	  
21. What	  are	  your	  projections	  for	  output	  in	  the	  next	  twelve	  months?	  
	  
22. Do	  you	  plan	  to	  increase/decrease	  the	  number	  of	  production	  staff	  in	  the	  next	  twelve	  
months?	  
	  
23. Did	  your	  suppliers	  increase	  their	  prices	  off	  the	  back	  of	  the	  quotas?	  
	  
24. Have	  the	  quotas	  impacted	  on	  the	  availability	  and	  quality	  of	  local	  fabric?	  Does	  local	  
fabric	  match	  up	  to	  fabric	  from	  China?	  Have	  local	  textiles	  firms	  been	  able	  to	  take	  up	  the	  
slack?	  
	  
25. How	  have	  your	  sourcing	  practices	  for	  fabric	  changed	  in	  response	  to	  the	  quotas?	  
	  
26. Is	  there	  any	  evidence	  that	  quotas	  are	  driving	  firms	  up	  or	  down	  the	  value	  chain?	  Have	  
you	  changed	  your	  output	  mix	  in	  the	  past	  six	  months?	  
	  
27. Are	  you	  getting	  more	  or	  less	  orders	  since	  the	  quotas	  began?	  
	  
28. Have	  you	  applied	  for	  additional	  quota?	  And	  if	  so,	  was	  it	  conditional?	  
	  
29. Have	  the	  clusters	  provided	  you	  with	  assistance	  in	  upgrading	  your	  capabilities?	  
	  
















Sample	  of	  questionnaire	  for	  2008	  survey	  of	  32	  clothing	  manufacturers	  
	  
1. Have	  you	  been	  adversely	  affected	  by	  the	  quota	  on	  fabric	  
• Yes	  ………………….	  
• No	  …………………..	  
	  
If	  yes,	  would	  you	  regard	  the	  adverse	  effect	  as	  
• Serious	  negative	  impact	  ……………………….	  
• Negative	  but	  manageable	  …………………….	  
	  
2. Do	  you	  think	  quotas	  have	  resulted	  in	  local	  fabric	  prices	  increasing	  excessively?	  
• Yes	  …………………	  
• No…………………..	  
	  
3. Following	  the	  introduction	  of	  quotas	  in	  2007	  are	  you	  producing	  	  
• More	  garments	  ………………..…..	  
• Less	  garments	  ……………………….	  
• Same	  garments	  …………………….	  
	  
4. Since	  the	  implementation	  of	  quotas,	  have	  your	  margins	  
Grown Maintained Dropped 
Major 
 Minor  No change  Major  Minor  
	  
5. Have	  you	  changed	  your	  product	  mix	  due	  to	  quotas?	  
• Yes	  ……………………	  
• No	  …………………….	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  If	  yes,	  has	  your	  product	  mix	  become	  
• More	  complex	  ………………………....	  
• High	  value	  added	  ……………………..	  
• Less	  complex	  ……………………………	  
• Low	  value	  added	  ………………………	  
	  
6. Have	  quotas	  provided	  relief	  from	  imported	  competition?	  
On	  a	  scale	  of	  1-­‐10	  (with	  1	  =	  lowest	  and	  10	  highest)	  ……….	  
	  
7. When	  quota	  restrictions	  expire	  end	  2008,	  do	  you	  anticipate	  your	  order	  book	  will	  
• Grow	  ………………………………..	  
• No	  change	  ………………………..	  
• Reduce	  (minor)	  ………………...	  
















8. How	  have	  the	  quotas	  affected	  your	  relationship	  with	  your	  customers?	  
• Positively	  ………………………..	  
• Negatively	  ………………………	  
• No	  Change	  ……………………..	  
	  
Can	  you	  briefly	  describe	  the	  change?	  
	  
9. Have	  you	  had	  difficulty	  recruiting	  new	  machinists	  or	  skilled	  production	  staff	  in	  the	  
last	  year?	  
• No	  ………………………..	  
• Yes	  ……………………….	  (Please	  indicate	  the	  average	  recruitment	  lead	  time)	  	  
	  





Name	  of	  Company	  ……………………………………………………………………………………………	  
	  
	  
List	  participants	  in	  survey	  
	  
Alley	  Cat	   	   	   	   	   Thousand	  Hills	  Clothing	  
Levi	  Strauss	  and	  Co	  (SA)(PTY)	  	   	   Balsch	  knitwear	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  
Johnson	  Sportswear	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  	   	   TGFM	  
Bernadotte	  (Pty)	  Ltd	   	   	   	   Tern	  Sportswear	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  
The	  New	  Clothing	  Company	   	   	   Blue	  Jeans	  Traders	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  
Sock	  It	  Manufacturing	  (Pty)	  Ltd	   	   House	  of	  Monatic	  
Big	  Bay	  Trading	  CC	   	   	   	   Monviso	  
Genelli	  Clothing	   	   	   	   Ellen	  Arthur	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  
Pep	  Clothing	   	   	   	   	   Ninian	  and	  Leicester	  
Elle	  Boutique	   	   	   	   	   Kingsgate	  Clothing	  Group	  
Cape	  Underwear	  Manufacturers	   	   Soskolne	  Clothing	  Enterprises	  
Pals	  Clothing	  (Pty)	  Ltd	  	   	   	   Bibette	  Clothing	  Manufacturers	  
Capestorm	   	   	   	   	   DB	  Apparel	  (Playtex)	  
Davinscot	  Group	   	   	   	   Allwear	  
Bonwit	  	   	   	   	   	   SA	  Clothing	  



















Sample	  of	  questionnaire	  for	  survey	  of	  small	  clothing	  manufacturers	  
	  
Please	  note	  that	  full	  assurance	  is	  given	  regarding	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  all	  information	  volunteered	  and	  
participants	  will	  remain	  anonymous	  at	  their	  request.	  
	  










































Migration	  out	  of	  clothing	  sector	  
	  
Aging	   workforce	   with	   no	   new	  
skills	  influx	  
	  
Switch	  to	  informal	  self	  employment	  
	  
	  
5. Do	  you	  use	  imported	  and/or	  locally	  produced	  fabric?	  Please	  indicate	  the	  %	  local	  and	  imported	  fabric	  use	  




































Shortages	   in	   the	   supply	   of	   locally	  
produced	  equivalent	  fabric	  	  
	  
Non-­‐availability	   of	   these	   fabrics	   in	  




8. 	  In	  response	  to	  quotas	  on	  fabric	  imports	  from	  China,	  did	  you:	  
Switch	  to	  sourcing	  fabric	  locally?	  
	  




If	  the	  latter,	  please	  indicate	  which	  country/ies……………………..	  
	  






9. What	  happened	  to	  fabric	  prices	  between	  2006	  and	  2008	  and	  what	  was	  the	  average	  price	  change	  was	  for:	  
	  




What	  reasons,	  if	  any,	  did	  your	  suppliers	  give	  for	  the	  change?……………………………………………………………..	  
	  




What	  reasons,	  if	  any,	  did	  your	  suppliers	  give	  for	  the	  change……………………………………………………………..	  
	  




Please	   quantify	   the	   percentage	   change	   in	   total	   number	   of	   units	   ordered	   from	   you	   and	   in	   turnover	  	  	  	  
between	  the	  periods	  (Note	  actual	  figures	  are	  not	  required,	  just	  percentages).	  
	  
	  
Units	   Turnover	  
Jan	  2006	  -­‐	  Jan	  2007	  
	   	  
Jan	  2007–	  Jan	  2008	  
	   	  
Jan	  2008–	  Jan	  2009	  
	   	  
	  
11. Since	  quota	  withdrawal,	  with	  respect	  to	  your	  supply	  to	  the	  South	  African	  market,	  have	  margins:	  	  
	  
















	  If	  yes,	  did	  your	  garment	  output	  mix	  move	  to:	  
Increase	  
	  














Did	  you	  change	  your	  output	  mix	  due	  to	  the	  restrictions	  ie	  produce	  more	  





















High	  value	  added	  	  
	  












14. Did	  the	  quotas	  provide	  relief	  from	  import	  competition?	  	  
Scale	  1-­‐10	  	  (1=lowest;10=highest)	  	  	  ……....	  
	  
15. Between	  2006	  and	  2009,	  did	  your	  supply	  base	  (please	  circle)	  
	  
Grow	   No	  change	   Reduce	  (minor)	   Reduce	  (major)	  
	  
16. If	   you	   found	   that	   demand	   for	   your	   output	   fell	   between	  2006	   and	  2009,	   please	   rank	   in	   importance	   the	  
following	  reasons	  for	  this	  change:	  
	  
Competition	  from	  imported	  garments	  	  
	  
Competition	  from	  other	  locally	  produced	  garments	  
	  
A	  fall	  in	  consumer	  demand	  for	  clothing	  generally	  
	  
A	  fall	  in	  demand	  in	  your	  particular	  market	  segment	  
	  
	  
	   Other	  (please	  specify)	  ……………………………………..………………………………………………………………………………………….	  
	  
17. How	   did	   the	   average	   shelf	   price	   (RSP)	   of	   your	   garments	   change	   between:	   (you	   need	   only	   to	   indicate	  
movements	  in	  %	  terms	  not	  actual	  figures)	  
	  
	  
Increase	   Decrease	   No	  change	  
Jan	  2006	  -­‐	  Jan	  2007	  
	   	   	  
Jan	  2007–	  Jan	  2008	  
	   	   	  
Jan	  2008	  –	  Jan	  2009	  
	   	   	  
	  
18. How	  did	  your	  margins	  change	  between:	  (again	  in	  %	  terms	  only)	  	  
	  
Increase	   Decrease	   No	  change	  
Jan	  2006	  -­‐	  Jan	  2007	  
	   	   	  
Jan	  2007	  –	  Jan	  2008	  
	   	   	  
Jan	  2008	  –	  Jan	  2009	  
	   	   	  
	  
19. Many	   small	  manufacturers	   argue	   that	   their	   buyers	   put	   a	   considerable	   amount	   of	   pressure	   on	   them	   to	  













unwilling	   to	   compromise	   their	   own	  margins.	   As	   a	   result,	   manufacturers	   are	   forced	   to	   deliver	   a	   lower	  




20. The	   China	   quotas	   were	   intended	   to	   help	   small	   manufacturers	   to	   boost	   their	   output	   and	   raise	   overall	  













21. Do	  you	  know	  of	  any	  firms	  that	  went	  out	  of	  business	  over	  the	  past	  five	  years	  and	  if	  so,	  how	  many?	  ………….	  
	  
22. What	   role	   do	   you	   believe	   that	   government	   can	   play	   in	   assisting	   small	   clothing	   manufacturers	   in	   the	  













If	  yes,	  to	  which	  country/ies?	  ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...	  
And	  roughly	  what	  percentage	  of	  production?	  	  …………………………..	  
If	  no,	  please	  motivate	  …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….	  
	  









Romeo	  and	  Juliet	  
Texcetra	  
Jack	  and	  Gill	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